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PREFACE
On January 11, 1923, French and Belgian engineers and 
officials, accompanied by one French cavalry and two infan­
try divisions, as well as a Belgian detachment, entered the 
Ruhr district, industrial heartland of Germany. The previ­
ous day the French government had informed the German gov­
ernment and the Ruhr population that a Mission of Control 
was to supervise German resources and insure execution of 
the reparations clauses of the Treaty of Versailles. France 
and Belgium, requesting German cooperation in the endeavor, 
justified their action by reference to the Reparation Com­
mission's December 26, 1922, and January 9, 1923, declara­
tions of German default in the delivery of reparations 
timber and coal. The German government, however, forbade 
the Ruhr populace to assist the invaders, and Germany began 
a massive program of passive resistance, which, in turn, 
resulted in an extension of the occupation zone and a rigid 
military operation. Upon Germany the economic impact of the 
struggle was disastrous; after inflation reached unprece­
dented levels, Gustav Stresemann, the new Chancellor, on 
September 26 issued a decree ending passive resistance. 
Germany's economy lay shattered. The occupation had also
iii
Iind a detrimental financial effect upon France and Belgium, 
which received less German coal and coke in 1923 than in 
1922. Furthermore, the occupation had unfortunate politi­
cal repercussions for France because it had, in engaging in 
a military occupation of the Ruhr, acted in defiance of 
official British opinion and thereby antagonized the Brit­
ish government. After the Ruhr experience, France would 
not pursue an independent foreign policy in the face of 
British opposition, and in the 1930's this French deference 
to British leadership was to produce cataclysmic conse­
quences for the people of Europe.
Since the Ruhr occupation has been termed a turning 
point in inter-war Anglo-French diplomacy, a detailed exam­
ination of relations between the two countries during the 
crucial period of January 1 to September 26, 1923, is of 
value. Many points need to be considered and questions an­
swered. First, the Ruhr occupation must be placed in his­
torical perspective by determining how closely the French 
and British governments cooperated in making and enforcing 
the Treaty of Versailles, over what basic issues they dis­
agreed, and what combination of events in the 1919-1922 
period led the French government to take independent action 
against Germany. Then France's motives for occupying the 
Ruhr must be examined. Once the occupation was in progress, 
did the British government encourage Germany to pursue pas­
sive resistance or did it attempt to make the occupation
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difficult for France and thus encourage it to evacuate the 
Ruhr? Finally, what was the effect of the occupation on 
the issues of reparations and security, and why did it mark 
the end of an independent French foreign policy?
As the fiftieth anniversary of the Ruhr occupation 
approaches, the historian can point to myriad articles and 
books which mention the occupation. Almost all of the works, 
however, were written either during the period of the occu­
pation or within ten years after the evacuation of the Ruhr, 
and most of them are polemical and nationalistic.
Recently, two books and two dissertations have ap­
peared which consider some aspect of the Ruhr struggle.
Eric Roman's "The Ruhrkampf in History" (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation. New York University, 1965) ,  is a general sur­
vey of the occupation through September, 1923» Focusing 
upon no particular aspect, it is based almost exclusively 
on secondary sources and is poorly written. Roman's brief 
discussion of Anglo-French relations is drawn entirely from 
previously-printed materials, and to him France is an impe­
rialistic aggressor. Very similar to Roman's work in many 
ways is Royal J. Schmidt, Versailles and the Ruhr : Seedbed
of World War II (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, I968). It,
too, is badly written, lacks unity, and is based almost en­
tirely upon secondary works. Schmidt's approach was also 
basically anti-French and his study of British policy su­
perficial. Neither of the two authors utilized the three
French Documents diplomatiques volumes published in 1923. 
Alfred Emile Cornebise's "Some Aspects of the German Re­
sponse to the Ruhr Occupation, January-September, 1923" 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Car­
olina , 1965)1 though a work of fine quality, deals prima­
rily with internal German affairs and mentions Anglo-French 
diplomacy only peripherally. The excellent work by Jean- 
Claude Pavez, lÆ Reich devant 1'occupation franco-belge de 
la Ruhr en 192J3 (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1969)1 is, like
that of Cornebise, based upon German documents. It also 
focuses almost exclusively upon domestic events in Germany 
during the occupation period.
No French or English book or article located in this 
study considers in detail Anglo-French diplomacy during the 
Ruhr occupation. Although a portion of Arnold J. Toynbee, 
Survey of International Affairs, 1924 (London: Oxford Uni­
versity Press, 1928) does discuss the May 2 to August 20, 
19231 segment of events, the work is based almost entirely 
upon the few documents published in that year by the French, 
Belgian, and British governments. No published work on the 
Ruhr venture is based upon the Anglo-French diplomatic cor­
respondence contained in the Public Record Office in London. 
These records are vital to any study of the Ruhr in Anglo- 
French diplomacy, for the small collection or documents 
published by Britain and France in 1923 covers only the pe­
riod after May 2, 1923. Thus the correspondence exchanged
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between Britain and France during the critical first four 
months of the occupation has not been utilized in earlier 
works dealing with the Ruhr. This manuscript deals exten­
sively with those indispensable documents.
The labors, thoughtfulness, and concern of many peo­
ple have enabled me to complete the course of graduate study 
at the University of Oklahoma and the preparation of this 
manuscript. Although I now express sincere gratitude to all 
of them, I feel that there are several persons to whom I am 
especially indebted.
Three members of my committee have closely supervised 
the preparation of this work and have given much valuable 
and constructive criticism; for this assistance I thank Pro­
fessors Robert A. Nye, Gordon D, Drummond, and William H, 
Maehl, Jr. An extra word of appreciation must, however, be 
given to Professor Gordon D. Drummond, who gave most un­
selfishly of his own time in order to aid me in meeting cru­
cial deadlines and without whose aid completion of the man­
uscript would have been delayed. To Mrs. Marjorie Bradley, 
Assistant to the Dean, Graduate College, The University of 
Oklahoma, I am grateful for constant encouragement, advice, 
and numerous acts of kindness freely given since my arrival 
on this campus in September, I966.
Several people who made significant contributions 
during the course of my research in Europe in 1971 deserve
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special mention. R. R. Mellor, N.B.E., Records Branch, 
Library and Records Department, Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office, London, made available ten indispensable volumes of 
Foreign Office Correspondence which had been removed from 
the Public Record Office. During the time I was researching 
in his office, he not only showed much interest in my work, 
but also provided a pleasant place to work and led me to 
other valuable material. The staff of the Bibliothèque de 
Documentation Internationale Contemporaine, Université de 
Paris, Nanterre, was extremely cooperative and provided ex­
cellent typing facilities which greatly accelerated the pace 
of research in their fine collection. To Mademoiselle 
Suzanne Guyotat of that staff I am especially grateful, 
for after introducing me to the Library she served as trans­
lator when I needed one, showed concern about my progress, 
and at times extended hospitality after work hours ended. 
From the day of my arrival in England, my new friend, 
Patricia A. Gajda, Garfield Heights, Ohio, gave most help­
ful hints about researching in the Public Record Office and 
other facilities in London, as well as an introduction to 
the city itself, and she has also answered many questions 
during the course of the writing of this dissertation.
While I am Indebted to numerous relatives, friends, 
and colleagues, several of them merit individual recogni­
tion. My family has throughout given encouragement and ma­
terial support, as well as understanding ; for this I am
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deeply thankful. Especially during my first year in Norman, 
Jerold A. and Josephine Wilke were a source of encouragement 
and aid, and all during my stay at the University I looked 
forward to Saturday evenings in their home. In addition, I 
must express appreciation to Jo for helping me proofread 
this manuscript. To Edwin A. and Beverly Graeter, of Wies­
baden, Germany, I am extremely grateful for giving both as­
sistance and inspiration during the period of my research in 
Europe; furthermore, to my dear friend Beverly I am particu­
larly indebted for constant concern, interest in my prog­
ress,- and priceless moral support— even at the times 1 failed 
and became most discouraged. Edwin D. and Lenore Piekarsky, 
David and Daniel, deserve much credit for completion of this 
degree. During my last two years in Norman they allowed me 
to become a part of their family each Wednesday evening, as 
well as on many other occasions, and at every crucial stage 
of my academic career at the University they have been a 
source of strength and have most graciously made their home 
mine for extended periods of time. To my dear friend Lenore 
I will always be grateful for typing this manuscript in her 
usual meticulous, conscientious fashion and completely re­
lieving me of all concern about the quality of its appear­
ance, but especially for accomplishing the task in such a 
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THE RUHR IN ANGLO-FRENCH DIPLOMACY: FROM THE BEGINNING
OF THE OCCUPATION UNTIL THE END OF PASSIVE RESISTANCE
CHAPTER I
THE ROAD TO THE RUHR: ANGLO-FRENCH DIPLOMACY FROM l8?l
TO THE CLOSE OF THE PARIS CONFERENCE, JANUARY 4, 1923
As 1923 opened, France, feeling deserted by Britain 
and threatened by Germany's resentment toward the Versailles 
Treaty and failure to execute its Treaty obligations, occu­
pied the Ruhr district in an effort to attain both repara­
tions and security. The British government criticized the 
occupation, for it believed that the French policy of coer­
cion would retard Germany's economic recovery and disrupt 
trade, as well as stimulate German nationalism. After 
Franco-Belgian troops entered the Ruhr, many British poli­
ticians and newspapers angrily declared that the Entente 
no longer existed and called for a severing of all ties 
with France. Because, however, the Bonar Law and Baldwin 
governments believed in the necessity of maintaining the 
Entente, they failed to exercise pressure to compel Prenne 
to withdraw from the newly occupied territory; in fact, 
they indirectly aided the French government and enabled it
1
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to pursue the occupation. Even though Britain had acqui­
esced and had assisted France, animosity between the two 
countries was more intense at the close of 1923 than it 
had been since the Fashoda crisis in I898.
The primary source of Anglo-French antagonism was 
the question of how to deal with Germany— the nation which 
had played such a vital role in strengthening the ties be­
tween Britain and France early in the twentieth century.
The respective British and French attitudes toward the 
German problem reflect certain basic characteristics of 
the foreign policy of the two nations both before 1914 and 
after I918. A desire for security, and at times for re­
venge, against an increasingly powerful Germany had been 
the most consistent theme of French foreign policy since 
the Franco-Prussian War. During the same period, British 
policy was marked by both isolationism and an interest in 
maintaining a European balance of power--goals which at 
times conflicted. During most of the last three decades of 
the nineteenth century the balance of power had operated 
without British intervention, for Russia, France, Germany, 
and Austria-Hungary checked each other, but this situation 
began to change at the turn of the century. Believing that 
the Germany of William II threatened the balance of power 
and feeling its Empire threatened by the growing naval 
strength of other world powers, Britain, aided by the real- 
politik of French leaders such as Théophile Delcassé and
3
I’nul Cambon, settled its outstanding colonial differences 
with France in 1904.^ After observing continued German in­
transigence and thirst for power, as reflected in the first 
Moroccan crisis and the passage of several naval laws, Brit­
ain also made a colonial settlement with France's ally, 
Russia. During the years from 190? until the outbreak of 
World War 1, Anglo-French ties remained strong, and after 
the assassination at Sarajevo they cooperated closely to de­
feat the power whose threat had helped bring them together. 
At the close of the war, however, Britain faced a dilemma : 
while it wanted to withdraw from an active role in Conti­
nental politics it also wanted to rebuild Germany as a 
counterweight to the militarily powerful, yet insecure 
France. This traditional two-fold British aim was to cause 
much friction with the neighbor across the Channel,
Relations between France and Britain had become 
strained even before Germany formally capitulated, with the 
first overt contention coming between October 25 and Novem­
ber 11, 1918, as Allied commanders met to discuss the terms 
of the armistice requested by Germany. When Marshal Ferdi­
nand Foch met with Generals Henri-Philippe Petain, John J.
A. J. P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 
1848-1918 (London: Oxford University Press, 1 9 5 Ü » pp. 2ol-
2851 413-417 » 427-428; George Monger, The End of Isolation: 
British Foreign Policy, 1900-1917 (London: Thomas Nelson
and Sons, LtdT, 19^3)1 PP* 2-10; Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., 
The Politics of Grand Strategy: Britain and France Prepare
for War, 1904-1914 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard Uni­
versity Press , 1969)» pp. 13-17, 21, 27-28.
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Pershing, Douglas Haig, and Armando Diaz at Senlis on Octo­
ber 25, Petain and Haig very quickly disagreed over armis­
tice terms, and in this disagreement lay the seeds of five 
years of Anglo-French friction. On all except one of the 
issues dividing the French and British commanders, the 
French advocated more harsh treatment of Germany than did 
their Allies; they wanted the victors to disarm German 
troops almost completely, to occupy both the left bank of 
the Rhine and a zone fifty kilometers wide on the right 
bank, and to mention reparations in the armistice terms. 
Although the British opposed all of these demands, they 
were more severe than the French about the disposition of 
the German fleet. While the armistice terms presented to
the German representatives on November 8 , I918, followed
2French desires more closely than British, the victory 
could be considered Pyrrhic, for the absence of agreement 
concerning the terms indicated that France and England 
might follow divergent paths in the post-war world.
Soon after the Paris Peace Conference opened on Jan­
uary 18, 19191 the basic Anglo-French differences foreshad­
owed during the armistice negotiations began to delay the 
completion of a treaty with Germany. The French Premier, 
Georges Clemenceau, presented his views on the points vital
2Arthur H. Furnia, The Diplomacy of Appeasement; 
Anglo-French Relations and the Prelude to World War II, 
I93I-I938 (Washington^ The University of Washington 
Press, i960), pp. 1-3.
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to his nation: the future of the Saar Basin and of the
Rhineland, as well as the question of reparations. On 
each he encountered Anglo-American opposition. In reality, 
the primary interests of France centered around security 
and reparations, and it sought to attain the first of these 
through re-drawing its eastern boundaries. The Saar Basin, 
rich in coal resources, had belonged to France from 1793 to 
1815, and Clemenceau, President Raymond Poincare, and French 
parliamentary leaders called for the re-annexation of that 
section of the Saarland which had belonged to France in 
l8l4, along with international control of the mining dis­
trict north of the former French section and French owner­
ship of the mines in both sections. Although Prime Minister 
David Lloyd George rejected the annexation proposal, he was 
willing to discuss the other two items, and a compromise 
eventually settled the dispute: the Saar was to be governed
by a League of Nations Commission for fifteen years, and 
then a plebiscite was to be held; in compensation for the
coal mines of northeastern France destroyed by Germany,
3France received the coal mines of the Saar.
Clemenceau likewise encountered American and British 
opposition to the two basic solutions proposed by various 
French leaders for the future of the Rhineland. Supported
^J. Hampden Jackson, Clemenceau and the Third Repub- 
lie (New York: Collier Books, I962),^pp. 140, 144; Jacques
Chastenet, Histoire de la Troisième République, Vol. V:
Les années d'illusions, 1918-1931 (Paris; Librairie 
Hachette, I960), pp. 35, 371 39»
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by Poincare, Foch advocated that all the left bank terri­
tory be separated from Germany and, preferably, given out­
right to France; if this goal could not be attained, France 
would accept a separate Rhenish state detached from Germany 
and occupied by French or inter-Allied troops. Several ob­
jectives were involved in the French concern with the Rhine­
land. While some French nationalists, using various his­
toric and economic arguments, wanted a detached Rhineland 
that would eventually become an integral part of France, 
the question of security lay at the heart of the demands 
of most Frenchmen: France wanted the Rhine for protection
from its enemy, Germany. Moreover, a Rhineland under French 
or inter-Allied control would have further strategic value 
in that it would enable France and its allies to protect the 
new states of central and southeastern Europe. Since a 
Germany in possession of the Rhine could attack and defeat 
Czechoslovakia and Poland before France or Britain could 
come to their aid, it must not control the Rhine.
President Woodrow Wilson and Lloyd George opposed 
even Clemenceau*s plan for an autonomous Rhineland, saying 
that the proposal smacked too much of outright annexation 
of an area that was German in language, economy, and cul­
ture. On March l4, Lloyd George and Wilson told the French 
Premier that if France would renounce the permanent occupa­
tion and separation of the Rhineland, the United States and 
England would guarantee it against unprovoked German
7
aggression. Although Clemenceau, an admirer of Anglo-Saxon 
democracies, was pleased, Poincare, feeling that promises 
were worth less than sureties, failed to share his elation, 
and Foch, who did not abandon his position, stated on 
March 31 that if France did not hold the Rhine permanently, 
nothing could stop Germany from inflicting complete defeat 
upon it. After a five-week stalemate, Clemenceau again 
compromised and withdrew his demand for separation. He 
accepted joint Allied occupation of the Rhineland for a 
fifteen year period, but he did so only after his colleagues 
agreed to add an important qualification which was written 
into Article 429 of the Treaty, which stated that if Germany 
failed to keep its Treaty engagements the period might be 
extended or the occupation renewed. Thus Clemenceau ex­
changed French demands for a Rhine frontier for the Anglo- 
American guarantee treaties, the fifteen-year joint occu­
pation of the left bank of the Rhine, and the permanent
demilitarization of both the left bank and a fifty kilo-
ameter strip of the right bank.
Neither Foch nor Poincare ever forgave the Premier 
for the capitulation or appreciated the agony of choice 
involved. Clemenceau felt the necessity of compromising 
on the Rhineland and Saar questions because he realized
Ernst Fraenkl, Military Occupation and the Rule of 
Law: Occupation Government in the Rhineland, 1918-1923
(London: Oxford University Press , 19^4), ç. 6 ; Jackson,
Clemenceau, pp. l4l-l42; Chastenet, Troisième République, 
V, 35-37.
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that France had not won the war alone. Since he believed 
that France could hold Germany in check only with the as­
sistance of the Allies and that the continued existence of 
the Entente Cordiale was more important than a French 
Rhineland, he chose to give up the territorial benefits 
of victory in order to avoid diplomatic isolation. Once 
the choice had been made, even Poincare was to be unable
5to retract it.
The friction between Britain and France foreshadowed 
in pre-armistice disagreements and divergent viewpoints 
during the peace negotiations soon came to the surface, and 
a major cause of the difficulty was the British failure to 
understand the French feeling of insecurity; in fact, in 
the three or four years after 1919» the British became con­
vinced that the French aspired to European hegemony. Vis­
count D'Abernon, British Ambassador in Berlin, was typical 
of those who believed that France, supported by its large 
army and system of alliances in eastern and central Europe, 
sought to be supreme on the Continent, Having acted to re­
establish the balance of power by helping defeat the German 
bid to control Europe, Britain did not want France to assume 
that position.^ As several French historians have revealed.
Arnold Wolfers, Britain and France Between Two Wars : 
Conflicting Strategies of Peace Since Versailles (New York; 
Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1940), p. 16; David Thomson, 
Democracy in France Since l8?0 (4th ed.; New York: Oxford
University Press, 1964), p. 203.
^Viscount D'Abernon, An Ambassador of Peace. Pages 
from the Diary of Viscount D'Abernon (Berlin, 1920-1926),
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French leaders realized that Britain feared their hegemony, 
and this awareness increased tension between the two na­
tions. Paul Cambon, long-time French Ambassador to England, 
aptly characterized the British outlook when he remarked to 
his successor, Comte Auguste de Saint-Aulaire, "The misfor­
tune . . .  is that the English do not yet know that Napoleon 
is dead." Frenchmen resented the charges of militarism, 
imperialism, and thirst for power that assailed them when 
they clung to the protection given by the Treaty of 
Versailles
Instead of striving for hegemony, France, which had 
the spirit of a martyr rather than a victor, had entered a 
pacific period of its history, and the French peasants and 
masses wanted only peace. Britain, nevertheless, listening 
to the extreme French nationalists, failed to perceive this 
and to understand that France maintained a big military 
machine out of nervousness rather than a desire to dominate. 
Although few observers realized it, French power had been 
declining in the pre-war years, and the war, which appeared
Vol. II: The Years of Crisis: June 1922-December 1923
(London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1929), p. 22; Pierre Renouvin,
Histoire des relations internationales. Vol. VII: Les
crises du XXe siecle, I. De 19l4 a 1929 (Paris; Librairie 
Hachette, Ï957)i P» 237; Bertrand de Jouvenel, D'une guerre 
al'autre. Vol. I; De Versailles à Locarno (Paris: Calman-
Levy Éditeurs, 194o), p. 282.
^Auguste de Saint-Aulaire, Confession d'un vieux 
diplomate (Paris: Flammarion, 1953) P« 536; Etienne Man-
toux, The Carthaginian Peace or the Economic Consequences 
of Mr. Keynes (New York; Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952), 
p. 22.
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to enhance French power greatly, had actually hastened the
Ddecline. Many Frenchmen were aware, however, that the war 
had severely weakened the nation: war deaths numbered
1,427,800, and 700>000 had been crippled, 2,344,000 wounded, 
433,000 captured or missing, and the birth rate cut in half; 
7 per cent of French territory lay devastated, and many vil­
lages and factories had totally disappeared. In addition, 
France had lost its Russian investments and had been forced 
to liquidate many of its foreign assets, its industry suf­
fered from disorganization, and many of the recovered coal 
mines were flooded. Furthermore, although it possessed the
greatest military force in Europe, France had a small navy
9with which to control its vast colonial domain.
Soon after the Paris Peace Conference, three trends 
in British policy convinced France that the task of enforc­
ing the peace treaties lay primarily on its shoulders : a 
revival of a policy based on the balance of power, a re­
awakening of isolationist sentiment, and a re-emphasis of
Paul Reynaud, La France a sauvé 1'Europe (2 vols.; 
Paris: Flammarion, 19^7)» I» 37 î André Siegfried, France :
A Study in Nationality (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1930), p. 55; Sir Arthur Willert, Aspects of British For­
eign Policy (New Haven:^ Yale University Press, 1928), pT 
43; Rene Albrecht-Carrie, France, Europe and the Two World 
Wars (Geneva: Librairie E. Droz, I96O), pT 4l.
^Frederick Lewis Schuman, War and Diplomacy in the 
French Republic. An Inquiry into Political Motivations and 
the Control of Forci<;n Policy (New York; McGraw-Hill Book 
Company, Inc. ̂ 1931) t P» 255 » Maxime Mowin^ Histoire des 
nations européens. Vol. I: Be la premiere a la deuxieme
guerre mondiale (1918-1939) (Paris : Payotl 1962), p. 86.
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commercial interests. According to Harold Nicolson, "The 
constant motive or principle which runs through all British 
foreign policy is the principle of the Balance of Power, 
and in keeping with this tradition, Britain after World 
War I sought to prevent domination of the European conti­
nent by France, which it considered the strongest power ; 
therefore, it supported the second power, Germany, as a 
counterweight to the first. On the other.hand, while Brit­
ain was concerned with the balance of power and was to take 
an active role in all major inter-war conferences, it also 
dreamed of returning to isolation and to its own interests, 
for there were enough economic and imperial problems with 
which to deal. In some respects the English, characterized 
by excessive insularity, were content to let Europe drift.
In 1923t however, economic interests concerned the 
British more vitally than did either the balance of power 
or a desire for isolation, and their interest in German re­
covery further embittered Anglo-French relations. This em­
phasis upon the economic factor--certainly a part of tradi­
tional British diplomacy— was evident even during the Peace 
Conference, for Lloyd George desired a settlement that would
^^Harold Nicolson, Diplomacy (2nd ed.; London: 
Oxford University Press, 1950), p. 135»
^^René Albrecht-Carrié, A Diplomatic History of 
Europe Since the Congress of Vienna (New York: Harper &
Row, 1958)» p. 301; Willert, Aspects of Policy, p. 43 ! 
Prank Herbert Simonds and Brooks Enemy, The Great Powers 
in World Politics. International Relations and Economic 
Nationalism (New York: American Book Company, 1939)»
p. 566.
12
allow wounds to heal quickly so that international trade 
would recover. From the beginning, the British wanted 
to restore Germany so that it could purchase from them, 
and this desire was enhanced after the post-war boom 
turned into a severe slump: in 1921, British exports
were 4?.9 per cent less than in 1920 and imports 43»7 per 
cent lower; wages fell sharply; and unemployment became a 
major problem, never to fall below the 1,000,000 figure 
between the wars. Most of the unemployed were from the 
previously important export trades--coal, cotton, and 
shipbuilding— which had either over expanded or been bat­
tered by new competition from the Far East and the United
12States. Thus Britain was, after the war, primarily in­
terested in recovering its western European markets and 
concentrating upon economic affairs: "Over all British
foreign policy during this [inter-war] period, over Lloyd 
George's and Bonar Law's disagreements with the French on 
German reparations . . .  hung the nostalgia for the old 
world of peaceful trade, with armaments and political 
feuds finally laid aside.
12Jacques Chastenet, Vingt ans d'histoire diplo­
matique, I919-I939 (Geneva: Éditions du Milieu du Monde,
1945}, p. 26; Charles Loch Mowat, Britain Between the Wars. 
1918-1940 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1955),
pp. 125-126 ; F. S. Northedge, The Troubled Giant : Britain
Among the Great Powers, 1916-1939 (New York: Frederick A.
Praeger, 19^6), pp. 626, 92, 6o-o9, I61, 625.
^^Northedge, Troubled Giant, p. 626.
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Britain was, however, unable either to lay aside 
the political feud with France or return to isolation, and 
for this the German problem was largely responsible:
The basic issue underlying the controversy between 
Britain and France was not a matter of general atti­
tudes, but the concrete political problem of Germany's 
power and position^ How strong could Germany be per­
mitted to become without menacing the vital interests 
of the two countries? The British and the French dis­
agrees on the answ*., to this question; this disagree­
ment accounts for most of the discord between them.l^
While French foreign policy between the wars centered on 
trying to keep Germany in its place and seeking British 
support against it, Britain resisted both e f f o r t s D u r ­
ing the 1919-1923 period, the so-called German problem 
consisted of three basic elements— security, reparations, 
and the enforcement of the Versailles Treaty— over each of 
which France and Britain disagreed.
The security question, as E. H, Carr wrote, was 
predominant for France: "The most important and persist­
ent single factor in European affairs in the years follow­
ing 1919 was the French demand for security." The word 
"security," the keynote of French policy, had several 
facets: since France feared a new war with Germany, it
meant a guarantee against future German invasion of French 
territory, but it also meant that France wanted the pres­
ervation of the entire status quo established by the peace
^^Wolfers, Britain and France, p. 38I. 
^^Ibid., p. ?b.
l4
t r e a t i e s . S e v e r a l  factors Interacted to instill an over­
whelming sense of insecurity in the French people. By the 
time the Versailles Conference ended, almost all of France's 
great Allies had deserted it, and soon afterwards the rejec­
tion by the United States and Britain of the June 28, 1919, 
pact of guarantee clearly revealed French isolation. When 
the two primary war-time Allies refused to accept the pact, 
France felt cheated, for after having previously given up 
demands for an autonomous Rhineland state in exchange for 
the guarantee, it now had lost its minimum requirements for 
security. Had the British government offered to continue
the guarantee, many of the difficulties between 1920 and
171923 might have been averted, but since it failed to do 
so, France believed firmly that it would have to depend 
primarily upon itself if Germany were to attack.
Both the fear of German revenge and geopolitical 
factors added to the feeling of insecurity. German mili­
tary prestige was extremely high even at the close of the 
war, and Germany— the country of "Prussian militarism"-- 
was dissatisfied with the terms of the Versailles Treaty. 
France feared revenge above all because it had the principal
E. H. Carr, International Relations Between the Two 
World Wars, 1919-1939 (New York; Harper & Row, 1966), p. 25; 
Wolfers, Britain and France, pp. 11-12, 20.
^^B. T. Reynolds, Prelude to Hitler (London: Jona­
than Cape, 1933), p. 64; Robert Blake, The Unknown Prime 
Minister. The Life and Times of Andrew Bonar Law, 1858- 
1923 (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1955), p. 483 »
Schuman, War and Diplomacy, p. 256; Willert, Aspects of 
Policy, p. 39.
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l8responsibility for the execution of the hated Treaty. 
Moreover, France and Germany shared a common border, and 
invaders had on numerous occasions come across the vulner­
able French left flank, close to which lay the nation's 
most important industrial section and Paris itself. Dur­
ing the war French manpower losses had been staggering, 
and while the German population, still growing, numbered
63.000.000, France's stationary population reached only
391000.000. Twice invaded within fifty years, France had 
been the scene of four years of devastating warfare while 
Germany lay relatively unscathed, and there was also a 
great disparity between German and French industrial de­
velopment. All of these factors acquired added importance 
as Britain began to lose interest in rigid maintenance of 
the peace settlement.
British declining interest in some aspects of Treaty 
maintenance stemmed from several conditions, one of the 
most important being the absence of a strong sense of in­
security. After the victory in 1918, any threat of war 
appeared remote to the British, for they had little fear 
of Germany, communications with the various parts of the 
Empire were secure, and they failed to perceive the inten­
sity of European dissension. In the early post-war years 
as France was demanding increased security along the Rhine,
18Wolfers, Britain and France, pp. 33-34 ; Furnia, 
Diplomacy of Appeasement, p. 1.
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Britain, feeling that the British Isles were entirely safe, 
grew irritated and failed to understand French fears, partly 
because the fighting, destructiveness, and horrors of the 
war had not occurred on its own soil and because the scut­
tled German fleet lay rusting at Scapa Flow and the German
19colonial empire had disappeeired.
Having little fear of Germany, Britain strongly dis­
agreed with the French desire to build up overpowering mil­
itary and diplomatic force as a deterrent against future 
German attack. While France sought to maintain a formidable 
war machine and build a system of alliances on Germany's 
eastern border in order to discourage an attack on the es­
tablished order, the British government favored the oppo­
site strategy. Believing that French preponderance would 
increase Germany's resentment and cause a nationalistic 
explosion, it attempted to resolve disputes peacefully and
remove incentives for rebellion; it wanted to relax, trust,
20forgive, forget, and save Germany.
W. N. Medlicott, British Foreign Policy Since Ver­
sailles, 1919-1963 (2nd ed.; London: Methuen & Co., Ltd.,
1968), p. xvii; Wolfers, Britain and France, pp. 203-204, 
231» Chastenet, Vingt ans, p. 203; Albrecht-Carrié, Diplo­
matic History, pi 38Ô; Carr, International Relations, p. 50; 
M. R. D. Foot, British Foreign Policy Since 1698 ^London: 
Hutchinson's University Library, 1956), ^  Ô7i Raymond 
Recouly, La Ruhr. Ce quelle représentait pour I'allemagne. 
Ce qu'elle represente pour la France. Pom*quoi nous avons 
pris ce gage (Paris : Ernest Flammarion, Éditeurs, 1923),
p. 173.onNorthedge, Troubled Giant, p. 224; Wolfers, Britain 
and France, pp. 5, 13, 233» P. A. Reynolds, British Foreign 
Policy in the Inter-War Years (London: Longmans, Green &
Co,, 1954), p. 12; Albrecht-Carrié, France, Europe, p. IO6 .
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The reparations problem, which was closely related
to and more complicated than the security question, was a
constant source of friction between the Allies in the five
years following the end of the war. Whereas a Frenchman,
writing in 1923» linked the two questions when he stated
that reparations gravely troubled Europe because the se-
21curity problem had not been solved, Britain saw them
as distinct and disagreed with France about the nature of
reparations :
The essence of Anglo-French differences over 
German reparations was that British politicians 
saw reparations as a contractual liability arising 
from an engagement, the Versailles Treaty, the le­
gality of much of which they doubted, whereas for 
the French governments reparations were an aspect 
of Franco-German power relations.22
Reparations as an economic problem involved three basic 
questions: how much damage had been done, how much uf
it should Germany pay for, and how could it do so?
When the peacemakers at Versailles, after much contro­
versy, decided that Germany should pay for damage done 
to the Allied civilian population and its property, in­
cluding the cost of pensions, they were unable to deter­
mine a total sum and created the Reparation Commission, 
to which they left the tasks of assessing the amount of 
the final claim and establishing the manner of its
21 / 'Andre Honnorat, Un des problèmes de la paix. La
sécurité de la France. Textes et documents (Paris : Alfred
Costes, 1923), p. 157.
22Northedge, Troubled Giant, p. 223»
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payment. Attempts to fulfill these two tasks were to 
poison relations among the powers.
France viewed the reparations problem from both 
the economic and political standpoint, and soon after 
the war ended the first of these was predominant. Need­
ing to repair the physical damage to the devastated 
northeastern departments, Frenchmen believed that the 
Treaty of Versailles provided the solution in the rep­
arations section and remembered that after the Franco- 
Prussian War they had paid an indemnity even though Ger­
man soil had not been invaded. Furthermore, since the 
French government was hesitant to rely on taxation in 
order to set its finances in order it needed reparations 
desperately. The political aspect, however, was always 
important, and from the beginning some French leaders 
envisaged reparations as a tool to use in keeping the 
former enemy in a politically, economically, and mili­
tarily inferior position. They, in fact, seemed to de­
sire German weakness almost more than French recovery
and were attracted by the vision of a Germany crippled
23by large reparations payments.
^^Frank H. Simonds, How Europe Made Peace Without 
America (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Page & Com­
pany, 1927), pp. 99-100; Chester E. Sipple, British For­
eign Policy Since the World War, University of Iowa Stud­
ies in the Social Sciences, Vol. X, No. 1 (Iowa City : 
University of Iowa Press, 1932), p. IO6 ; Thomson, France, 
p. 193i Willert, Aspects of Policy, p. 4l; Philip Dorf, 
Europe at the Crossroads (New York: Oxford Book Company,
T935), p. 40.
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Although there were inconsistencies in the British 
position on reparations, the general tendency after 1919 
was to call for an easing of the reparations burden placed 
upon Germany, and this approach stemmed primarily from the 
British stress on economic interests. Unlike the French, 
the British seldom questioned Germany's will to pay, but 
they doubted that it was able to raise the necessary sums 
and convert them into foreign currencies. In addition, 
they wondered if Allied countries could absorb these pay­
ments without damaging their economy through impairing 
their export industries and increasing unemployment.
Britain also began to oppose the exaction of large sums 
because it felt that such payments would result in the 
politically and economically undesirable ruin of Germany. 
When its economic position remained precarious in the 
early post-war years, Britain, believing that one of the 
chief causes was French demands on Germany, began to lose 
interest in reparations and to attempt to have the German 
indebtedness scaled d o w n . T h e s e  British moves, of course, 
frightened France and made it feel increasingly insecure.
24Frank H. Simonds pointed out that when, in 1919, 
the British believed that they could get large sums from 
Germany, they made large demands. When, around 1922 and 
19231 they saw that Germany could pay only in undesirable 
reparations in kind, they attacked the French for wanting 
to collect even moderate amounts. See Europe Made Peace,
pp. 116-117.
^^Northedge, Troubled Giant, p. I88; Henri Lichten- 
berger. Relations Between France and Germany (Washington:
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Although some French leaders recognized the inter­
dependence of the two keynotes of French diplomacy, almost 
all of them failed to realize that reparations and security 
— both highly desirable goals--were basically incompatible. 
It was true that France needed reparations from Germany, 
but Germany's industrial power would have to be restored 
to enable it to make payments, and when this occurred it 
would have the military potential that France feared. 
Should, on the other hand, the German economy be kept weak 
enough to prevent a threat to French security, Germany 
would be unable to make reparations payments. This para­
dox, seemingly insoluble, plagued French leaders in the 
inter-war period:
No French statesman can accept either horn of the 
dilemma to the exclusion of the other, since, to 
the nation, security and reparations are equally 
important. No one can devise a program of attain­
ing both, in a fashion not involving an apparent 
diminution of the one or the other which the nation, 
as yet, is unprepared to accept. Between 1920 and 
1925 no French Premier dares to yield security in 
order to obtain reparations, nor to yield repara­
tions in order to obtain security. . . .26
On the third element of the German problem, the 
issue of the enforcement of the Versailles Treaty, French
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1923),^p. 86 ; 
Maurice Baumont, Gloires et tragedies de la Troisième 
République (Parisl Librairie Hachette, 1956), pi 338; 
Sisley Huddleston, La politique anglaise et la France 
(Boulogne-sur-Seine: Imprimerie d'Études sociales et
politiques, 1924), p. 6.
Schuman, War and Diplomacy, p. 258; see also 
Renouvin, Relations internationales, Vol, VII, Part I,
pp. 234-235.
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and British policy again diverged. Although Poincare,
Koch, and other prominent French leaders had been severely 
disappointed with the terms of the Treaty, they insisted on 
its strict execution once it became law, for it was, despite 
shortcomings, the legal instrument capable of assuring he­
gemony over Germany and providing French security. Particu­
larly after the failure of the Anglo-American guarantee pact
France clung obstinately to the remnants and sought to de-
27fend the whole new status quo across the Continent. To
the dismay of France, Britain, failing to view the Treaty 
as sacrosanct, very quickly began to take a revisionist 
position. First, Britain, which traditionally regarded 
almost all settlements as temporary ones likely to be 
changed sometime in the future, did not regard the Treaty 
as a permanent arrangement. Furthermore, soon after the 
close of the Peiris Peace Conference the British began to 
feel that the peacemakers had been too harsh and to believe 
that the Treaty must be applied lightly and its harshest
28clauses attenuated. France, however, believed that Brit­
ain had an additional motive for desiring revision: it
Schuman, War and Diplomacy, pp. 256-257» Simonds 
and Enemy, Great Powers, p. 5^^» Chastenet, Troisième 
République, V, ?ë; Mantoux, Carthaginian Peace, p. 22; 
Wolfers, Britain and France, pp. 203, 212, 18.
28Wolfers, Britain and France, pp. 202, 212; Kop- 
pel S. Pinson, Modern Germany: Its History and Civiliza­
tion (2nd ed. ; New York: The Macmillan Co., 1965) , pi 52̂ 6;
Charles D. Hérisson, Les nations anglo-saxonnes et la paix 
(Paris: Librairie du Recueil SireyV 1936), pp. 88, 91 «
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wanted to modify the Treaty because it impeded trade and 
could be enforced only with the intervention of a too- 
powerful France. As Britain came to support German insist­
ence upon Treaty revision, the French grew increasingly 
bitter, for they realized that Germany's demands affected 
them more directly than the British, who, they charged, 
were willing to diminish France's share of the spoils since
they already possessed the most coveted war prizes: Ger-
29many's navy and colonies. This outlook made the French 
bitter and further poisoned relations between the two 
countries.
The Ruhr district had become a diplomatic focal 
point before January, 1923» for on four occasions in 1920 
and 1921 one or more of the Allied powers either occupied 
or threatened to occupy a portion of it. An examination 
of the British and French position on each instance helps 
to place the 1923 occupation in historical perspective.
The Ruhr first became the scene of diplomatic tension in 
March, 1920, when the Kapp putsch led to a series of vio­
lent left-wing revolts and Germany, without Allied consent, 
mavched Reichswehr troops into the demilitarized zone to 
quell the rebellion. In response, French troops on April 6
Charles d'Ydewalle, Vingt ans d'Europe, 1919-1939 
(Paris: E. Flammarion, 1939)» P» 23» Chastenet, Troisième
République, V, pp. 78-79* Wolfers, Britain and France, p. 
221; Lichtenberger, France and Germany, p. 24.
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occupied the German cities of Frankfurt, Hanau, Darmstadt, 
Hamburg, and Dieburg. Fearing that this French action was 
intended to separate the Ruhr from the rest of the country 
and to encourage separatist movements, the German govern­
ment protested and tense moments followed. The British 
government was in a dilemma : while disapproving of French
action, it feared that dissociating itself from the inva­
sion would cause Allied unity to suffer a heavy blow; yet 
to remain silent would indicate approval. As days passed, 
however, it came to support the German protest, refused to 
let British troops participate in the occupation, and warned 
that France was endangering the Entente. France, reluctant 
to risk alienation of its most important ally, yielded and 
withdrew its troops on May 17» The incident carried a two­
fold historical significance in that it marked the first
use of military sanctions against Germany and caused an
30open breach in Anglo-French relations.
Less than two months after the departure of French 
troops from the five German towns, a new threat to occupy 
the Ruhr grew out of an Allied conference held at Spa on
William Halperin, Germany Tried Democracy; A
History of the Reich from 1918-1933 (New York: 
:on & Company, Inc , 19^5)~ pp. I08-I9O ; Erich
Political__
W. W. Norto
Eyck, A History of the Weimar Republic, trans. by Harlan 
Hanson and Robert G. L, Waite, Vol. I: From the Collapse
of the Empire to Hindenberg's Election (Cambridge, Massa­
chusetts: Harvard University Press, I962), p. I56; North­
edge, Troubled Giant, pp. 162, l64; Royal J. Schmidt, Ver­
sailles and the Ruhr: Seedbed of World War II (The Hague :
Martinus Nijhoff, 19ÔÔ), p^ 29.
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July 5-16, 1920, where the delegates discussed German dis­
armament, the prosecution of war criminals, the establish­
ment of the amount of German coal deliveries for the next 
six months, and distribution of reparations payments among 
the Allies. As the Spa Conference opened, Alexandre Mil­
ler and, French Foreign Minister and President of the Coun­
cil, complained that Germany was behind in coal deliveries 
due the Allies, and the Allied representatives, after dis­
cussion, agreed to reduce monthly coal deliveries to
2,000,000 tons for the next six months. When the German 
industrialist, Hugo Stinnes, protested bitterly and in­
sisted upon a lower figure, the Allies threatened to occupy 
31the Ruhr. Moreover, the German failure to comply with
the Treaty terms limiting its army to 100,000 men elicited
another threat from the Allied Premiers : should Germany
fail to carry out the military provisions of the Versailles
32Treaty, the Allies would occupy the Ruhr.
During the Spa crisis, unlike that of April, England 
and France stood side by side in dealing with Germany. Ger­
many's failure to disarm and execute the military provisions
Schuman, War and Diplomacy, pp. 263-264; Coal Pro­
tocol Signed at Spa, July lë, Ï926V in Great Britain, Public 
Record Office, FO 371/4771, C 1777/192/18. Public Record 
Office documents will hereafter be cited as follows: name
of document, date, volume, registry number. See Appendix I 
for note on Foreign Office citations.
^^Chastenet, Troisième République, V, 82; Schuman,
War and Diplomacy, p. 2^3; Protocol of the Conference of 
Spa, July 9, 1920, FO 371/4756, C 1700/II3/18.
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of the Treaty, the gains made by extremist parties in the 
June 6 German elections, alleged discrimination against 
AZlied trade, and the absence of any sign of German coop­
eration— all of these factors led to a new approach by 
Lloyd George. Paced with German intransigence, the Allies 
called Marshal Foch and the English Commanding General,
Henry Wilson, to come to Spa to begin preparing for Allied 
action, but at the last moment Germany capitulated and 
signed the Protocol. England, it should be noted, had set 
forth conditions before agreeing to the inclusion in the 
Spa protocols of the sanction of the Ruhr occupation: it
had stipulated that it should be an inter-Allied occupa­
tion, that it should terminate as soon as coal deficien­
cies had been made up, and that Allied forces should stay 
away from villages and towns. Even though Britain, through 
these limitations, had modified the nature of the threatened
occupation, it had, significantly, accepted the principle of
33the occupation of the Ruhr as a sanction. Since the joint 
Anglo-French threat to occupy the Ruhr had produced German 
acquiescence, the weapon was soon to be used again.
After delivering the required amount of coal for a 
few months, Germany began to fall behind toward the end of
^^Eyck, Weimar Republic, I, l68; Northedge, Troubled 
Giant, pp. 168-170» Maximilian Harden, Germany, France and 
England, trans. and ed, by William Cranston Lawton (London: 
Brentano's, Ltd., 1924), p. 42; Carl Bergmann, The History 
of Reparations (London: Ernest Benn Limited, 192?), pT 179*
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1920, and in January, 1921, German and Allied experts met
in I’aris in an unsuccessful attempt to agree about the
total amount of German reparations indebtedness. Then the
Supreme Council, meeting late in January, drew up the Paris
Resolutions (which called for a "final" settlement based on
a fixed scale of payments over a forty-two year period) and,
after presenting the Resolutions to the German government,
invited it to attend a conference in London. At the London
Conference, March l-l4, 1921, the German delegates announced
that the Paris Resolutions were unacceptable. They declared,
moreover, that they had already paid ever 20,000,000,000 gold
marks and owed only 30,000,000,000 additional gold marks.
Since this amount was only approximately one-seventh of the
226,000,000,000 gold marks proposed in the Paris Resolutions,
both Lloyd George— who called the German proposals a mockery
of the Treaty— and Premier Aristide Briand, as well as the
whole of the British and French press, attacked the German
offer as an overt challenge. On March 3> Lloyd George told
the Germans that if they had not accepted the Resolutions
by March 7 the Allies would occupy Duisburg, Ruhrort, and
Düsseldorf, located at the mouth of the Ruhr Valley, and
34would engage in other economic sanctions. When the 
threat failed to move Germany, Belgian and French troops 
occupied the three towns on March 8 , 1921, and established
O A Schuman, War and Diplomacy, pp. 264-265» C. L. 
Mowat, Britain, p. 112.
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a customs cordon between occupied and unoccupied territory.
This occasion differed greatly from that of April, 1920,
for British detachments participated In the occupation
along with the French and Belgians.
Although Lloyd George had agreed to this measure of
force In order to avoid a clash with France, he let Germany
know, through Lord D'Abernon, that If It proposed more rea-
35sonable figures the occupation would not last long. Brit­
ish participation In the occupation was, nevertheless, ex­
tremely significant, for Britain had, at least for the mo­
ment, followed the French policy of severity rather than 
conciliation and had, by participating In the occupation 
of additional German territory, weakened the argument It 
was to raise against similar French action In 1923.
Only two months later, Germany was faced with an 
extension of the occupation. On April 2?i the Reparation 
Commission finally established the total German reparations 
indebtedness at 132,000,000,000 gold marks, and a conference 
of Allied representatives meeting In London from April 29 
to May 5 accepted the figure and devised the London
Schuman, War and Diplomacy, p. 266; Chastenet, 
Troisième République, V, 86 ; Schmidt, Versailles and Ruhr, 
p. 75» Bergmann, Reparations, p. l80. France did not 
withdraw Its troops In 1921; thus, In 1923 It began the 
Ruhr occupation from Düsseldorf. See David Lloyd George, 
The Truth about Reparations and War Debts (London: William
Helnemann, Ltd., 1932), pT $8 ; Schmidt. Versailles and 
Ruhr. p. 30.
^^When Lloyd George learned of the total debt figure 
established by the Reparation Commission, he asked Sir John
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Schedule of Payments, which set forth a plan by which
Germany could repay the debt. The Allies presented the
London Schedule to Germany on May 5 and announced that if
it failed to accept the entire Schedule within six days
an Allied occupation of the Ruhr Valley itself would occur.
When the German government protested, thinking that the
132,000,000,000 gold mark figure was much more than it was
capable of paying, the Allies failed to budge, and the
government of Konstantin Fehrenbach resigned on May 4,
creating a new crisis. Germany, however, was unable to
resist, and after Josef Wirth formed a Cabinet on May 10
it accepted the financial settlement and fulfilled the
terms of the London Schedule until December, 1921, when
it again threatened a default and requested a moratorium
37for the January I5 and February 15» 1922, payments.
At the close of 1921, European observers looking 
back upon the years of 1920 and 1921 could thus point to 
four occasions on which various Allied powers had threat­
ened to occupy a few towns or the whole of the Ruhr Valley, 
Germany's industrial heartland. France had been involved
Bradbury, the British member of the Commission, whether 
the figure was a moderate, fair amount, and Bradbury re­
plied that he did not believe it excessive. Premier 
Briand, however, said that he would be criticized in 
France for not insisting on a larger sum. See Lloyd 
George, Reparations, pp. 58-59»
Schuman, War and Diplomacy, pp. 266-2671 269;
C. L. Mowat, Britain, p. 113; Halperin, Germany, pp. 202
203.
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in all four of the threats, England in three; French 
troops had occupied German territory on two occasions, 
English on one. From the beginning, therefore, the 
menace of a Ruhr occupation forced German compliance. 
Furthermore, France observed that the Ruhr could be 
used as a tool to break German resistance and obtain 
payments and that England, even if it did not partici­
pate in an occupation, would not compel its ally to 
abstain.
Although not openly proclaimed at the time, the 
breach between England and France had been widened dur­
ing 1921 by the German problem, the question of Upper 
Silesia, and the problems in the Near East with the 
Turkey of Mustapha Kemal; during 1922, events on both 
the French and English domestic scenes created additional 
friction. Trends in France were particularly important, 
for since the latter part of 1921 Premier Briand's pol­
icies had met strong criticism in the French legislature, 
where voices were insisting that France occupy more Ger­
man territory as a coercive measure. When the December, 
1921, German request for a moratorium led to the Cannes 
Conference in January, 1922, many French politicians 
feared that Briand would, under British pressure, make 
too many financial concessions to Germany. Although 
Briand, like his countrymen, wanted both security and
30
reparations, he felt that neither could be attained without 
close Allied cooperation; the French opposition, however, 
considered this attitude anglophile and termed it a sign 
of weakness. When the President of the Council appeared 
to be on the verge of consenting to new economic conces­
sions to Germany at the Cannes Conference, parliamentary 
criticism mounted, and he returned to Paris on January 12 
to defend his position before the Cabinet and the Chamber 
of Deputies. Receiving little support and feeling that 
he lacked the confidence of the nation and political lead­
ers, he startled everyone by resigning that day without 
calling for a formal vote of confidence.
The replacement of Briand by Raymond Poincare dis­
tressed England, especially Lloyd George, who, though 
biased, painted an accurate picture of basic differences 
between the two French statesmen; Briand, born in Brit­
tany, an area which had not been invaded for centuries, 
was "congenial, humorous, tolerant"; Poincare, a native 
of Lorraine who had seen his country invaded by Germany 
in 1870, was "cold, reserved, rigid, with a mind of un­
imaginative and ungovernable idealism." He pointed out 
that although Poincare was extremely fair in his ordi­
nary activities, he was unfair so far as Germany was con­
cerned, his "opinions on everything German" being "those
O ÛSchuman, War and Diplomacy, pp. 268-272; 
Jouvenel, D'une guerre a l'autre, p. 282.
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39of a Salvation Army captain about the devil." When Poin­
care came to power, British observers agreed with Lloyd 
George that French diplomacy was moving away from a policy
of reconciliation with England toward a showdown with Ger- 
Lnmany, for the new Premier's post-war activities and per­
sonal characteristics convinced them that he would lead 
France to exert more pressure upon the defeated Germans. 
They remembered that the patriotic Poincare, who indeed 
loved France above all, had come into office in 1912 on a 
wave of nationalism and was himself the outstanding spokes­
man and symbol of the 1911-1914 nationalist revival. They 
had also heard that instead of being the traditional "ges­
ticulating, bragging" Frenchman he was a fine, strictly 
disciplined, and virtually ascetic lawyer who could not be 
budged from an idea or conviction when he believed he was 
right
^^Lloyd George, Reparations, pp. 67-68.
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Since he stepped down from the President's office 
in 1920t this obstinate Frenchman had become convinced that 
France was being mistreated and defrauded by its Allies and 
that Germany must not be allowed to elude its legal respon­
sibilities. This message he proclaimed throughout 1921 as
42he became France's most powerful journalist. Twice each 
month he wrote the article on current political affairs in 
La Revue des deux mondes, France's most prestigious intel­
lectual magazine; his articles also appeared frequently in 
Le Matin, the country's leading popular newspaper, and in 
the semi-official and extremely influential 1^ Temps. When 
he became Premier in January, 1922, he had little time for 
writing anti-German articles, but he preached the same ser­
mon through a new instrument. Almost every Sunday he went 
to some town or village to speak and dedicate a memorial 
to the local war victims, and on these occasions he repeat­
edly declared that Germany had caused the war and was try­
ing to cheat France of reparations. These bitter sermons 
and articles, which led his French followers to demand de-
43cisive action against Germany, made the English nervous.
42Simonds, Europe Made Peace, p. 21$; Raoul Persil, 
Alexandre Millerand, 1859-1943 (Paris; Société d'editions 
Françaises et Internationales, 1949), P» l4?; Huddleston, 
Poincare, p. I03.
Baumont, La faillite de la paix. 1918-1919, 
Vol. I: De Rethondes a Stresa (1918-1935) (5th ed.;
Paris; Presses Universitaires de France, 1957)1 P* 257; 
Schuman, War and Diplomacy, p. 277«
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Nervousness, however, also characterized the French 
attitude toward English policy, for the activities and per­
sonality of Lloyd George disturbed the French just as those 
of Poincare perturbed the British. If Poincare had more 
enthusiastic French support than that given any Premier 
since Clemenceau, it was Lloyd George who was primarily 
responsible: Frenchmen welcomed his appointment because
they felt that he would stand up to Lloyd George more firmly 
than any other French statesman and insist on the protection 
of their rights. Since 1919» the policies of the British 
Prime Minister had tended to destroy confidence in Britain, 
for the French felt that he had practiced a policy hostile 
to them and had tried to stir up Europe against them with
kkcharges of militarism and imperialism. When, therefore, 
the Chanak incident precipitated the resignation of Lloyd 
George on October 19, 1922, they were elated and felt that 
Poincare had won a victory in the Anglo-French duel.
The French admired and liked Andrew Bonar Law, the
new Prime Minister, who had lost a son in the war. Although
they felt that he was a true friend of France who wanted
Anglo-French cooperation, the French were soon to learn that
45Bonar Law did not condone their reparations policy. By
The Pomp of Power (6th ed.; London: Hutchinson &
Co., n.d.), pp. 174-175; Simonds, Europe Made Peace, p. 242; 
Baumont, Faillite, 1 , 274; Camille Georges Picavet, L*Europe 
politique de 1919 à 1929 (Paris: Librairie Felix Alcan,
1931), p. 75.
Baumont, Faillite, I, 274; Wandycz, Eastern Allies, 
p. 269; Saint-Aulaire, Confession, p. 636.
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the close of 1922, moreover, discord between the two coun­
tries had grown to the point that no change in personnel 
was likely to mitigate the effects of nearly four years of 
frequent disagreement and mistrust.
During 1922, in the midst of the change of ministries 
in both France and England, several key diplomatic events 
had increased friction between the two countries, the first 
of these being the Cannes Conference. At Cannes, where the 
Supreme Council met on January 5-1-31 1922, to consider the 
December l4, 1921, German request for a moratorium on the 
January 15 and February 15 reparations installments, discus­
sions between Lloyd George and Briand were the focal point 
of the Conference. The former wanted to improve the eco­
nomic condition of Europe, including Russia, and in order 
to obtain economic concessions from France he offered it 
an Anglo-French security pact similar to the abortive one. 
The French delegates, feeling that Lloyd George offered 
this guarantee in order to compel the French government to 
renounce the material guarantee of an occupation of the 
right bank of the Rhine, objected strongly to the British 
proposals. Furthermore, the terms of the proposed pact 
displeased them, for it contained no precise military con­
vention and was a unilateral pact--which they considered 
humiliating--that would last only ten years, place no ob­
ligations on the Dominions, and guarantee France's border 
with Germany but not its strategic interests in eastern
35
liurope. At this point French leaders» as mentioned earlier, 
grew concerned that the conciliatory Briand might subordi­
nate French policy to English direction and accept the pact, 
which they considered a mirage. When the French Cabinet 
fell, the unsuccessful Cannes Conference adjourned, and the
Reparation Commission had to assume the task of dealing with
46the German request for a moratorium.
Delegates at the Cannes Conference had agreed, under
4?the leadership of Lloyd George, that representatives of 
all the major powers would meet to discuss economic ques­
tions; when they met to do so in Genoa on April 10-May 19» 
1922, both German and Russian delegates were present. Since, 
however, Poincare believed that Lloyd George wanted to draw 
France to Genoa in order to revise the Treaty of Versailles, 
he refused to attend, sent Louis Bar thou to represent France, 
and insisted that the question of reparations and Allied 
debts not be placed on the agenda. Although in his opening 
address Lloyd George called the conference the "greatest 
gathering of European nations" ever assembled and discussed
Schuman, War and Diplomacy, pp. 269-270; Albrecht- 
Carrié, Diplomatic History, p. 393; 0. L. Mowat, Britain, 
p. 11^; P. Rain, L*Europe de Versailles (1919-1939). Les 
traités de paix--leur application--leur mutilisation (Paris : 
Payot, 1945)1 p. 166; Jouvenel, D'une guerre a l'autre,
p. 282.
47Quincy Howe, A World History of Our Own Times,
Vol. II; The World Between the Wars (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1953)« p. I5I Howe suggested that it was only 
in 1922 that Lloyd George began "to pry himself loose from 
France when he sponsored a momentous international confer­
ence at Genoa" and invited the Germans and Russians.
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broad conditions for the economic and political recon­
struction of Europe, disappointments soon clouded the 
scene. The Russians began to cause difficulties about 
disarmament and pre-revolutionary debts, and on April l6 
they concluded the Treaty of Rapallo with Germany, a step 
which other powers considered an act of defiance and which 
increased French distrust of Germany. Then Poincare, in a 
speech at Dar-le-Duc on April 24, also helped undermine 
the Conference: he stated that France would continue to
participate in the Conference only if no concessions were 
made to Germany; furthermore, should Germany fail to meet
its reparations installment due at the close of May, France
48would invade the Ruhr on its own. The Genoa Conference 
thus ended in failure, and the strain on Anglo-French re­
lations was great.
Meanwhile, the problem of reparations continued to 
plague Europe both during and after the Cannes and Genoa 
Conferences. When Germany frequently mentioned its desire 
for some kind of moratorium, the French delegates to the 
Reparation Commission were hostile and refused even to 
consider any moratorium that did not grant "guarantees" 
in the shape of extensive Allied control of German finances. 
After long negotiations, Germany on July 12 requested
48 ,Rene Pinon, Le redressement de la politique fran­
çaise, 1922 (Paris: Perrin et Cie., 1923)» P* ü i ; Schuman,
War and Diplomacy, pp. 275-276; C. L. Mowat, Britain, p.
Il4; Lloyd George, Reparations, p. 69.
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complete release from cash payments during the balance of 
1922 and stated that its financial condition would also 
make such payments impossible in 1923 and 1924. The French 
chairman of the Reparation Commission, Louis Dubois, refused 
to consider this request. Then in August, 1922, trouble 
came from another source. That year America called fre­
quently upon the European debtors for payment of their war 
debts, and this American insistence was the first decisive
step on the road to the occupation of the Ruhr, for it led
49to the Balfour Note.
On August 1, Arthur Balfour, temporarily in charge 
of the Foreign Office, published a note, addressed to the 
French government, stating that Britain, which sought a 
general economic settlement, would abandon all claims to 
reparations and all further claims for payment. If, how­
ever, the United States refused to cancel the debts that 
European nations owed it, Britain would have to receive 
enough from its debtors to pay what it owed the American 
government. The effect of the Balfour Note was disastrous, 
for the Americans resented the burden being placed on their 
shoulder, and the French insisted that if England were to 
press them to pay their debt they would have to exert in­
creased pressure to extract payments from Germany. Thus 
the Note indirectly pushed France toward the occupation of
49Schuman, War and Diplomacy, pp. 274-277; Simonds 
Europe Made Peace, p. 231.
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the Ruhr and wounded its diplomatic image, for it made 
French insistence upon payments from Germany appear to be 
the principal obstacle to an international financial set­
tlement.^^ In addition, the Balfour Note reduced the like­
lihood of an agreement between France and Britain at the 
forthcoming London Conference.
The London Conference, called by Lloyd George to 
deal with the July 12 German request for a moratorium on 
payments for the next two and a half years, met August ?-l4, 
with both Poincare and Lloyd George present. When Poincare 
refused to grant a moratorium and insisted upon "productive 
pledges" from Germany, including exploitation of the state 
mines in the Ruhr and the appropriation of 60 per cent of 
the capital of left bank German dyestuff factories, Lloyd 
George and the Germans found the French proposals unaccept­
able. On August 14, the last day of the Conference, Lloyd 
George, sensing that France might soon occupy the Ruhr, 
said that if the French knew of a sure method to get money 
from Germany, they should try to do so. Doubtlessly they 
would meet serious disappointments, but they must have the 
right to convince themselves of the facts by the method 
they judged best. After a week of controversy, the Con­
ference ended in deadlock--the first time since the
C. L. Mowat, Britain, p. l6l; Huddleston, Poincare, 
p. 130; Schmidt, Versailles and Ruhr, pp. 39» 83; Chastenet, 
Vingt ans, p. 48.
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armistice that a conference of British and French heads 
of state had ended in a clear and official admission of 
conflict
During the late summer months of 1922, the Franco-
British conflict became increasingly intense as events in
the Near East in mid-September complicated the controversy
over the reparations question. When Poincare withdrew the
French troops reinforcing British troops at Chanak, the
strain was almost overwhelming, and Lord Curzon, Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs, immediately went to Paris to
consult Poincare. An extremely stormy interview ensued,
and Curzon left the room crying and in a fit of rage; the
situation exacerbated relations between the two diplomats,
and memories of the encounter haunted Curzon thereafter,
0 52increasing his hatred of Poincare.
Meanwhile, in France "political leaders, journal­
ists, industrialists, merchants, shopkeepers, taxpayers, 
peasants, artisans" were growing impatient with seemingly
Schuman, Wcur and Diplomacy, pp. 276-277» Etienne 
Weill-Raynal, Les reparations allemandes et la France, 
Vol. II: L*Application de l'état des paiements, Inoccupa­
tion de la Ruhr et 1 * institution du Plan Dawes (mai 1921^ 
avril 1924) (Paris: Nouvelles editions latines, 1947/»
p. 371» Georges Suarez, Briand, sa vie, son oeuvres, avec 
son journal et de nombreux documents inédits. Vol. V: 
Li^tisan de la Paix, 1918-1923 (Parisl Librairie Pion, 
Ï9Îl), p. Ï2?̂ . It should be noted that Lloyd George did 
not question the legality of the threatened French inde­
pendent action against Germany.
52C. L. Mowat, Britain, p. Il8.
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endless and useless conferences and delays: having been
led to believe that they could collect large sums from Ger­
many, they were insistent upon using pressure to do so. 
Poincare, in order to stay in office, had to act in tune 
with the demands of public opinion and his supporters, and 
his increasingly full Sunday speaking schedule fanned the 
flames even more. Repeatedly he stated that only by seiz­
ing "productive guarantees" could France break down German 
resistance and secure its own rights. All of the speeches 
received wide circulation and helped prepare Frenchmen for 
the next step--the Ruhr occupation: "The Ruhr became a
catchword, a symbol, a magic panacea for all the ills the 
Republic had fallen heir to."^^
During the same period, Germany was experiencing 
severe financial problems as the mark's value declined 
from 490 to the dollar in July to 3,012 in October and was 
to reach 7i353 in December. After the British tried unsuc­
cessfully to draft a moratorium scheme acceptable to France, 
Germany on November l4 asked the Reparation Commission for 
a moratorium of three or four years on all payments except 
a few deliveries in kind. Poincare refused to consider 
either a moratorium or the November 4 German request for 
stabilization of the mark, for he considered both a reduc­
tion of Germany's total indebtedness. Finally, he and
^^Schuman, War and Diplomacy, pp. 277-278.
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Bonar Law, together with Mussolini, decided to hold a
conference in London in December to discuss reparations
kUand inter-Allied debts.
The French government was, however, pessimistic 
about the forthcoming encounter. On November 1?, Poincare 
explained to the Chamber of Deputies the main points of the 
plan he would propose to the London Conference: its out­
standing feature was the insistence that only if France 
were allowed to seize productive guarantees would it con­
sent to a moratorium. After he warned that France would 
resort to force if the Treaty could not be executed in a 
spirit of harmony by all of the Allies, the President of 
the Council requested and received a postponement of dis­
cussion for one month. Doubting that Poincare's proposal 
would receive support at the London Conference, the French 
began to make other plans. On November 27» 1922, President 
Millerand presided over a meeting of the Cabinet at the 
Elysée Palace, and the next day an article in Le Temps an­
nounced that France was planning to extend the Rhenish oc­
cupation, replace German functionaries by French ones, and 
occupy two-thirds of the Ruhr ; this would be carried out 
either with or without allies if France failed to win over 
the British at the London Conference.
5*Ibid.. pp. 282-283.
^^Ibid., p. 284; Jean-Claude Favez, Le Reich devant 
l'occupation franco-belge de la Ruhr en 1923 (Geneva:
42
At the London Conference, December 9-11» 1922, Donar 
Law presented a plan— transmitted by Germany--for a morator­
ium and stabilization of the mark, as well as a proposal for 
an international gold loan from which reduced reparations 
payments could be made. Poincare, moving that the plan be 
rejected, asserted that the French legislature would refuse 
to consent to any reduction of the German indebtedness and 
would agree to no moratorium without pledges, particularly 
the Ruhr mines. He called for both the occupation of the 
Ruhr and the imposition of certain other financial sanc­
tions to force Germany to make serious offers and to insure 
that it carried them out. When the Conference ended on 
December 11 with plans to meet again in Paris on January 2, 
1923,^^ the deadlock was complete. Returning to Paris, 
Poincare, although he found that most French political 
leaders clearly favored the use of force, hesitated to 
take action. Only after long talks with President Mil­
lerand and André Maginot, Minister of War, did the Premier 
agree to occupy the Ruhr, and even then he refused to act
until after he tried once more in the upcoming Paris Con-
57ference to get British cooperation.
Librairie Droz, 1969), p. 51; Jacques SeydouXj De Versailles 
au Plan Young; Reparations, dettes interalliées, recon­
struction europeene (Paris ; Librairie Pion, 1932), p. II6 .
Schuman, War and Diplomacy, p. 284; Jacques 
Chastenet, Raymond Poincare (Paris ; René Julliard, 1948), 
pp. 239-240.
^^Chastenet, Troisième République, V, 101; Persil, 
Millerand, p. l48; Favez, Le Reich, p. 56.
43
When Bonar Law and Poincare discussed the divergent 
British and French viewpoints in their respective legisla­
tive bodies soon after the breakdown of the London Confer­
ence, this further aroused public opinion in the two coun­
tries. In the House of Commons on December l4, 1922, Bonar 
Law said that even though Germany had indeed fallen behind 
in reparations payments, he felt that it had been through 
no deliberate action. He warned France that Britain "could 
not remain indifferent" to any French actions that would 
make it more difficult for Germany to make payments. The 
next day, Poincare appeared before the Chamber of Deputies 
to discuss the results of the London Conference. Although 
he tried to minimize the differences between France and 
England and said that he hoped that they could reach an 
agreement, he affirmed that France could not consent to an 
unconditional reduction of the German payments and insisted 
that war debts and reparations must be considered separately. 
Warning that the sanctions set forth in Article 232 of the 
Treaty of Versailles might have to be utilized, he asked for 
parliamentary support in the forthcoming Paris Conference; 
after a long discussion he received overwhelming support in
the Chamber and the following week secured a unanimous 
C ftSenate vote.
Meanwhile, the French government began actual prep­
aration for the occupation which would be carried out if
C ÛHalperin, Germany, p. 24?; Schuman, War and
Diplomacy, p. 285.
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Poincaré failed to win over the English at the Paris Con­
ference. Jacques Seydoux, Director of the Commercial Rela­
tions section of the Political and Commercial Affairs divi­
sion of the Quai d'Orsay, worked incessantly in December 
preparing for the occupation and planning how to make it 
economically profitable. One key element was nevertheless 
absent--a legal pretext for the threatened occupation; in 
order to justify the occupation on legal grounds, Poincare 
believed that he would need the Reparation Commission to 
declare Germany in default. Fortunately, Germany had pro­
vided him with an opening by informing the Reparation Com­
mission on December 2 that it could not make timber deliv­
eries on time and requesting an extension until April 1, 
1923» On the basis of a French motion, the Commission on 
, December 26 declared Germany in arrears in 1922 timber de­
liveries to France and decreed, against the vote of Sir
John Bradbury, the British delegate, that this German
59failure constituted a voluntary default. Part of Poin­
care's legal scaffolding lay ready to use should the Paris 
Conference prove unsatisfactory.
When the Paris Conference opened on January 2, 1923, 
the prevalent mood was one of p e s s i m i s m . B e c a u s e  it is
^^Seydoux, Reparations, p. II6 ; Halperin, Germany, 
p. 248; Schuman, War and Diplomacy, p. 284.
^^On the eve of the Conference, Bonar Law wrote to 
Curzon, who was at Lausanne, saying that he had no hope 
unless the unexpected occurred: see Blake, Bonar Law, p. 
486.
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unlikely that either France or Britain seriously expected 
the other party to change its basic position, the Confer­
ence was virtually doomed to failure. Poincare presided 
at the opening of the Conference, and he, Bonar Law, and 
the Italian delegate, the Marquis della Toretta, presented 
their respective plans for a settlement of the reparations 
and inter-Allied debts questions. While the Italian plan 
received little consideration, basic differences marked 
the French and British plans.
The extremely complicated Bonar Law plan (as the 
British proposals came to be k n o w n ) , c o v e r e d  the issues 
of reparations and inter-Allied debts. It called for a 
reduction of the German debt from 132,000,000,000 gold 
marks to 50,000,000,000 gold marks and said that for four 
years Germany would make no payments except certain limited 
deliveries in kind; after the end of the four-year morator­
ium, it would pay 2 ,000,000,000 gold marks per year for 
four years, 2 ,500,000,000 gold marks annually for the fol­
lowing two years, and after that 3 »3331000,000 gold marks 
per year. This plan would be offered to Germany only if 
it agreed to stabilize the mark, restore budget equilibrium, 
and accept Allied financial supervision in carrying out the
Bertrand de Jouvenel called it the most complicated 
of the innumerable plans suggested between the wars for the 
settlement of the reparations question; see O'une guerre a 
1'autre, I, 306. Carl Bergmann, the German financial expert, 
is reported to have said: "I would prefer to pay repara­
tions than to try to understand the Bonar Law plan," See 
Weill-Raynal, Reparations, II, 336,
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economic reforms. Should it fail to satisfy the supervis­
ing authorities in carrying out the economic reforms or in 
making revised payments, it should be subject
to any measures which Allied Powers, upon a report of 
such failure from the supervising authority, may unan­
imously decide to be necessary. Such measures may in­
clude the forcible seizure of German revenues and 
assets and the taking over of German fiscal machinery 
and the military occupation of German territories out­
side the treaty occupation area..
Allied financial supervision would be carried out by a For­
eign Finance Council, located in Berlin. Britain, Belgium, 
France, and Italy would each appoint one member of the 
Council, and one American and one person of neutral Euro­
pean nationality would also be members; the German Finance 
Minister would serve as ex officio chairman, who could vote 
only in case of a tie. The Council, which would have wide- 
ranging control over German currency legislation, budget, 
public expenditure and general financial administration, 
would be independent of the Reparation Commission sitting 
in Paris and would, in effect, alter the position of the 
Reparation Commission: "If the Reparation Commission is
retained at all it should be as a purely judicial body with 
such changes of constitution as may appear desirable.
With reference to the question of inter-Allied debts, the 
Bonar Law plan offered to cancel the war debts owed Britain 
by its Allies if they would waive the Belgian priority in
^^Plan for General Settlement of Reparation and Euro­
pean Inter-Allied Debts, January 2, 1923» FO 371/862$,
c 162/1/18.
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reparations payments and apply the gold deposits held by 
Britain to the repayment of the war debts owed it.
Jacques Seydoux immediately studied the plan, and 
on the basis of his comments Poincare criticized it the 
following day. The Premier declared that the British pro­
posals were not even a base for discussion because they 
directly infringed the Versailles Treaty by calling for a 
reduction of the German debt as fixed in the 1921 Schedule 
of Payments and proposing to modify the functions and mem­
bership of the Reparation Commission. He also attacked 
the role to be assigned to the German Finance Minister in 
the proposed Foreign Finance Council and objected to the
64four-year moratorium and the absence of productive pledges.
Whereas the Bonar Law plan was worded in a detached, 
businesslike fashion, the plan presented by Poincare on 
January 2, 1923» was written in a highly emotional tone, 
its first paragraph declaring that France was not able *’io 
forget that it is Germany who declared war on her, who in­
vaded ten French departments and systematically devastated 
them." France would consider a reduction of the
132,000,000,000 gold mark figure only if the other Allies
6 3During the war Italy and France deposited gold 
with Great Britain as security for loans made to them to 
enable them to carry on the war. Ibid.
^^Seydoux, Reparations, p. 117- On January 4, the 
British delegation submitted a lengthy memorandum defend­
ing its plan and denying that it was contrary to the 
Treaty; see FO 371/8626, C 445/1/18.
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increased its percentage of the proceeds or granted a pri­
ority for the reconstruction of its devastated districts. 
ISven then it could grant only a partial moratorium, limited 
to two years, which would be subject to certain conditions: 
in order to supervise the continuation of coal deliveries, 
an Interallied Coal Commission must be created in Essen 
and chaired by a Frenchman; the Allies should control the 
state-owned forests in occupied Germany and be able to 
seize the coal tax and customs receipts in the occupied 
Rhineland and the Ruhr if Germany defaulted; German failure 
to comply with the terms of the plan would result in the 
military occupation of Essen, Bochum, and any other part of 
the Ruhr designated by Marshal Foch; finally, a customs bor­
der would be drawn to the east of occupied territory.
The British delegates, who believed that the French 
plan would prevent the restoration of Germany's credit and 
destroy the possibility of German payments, objected 
strongly to the provisions calling for a moratorium with 
productive pledges and the continuation of deliveries in 
kind during the moratorium period. Bonar Law quickly be­
came discouraged and wanted to leave after the first ses­
sion; on January 3» Lord Crewe, the British Ambassador to 
France, sent a message from the Prime Minister to the Cab­
inet saying that the divergence between the British and
^^Programme de la Conference, January 2, 1923 
FO 371/8625, C 212/1/18.
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French views was so great and Poincare so obstinate that 
he saw hardly any chance of reaching an agreement.
At the opening of the session on the afternoon of 
January 4, the President of the Council stated that the 
ditch which separated Britain and France was the question 
of a moratorium with pledges; since the difference in prin­
ciple between them could not be overcome, further attempts 
to compromise would be useless and perhaps harmful. Speak­
ing to a group of journalists later in the day, Bonar Law, 
disagreeing with Poincare's assessment, said that the basic
difference was whether or not the proposed steps would per-
67mit German economic recovery.
When the Conference ended that afternoon, it seemed 
to many observers that Bonar Law had given up too easily 
and that neither side had seriously searched for a way to 
avert the impasse. Given the emotional reaction of each 
of the powers involved, however, it is doubtful that a so­
lution could have been reached; each one, feeling that the 
plan of the other injured its own interests, declared the
other's proposals unacceptable. The viewpoints appeared
68irreconcilable. Although the proceedings had been
Blake, Bonar Law, p. 486; Crewe to FO [Foreign
Office], January 3, 1923, FO 371/8623, C I8O/I/I8 .
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^^The Times (London), January 5, 1923, p. 10.
Huddleston, Poincare, pp. 137-138; Eyck, Weimar 
Republic, I, 232; Mourin, Nations europeenes, I, 5^1 
Edouard Driault, La paix de la France. La politique in­
ternationale de l^apres-xuerre, 19l8-1935 (Paris; Editions 
G. Ficker, 193^), P» 1287
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carried on in a friendly fashion and the Conference broke 
up amidst mutual expressions of cordiality, few people 
failed to realize that a chasm, which had been widening 
since late I918, clearly separated the two former Allied 
powers. Almost everyone wondered whether the next French 
step would be toward the Ruhr.
CHAPTER II
FRENCH AGGRESSIVENESS AND BRITISH ASSISTANCE; THE 
RUHR OCCUPATION, JANUARY 5-FEBRUARY 28, 1923
By January 5, 1923, French leaders had decided to 
occupy the Ruhr district of Germany. The momentous deci­
sion having been made, they steadily pursued their course, 
not hesitating to use harsh methods when necessary. Al­
though the British government had long feared that France 
would move into the Ruhr, it was caught unprepared and had 
no clearly defined policy. While sections of Parliament 
and the press assailed the occupation, the British govern­
ment during the first two months of the occupation did 
little to impede French action. Instead, it in several 
ways rendered assistance.
Although most observers agree that the decision to 
occupy the Ruhr was not hastily made, there is broad dis­
agreement over the reasons which impelled the French to 
initiate the occupation.^ No simple explanation is accurate,
One cannot say firmly why Poincare decided to take 
this course, for many of his papers were burned, and the 
remaining ones will be available to researchers only in 
I99OJ see Pierre Miquel, Poincare (Paris: Librairie
Artheme Fayard, I96I), p. ?•
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for several factors interacted to make France act without 
the consent of its neighbor across the Channel. Economic 
ones have been most frequently emphasized. Since the com­
ing into force of the Versailles Treaty, Germany had almost 
always been in arrears in cash payments and deliveries and 
had sought deferments and moratoriums. At the close of 
1922, it was 20 per cent behind in coal deliveries demanded 
by the Reparation Commission, and both French patience and 
the French Treasury had reached a breaking point. Repara­
tions receipts were needed to finance reconstruction of the 
devastated departments, and the French decided to occupy 
the Ruhr in order to obtain them: should Germany, after
the occupation, fail to pay as scheduled, France would con­
trol its key productive resources. Since methods previously 
used had failed to make Germany pay, France decided to try 
new ones--methods foreshadowed in previous threats to occupy 
the Ruhr. Believing that the mere threat of force would, as
on previous occasions, bring about German compliance, France
2never seriously anticipated German resistance.
^Hajo Holborn, The Political Collapse of Europe (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1 9 5 U , P. 120; A. J. P. Taylor, The
Origins of the Second World War (2nd ed.; Greenwich, Con­
necticut: Fawcet Publications, Inc., 1965), pp. 4?1 53»
J.-B. Duroselle, Histoire diplomatique de 1919 a nos .jours 
(4th ed. ; Paris: Libra^irie Dalloz, 1966), p. 77» Jacques
Chastenet, Raymond Poincare (Paris : René Julliard, 1948),
p. 245; Edouard Bonnefous, Histoire politique de la Ille 
République, Vol. Ill: L*après-guerre. 1919-1924 (Paris :
Presses Universitaire de FranceT 1959) p. 346 ; Arnold 
Wolfera, Britain and France Between Two Wars: Conflicting
Strategies of Peace Since Versailles (New York: HarcourtT
Brace and Company, 19^0), pp. 57-58» Miquel, Poincaré,
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The Ruhr district, an extremely important section 
of Germany, was an area approximately sixty miles long and 
twenty-eight miles wide lying between the Ruhr and Lippe 
rivers. Containing 10 per cent of the German people, it 
was the most thickly populated area on the Continent and 
had fourteen towns with a population of over 100,000. It 
abounded in natural resources and at the time of the occu­
pation produced about 85 per cent of Germany's coal, BO per 
cent of the steel and pig iron, and 70 per cent of the 
railway traffic. Because France could find there the fuel
Oneeded by its Lorraine iron industry, Poincare believed 
that with the Ruhr in his hands he could either force Ger­
many to pay or exploit the resources of the area.
p. 456 ; Sisley Huddleston, Poincare : A Biographical Por­
trait (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1 9 2 4 ) , p. 23;"
Frank H. Simonds, How Europe Made Peace Without America 
(Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Page & Company, 192?) 1
p. 216.
3Frederick Lewis Schuman, War and Diplomacy in the 
French Republic. In Inquiry into Political Motivations and 
the Control of Foreign Policy (New York: McGraw-Hill Book
Company, Inc., 1931)V P* 290; Royal J, Schmidt, Versailles 
and the Ruhr : Seedbed of World War II (The Hague : Martinus
Nijhoff, 1968), pp. 7-8; Joseph King, The Ruhr. The History 
of the French Occupation of the Ruhr : Its Meaning and Con­
sequences (London: British Bureau for Ruhr Information.
1924), p. 4; F. Lee Benns, European History Since 187O (New 
York: F . S. Crofts & Co., 1 9 3 w , p. 545 ; Guy Greer The
Ruhr-Lorraine Industrial Problem: A Study of the Economic
Inter-Dependence of the Two Regions and Their Relation to 
the Reparation Question (New York: The Macmillan Company,
1925), p. 179" Although it has been alleged that the Comité 
des Forges, representing the French mining interests, urged 
the occupation of the Ruhr, Schuman stated that he found no 
convincing evidence to substantiate the charge; see War and 
Diplomacy, p. 279.
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Several political motives also led France to occupy 
the Ruhr. One of these was closely related to economic 
goals: because France believed that the Germans had will­
fully evaded reparations payments, it wanted to force them 
to pay in order to break their resistance. In addition, 
the French government realized that failing to insist upon 
payment would mean giving up its most important method of 
controlling German affairs. Feeling that German resistance 
to fulfillment of the Versailles Treaty left it no choice,
France intended the occupation as a showdown and a method
4of forcing Germany to cede.
Additional political considerations played a role 
in creating widespread French support for the Ruhr venture. 
Some French nationalists, such as Marshal Foch, wanted their 
country to move into the Ruhr in order to regain the posi­
tion held in I918 and make itself supreme in Europe. They 
believed that control of the Ruhr resources could, by weak­
ening Germany, enhance France's power position.^ France
René Albrecht-Carrie, France Europe and the Two 
World Wars (Geneva: Librairie E. Droz, I96O), p^ 13^;
Wolfers, Britain and France, p. 58; Jacques Chastenet,
Vingt ans d'histoire diplomatique. 1919-1939 (Geneva: 
Editions du Milieu du Monde, 1945), p. 2o4; Miquel, Poin­
care , p. 456; René Pinon, L'avenir de 1'Entente franco- 
anglaise (Paris : Librairie Pion, 1924), p^ 138; Raymond
Recouly, De Bismarck a Poincaré. Soixante ans de diplomatie 
républicaine (Paris : les Editions de France, 1932), pl 491• 
T. W. Foerster wrote that Poincaré moved into the Ruhr to 
force Germany to pay reparations and thus "re-establish the 
reign of law in Europe"; see Ei^ope and the German Question 
(New York: Sheed & Ward, 1940), p. 279•
^Viscount D'Abernon, An Ambassador of Peace. Pages 
from the Diary of Viscount D'Abernon (Berlin, 1920-1926)%
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also decided to act, as mentioned earlier, because it felt 
that the Versailles Treaty was being evaded in two ways. 
First, of course, Germany had failed to make the required 
reparations payments and deliveries and had failed to disarm 
according to Treaty stipulations and try the Kaiser and war 
c r i m i n a l s S e c o n d ,  the French believed that they had been 
constantly called upon to make concessions which constituted 
an evasion of the Treaty: during several of the twenty-
three international conferences held between 1920 and 1923» 
they had sacrificed part of their claims. France, feeling 
that it had been humiliated since World War I and sensing 
itself estranged from Britain, decided to defend its inter­
ests and to prove that it could, if necessary, enforce the
7Versailles settlement alone. The occupation was also
Vol. II: The Years of Crisis: June 1922-December 1923
(London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1929)» P% 23; Jacques
Chastenet, Histoire de la Troisième République, Vol. V:
Les années d*illusions, 19l6-1931 (Paris: Librairie 
Hachette, I960), pp. 103-104; Raoul Persil, Alexandre 
Millerand, 1859-1943 (Paris: Société d'éditions Françaises
et Internationales, 1949), p. 150; S. William Halperin, 
Germany Tried Democracy: A Political History of the Reich
from 1918-1933 (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc.,
1965), P . 247.
6Lindley Fraser, Germany Between Two Wars : A Study
of Propaganda and War Guilt (London: Oxford University
Press, 1945), p. ^9; Raymond Leslie Buell, Europe : A
History of Ten Years (New York: The Macmillan Company,
1929), pp. 40-42.
^Harold Nicolson, Curzon: The Last Phase, 1919-
1925 : A Study in Post-War Diplomacy (Boston: Houghton
MifflinCompany, 1934), p. 192; Lieutenant-Colonel Reboul, 
Pourquoi nous sommes dans la Ruhr (Paris : Berger-Levrault,
1923), p. V ; Jules Laroche, Au Quai d'Orsay avec Briand et 
Poincaré, 1913-1926 (Paris : Hachette, 1957)» P* 179 *
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intended as a showdown with England. For four years Lloyd 
George had, in conference after conference, destroyed 
French confidence and made Frenchmen feel that England was 
forcing France to play a subordinate role. They felt that 
Poincare could lead them in the fight to restore French
g
prestige and make France independent of England.
France's chronic sense of insecurity also led toward 
the occupation. Some of the French leaders believed that 
Germany was planning a coup and building armaments in the 
Ruhr valley itself. They declared that France invaded the 
Ruhr to solve the problem of security against future German
Qattack. Adding to the insecurity was the fact that France
L.-L. Klotz, De la guerre a la paix. Souvenirs et documents 
(Paris : PayoTl 19r5), pT 150; René Pinon, Le redressement
de la politique française, 1922 (Paris: Perrin et Cie.,
1923), P. ii; W» M. Jordan, Grenat Britain, France, and the 
German Problem, 1918-1939 : A Study of Anglo-French Rela­
tions in the Making and Maintenance of the Versailles Set­
tlement (London: Oxford University Press, 1943), p. 52;
Huddleston, Poincare, p. 17*
oHuddleston, Poincare, pp. 19-20; Wolfers, Britain 
and France, p. 58; Holborn, Collapse, p. 120; Simonds,
Europe Made Peace, p. 242; Chastenet, Vingt ans, p. 204.
^Schuman, War and Diplomacy, p. 280; H. Brenier,
Why France is in the Ruhr (Marseille: Comité de Relations
Internationales, 1923), pp. 16-1?; Greer, Ruhr-Lorraine 
Problem, p. 1?8. During the period of the occupation sur­
veyed in this study, statements made in French newspapers 
and journals and in public pronouncements most frequently 
mentioned reparations and security as the objects of the 
occupation. Sometimes the former appeared to be the goal, 
at other times the latter. Bertrand de Jouvenel quotes a 
November l6 , 1923, speech in which Poincare was discussing 
the 166,000,000 net cost of the occupation to that point. 
Speaking of the deficit, Poincare said: "It is not too
expensive for buying our security"; see D 'une guerre a 
11autre, Vol. I: De Versailles a Locarno (Paris: Calman-
Levy, Editeurs, 1940), p. 3l4.
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felt abandoned because both Britain and the United States 
misunderstood and showed little sympathy for their former 
ally.^"
Finally, Poincare decided to occupy the Ruhr because 
French public opinion, which he had helped shape by speech 
and pen, urged him to do so. After nine years of war-time 
suffering and post-war disappointment and disillusionment, 
the French people called for a new course, and the govern­
ment had to show that it could act to force German compli­
ance with the T r e a t y . T h e  President of the Council re­
membered that Briand had been criticized for failing to be 
firm with both Germany and Britain. In addition. President
Millerand, Marshal Foch, and most Cabinet members were
12calling for the occupation.
William L. Shirer, The Collapse of the Third Re­
public; An Inquiry into the Fall of France in 1940 (New 
York: Pocket Books, 197l)i P 126; Jean-Claude Favez, Le
Reich devant 1'occupation franco-belge de la Ruhr en 1923 
(Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1969), p. 59»
^^Chastenet, Poincare, p. 299; Henri Lichtenberger, 
The Ruhr Conflict: A Report Supplementing the Report En­
titled "Relations Between France and Germany" (Washington: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1923)» P« 4; 
Huddleston, Poincare, p. 137» Schuman, War and Diplomacy, 
p. 277» Simonds, Europe Made Peace, p. 105; Maximilian 
Harden, Germany, France and England, trans. and ed. by 
William Cranston Lawton (London: Brentano's, Ltd., 1924),
p. l86.
André François-Poncet, De Versailles a Potsdam-—  
La France et le problème allemand contemporain. 1919-1945 
(Paris: Flammarion 1948). p. 101; Pierre Renouvin, His^
toire des relations internationales. Vol. VII: Les crises
du XXe siècle, I. De 1914 a 192^ (Paris : Librairie
Hachette, 1957), pp. 250-251; Maxime Mourin, Histoire des
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Several factors, then, interacted to bring about 
the Ruhr occupation, and throughout its course there was 
to be confusion about French goals. Poincare wanted to 
make Germany pay reparations in order to help solve French 
financial difficulties, to enforce the Versailles Treaty, 
to exert some control over Germany’s affairs, and, it seems, 
to retard Germany's industrial and financial recovery. He 
believed that these results would also help protect France 
against the threat of German aggression. Although Foch and 
some French nationalists viewed the Ruhr venture as a po­
tential means of territorial aggrandizement, Poincare 
failed to share their aspirations. Repeatedly he was to 
state that France had no annexationist ambitions in the 
Ruhr, and when Germany surrendered in September he was to 
refuse to discuss any attempts to detach part of the Ruhr.
Even though Lord Crewe, British Ambassador to France,
reported on January 9 that France had made no decision to
13occupy the Ruhr, three pieces of correspondence dated 
January 8, 1923, reveal that France had made concrete plans
% % % nations europeenes, Vol. I : De la premiere a la deuxieme
guerre mondiale (l9l8-1939) (Paris: Payot, 1962), p. 90;
Persil, Millerand, pp. 149-150. Mourin, as well as several 
other writers, said that Poincare would have preferred ac­
tion which would not bring British disapproval. They indi­
cate that at the last moment he hesitated, and Millerand 
pushed him into action; see Mourin, Nations europeenes. I,
50.
^^Crewe to FO, No. 28, January 9, 1923, FO 371/8702,
c 509/313/18.
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for the occupation. First, in a letter to Louis Barthou, 
French delegate to the Reparation Commission, Poincare en­
closed a copy of four documents; a letter to General 
Dégoutté, Commander of the French Army of the Rhine; a 
letter to Monsieur Coste, Inspector General of Mines; a 
proclamation to the population of the Ruhr ; and a notifi­
cation to the German government. He explained that he had 
asked the Belgian government to make a similar notification 
to the German government at the appointed time and added 
that the Belgian and Italian governments had, at his re­
quest, agreed to send engineers to Düsseldorf to join the
l4Coste mission.
In his letter to Coste, Poincare sent two enclosures
setting forth the powers of the control mission to be estab-
15lished at Essen. The first enclosure, which had no date, 
created and placed under Coste a Mission of Control of the 
Mines and Factories of the occupied territories (Mission de 
Contrôle des mines et des usines, commonly referred to as 
MICUM). It gave vast powers to the MICUM--including the 
right to compel cooperation from administrative organs, 
chambers of commerce, and industrial associâtions--and 
authorized MICUM officials to enter offices, mines, and
Poincare to Barthou, January 8 , 1923i in France, 
Archives nationales, collection number F30 [Finances. Ad­
ministration centrale], carton $82. Archives nationales 
documents will hereafter be cited as follows : name of
document, date, A.N., collection number and carton.
^^Poincare to Coste, January 8 , 1923» A.N., f30 582.
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factories and demand access to all accounting records. 
German employees of both government and industry were to 
place themselves at the complete disposal of MICUM offi­
cials. The second enclosure, dated January 5, 1923i stated 
that after January 11, 1923, the coal distribution duties 
usually performed by the German Kohlensyndikat would be 
submitted to the approval of the MICUM, which could modify 
them when necessary. Should the Kohlensyndikat fail to 
make the necessary deliveries to the Entente countries and 
the occupied territories of the left bank of the Rhine, 
severe penalties would result.
Writing to General Dégoutté on January 8, Poincare 
sent a copy of his instructions to Coste. He placed Coste 
and all his personnel under Dégoutté's authority and in­
cluded a copy of the notification to be made to the popula­
tion of the Ruhr at the beginning of the occupation. Then 
the French premier emphasized that Dégoutté*s mission must 
be pacific in nature, having as its object only the protec­
tion of MICUM operations.
France had thus, by January 8, made the necessary 
preparations for the occupation. When would the move into 
the Ruhr begin? One would assume that Raymond Poincare,
^^Pouvoirs de la Mission de Contrôle, A.N., f30 
382; Contrôle de la repartition des charbons, January 3, 
1923. A.N., F30 582.
^^Poincaré to Dégoutté, January 8, 1923, A.N., 
f30 582.
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the lawyer and advocate of strict enforcement of the Treaty, 
would act only after he had both a legal and a moral pre­
text for invading the Ruhr. In the documents, for example, 
Poincare recalled that on December 26, 1922, the Reparation 
Commission had declared Germany in default on timber deliv­
eries, but realized that the Ruhr had relatively small 
timber resources. If, however, the Reparation Commission 
would declare Germany in default on coal deliveries, France 
would have the necessary justification. Barthou, the 
French delegate, had already proposed that the Commission 
declare Germany in default because it had delivered only 
11,710,365 of the 13,864,100 tons of coal demanded during 
1922 and had been behind in deliveries in 1921 as well.
When the Reparation Commission on January 9 decided by a 
three-to-one vote, Sir John Bradbury opposing, that Ger­
many was in voluntary default in coal deliveries, Poincare, 
according to the secondary sources consulted in this study, 
used the decision as justification for the move into the 
Ruhr.^®
Although many works imply that Poincare would not 
have acted without the declaration, portions of his Janu­
ary 8 letter to Dégoutté, as well as those to Barthou and
iflEtienne Weill-Raynal, Lea reparations allemandes 
et la France, Vol. II: L*Application de I'etat des paie­
ments , 1'occupation de la Rul^ et 1'institution du Plan 
Dawes imai 1921-avril 1924) (Paris: Nouvelles éditions
latines, 194?), P» 36Ô; Bonnefous, Histoire politique, III, 
345; Schuman, War and Diplomacy, pp. 200-209•
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Coste, reveal that France definitely intended to occupy 
the Ruhr whether or not the Reparation Commission signaled 
German default in coal deliveries. The President of the 
Council and Foreign Minister called Dégoutté’s attention 
to the proclamation to the Ruhr population, the notifica­
tion to the German government, and one of the enclosures 
sent to Coste. For each of the three documents alternative 
opening paragraphs, marked A and B, were given. He directed 
that alternative B was to be used if the Reparation Commis­
sion the next day declared Germany in default on coal deliv-
19eries and alternative A if it failed to do so. The Com­
mission, as indicated, gave Poincare the legal pretext he 
desired.
Wasting no time, France and Belgium on January 10 
informed the German government of the action they planned 
to take. In the notification to Germany, France declared 
that because Germany had, as noted by the Reparation Com­
mission, defaulted in coal and timber deliveries it was,
in accordance with Paragraphs 17 and 18 of Annex II to
20Part VIII of the Versailles Treaty, sending a control 
mission of engineers into the Ruhr to supervise the activi­
ties of the Kohlensyndikat. The notification asked that 
the German officials cooperate with the MICUM. France, it 
affirmed, had no intention of carrying out a military
19
See Appendix II
Poincare to Dégoutté, January 8, 1923» cited above. 
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operation or a political occupation and was sending only 
enough troops to guard the MICUM and guarantee fulfillment 
of its duties. The proclamation to the people of the Ruhr 
explained more fully the nature of the occupation. It 
stated that the French and Belgian governments planned to 
cause no change in the ordinary life of the residents, "who 
can continue to work in order and tranquility." The two 
occupying powers encouraged the German government to assist 
the MICUM and the troops sent to protect it and warned lo­
cal authorities and workers that if they created difficul­
ties for either MICUM officials or military personnel,
21coercive measures and sanctions would immediately result.
On January 11, 1923i the MICUM, accompanied by two 
French infantry divisions, one cavalry division, and a 
Belgian detachment, moved into Essen. General Dégoutté 
declared a state of siege, stated that German civil author­
ities were under the orders of French military officials, 
demanded that all German citizens in the newly occupied 
territory surrender their arms, and forbade the publication
of anything designed to incite disorder and resistance to
22French and Belgian troops.
^^Notification au gouvernement allemand, A.N., f30 
382; Proclamation à la population de la Ruhr, January 11, 
1923, A.N., F30 582.
22Arnold Joseph Toynbee, Survey of International 
Affairs, 1924 (London: Oxford University Press, I928),
p. 270.
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The British government had learned officially of
the impending French move two days before the occupation
began* Saint-Aulaire, French Ambassador to England, called
at the Foreign Office and said that since the Reparation
Commission had that day declared Germany in default on coal
deliveries, France was going to act upon the rights given
it in Paragraph l8 of Annex II to Part VIII of the Treaty.
The French government interpreted the word "respective" in
that paragraph to mean that it could act alone, for Austen
Chamberlain had over two years ago in the House of Commons
23made a similar interpretation. France, therefore, was
sending engineers into the Ruhr, and it hoped that Britain
would soon do likewise. Saint-Aulaire said in closing that
French troops were to accompany the engineers only because
the British government had refused to participate in the 
24occupation.
Saint-Aulaire was referring to the October 28,
1920, statement by Austen Chamberlain, Chancellor of the 
Exchequer. Chamberlain answered a question about the 
British government's decision not to exercise its rights 
under Paragraph I8 to seize the property of German nation­
als in Britain if Germany voluntarily defaulted in repara­
tions payments. He stated: ". . . I would say that the
words of the paragraph clearly leave it 'to the respective 
Governments' to determine what action may be necessary 
under the paragraph." See Great Britain, Parliament, House 
of Commons, Official Report, Parliamentary Debates, Fifth 
Series, Vol. 1331 col. 1922. Parliamentary debates will 
hereafter be cited as follows : Parliamentary Debates,
House of Commons or House of Lords, volume number, and 
column.
24Memorandum by Ralph F. Wigram, Foreign Office 
Second Secretary, January 9, 1923, FO 37I/8702, C 541/313/18.
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The following day, January 10, Saint-Aulaire called 
on Sir Eyre Crowe, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs, to receive Prime Minister Bonar Law's re­
sponse to his verbal communication of the previous evening. 
Through Crowe, Bonar Law informed the French Ambassador 
that the British government was unable to agree that only 
British abstention necessitated the sending of French and 
Belgian troops into the Ruhr, for at the recent London and 
Paris Conferences he had said that it would be necessary to 
send troops if any Allied officials, even British ones, en­
tered the Ruhr. Crowe added that because the British gov­
ernment, as Bonar Law stated at the close of the Paris Con­
ference, could in no way participate in or accept responsi­
bility for measures enacted by France, it could send no en­
gineers. In closing, he stated that the Prime Minister
wished to avoid discussing technical questions pertaining
25to the legality of French action.
From the beginning of the occupation, some key French 
diplomats tried to avoid irritating Britain as much as pos­
sible. In a telegram received by the Quai d'Orsay on Jan­
uary 10, Saint-Aulaire reported that the French military 
attache had found the British War Office concerned about 
the reactions that French troop movements on the Rhine 
would produce on British public opinion. The Ambassador,
^^Note by Sir Eyre Crowe, January 10, 1923i 
FO 371/8702, C 601/313/18.
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who felt that British public opinion shared this concern, 
suggested that Prance give more precise information about 
its plans and warned that if the British learned of French 
actions only through German sources they would be much more 
perturbed. At the beginning of the second week of the occu­
pation, Poincare urged Paul Tirard, President of the Inter- 
Allied Rhineland High Commission, to instruct all local 
French authorities to do everything possible to avoid inci­
dents in the British occupation zone which might necessitate 
the intervention of British troops.
In spite of these efforts to avoid friction with 
Britain, Poincare in his January 11 Senate address criti­
cized British post-war policy, devoting more of the speech 
to British shortcomings than to German misdeeds. In his 
first appearance before the Senate since the day after the 
close of the London Conference, he began by giving an ac­
count of the major diplomatic events since that time.
First, he pointed out that at the London Conference France 
had not been alone in requiring pledges from Germany, for 
both Belgium and Italy had concurred. Thus it was England, 
not France, that had isolated itself on the question of 
productive pledges.
Discussing the French plan presented at the Paris 
Conference, Poincare stated that he had tried to make it
Saint-Aulaire to Poincare, No. 22-23 [January 9 
or 10, 1923]1 A.N., AJ9 [Haute Commission interalliée du 
Rhénanie] 3918; Poincare to Tirard, No. 43, January 19, 
1923, A.N., AJ9 3904.
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acceptable to the British government by discarding "any
appearance of military or political combination" and
eliminating the re-establishment of a customs cordon sur-
27rounding the occupied territory. He then outlined the 
French plan and said that it was a very moderate program 
which sought only modest guarantees to be exacted should 
the Allies grant Germany a moratorium. Despite the moder­
ation of the French plan» the British had disagreed with 
France, Italy, and Belgium. Although he regretted this, 
Poincare was not surprised because for several years and 
in numerous conferences France and Britain had discussed 
the reparations problem with very little success.
Poincare next criticized the Bonar Law plan. He 
prefaced his remarks by saying that because the Treaty of 
Versailles was a "painfully obtained minimum" less favor­
able to French interests than desired, France would not 
let it be dismantled even though the British regarded the 
Treaty as "a theoretical maximum from which it would be
28desirable to retreat as much as possible." Establishing 
the finance council and the arbitral committee proposed in 
the Bonar Law plan would, according to him, modify the 
Treaty, and France's interests would not be protected by
^France, Journal officiel de la République fran­
çaise, Débats Parlementaires, Sénat, January 12, 19231 
p. 30. Débats Parlementaires entries will hereafter be 
cited as follows : J.O., Senat or Chambre, date, page.
28‘̂ °Ibid., p. 31.
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those bodies. In addition, the plan proposed severely re­
ducing France's credit. France could accept neither this 
nor the four-year moratorium to be granted to Germany, for 
during the moratorium period coercion could be applied only 
with the unanimous consent of the Allies, and experience in 
the Reparation Commission had shown that unanimity was dif­
ficult to attain.
Then he mentioned reasons why the French government 
had that day taken action. It did so because of the need 
to balance the budget and rebuild the ruins in ten depart­
ments and because of Germany's refusal to pay. The Repara­
tion Commission had, by its January 9 declaration, given 
France the opportunity to collect from the Germans, who 
possessed sufficient wood and coal but had refused to make 
deliveries. Whether the subject was roads, nitrogen, or 
anything else, Germany had always delayed in complying with 
Treaty provisions. France had reached the end of its pa­
tience and had moved into the Ruhr to execute the Treaty of 
Versailles. He added that if England had participated in 
enforcing sanctions and requiring guarantees it would have
been unnecessary to send soldiers into the Ruhr, for the
29Germans would not have considered resistance. Finally, 
he discussed motives again: "We are going in search of
coal and it is all there. . , France felt no intoxica­
tion with victory and was not trying to humiliate or crush
^^Ibid.. pp. 31-32.
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a defeated people. "She only demands respect for obliga­
tions undertaken and, above all, her security and repara-
30tions for her damages." Thus the President of the Council 
had, on the opening day of the occupation, affirmed the 
French desire for both reparations and security.
On the same day, Poincare, greeted by enthusiastic 
cheers, appeared before the Chamber of Deputies and pre­
sented another lengthy explanation and defense of his poli­
cies. When Léon Blum, a leader of the Socialist party, 
criticized the occupation, disorder ensued, causing the 
session to be suspended briefly. Poincare then asked that 
all questions on foreign policy be postponed until the 
first Friday in February. In the scene which followed, 
the left and right hurled insults at each other, but when 
the vote occurred, the Chamber approved Poincare's request 
by a 478 to 86 vote.^^
As reflected in the press during the first two weeks 
of the year, French public opinion concerning the repara­
tions issue and the alliance with Britain moved from cre­
scendo to diminuendo and then back to crescendo. When the 
Bonar Law plan was published on January 3, bitter disap­
pointment and anger filled French newspapers. læ Matin,
^°Ibid., p. 32.
.0., Chambre, January 12, 1923, pp. 14-26. The 
Senate had earlier that day, without a formal vote, agreed 
to postpone interpellation on foreign policy until after 
February 2. See J .0., Senat, January 12, 1923» p. 32.
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a non-partisan organ, said that the plan was the poorest
offer Britain had ever made, and the semi-official Temps
concluded a rather violent article by saying that the ties
which bound Britain and France during the war had disap- 
32peared. The note of intense anglophobia persisted for 
about two days and then began to wane at the close of the 
Paris Conference. Although Philippe Millet, writing for 
the popular Petit Parisien, blamed the Bonar Law plan 
for Anglo-French disagreement, he expressed disappointment 
at the failure to reach an agreement in Paris and, unlike 
his colleagues in most other papers, hoped that the rift 
between the two countries would not widen so much that it 
could not later be bridged. Temps, noting that the
Anglo-French separation took place cordially, stated that 
France, Belgium, and Italy had to deal with the crisis as 
best as they could and that their task would be more diffi­
cult because the British attitude would encourage German 
resistance. In Le Journal des Débats, a newspaper of the
right-center, Auguste Gauvain spoke sorrowfully of the
33basic disagreement among the Allies.
Most Paris newspapers praised both the Franco-Belgian 
occupation of the Ruhr and Poincare's January 11 speeches.
32Le Matin, January 3, 1923» P» 1» Le Temps, Janu­
ary 4, 1923» p. 1. See Appendix IV for a brief discussion 
of French newspapers surveyed in this study.
^^Le Petit Parisien» January 5» 1923 » P- 1: Le Temps 
January 6, 1923» p. 1» Le Journal des Debats, January 6,
1923» p. 1.
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Typifying the general tone of relief that the government 
had acted were the opening words of an article in Le Petit 
Parisien; "It is done ; we have turned the key and the door 
is wide open." While it lauded Millerand and Poincare for 
personifying the will and policy of France, Le Temps warned 
that it would take time before financial results of the 
occupation were visible, L*Écho de Paris stated that Poin­
care had defended French rights with authority and force, 
presented very clearly German bad faith and ill will, and 
justified the position of the French government in the re­
cent conferences. On the other hand, L*Oeuvre and L*Ere 
Nouvelle, organs of the Bloc des Gauches, called attention 
to the part of the speech which stated that the Ruhr pledges 
might become productive slowly. L'Oeuvre said in an inci­
sive article that while waiting to see the result of the 
Ruhr venture it could weigh the factors "for" and "against." 
The article listed more factors "against" than "for."
When France informed Britain of its plans to send 
troops and engineers into the Ruhr, a critical phase in 
the history of the occupation began. As the troops ad­
vanced, the eyes of the diplomatic world focused upon 
London as much as upon the Ruhr itself, for Britain, the 
only nation capable of opposing France, held a crucial
Le Petit Parisien. January 12, 1923i P* 1; Le 
Temps, January 12, 1923, p. 1; L'Écho de Paris, January 12, 
19231 p. 1; L*Oeuvre, January 13» 1923, P* 1»
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position. What action would the British take in face of
the French resort to force to execute the Treaty? Would
35they assist or try to make obstinate France withdraw? 
Although the British government on January 10 shunned par­
ticipation in French coercive measures, it stopped at that 
point and neither opposed the occupation nor took a firm 
stand against the French. For this it was criticized by 
those who felt that a strong British protest at the begin­
ning of the occupation might have caused France to hesitate 
or withdraw. While the government was passive, a large 
segment of the British public attacked the French moves, 
and this encouraged Germany to resist, hoping for British
36aid and a breakup of the Entente.
Since research in the British Foreign Office corre­
spondence revealed no official British protest against 
French Ruhr activities during the early weeks of the occu­
pation, one wonders why the British government failed to 
condemn action which many of its officials felt would be 
unsuccessful and detrimental to the peace and prosperity
^^Albrecht-Carrie, France. Europe, pp. 133» 135* 
Erich Eyck said that had England collaborated with France, 
Poincare would have been forced constantly to heed British 
wishes; see Erich Eyck, A History of the Weimar Republic, 
trans. by Harlan Hanson and Robert G. L. Waite, Vol. I: 
From the Collapse of the Empire to Hindenberg's Election 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts : Harvard University Press,
1962), p. 232.
^^Lichtenberger, Ruhr, p. 2; Huddleston, Poincare, 
p. 138; King, Ruhr, p. 9» Eyck, Weimar Republic, I, 232.
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of Europe. Although none of them provides an entirely
satisfactory explanation, several reasons could be advanced
for British behavior in the early stages of the occupation.
First, Bonar Law had promised British neutrality and wanted
to do nothing that would hinder the French government.
Second, as Miles W. Lampson, Foreign Office Counsellor,
told an official of the United States Embassy on January 9»
Britain disagreed with France only over the method to be
used to make Germany pay : it too was anxious to collect as
much as possible and would be glad if events proved that it
37had misjudged the effectiveness of French methods. Fi­
nally, the absence in Lausanne of Lord Curzon, Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs, accounted for part of Britain's 
inaction.
Not only did the British government refrain from 
condemning France: it also failed to respond to German
protests against French and Belgian action. When Herr 
Sthamer, the German Ambassador, on January 11 officially 
protested and declared Franco-Belgian action illegal, both 
Crowe and Lampson concluded that no answer was required. 
Later in the month Sthamer protested special ordinances of 
the Rhineland Commission concerning coal distribution and
^^Weill-Raynal, Reparations, II, 371» Saint-Aulaire 
to Poincare, No. l48, February 14, 1923» A.N., AJ9 3918; 
Foreign Office Minute (Central Department), January 8 , 
1923» FO 371/8768, C 593/593/18; Minute by Lampson, Janu­
ary 9 , 1923» FO 371/8627» C 545/1/18. See Appendix III 
for a partial list of diplomatic, political, and military 
personnel to whom reference is made in this study.
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the seizure of customs, and Lampson, Curzon, and Bonar Law 
decided that no reply should be made. The same thing hap­
pened again when the German government condemned the expul­
sion of thirty-eight German officials and their families,
and as late as March the British government continued to
”î8turn a deaf ear to numerous German complaints.
Instead of responding positively to German protests 
by officially condemning France, Britain in the earliest 
stages of the occupation assisted it in the crucial matter 
of transportation. The British zone of occupation in the 
Rhineland lay between France and the Ruhr, and the major 
railroad connections between the French zone and Düsseldorf 
passed through it. On January 7» General Dégoutté informed 
Colonel Fuller, at General Headquarters, British Rhine Array, 
that he had received orders from the French government to 
begin a preliminary concentration of troops. To do this, 
he would need to utilize the railroads in the British zone 
in order to send sixty-six troop trains to Düsseldorf, and 
he requested Fuller to insure their safe transit.
British Foreign Office officials considered the 
French request the following day. Although some of them 
felt that it entailed a legal breach of the Rhineland
O 0Minutes on communications from Sthamer to FO, Jan­
uary 11, 1923, FO 371/8702, C 655/313/18; January 23, 1923. 
FO 371/8706, C 1407/313/18; January 26, 1923, FO 371/8707,
C 1693/313/18; Saint-Aulaire to Poincare, No. 212, March 2, 
1923, A.N., AJ9 3897.
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Agreement, they recalled that in March, 1921, troops had 
been moved through the Rhineland in the occupation of Düs­
seldorf. Lampson concluded that since Bonar Law had prom­
ised continued friendship and since the Rhine Army had made 
no objections, it would be both unwise and useless to at­
tempt to prohibit French movement through the British zone. 
Sir Eyre Crowe agreed with him that the British forces 
should follow a "friendly but passive attitude throughout" 
and request instructions concerning cases in which they 
were in doubt. On January 9» Tirard telegraphed Poincare 
that Lord Kilmarnock, British High Commissioner of the 
Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission, had informed him 
that British military authorities in Cologne had agreed
to protect the railways in order to assure passage of
39French troops.
At this point, the attitude of Lord Kilmarnock 
should be considered, for during the occupation he was 
the most important British official in the occupied Rhine­
land. Along with many other British residents in the 
Rhineland, Kilmarnock sympathized with France and believed
that the French could not afford to be defeated in their 
4oRuhr venture. Even though Britain failed to approve the
^^General Headquarters, Rhine Army, to War Office, 
January 7, 1923» and Minutes on this telegram, FO 371/8703, 
C 680/313/18; Tirard to Poincare, No. 2, January 9» 1923, 
A.N., AJ9 4312.
^^Other British personnel in the Rhineland, includ­
ing General Alex J . Godley, General Officer in Command of
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occupation it could not let France be defeated, he said,
for if the Germans won "the last shot of the allies would
have been fired and would have failed of its effect. No
other really effective means of pressure would remain and
Germany would be in a position practically to defy further
execution of the Treaty of Versailles." In mid-February,
Kilmarnock declared that British policy until that time
4lhad worked more to German than French advantage. The 
attitude of its officials on the Rhine undoubtedly played 
a role in the British government’s failure to protest 
Franco-Belgian action.
Even before French and Belgian troops marched into 
the Ruhr, Kilmarnock sensed himself about to be plunged 
into the maelstrom of diplomatic activity. In a January 10 
telegram, marked "Urgent," he reported that impending French 
moves were already raising delicate questions upon which the 
Rhineland High Commission would be asked to make decisions. 
He requested instructions about the line of action he should 
take and asked if he "should assent to measures of a minor
the British Army of the Rhine, sought to facilitate the 
French task as much as possible without disobeying their 
own instructions; see Saint-Aulaire to Poincare, No. 92, 
January 2?, 1923, A.N., AJ9 3918; Auguste de Saint-Aulaire, 
Confession d’un vieux diplomate (Paris: Flammarion, 1953)»
p. 651; Paul Tirard, La France sur le Rhin. Douze années 
d'occupation rhénane (Paris: Librairie Pion, 1930), p. 396 ;
B, T. Reynolds, Prelude to Hitler (London: Jonathan Cape,
1933), p. 66.
4lKilmarnock to FO, No. 15, January 23, 1923,
FO 371/8706, C 1300/313/18; Kilmarnock to FO, No. 55, Feb­
ruary 10, 1923, PO 371/8712, C 2581/313/18.
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character calculated to facilitate French operations. . . 
Since Foreign Office personnel had as early as January 8 
discussed the impact French action could have on British 
participation in both the Rhineland High Commission and the 
Reparation Commission, they were able to respond quickly. 
First, they reminded Kilmarnock that because Bonar Law had 
recently assured France of continued friendship, the British 
government wanted to minimize the ill effects of French ac­
tion upon Anglo-French relations. He was, therefore, to 
continue attending High Commission meetings. Should the 
Commission have to deal with any questions growing out of 
French independent action, he must refuse to take part in
those decisions and declare that neither he nor his govern-
/|2ment associated themselves with them.
The British press in the first two weeks of J anuary 
failed, for the most part, to follow Foreign Office policy 
of abstaining from overt criticism of French action. Pre­
dictably, the Conservative Daily Telegraph and the semi­
official and moderately-Conservative The Times were, though 
disturbed about French attitudes and moves, guarded in their 
criticism. The Liberal Manchester Guardian and Labour's 
Daily Herald attacked Prance. Unlike the other papers, the 
Daily Mail, which claimed to have the world's largest net 
daily sale, took a strongly pro-French and anti-German stand.
42Kilmarnock to FO, No. 3* January 10, 1923,
FO 371/8702, C 566/313/18; Curzon to Kilmarnock, No. 35, 
January 11, 1923, FO 371/8768, C 593/593/18.
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After the breakdown of the Paris Conference, most of 
these papers reflected a sense of uncertainty about impend­
ing French moves and their impact upon Anglo-French rela­
tions. The Times praised the Bonar Law plan, expressed 
concern about the risks France was taking upon itself, and 
said that French independent action would deal the Ver­
sailles Treaty a heavy blow. It refused to say that the 
Entente Cordiale had been broken even though Britain and 
France were following separate lines of action. The Daily 
Telegraph felt that good could result from getting down to 
the fundamentals in the reparations controversy. When, 
however, French forces moved into the Ruhr, opinion di­
verged. France, declared the Manchester Guardian, was 
trying to detach the Rhineland from Germany, and British 
forces must stay in Cologne to prevent it. On January 10, 
The Times stated that although the French plan to exert 
pressure on the important German industrialists would fail, 
Britain could only stand aside and wait. Five days later 
it labeled French action "a sheer disaster," but neverthe­
less reminded its readers of the disappointments France had 
suffered since 1919. While the Daily Herald and Labour 
leaders in England, France, and Belgium were condemning the 
French march into the Ruhr, the Daily Mail entitled its Jan­
uary 11 leading article "God-Speed to FranceI" The article
& ÔThe Times (London), January 5i 1923i P, 12; Janu- 
ary 8, 1923, p. 11; Daily Telegraph, January 5, 1923, p. 8.
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said that France was pursuing the correct course and that 
"for the first time Germany will have to think seriously
kkabout paying up." Thus press opinion in Britain was as 
divided and uncertain as the government itself.
Before returning to an account of the diplomacy of 
the Ruhr, it would be helpful to take a glimpse at those 
British and French figures who were most directly responsi­
ble for foreign policy during the early weeks of the occu­
pation. When 1923 opened. Lord Curzon was in Lausanne, and 
Prime Minister Bonar Law had to deal with the reparations 
crisis. Although he grasped economic problems and had been 
interested in the reparations question as Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, Bonar Law had never been seriously interested in 
foreign affairs and had played an important part in none of 
the major reparations conferences. Nevertheless, it was he 
who had to face Poincare in the Paris Conference, and Curzon 
quickly began to criticize his handling of the Conference. 
That Curzon was critical of Bonar Law should be no surprise,
f t  A _Manchester Guardian, January 11, 1923» P» 6; The 
Times (London), January 10, 1923» P- 11; January 15» 1923 » 
p. 11; Daily Herald, January 15» 1923» p. 3» Daily Mail, 
January 11, 1923» P* 6. Beginning January 9» the Daily 
Mail in every issue printed letters to the editor applaud­
ing his stand on the Franco-German situation. Most of 
these letter writers sympathized with France, believed that 
a club must be used to make Germany pay, and felt that the 
editor was standing almost alone in upholding the French 
position. On January 9 there were about five letters, and 
by January 13 the number had increased to approximately 
twenty.
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for he held a low opinion of many of his associates. That
he should condemn his chief's handling of a reparations
conference is somewhat amazing, for he did not understand
economics, was bewildered by the reparations problem, and
Lkknew little about Continental politics.
Curzon, one of the most intelligent and industrious 
men to direct British foreign policy in the twentieth cen­
tury, had hoped to revive the prestige of the Foreign Of­
fice, which had declined under Lloyd George. Instead, it 
plummeted while he was in control, and for this he was par­
tially responsible. Because the Foreign Secretary tried to 
do all the work himself and cared little for his Foreign 
Office colleagues, whom he frequently insulted, both they
46and foreign diplomats had difficulty in working with him.
^Robert Blake, The Unknown Prime Minister. The 
Life and Times of Andrew^Bonar Law. 1858-1923 (London:
Eyre and Spot'tisWode, 1955^» PP- 482-483, 4o9; Nicolson, 
Curzon, p. $8; Earl of Ronaldshay, The Life of Curzon (3 
vols.; London: Ernest Benn, Ltd., 1928), III, 345.
^^Nicolson, Curzon, p. 5; Gordon A. Craig, "The 
British Foreign Office from Grey to Austen Chamberlain," 
in The Diplomats, 1919-1939, Vol. I: The Twenties, ed. by
Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert (New York; Atheneum, 
1967)1 pp. 26, 28, 32-33; Saint-Aulaire, Confession, pp. 
547-548; Leonard O. Mosley, Curzon. The End of an Epoch 
(London: Longmans, I96O), p. 195. George M, Young said
that Curzon was "impetuous, passionate and self-important," 
and A. J. P. Taylor called him "one of nature's rats"; see 
Young, Stanley Baldwin (London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1952),
p. 61; Taylor, English History, 1914-1945, Vol. XV of The 
Oxford History of England, ed. by Sir George Clark (15 
vols.; London: Oxford University Press, 1934-1965), p.
204. Mosley, by pointing to Curzon's severe illness in 
1923 and to his numerous domestic problems with his daugh­
ters and second wife, also sheds light on his behavior; 
see Curzon, pp. 198-200.
8i
In addition, his relationship with the Cabinet was often
stormy, for he considered his "office as a thing apart,
rarely to be submitted to Cabinet debate and even less
Lnfrequently to Cabinet dictation." The proud Curzon, 
unfortunately, also had difficult relations with the 
French. Harold Nicolson indicated that the Foreign Secre­
tary considered French demands with a spirit of "irritated 
personal competitiveness," and Lord Crewe's biographer 
talked of Curzon*s amazing capacity for hatred, which was 
directed toward loathing Poincare. Saint-Aulaire reported 
that during the critical first phase of the occupation his
task was easy, thanks to the loyalty of Bonar Law, whom he
48saw almost daily, and the absence of Curzon at Lausanne.
Assisting Curzon were three able men: Sir Eyre
Crowe, Sir William Tyrrell, and Lord Crewe. Crowe, who 
had worked at the Foreign Office since I885 and was cur­
rently Permanent Under-Secretary, rendered distinguished 
service. Both he and Assistant Under-Secretary Tyrrell, 
who had been Lord Grey's Private Secretary, were skilled.
47Keith Middlemas and John Barnes, Baldwin: A
Biography (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson^ 1969), P* 1?8.
48See Nicolson, Curzon, p. 195î James Pope-Hennessy, 
Lord Crewe : 1858-1945 : The Likeness of a Liberal (London:
Constable & Co., Ltd., 1955)» P» l64; Saint-Aulaire, Con­
fession, p. 652. Curzon wrote to Crewe : "I do not think
that in public life I have ever known a man of Poincare's 
position whose mind and nature were so essentially insular 
or whose temper was under such imperfect control"; see 
Curzon to Crewe, February 20, 19231 FO 800/l$4.
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perceptive, and courageous diplomats respected by all 
their associates. Lord Crewe had been Ambassador to 
France only since December, 1922, and his selection was 
unusual in that Curzon, a Conservative, asked the Opposi­
tion's official leader in the House of Lords to take the 
Paris post. Curzon took this unorthodox step, he said, 
because he considered Paris the pivot of British Conti­
nental diplomacy and wanted the Embassy headed by a man
of great authority and influence who loved France, knew
49it well, and would please the French official world.
Curzon and Poincare, though they detested each 
other, had some things in common. The French Foreign 
Minister and President of the Council, like Curzon, wanted 
little parliamentary interference with foreign policy di­
rection, preferred strong executive leadership, and wanted 
the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate to leave the ini­
tiative to him. His power was virtually unchecked, for 
parliament could criticize, but not construct. He, too, 
worked unbelievably long hours, but unlike Curzon he 
dealt closely with the Ruhr situation throughout the 
occupation, seldom taking a vacation, staying in tele­
phone contact with the Quai d'Orsay, and working on 
speeches and dispatches on the train when forced to be 
away.
^^Craig, "British Foreign Office," pp. 26-27; 
Pope-Hennessy, Crewe, pp. I56, I60.
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Poincare's temperament led him to do most of his
work alone, and he had few collaborators. He depended
most upon Peretti de la Rocca, Director of Political and
Commercial Affairs at the Quai d'Orsay since October, 1920.
The Political Director— who saw Poincare at least twice a
day, traveled with him and conducted many interviews for
him— reported that his relations with other diplomatic
personnel were business-like and firm, but cordial. The
French Ambassador to England, the Comte de Saint-Aulaire,
had been serving in that capacity since November, 1920.
Although Saint-Aulaire was in close personal touch with
Poincare, Curzon told Crewe that the Ambassador did not
50have his chief's confidence.
When French and Belgian troops and engineers occu­
pied the Essen district on January 11, 1923, the German 
government faced a dilemma: should it submit to the occu­
pation and make new reparations proposals, or should it 
resist Franco-Belgian efforts? Chancellor Wilhelm Cuno 
quickly labeled French action illegal, withdrew the German 
Ambassador from Paris and Minister from Brussels, and
Schuman, War and Diplomacy, pp. 280, 286; Miquel, 
Poincare, p. 46?; Huddleston, Poincare, p. 29» Peretti de 
la Rocca, "Briand et Poincare: Souvenirs," La Revue de
Paris, 43rd Year, No. 6 (1936)» 776-778; Pope-Hennessy, 
Crewe, p. l64. The article by Peretti de la Rocca gives 
excellent insight into the temperament and habits of 
Poincare but fails to discuss the Ruhr occupation.
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ordered a program of passive resistance. Cuno chose pas­
sive resistance for several reasons. First, Germany was 
incapable of successful armed resistance. Second, he be­
lieved that without the cooperation of the Ruhr populace 
the invaders would be unable to operate mines, railroads, 
and factories, and this would make the occupation so ex­
pensive that the French Treasury would face bankruptcy, 
thus demoralizing French taxpayers. Then the occupation 
would become a fiasco, and the French would withdraw with 
a tremendous debt and diminished diplomatic prestige. 
Finally, British press reaction since the Paris Confer­
ence and the activities of Lord D'Abernon in Berlin en­
couraged the Germans to resist and to hope for British 
51intervention.
Having chosen their course, the German government 
and Ruhr population pursued it relentlessly. On Janu­
ary 10 the Kohlensyndikat, nerve-center of the coal in­
dustry, moved from Essen to Hamburg, taking all its records. 
The government ordered the cessation of all reparations pay­
ments in cash and kind to France and Belgium, forbade the 
payment of duties and coal taxes that might be collected by 
them, prohibited the delivery of all commodities to the
 ̂Halperin, Germany, p. 248; Schmidt, Versailles and 
Ruhr, pp. 289-290 ; Benns, European History, p . 545 ; Favez. 
Le Reich, p. II6 ; Pierre-Etienne Flandin, Politique fran­
çaise, 1919-1940 (Paris: Les Éditions Nouvelles, 19^7),
pp. 35-3»; Tirard, La France sur le Rhin, p. 344.
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invaders, and decreed that any German who assisted them 
would be penalized. The population responded well. Miners 
and factory workers, along with telegraph, postal, and 
railroad personnel refused to perform services that might 
assist the French and Belgians, and those who became unem­
ployed through strikes received financial aid from the gov- 
52ernment. Economic paralysis gripped the former hub of 
European industry.
German resistance provoked more energetic measures 
from the occupying powers, who had planned an "invisible," 
non-military occupation. Because Germany stopped coal de­
liveries, France and Belgium on January 15 extended the 
occupation from Essen to Bochum and Dortmund. When Ger­
many, on January 13, informed the Reparation Commission 
that it had stopped all reparations deliveries to France 
and Belgium, the Commission on January 26, Sir John Brad­
bury abstaining, declared Germany in general default in 
its reparations obligations. France acted upon this dec­
laration and on February I prohibited the transport of
53coal from occupied to unoccupied Germany. French and
^ Un An d 'occupation: 1*oeuvre franco-belge dans 
la Ruhr en 1923 (Düsseldorf; Imprimerie de 1*armée du 
Rhin, 1924), pp. 14-15 ; Halperin, Germany, pp. 248-249; 
Toynbee, Survey, p. 273; Chastenet, Troisième République,
V, 105.
^^Toynbee, Survey, p. 2?4; P.-E. Nayral de Bourgon, 
Dix ans de souvenirs (19X4-1924). Part 8: Les fruits de
la victoire. La Ruhr (Nîmes : Imprimerie Chastanier freres
et Aimeras, 1933)» p. 107; Sir John Bradbury to Treasury,
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llolgiuti officials met on February 10, decided to intensify 
the occupation, and prohibited German ministers from enter­
ing occupied territory. The Rhineland High Commission on 
February 12 dismissed German customs officials in occupied 
territory (the British zone excepted) for refusing to work 
under the Allies, and it adopted Ordinance No. l43 prohib­
iting export of manufactured goods from occupied territory 
into the rest of Germany and erecting a tariff wall between 
the two sections. Two weeks later it took control of the 
strips of territory between the Mainz-Coblenz-Cologne 
bridgeheads, which French troops had occupied on Febru­
ary 25 in order to simplify customs control and prevent
54Nationalist demonstrations. The Rhineland and Ruhr were, 
in effect, separated from the rest of the Reich.
A struggle between occupying forces and inhabitants 
engulfed the Ruhr valley. German bureaucrats who refused 
to collect taxes and work for French and Belgian authori­
ties were dismissed, and mass arrests and frequent clashes 
between troops and the Ruhr populace occurred. At times 
the French forbade the local German police to wear uniforms 
and arm themselves, and they imposed large fines and jail
January 27, 1923, FO 371/8628, C 1795/1/18; French Govern­
ment to German Embassy, Paris, February 1, 1923, FO 371/8709,
c 1693/313/18.
^^Crewe to FO, No, I70, February 11, 1923,
FO 371/8712, C 2595/313/18; Kilmarnock to FO, No. 59, Feb­
ruary 12, 1923, FO 371/8712, C 2708/313/18; No. 60, Febru­
ary 12, 1923, FO 371/8712, C 2723/313/18; No. 86, Febru­
ary 26, 1923, FO 371/8716, C 3587/313/18.
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sentences, seized private property, and censored the German
press. During 1923 the invaders killed 76 Germans, wounded
92, and expelled approximately 147,000 from the occupied 
55area.^^
Although in the crucial first weeks of Franco-German 
combat the British government could have uj-ged France to 
abandon the struggle, it did almost the opposiie. Besides 
allowing France to transport troops through its zone on 
the eve of the occupation, avowedly neutral Britain assisted 
in additional ways during the first month of the occupation. 
The first of these was customs collection. After the Repa­
ration Commission on January I6 declared Germany in default 
on coal and livestock deliveries, Poincare told Saint- 
Aulaire to notify the British government that France was 
seizing the customs in occupied territory and requesting 
permission to collect them in the British zone. He pointed 
out that in the 1921 occupation the Americans had allowed 
the Allies to do this in their zone. When Saint-Aulaire 
presented the request to Bonar Law on January 17, the Prime 
Minister said that the British government would grant the 
request if Lord Kilmarnock took no part in the High
^^Halperin, Germany, pp. 249-250; Benns, European 
History, p. 546. Simonds wrote that because Poincare had 
failed to anticipate active German resistance, he had not 
sufficiently planned the military operation, and this 
caused French blundering. The killing took place because 
of the poorly-planned operation, not "according to plan," 
as the outside world believed; see Europe Made Peace, 
p. 248.
88
Commission decisions putting it into effect and if no 
British troops were used to enforce the measures or 
quell incidents arising from their enforcement. He 
urged France to avoid any disturbance which would in­
volve British troops.
The German government's order for the cessation of 
reparations deliveries to France and Belgium caused the 
emergence of new difficulties and brought about another 
British concession to France. Kilmarnock pointed out on 
January 19 that the Rhineland Agreement stated that no 
German law or regulation became effective in the occupied 
Rhineland until it had been approved by the High Commis­
sion. Since the recent German measures had not been ap­
proved by the Commission and could technically be consid­
ered illegal, he asked what he should do if the High Com-
57mission were asked to make a ruling. The Foreign Office
^^Poincare to Tirard, No. 322, January 17, 1923, 
A.N., AJ9 3904 ; Saint-Aulaire to Curzon, January 1?, 1923, 
FO 371/8704, C 988/313/18; Note by Lampson, January 17, 
1923, FO 371/8704, C 988/313/18; Poincare to Tirard, No. 
43, January 19, 1923, A.N., AJ9 3904. Saint-Aulaire, Con­
fession, p. 652, pointed out that Bonar Law did this 
without consulting the Cabinet. The Foreign Office tele­
gram notifying Kilmarnock of the decision stated: "Our
object is to avoid friction with the French whilst at the 
same time keeping aloof from the application of and re­
sponsibility for a line of policy which His Majesty's Gov­
ernment disapprove"; see FO to Kilmarnock, No, 5, Janu­
ary 16, 1923, FO 371/8704, C 988/313/18.
^^Kilmarnock to War Office, January 19, 1923,
FO 371/8705, C 1167/313/18. In his Minute on Kilmarnock's 
dispatch, Lampson made a clear statement of the difficulty 
of the situation: "The Germans have behaved with their
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Instructed him to abstain from voting should the question 
arise. If the Commission were to penalize a German for 
obeying the new measures, he could not arrest him, but he 
should not prevent Allied authorities from enforcing the 
decision in the British zone so long as no British troops 
or officials were involved. Soon after this, German of­
ficials at Cologne refused to obey French orders to con­
tinue coal deliveries, and when the French on January 21 
ordered the arrest of a German revenue official, von
ilaeling, the British allowed him to be arrested in their 
enzone. Once more the British had aided the French and 
Belgians in their endeavor.
In its relations with German officials during the 
first month of the occupation the British government also 
rendered indirect assistance to the French. As early as 
January 1?, Counsellor Lampson strongly advised Ambassador 
Sthamer against continuing resistance, and a week later 
the Foreign Office told Lord D'Abernon to warn the German
normal stupidity: but it does not appear desirable to tell
them so, for we might then be faced with argumentation as 
to who was the prime offender--they or the French. The 
problem now before us arises out of a deliberate and avowed 
breach of the treaty by Germany who claims justification 
for her act on the ground that France by invading the Ruhr 
has broken the treaty."
^®F0 to Kilmarnock, No. 6, January 22, 1923i 
FO 371/8705, C 1167/313/18; Saint-Aulaire to Poincare,
No. 70, January 22, 1923, A.N., AJ9 3918. General Officer 
Commanding Rhine Army to War Office, January 21, 1923,
FO 371/8705, C 1213/313/18; Tirard, La France sur le Rhin,
pp. 398-399.
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government to avoid incidents in the British zone, espe­
cially interference with customs collection. After the 
visit of Chancellor Cuno to the Ruhr caused a furor in 
Paris, D'Abernon, in accordance with Kilmarnock's recom­
mendations, suggested to the German government that no
59minister visit Cologne.
After having assisted the French at the beginning 
of the occupation, however, the British government in late 
January and early February became less cooperative. Fol­
lowing the arrest of von Haeling, tension mounted, and on 
January 22 the Foreign Office told Crewe to impress upon 
Poincare the necessity of avoiding any incidents in the 
British zone, to suggest that France either drop or post­
pone all sanctions except customs, and to warn that public 
opinion in England was rising against the policy of benev­
olent neutrality. Two days later Kilmarnock was instructed 
to allow the French to make arrests in the British zone 
only after previous consultation with the British govern­
ment,^^ In response, Poincare told Crewe on January 23 
that although he realized the necessity of avoiding
^^Note by Lampson, January 1?t 1923, FO 371/8704,
C 989/313/18; FO to D'Abernon, No. 19, January 24, 1923, 
FO 371/8706, C 1301/313/18; Kilmarnock to FO, No. 56, 
February 10, 1923, and FO to D'Abernon, No. 34, Febru­
ary 13, 1923, FO 371/8712, C 2582/313/18.
^^FO to Crewe, No. 34, January 22, 1923, and FO to 
Kilmarnock, No. 12, January 24, 1923, FO 371/8706,
C 1300/313/18; Poincare to Tirard, No. 7I, January 24, 
1923, A.N., AJ9 3904.
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disturbances he must emphasize that France was determined 
to carry out its policy, whatever the cost, in order to 
prevent Germany from destroying the Treaty of Versailles. 
Nevertheless, after Saint-Aulaire had urged him to facil­
itate the task of the British in their zone in order to 
calm apprehensions of the friends of France in the Brit­
ish Cabinet, Poincare instructed Tirard to avoid inci­
dents. The President of the Rhineland High Commission 
immediately assured Kilmarnock that French action would 
be reduced to the lowest level necessary to maintain 
order and execute the ordinances of the High Commission, 
and he asked British officials in Cologne not to allow 
German authorities to make Cologne a center of resist­
ance. Within a few days Kilmarnock reported that the 
French were indeed doing everything possible to avoid 
friction.
In another attempt to make France prevent diffi­
culties, the British government threatened to withdraw 
its troops from the Rhineland, a course advocated by 
some diplomats and part of the press. It instructed 
Crewe and Kilmarnock to warn the French government and 
local Rhineland authorities that incidents and arrests
^^Crewe to FO, No, 89» January 23» 1923»
FO 371/8706, C 1410/313/18; Saint-Aulaire to Poincare, 
No. 91 and No. 92, January 27» 1923» A.N.» AJ9 3918; 
Tirard to Poincare, No. 48, January 27» 1923» A.N.,
AJ9 3897; Poincare to Crewe » January 31» 1923»
FO 371/8709» C 2039/313/18; Kilmarnock to FO, No. 36, 
January 31, 1923» FO 371/8709» C 2126/313/18.
92
in the Cologne zone would cause public opinion to insist 
upon w i t h d r a w a l E v e n  after the Cabinet agreed on Jan­
uary 26 to maintain the troops in the Rhineland as long 
as possible, Foreign Office personnel continued to con­
sider withdrawing them in order to extricate Britain from 
an embarrassing situation. A lengthy Foreign Office Minute 
of February 8 concluded that withdrawal would have adverse 
effects upon relations with France ; therefore, because 
"the basis of British policy is friendship with France 
. . . anything tending to disturb that friendship is to 
be avoided." Furthermore, since the presence of British 
troops pleased France, Belgium, and Germany and guaranteed
Britain a share of any payments to be made by Germany,
6 3withdrawal would occur only if absolutely necessary.
^^FO to Crewe, No. 34, January 22, 1923, FO 371/8706, 
C 1300/313/18; FO to Kilmarnock, No. l4, January 24, 1923,
FO 371/8706, C 1301/313/18. British diplomats had divergent 
opinions concerning the advisability of withdrawing British 
troops from the Rhineland. Lord D'Abernon advised with­
drawal in order to increase the government's liberty of ac­
tion and improve its prospects of serving as mediator be­
tween France and Germany; D'Abernon to FO, No. 52, Janu­
ary 24, 1923, FO 371/8705, C 1567/313/18. Kilmarnock rec­
ommended retention of the troops for several reasons.
First, France would regard British withdrawal as pro- 
German. Withdrawal would also affect British prestige, 
destroy hope of getting reparations from Germany, and re­
move any check on French action; Foreign Office Minute, 
January 25, 1923, FO 371/8708, C 1745/313/18. Lord Crewe 
stated that the majority of the French government would 
oppose withdrawal and that if troops were removed the French 
press would mount a massive attack on England and blame it 
if the expedition failed; Crewe to FO, No. IO6 , January 27,
1923, FO 371/8708, C 1709/313/18.
^^Great Britain, Cabinet, Cabinet Papers, Cab 23/45, 
3(23)6(b); the last set of numbers denotes Conclusion 6(b)
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Although the British government had left the French 
relatively free to do as they pleased during most of Janu­
ary, it grew concerned when its economic interests were 
affected by the occupation. A prolonged and voluminous 
correspondence concerning the impact of French and Belgian 
measures upon British trade and industry in the Rhineland 
began with a February 3 letter from the British Chamber of 
Commerce in Cologne. The Chamber reported that British 
merchants were experiencing great obstacles to normal com­
merce because both the Rhineland High Commission and the 
German government had passed ordinances establishing import
and export regulations and taxes, and in some cases they
64were being taxed twice. After receipt of the Chamber of 
Commerce letter, questions arose continuously, and the 
British government, often uncertain about how to proceed, 
turned frequently to Lord Kilmarnock for advice. He re­
ported on February 19 that special Allied committees study­
ing complaints about the effect of new measures upon British
of the third Cabinet meeting of 1923 * Cabinet Conclusions 
will hereafter be cited as follows ; Cab 23/45 or 46, 
meeting number (year) Conclusion number. Foreign Office 
Minute (Central Department), February 8, 1923» FO 371/8710, 
C 2258/313/18. Three telegrams dispatched in late Febru­
ary reveal that France realized that the British govern­
ment continued to discuss troop removal and acted cau­
tiously to prevent it; see Poincare to Tirard, No. I90-I9I 
and No. 193-195. February 20, 1923, A.N., AJ9 3904; Poin­
care to Tirard, No. 203; February 22, 1923, A.N., AJ? 3324.
64British Chamber of Commerce, Cologne, Germany, to 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, February 3, 1923,
FO 371/8711, C 2411/313/18.
94
trade wanted to prevent injury to British businessmen and 
would make special arrangements wherever possible to aid 
tlicm. Nevertheless, the situation grew worse, and on Feb­
ruary 23 Lampson telegraphed Kilmarnock that because the 
Foreign Office had received so many protests from British 
firms he should send his best economic adviser to London 
for consultation. Beginning in late February, however, 
Kilmarnock was for a time able to settle some of the most 
difficult commercial p r o b l e m s , a n d  the British govern­
ment continued to refrain from protesting the occupation.
The British government also displayed passivity and 
uncertainty in its failure to question officially the le­
gality of the Ruhr o c c u p a t i o n . O n  several occasions 
during January and February, Foreign Office officials, 
faced with the issue of the legality of French action.
^^Kilmarnock to FO, No. 74, February 1$, 1923,
FO 371/8714, C 3155/313/18; Lampson to Kilmarnock, No. 46, 
February 23, 1923, FO 371/8715, C 3384/313/18. In a Minute 
on D'Abernon to FO, No. 101, February 27, 1923, reporting 
that the situation of British traders in the Ruhr and Co­
logne was intolerable, J. C. Sterndale Bennett, Foreign 
Office Third Secretary, wrote: "Each case of hardship for
British subjects which has arisen has been forwarded to 
Lord Kilmarnock and is being submitted to the French au­
thorities who have so far shown every disposition to give 
such cases favourable consideration"; see FO 371/8717,
c 3658/313/18.
66.Several writers noted the British failure to 
raise the question of legality. See Favez, Le Reich, 
p. 115; Weill-Raynal, Reparations, II, 369-370. Maximil­
ian Harden stated that even the threat of having the dis­
puted paragraphs discussed officially in the Reparation 
Commission would have caused the French to hesitate; see 
Germany, p. l42.
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hedged and refused to condemn France openly. Although on 
December 28, 1922, Solicitor-General T. W. H. Inskip had 
written an opinion on Paragraph iB of Annex II to Part VIII 
of the Versailles Treaty which was unfavorable to the 
French, the British government refused to publicize the 
opinion. Even before French troops entered the Ruhr, Sir 
Eyre Crowe, discussing impending French action, made a 
statement that was to be repeated several times later:
"There is no doubt that Germany has not carried out the 
treaty in several most important respects. There is no 
question I think of France violating the treaty. What she
6 7is doing is action taken outside the treaty (in our view)." 
This position was stated quite clearly in a Central Depart­
ment Memorandum:
His Majesty's Government have never considered that 
the action taken by the French and Belgian Governments, 
either in the Ruhr or in the Rhineland, could properly 
be taken under paragraph l8. . . .  On the other hand.
^^Opinion by the Solicitor-General in FO 371/8768,
C 593/593/18; Minute by Crowe, January 10, 1923, FO 371/8702, 
C 540/313/18. Alexander Cadogan, Foreign Office First Sec­
retary, reiterated this idea on January 25 when the German 
Ambassador protested Rhineland High Commission ordinances 
concerning coal distribution and seizure of customs. He 
stated: "The answer [to the German protest] no doubt would
be that the French and Belgians are taking action 'outside' 
the Treaty. If one party to a Treaty breaks the Treaty (as 
the Germans have done) they cannot argue that measures of 
coercion may not be applied which are not exactly specified 
in the Treaty itself." See Minute by Cadogan, January 25, 
1923, FO 371/8706, C 1407/313/18. In mid-February, Lampson 
once more said that the French were "acting outside the 
treaty," which was "quite different to breaking it"; see 
Minute by Lampson, February l4, 1923, FO 371/8713,
c 2932/313/18.
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His Majesty's Government have never considered that 
the French and Belgian action was, because it was 
not covered by the treaty, contrary to the treaty.
Like the sanctions imposed on Germany in March 1921, 
the January 1923 sanctions can presumably be con­
sidered to have been imposed to enforce compliance 
by Germany with the treaty.68
Even in its encounters with diplomats and members 
of Parliament the British government frequently evaded the 
legality issue. As will be recalled, Crowe told Saint- 
Aulaire on the eve of the occupation that Bonar Law wanted 
to avoid reopening discussion of the interpretation of 
Paragraph iB. When Sthamer came to the Foreign Office on 
January 22 and began to question the legal basis for French 
action, Lampson refused to discuss the matter. When the 
German Ambassador returned a week later and asked if it 
were true that the Law Officers had labeled French action 
a breach of the Treaty, Lampson denied the truth of the 
allegation, refused to discuss the question of legality, 
and stated that French action was justified by interna­
tional law, which allowed powers to use force in order to
69make other powers fulfill their treaty obligations. The 
Foreign Office also warned Lord D'Abernon and Sir Charles 
Marling, Minister Plenipotentiary at the Hague, not to let
68Memorandum on the German Protest against certain 
Ordinances of the Rhineland Commission, January 2$, 1923, 
FO 371/8706, C 1407/313/18.
^^Note by Crowe, January 10, 1923, FO 371/8702,
C 601/313/18; Note by Lampson, January 22, 1923,
FO 371/8705, C 1257/313/18; Minute by Lampson, January 29, 
1923, FO 371/8708, C 1818/313/18.
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themselves become involved in any discussion concerning
the legality of French action. Faced with a Parliamentary
Question by Noel Buxton, who asked whether the Law Officers
had ruled if French action were contrary to the Treaty, it
70cleverly dodged the issue.
Since a British attack on the purported legal basis 
of the Franco-Belgian occupation might have caused France 
to withdraw, one wonders why the Foreign Office remained 
silent. Minutes written during the first week of the occu­
pation by Lampson and Ralph F. Wigram, Foreign Office Sec­
ond Secretary, shed some light on the reasons for British 
evasion of the question of legality. The day after Saint- 
Aulaire announced that France was moving into the Ruhr, 
Lampson wrote that he had always believed that Austen 
Chamberlain's October 28, 1920, House of Commons statement 
on the interpretation of Paragraph iB had weakened the 
British case against independent French action in actual 
practice, if not in law. Fearing that the British view­
point was "one of such nice legal distinction that it would 
not carry general conviction," he was extremely reluctant 
to argue about whether France's independent action fell
^°F0 to D'Abernon, No. 113, FO 37I/87O5 ,
C 1568/313/18; FO to Marling, March [no day of month given], 
1923, FO 371/8717, C 3679/313/18; Parliamentary Question in 
FO 371/8713, C 2932/313/18. In a February Ik Minute on the 
Parliamentary Question, Lampson wrote: "The specific point
'Whether France has broken the Treaty,' has never been re­
ferred to the L.O. [Law Officers] and I trust it never may 
have to be."
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within its rights under or outside the Treaty. Two days 
later Wigram, considering the January 11 German protest 
against the Ruhr occupation, mentioned another factor. He 
noted that if Sthamer said anything orally about the pro­
test, he could be told that whether the French or German 
interpretation of Paragraph l8 was the correct one, there 
was no doubt that Germany had defaulted in timber and coal 
deliveries and had only itself to blame if these defaults 
and the "flagrant and steady bad faith" shown in executing 
the Treaty had led to reprisals.
The tone of a portion of Parliamentary and press re­
action also helps explain the failure of the British gov­
ernment to oppose Pranco-Belgian moves and declare them 
illegal. At the opening of the new session of Parliament 
on February 13, the King expressed regret that the Allied 
governments had been unable to reach a general agreement 
at the London and Paris Conferences. He stated that Belgium 
and France had put their plans into operation and that the 
British government, "while feeling unable either to concur 
or participate in this operation, are acting in such a way 
as not to add to the difficulties of their A l l i e s . B o t h
^^Minute by Lampson, January 10, 1923i FO 371/87O2 ,
C 541/313/18; Minute by Wigram, January 12, 1923,
FO 371/8702, C 655/313/18. Wickham Steed stated that early 
in the year Curzon, along with Bonar Law, did not believe 
that the French occupation was illegal; see The Real Stanley 
Baldwin (London: Nisbet & Co., Ltd., 1930), p. 59»
72Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol. I60, 
cols. 5-6 .
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Samuel Roberts and Collingwood Hughes, Unionist members 
who moved and seconded the Address, indicated that even 
though they could not quite approve the occupation, they 
sympathized with France and desired that previously- 
strained relations between the two countries could be 
improved so that they could work closely together. Al­
though Herbert Asquith of the Liberal Party approved 
British refusal to participate in the Ruhr venture, he 
stated that on the grounds of French security the occupa­
tion was justified and reminded the House of the un­
ratified tripartite pact between France, America, and 
Britain.
The Prime Minister's speech began with a discussion 
of the London and Paris Conferences and an attempt to jus­
tify the British proposals. He pointed out that when it 
became clear at the Paris Conference that France was going 
to try its plan, there was really nothing the British gov­
ernment could do, for it did not want to end the Entente: 
to the contrary, he had come to office hoping to work with 
France in reconstructing Europe. The occupation, as he 
predicted in January, had become economically disastrous, 
for France had cut the juglar vein of German industry and 
had done more harm to Germany than to itself. The future 
was gloomy, and he did not know what Britain was going to 
do beyond retaining its troops on the Rhine as long as
^^Ibid., cols. 8-34.
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possible. An appeal to the League of Nations as suggested 
by Ramsay MacDonald would be useless since France would 
have nothing to do with it. He closed with a reaffirmation 
of the necessity of maintaining the Entente and an expres­
sion of hope that in the future something would occur to
7kenable Britain to intervene usefully.
In the debate which followed Bonar Law's speech, 
five members spoke in support of France, and only two 
Labourites condemned it bitterly. J. R. Remer, Unionist, 
stating that previous British policy had encouraged Germany 
to escape payment, called for Britain to assist France in 
the endeavor to make Germany pay and declared that France 
should have acted three years earlier. That France should 
be criticized in England for occupying the Ruhr was sur­
prising to another Unionist member. Sir William Davison, 
who pointed out that in May, 1921, British officials had 
supported similar action and warned that Germany was trying 
to play the Allies against each other. Toward the end of 
the debate, Henry Maddocks, also Unionist, expressed senti­
ments still held by many British people: because of the
war dead that France and Britain had lost in the common 
struggle, Britain should support France rather than the 
country that had caused all the devastation and bloodshed.
7kIbid., cols. 39-4$. Monsieur de Margerie, French 
Ambassador to Berlin, reported that Bonar Law's speech 
caused some German hope of English intervention; see Mar­
gerie to Poincare, No. 405, February l4, 1923, A.N., Aj9 
3916.
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Earlier in the debate, however, Charles Buxton and 
Thomas Shaw severely criticized French action and current 
British policy. Buxton, who had just returned from the 
Ruhr, described the state of affairs there as miserable 
and warned that the occupation would cause the social and 
political disintegration of Germany and perhaps the indus­
trial predominance of France. He condemned British policy 
for at times being weak and humble and at other times as­
sisting France by allowing the passage of troops through 
the British zone and permitting the arrest of German offi­
cials, and he asked if this policy was truly one of neu­
trality. Shaw declared that France was militaristic and
75anxious to dismember and ruin Germany. Nevertheless, 
even as late as mid-February the pro-French members of 
Parliament had been more vocal than the anti-French ele­
ment, and this hardly encouraged the Foreign Office to 
adopt a policy of resistance to France.
Although some British newspapers consistently at­
tacked both French and English policy during late January 
and February, not even in the British press did the govern­
ment receive a clear-cut mandate for forceful measures 
against France. Throughout the six-week period. The Times 
criticized the extension of the occupation and expressed 
disapproval of French action and increasing concern about
^^Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol. l60, 
cols. 45-115.
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its results. While calling on both February 12 and 20 for 
a statement of French aims, it continued, nevertheless, to 
endorse the British policy of non-intervention and to de­
clare that all Britain could do was wait. The Daily Tele­
graph also failed to take a clear stand on the situation, 
and most of its leading articles merely reported major Ruhr 
events. After stating on January 26 that there was no need 
to discuss the legal merits of the French case, it on Feb­
ruary 19 took the same position and affirmed that the basic 
point was that "France remains our Ally." Predictably, the 
Daily Mail maintained its pro-French stance as every issue 
continued to carry ten or twenty letters supporting the 
French position, and the leading articles approved the ex­
tension of the occupation. The constant theme of both 
letters and articles was that German industrialists were 
responsible for all the trouble and that British official 
policy was hindering the French efforts to make Germany 
fulfill its obligations.^^
On the other hand, the Manchester Guardian denounced 
France bitterly. On February 17 it stated that France and 
Germany were almost at war and condemned the "madness" of 
France's trying to carry repeurations "across the Rhine on a 
bayonet's point." In January this paper began to ask how
The Times (London), January 27, 1923, p. 11; Feb­
ruary 12, 1923, p. 11; February 20, 1923» p. 13 ; Febru­
ary 16, 1923, p. 11; Daily Telegraph. January 26, 1923* 
p. 9; February 19, 1923, pp. 8-9; Daily Mail, February 12 
and 21, 1923» p. 8.
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long England could stay neutral when the balance of power 
was being threatened, and it began to urge withdrawal of 
liritish troops from the Rhineland. On February 17 the 
Guardian stated that French action was illegal, that non­
intervention was an unsatisfactory policy, and that England 
should refer the matter to the International Court of Jus­
tice or to the Hague Tribunal. In its leading articles 
the Daily Herald preached a similar message, called for 
Britain and America to take a strong lead, and condemned
British action in the Rhineland as a step away from neu- 
77trality. The British press certainly failed to speak 
with one voice.
From late January through early March, the vital
question of railroad transportation through the British
78zone caused a flurry of diplomatic activity. This
^^Manchester Guardian, January 1?, 22, and 24, 1923, 
p. 6; February 17, 1923, P» 10; Daily Herald, January 22, 
1923, p. 1; February 19, 1923, P» 1 « During the same period 
French press utterances were basically calm, having lost 
much of the sense of excitement that characterized them at 
the beginning of the occupation. As the Germans intensified 
passive resistance, the press prepared French citizens for a 
long struggle and called for confidence, patience, and unity. 
The French attitude toward Britain reflected little strong 
animosity, perhaps because the pro-French portion of the 
British press was most frequently quoted in French news­
papers ; see Le Journal des Débats, January 27 and 30, 1923, 
p. 1; L'Écho de Paris, January 23 and 29, 1923, p. 1; L'Ere 
Nouvelle, January 22, 1923, pp. 1, 3; L*Oeuvre, February 12, 
1923, p. 1; L'Écho de Paris, February 13, 1923, P* 3; Le 
Temps, February l4, 1923, P* 1.
78Over one hundred dispatches in this period dealt 
with the railroad question.
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extremely complex problem centered upon French requests to 
use the railroads in the British zone for transportation 
first of reparations coal and then of troop and supply 
trains. The question arose on January 22 when Bonar Law 
said that he was disturbed about press reports that German 
railroad workers in the British zone might refuse to for­
ward coal to France. After Kilmarnock reported that de­
liveries to East France and Lorraine had to go through 
Cologne, the Foreign Office began to anticipate difficul­
ties. These soon emerged. Saint-Aulaire had on January 22 
mentioned to Poincare the possibility of German workers' 
preventing coal deliveries to France. When labor unrest 
in the British zone increased, the President of the Council 
on February 5 instructed his Ambassador to explain French
transportation problems to the British and request 
79concessions.
The following day, Saint-Aulaire delivered a note 
to the Foreign Office setting forth the French position.
It pointed out that since the German government had for­
bidden all transport of coal to France, the French them­
selves had transported it, but this had led to strikes in­
stigated by the German government. Recently, German
79̂ Memorandum by Lampson, January 22, 1923»
FO 371/8706, C 1301/313/18; FO to Kilmarnock, No. 8 , Jan­
uary 22, 1923, FO 371/8706, C 1293/313/18; Kilmarnock to 
FO, No. 17, January 23, 1923, FO 371/8706, C l4l3/313/l8; 
Saint-Aulaire to Poincare, No. 70, January 22, 1923, A.N., 
Aj9 3918; Poincare to Saint-Aulaire, No. 421-425, Febru­
ary 5, 1923, A.N., AJ9 3324.
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railvraymen of the Cologne Railway Direction had returned 
to work only on the condition that no reparations coal 
destined for France would be transported through the 
British zone, and this had put France in an impossible 
position in that it was being refused the right to receive 
reparations coal. The French, therefore, requested that 
they be permitted to run coal trains through the British 
zone and that the British government allow French authori-
80ties into its zone to insure this rail transportation.
Crowe, Lampson, Bonar Law, and Curzon, as well as 
Alexander Cadogan, Foreign Office First Secretary, and 
II. C. Lindsay, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs, discussed the French request in great 
detail. Three days later Curzon sent a reply which stated 
that the French request made it difficult for the British 
government to remain neutral. If French railroad personnel 
were allowed into the British zone, it would be necessary 
to employ military forces to protect them; should French 
troops be admitted to do this, strikes and disturbances 
would ensue. If, on the other hand, British troops were 
used, it would be a departure from the policy of non­
participation. The British government, therefore, hoped 
that the French would withdraw their request and felt that 
they could do so, for information had reached the Foreign
8oSaint-Aulaire to Curzon, February 6, 19231 
FO 371/8711, C 2329/313/18.
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Office indicating that France could without difficulty- 
transport almost as much coal as it had received before 
the occupation by using lines which did not involve the 
British zone. In addition, the note pointed out that 
little, if any, coal was then being moved from the Ruhr.
While the Foreign Office was waiting for the French 
reply, two communications from Lord Kilmarnock complicated 
the situation. In the first of these, Kilmarnock reported 
that he had met with General Dégoutté, who stressed that 
the Duren-Julich-Rheydt line, which skirted the British 
zone, was too difficult for the kind of traffic in ques­
tion. Claiming that in order to secure his communications 
with the Ruhr and to transport coal he needed to use the 
Gravenbroich-Duren line, which ran through six miles of 
the extreme western edge of the British zone. Dégoutté 
suggested that perhaps the boundaries could be arranged 
to make this line come within the French zone. The French 
had thus increased the scope of their requests, and Lampson 
and Cadogan felt that Britain should refuse to cede the 
Gravenbroich-Duren line; to do otherwise would be a dis-
82tinct departure from the policy of passivity. The second
Û -ICurzon to Crewe, No. 482, February 9i 19231 
FO 371/8711, C 2329/313/18; Map and note regarding railway 
communication between France and the Ruhr, communicated by 
the War Office on February 6, 1923, FO 37I/87II,
c 2527/313/18.
^^Kilmarnock to FO, No. 54, February 10, 1923,
FO 371/8712, C 2580/313/18. Neither Kilmarnock nor Godley
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telegram from Kilmarnock on February 10 was to lead France
to request even more, for it raised the question of the
movement of French troop and supply trains. Kilmarnock
reported that the German government had instructed the
President of the Cologne Railway Direction that no trains
carrying troops or supplies to the Ruhr could pass through
the British zone. This, Kilmarnock emphasized, would seri-
o oously threaten Allied communications.
On February 11, Lord Crewe talked to Poincare about 
Curzon's February 9 response to the French request for coal 
transportation facilities. After saying that he believed 
that France would ask for nothing else for the transport of 
coal and coke if its trains could use the Gravenbroich-Duren 
route, he moved on to the matter mentioned by Kilmarnock in 
telegram No. 55- Dégoutté had reported that because of the 
possibility of a general strike which would imperil his 
forces, he could not insure the safety of French and Belgian 
troops unless he was given "general control of all the
objected to the proposed cession of that part of the British 
zone since it was of little intrinsic value and British 
troops had never been stationed in it. Tirard to Poincare, 
No. 136, February I3 , 1923» A.N., Aj9 3324, shows that 
Tirard considered that both Kilmarnock and Godley, as well 
as Colonel J. D. McLachlan of the British Army of the Rhine, 
were francophile.
®^Kilmarnock to FO, No. 55, February 10, 1923»
FO 371/8712, C 2581/313/18. Kilmarnock criticized this 
German move, stated that up until that time British policy 
had aided Germany more than France, and said that Britain 
should place no obstacles in the way of French transporta­
tion of coal due them under the Versailles Treaty.
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railways in the occupied area." Poincare called Crewe's 
attention to Article 10 of the Rhineland Agreement and 
declared that it gave the General Officer Commanding-in- 
Chief (who was, he stated, General Dégoutté) complete con­
trol of all means of land and water communication. In 
closing, he said that he would like to send General Payot,
French Quarter Master General on the Rhine, to London to
84discuss transportation questions. The British govern­
ment was, therefore, faced with two questions: the move­
ment of reparations coal south from the Ruhr and of troops 
and military supplies north toward the Ruhr. It was becom­
ing difficult to keep the two questions separated.
A telegram from Lord D'Abernon on February 11 fur­
ther complicated the situation. He reported that the 
German government had offered to permit French and Belgian 
military transportation on the Gravenbroich-Duren line; 
if, however, such transportation were accepted on other 
lines in the British zone, German railwayman would strike 
after February l4.®^ On February l4, the Foreign Office
A4Crewe to FO, No. 173» February 11, 1923»
FO 371/8712, C 2596/313/18. In a Minute on this telegram 
Lampson stated that even though there was no written agree­
ment appointing the French commander to be G.O.C. of the 
Allied Rhineland forces, it had been generally recognized 
that the French had the chief command of forces in the 
Rhineland. See also Poincare to Tirard, No. 154-156, Feb­
ruary 11, 1923 » A.N., AJ9 3324, for a discussion of speci­
fic instances in which German action had disrupted French 
military communications.
®^D'Abernon to FO, No. 80, February 11, 1923,
FO 371/8712, C 2626/313/18. Kilmarnock on the same day
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instructed Crewe to tell Poincare that the British govern­
ment would welcome French acceptance of the German offer.
The following day Poincare told Crewe that although he could 
give a final reply only after talking to General Payot and 
the French Minister of Public Works, Yves le Trocquer, who 
were then in London, he was prepared to state that he con­
sidered as an absolute minimum permission to transport 
troops on all lines and coal on the Gravenbroich-Duren line. 
When Crewe warned that strikes in the British zone might 
cause Britain to withdraw its troops, Poincare replied that
British obstacles to the execution of the Treaty would pro-
86(luce a bad impression on French opinion.
transmitted a memorandum by Captain W. C. II, M, Georgi, 
technical adviser on railways, which showed that transpor­
tation of sufficient coal and troops on lines entirely out­
side the British zone was technically impossible. Both 
Kilmarnock and Georgi indicated that they believed the Ger­
mans were trying to stop traffic in order to wreck French 
plans. Georgi pointed out that a strike by German railway­
man in the British zone would cause little harm, for the 
British zone was already isolated because of a general rail­
way strike in the French and Belgian zones, and traffic 
through Cologne was currently only 5 per cent of normal; see 
Kilmarnock to FO, No. $6 , February 11, 1923» FO 371/8712,
c 2699/313/18.
Minutes on this dispatch indicate that it made For­
eign Office personnel somewhat more sympathetic to France. 
Lampson stated that when he considered the problem it be­
came difficult to harmonize British inactivity with the 
avowed intention of placing no obstacles in France's path.
He said that if France would not accept the German proposal 
to restrict military transport to the Gravenbroich-Duren 
line, "We should then tell the Germans that we do not intend 
to allow any more nonsense and that we will ourselves see 
that French communications with the Ruhr through our zone 
are not interfered with. . . . "
ftfiFO to Crewe, No. 66, February l4, 1923» FO 371/8712, 
C 2596/313/18; Crewe to FO, No. 194, February 15» 1923»
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On the day that Crewe talked to Poincare, Monsieur
le Trocquer and General Payot were in London discussing
07transportation arrangements. They and Saint-Aulaire met 
with a British delegation composed of Cabinet members Bonar 
Law, Salisbury, Curzon, and Derby; Crowe and Lampson of the 
Foreign Office; Sir Maurice Hankey, Cabinet Secretary; Colo­
nel J, D, McLachlan of the British Array of the Rhine ; and 
Captain W. C. Georgi, Kilmarnock's Technical Adviser. Al­
though the French failed to obtain all of their requests in 
this lengthy conference and the one the following day, the 
British granted major concessions.
Monsieur le Trocquer opened the February 15 meeting 
by stating that because German railwaymen had since Febru­
ary 10 refused to handle French military traffic through 
the British zone, he was unable to insure the safety of his 
troops. He therefore requested that France should, as had 
been the case since the occupation of Düsseldorf, Duisburg,
FO 371/8713, C 2873/313/18; Poincare to Saint-Aulaire, No. 
571-572, February 15, 1923, A.N., Aj9 3324.
®^Le Trocquer's appearance upset the Foreign Office 
personnel, who were informed of his coming only a few hours 
before he arrived on the night of February l4. They had 
been under the impression that General Payot was coming 
alone and had arranged for him to talk to Lord Derby, Sec­
retary of State for War. When they learned of the impend­
ing arrival of a French Minister, they felt that a respon­
sible British Minister should meet with him. They quickly 
arranged for both Bonar Law and Curzon, as well as the 
Marquess of Salisbury, Lord President of the Council, to 
meet the next day with him and Payot. See Minutes by Lamp­
son on the record of his conversation with Monsieur de Mon- 
tille. Counsellor of the French Embassy, February l4, 1923, 
FO 371/8713, C 2859/313/18.
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and Ruhrort in March, 1921, be allowed to use the lines 
in the British zone for military transport. In addition, 
he proposed that a French technical staff of five hundred 
members be sent into the British zone to prevent sabotage 
and asked permission for France to use the Gravenbroich- 
Duren line for both military and coal transport. Bonar 
Law replied that he was unable to admit French technicians 
into the zone, for if trouble arose, British forces would 
have to maintain order, and this would be contrary to the 
declared policy of non-intervention and neutrality. After 
warning that if France insisted on exercising a free hand 
at Cologne, Britain would have to withdraw its troops, he 
offered to cede the part of the British zone crossed by 
the Gravenbroich-Duren line. The French delegates argued 
that this line alone was insufficient for securing the 
safety of French troops and pointed out that it communi­
cated with Belgium rather than France. The discussion 
ended with a French suggestion that some arrangement might 
be reached to enable France to send through Cologne a pre­
determined maximum daily number of military trains approx­
imating the number sent before January 11, 1923t the figure 
to be fixed locally. The British made no reply to the sug­
gestion, and the French delegation requested another meet-
88ing the following day.
Q O Rough Notes of a Conversation held at 10, Downing 
Street, on February 15, 1923, FO 371/8713, C 2922/313/18.
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At 5:00 o'clock that afternoon the Cabinet met to
consider the transportation problem. Captain Georgi, who
met with them, explained that the Germans would probably
accept the French proposal for limiting military traffic
through the British zone to the pre-January 11 level and
should not object to the proposed boundary readjustment.
The Cabinet then instructed Curzon to telegraph D'Abernon
that the British government found reasonable the French
request for the same number of trains as had been allowed
before January 11 and relied upon German cooperation in
working this train service. D'Abernon should also tell
the Germans that Britain had agreed to transfer to the
French the northwest angle of the British zone containing
89the Gravenbroich-Duren line.
When the French and British delegations met at noon 
on February l6 , Bonar Law informed the French of the con­
tents of the telegram sent to Berlin the previous evening, 
lie formally offered the Gravenbroich-Duren line to be uti­
lized for all kinds of traffic, said that Britain was will­
ing to allow passage of the same number of trains for mili­
tary transport as before January 11, and stipulated that 
these trains would be worked by German personnel. When he 
asked if these concessions were sufficient, Payot and le 
Trocquer objected strongly to the continued employment of
®^Cab 23/45, 10(23)l(a and b); FO to D'Abernon, No. 
38, February 15, 1923, FO 371/8713, C 2901/313/18.
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German railway personnel, saying that recent events had 
shown that they could not be trusted to work French trains 
through the Cologne area. After long discussion, explana­
tions, and assertions of French treaty rights, they were 
unable to modify the British offer. As the meeting closed, 
the French said that they would have to refer the matter to 
Poincare for decision. Bonar Law urged the French govern­
ment to accept the offer and mentioned that since the whole 
question of the Ruhr occupation was coming up in the House
of Commons on February 19, he hoped nothing might be done
90to strengthen the hands of the Opposition.
Although Poincare was dissatisfied with the part 
of the British offer concerning the movement of military 
trains through Cologne, Saint-Aulaire on both February 15 
and 17 advised him to accept it. The French Ambassador 
reported that British Cabinet members and officials favor­
able to France— such as Chancellor of the Exchequer Stanley 
Baldwin, Lord Derby, and the Duke of Devonshire, Secretary 
of State for Colonies--had said that Bonar Law had made the 
greatest possible concessions. These men, he said, hoped 
that France would not bring up new discussions on the rail­
road question before the end of the Parliamentary debate 
coming up soon. Poincare, Poch, Weygand, and Payot exam­
ined the British propositions, and on the evening of
90Rough Notes of a Conversation held at 10, Downing 
Street, on February l6 , 1923, FO 371/8713, C 29^5/313/18.
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February 17, Poincare telegraphed Saint-Aulaire that he 
would accept the Gravenbroich-Duren line. In order not 
to create difficulties before the end of the debate in 
Parliament, he would agree to let British and French mili­
tary authorities on the scene negotiate a settlement for 
the passage of military trains through Cologne. On Febru­
ary 20, the Counsellor of the French Embassy, Monsieur de 
Montille, delivered Poincare's message verbally to Lindsay 
and said that it was the official answer: France accepted
the territorial concessions with thanks and the yet-to-be-
91arranged military transport concession without thanks.
While waiting for the French reply, British diplo­
mats had been active. On February 1? D'Abernon sent three 
telegrams in response to the Foreign Office February 15 
telegram to Berlin. He reported that the German government, 
though it did not mention the proposed territorial cession, 
would work the requested train service through Cologne if 
it were strictly limited to the terms proposed in the Brit­
ish telegram. The Germans asked, however, that the trans­
port take place on the left bank of the Rhine because of 
the hostile attitude of railway workers on the right bank. 
Two days later, the German Ambassador assented verbally to
^^Poincare to Tirard, No. 191-192 and No. 193-195, 
February 20, 1923, A.N., AJ/ 3904; Poincare to Saint- 
Aulaire, No. 605-608, February I7 , 1923, A.N., AJ9 3324; 
Conversation between Lindsay and Monsieur de Montille, 
February 20, 1923, FO 371/8715, C 3191/313/18.
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the cession of the Gravenbroich-Duren line and surrounding 
92territory.
The Foreign Office on February l8 instructed General 
Alex J. Godley, General Officer in Command of the British 
Rhine Army, to arrange with General Payot the handing over 
of the northwest angle of the British zone and start making 
arrangements for conveying French troops and supplies. Be­
fore committing himself definitely on the latter issue, he 
must submit to London the exact agreement reached with 
Payot. Godley conferred with Generals Dégoutté and Payot 
on the evening of February 19 to determine the daily number 
of trains to cross the British zone and after long discus­
sion made a compromise proposal. He suggested that the 
"number of troop trains to be accepted daily in either 
direction on each of the two main lines across British 
zone on left bank only for maintenance relief etc. of their
troops should be fixed at 5 and that this number should be 
93cumulative."
This conference marked the beginning of a lengthy 
correspondence and numerous sessions between British and 
French officials on one hand and British and German on the
^^D'Abernon to FO, No. 9 0 » No. 9 1 » and No. 9 2 , Feb­
ruary 1 7 , 1 9 2 3 , FO 371/8714, C 3007/313/18, C 3008/313/18, 
and 0 3009/313/18; Conversation between Sthamer and Lampson, 
February 1 9 , 1 9 2 3, FO 371/8 7 1 5 , C 3183/313/1 8 .
^^FO to Kilmarnock, No. 4l, February I8 , 1 9 2 3,
FO 371/8714, C 3009/313/18 ; General Headquarters Rhine Army 
to War Office, No. 3 9 7 , February I9, 1 9 2 3 , FO 37I/8715,
c 3200/313/18.
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other. During the negotiations France wanted greater 
transportation facilities than those proposed by Godley, 
and Germany wanted to grant fewer concessions and qualify 
them severely. The British themselves had difficulty de­
termining whether the figures proposed by Godley were in­
ferior to or in excess of the number of French trains 
traversing their zone before January 11. At first Foreign 
Office personnel thought that Godley's figures were too
high, but by February 26, Godley and Kilmarnock had begun
94to show that the figures were moderate.
On February 26, Captain Georgi and two members of 
Kilmarnock's staff met with the German Minister of Communi­
cations and the President of the Cologne Railway Direction 
in a four and one-half hour conference. The German offi­
cials accepted, with some limitations, the proposal of ten 
trains per day, non-cumulative, and suggested that it be 
sent officially to Berlin by London. When Kilmarnock re­
ported, however, that the French did not want to include 
trains journaliers (civil passenger trains) in the ten 
trains, a new problem emerged. In a March 1 telegram to
94 ̂Key documents in the February 20-26 correspondence 
are as follows: Kilmarnock to FO, No. 77» February 20,
19231 and FO to Kilmarnock, No. 46, February 22, 1923,
FO 371/8715. C 3243/313/18; G.O.C. Rhine Army to War Office, 
No. C.O. 401, February 22, 1923, FO 371/8715, C 3338/313/18; 
D'Abernon to FO, No. 96, February 23, 1923, FO 37I/8715,
C 3415/313/18; Kilmarnock to FO, No. 85, February 25, 1923, 
FO 371/8716, C 3474/313/18; Mr. Lyon (War Office) to Mr. 
Vansittart, transmitting letter from Godley, February 26., 
1923, FO 371/8716, C 3601/313/18.
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Kilmarnock, the Foreign Office suggested that before any­
thing further was done at Berlin he and Godley should dis­
cuss the February 26 proposals with French local authori­
ties and attempt to obtain their assent. Should they ob­
ject to the inclusion of the trains journaliers in the 
ten trains, perhaps the British government could, since
they had no military significance, ignore the German re-
95quest for their inclusion.
As February ended, the question of French military 
transport, though pending, was nearing solution, and all 
that remained to be determined was the scope of the conces­
sions to France. That German railwayman would be forced to 
transport French troops and supplies across the British 
zone was practically certain. In addition, both Germany 
and England had agreed to the cession of the part of the 
British zone containing the vital Gravenbroich-Duren line.
During the period from January 11 through the end of 
February, the British government had, therefore, made sig­
nificant concessions to France and Belgium. Although it 
could have stopped the passage of French troop trains to 
the Ruhr at the beginning of the occupation it failed to 
do so and then refused in February to prevent the movement
^^G.H.Q. Rhine Army to War Office, No. 40$, Febru­
ary 27, 1923, FO 371/8717, C 3724/313/18; G.H.Q. Rhine 
Army to War Office, No, 406, February 27, 1923, FO 371/8717, 
C 3723/313/18; Kilmarnock to FO, No. 87, February 27, 1923, 
and FO to Kilmarnock, No. 54, March 1, 1923, FO 371/8717,
c 3678/313/18.
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of additional troop and supply trains toward the Ruhr. 
Without these concessions, Prance might have been forced 
to curtail the occupation. In addition, as has been indi­
cated, the British permitted customs collection and the 
arrest of some German officials in their zone. Although 
proclaiming a policy of neutrality and non-participation 
in the face of French aggressiveness, Britain actually 
assisted the French in their endeavor.
While France was energetically pursuing the occupa­
tion, Britain had no policy and was merely waiting on 
events. Although it cannot be fully explained, British 
passivity in the early, crucial stage of the occupation 
stemmed from several factors. During much of the time.
Lord Curzon was either in Lausanne or primarily involved 
in Near Eastern diplomacy, and Bonar Law's illness was 
increasingly limiting his activities. At the same time, 
the pro-French leanings of Lord Kilmarnock, General Godley, 
and other British officials in the Rhineland also made it 
difficult for the government to resist French moves in the 
occupied territories. Furthermore, several intangible 
factors were extremely influential in determining British 
policy, foremost among them being the conviction that the 
Entente must be preserved. Because war memories were still 
vivid, few Englishmen wanted to impair relations with France 
Moreover, neither Parliament nor the press spoke clearly 
enough to compel the government to pursue a new course.
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Also significant was the belief held by some Foreign Office 
personnel that certain British threats and Parliamentary 
statements in 1920 and 1921 prevented them from challenging 
the legality of the occupation. Because they thus felt 
that their hands were tied, and also because the occupation 
had not yet resulted in major losses to British trade, 
British leaders offered no effective opposition to the 
occupation of the Ruhr.
CHAPTER III
FRENCH DETERMINATION AND BRITISH DRIFT: THE RUHR
OCCUPATION, MARCH 1-APRIL 19, 1923
During March and the first half of April, both France 
and Britain tended to follow patterns established during the 
first seven weeks of the occupation. In spite of the paucity 
of immediate financial returns, the French were determined 
to stay in Germany's industrial heartland. Although the 
British government assisted them less than it had earlier, 
it exerted no real effort to bring an end to the Ruhr impasse 
and lapsed almost completely into a policy of drift.
Throughout March and April, France intensified pres­
sure upon Germany and introduced more severe methods. On 
March 1, Crewe learned that Dégoutté had been given author­
ity to collect a kO per cent tax on coal and imprison mine 
owners refusing to pay it, and on March 3 France extended 
the occupation to the harbors of Mannheim and Karlsruhe and 
the Darmstadt railway workshops in retaliation for German 
obstruction of navigation of the Rhine-Herne canal.^ Two
^Crewe to FO, No. 429, March 1, 1923, FO 371/8718, 
C 3812/313/18; Kilmarnock to FO, No. 95, March 3, 1923, 
FO 371/8718, C 3947/313/18.
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telegrams from Consul-General Edward W, P, Thurstan in 
Cologne typify numerous reports about other French actions. 
He told on March 1 of the arrest of the entire police 
forces of Bochum, Recklinghausen, and Herne and declared 
that almost daily he received accounts of looting and 
highway robbery committed by French soldiers. Soon after­
wards he stated that the number of robberies was increas­
ing even more, that traffic on the Dortmund-Ems canal had 
ceased, that the police in several smaller towns had been
2deported, and that more railway stations had been seized. 
Later in the month, friction increased between Germany and 
France. On March l8 in Cologne an assassination attempt 
was made against Joseph Smeets, a Rhineland Separatist 
leader. Accusing a German nationalist of making the attack, 
the Rhineland High Commission, in retaliation, ordered on 
March 21 that all circulation between occupied and unoccu­
pied territory, except by rail, would be prohibited between 
8:00 P.M. and $ :00 A.M. Ten days later French soldiers and 
German factory workers clashed at the Krupp works in Essen 
as the French tried to occupy a portion of the factory.
^Thurstan to FO, No. 1$1, March 1, 1923, FO 37I/8718, 
C 3926/313/18; No. 157, March 5, 1923, FO 371/8719,
C 4327/313/18. Several times during this period Kilmarnock
criticized press coverage of events in occupied territory.
In a March 7 telegram, he gave details about an incident in 
Cologne arising out of a French request for accommodation 
and said that the matter was settled locally without trouble, 
He reported this himself because such occurrences often were 
exaggerated in the press, and press reports led to questions
in Parliament; see Kilmarnock to Lampson, March 7, 1923,
FO 371/8721, C 4699/313/18.
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After the skirmish, the thirteen Germans who lost their 
lives and thirty who were wounded became heroes to the
3Ruhr populace.
In the struggle between France and Germany, the 
railroad problem continued to plague the invaders, for 
in order to maintain the occupation forces and transport 
seized raw materials they were dependent upon the rail­
ways. From almost the beginning of the occupation, as 
has been indicated, German railroad personnel in the 
Rhineland had refused to execute the orders of the in­
vaders, forcing Franco-Belgian authorities on the scene 
to utilize their own technical troops in trying to work 
the intricate Ruhr and Rhineland railway systems. Whereas 
before the occupation a German staff of 170,000 had moved 
an average daily traffic of 375,000 tons of goods and 
400,000 passengers, France and Belgium had been able to 
muster a crew of only 12,500 technical workers, assisted 
by 1,380 German auxiliaries.^
^Kilmarnock to FO, No. 152, March 21, 19231 
FO 371/8731, C 9076/313/18; S. William Halperin, Germany 
Tried Democracy; A Political History of the Reich from 
1918-1933 (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 19&5),
p. 250; Royal J. Schmidt, Versailles and the Ruhr; Seedbed 
of World War II (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, I968), p.
127; The Times (London), April 2, 1923, P« 8. Accounts of 
this "Bloody Sunday" disagree about what occurred: German
writers say that French soldiers lost their heads, and 
French writers say that the workers attacked the soldiers.
4Arnold Joseph Toynbee, Survey of International 
Affairs, 1924 (London: Oxford University Press, 1928),
pp. 2t54-2B5.
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Because an almost total paralysis gripped the railway 
system, Franco-Belgian authorities in mid-February began 
drafting an ordinance for the establishment of a special 
railway administration in all occupied territory. Tirard 
reported on February 25 that the Belgians would approve the 
proposed ordinance only if a clause were added to Article 2 
stating that certain lines [they referred to those in the 
British zone] or portions of lines could be exempted from 
the competence of the new administration. On March 1, the 
French government accepted the Belgian proposition and the 
Rhineland High Commission, Lord Kilmarnock abstaining, 
adopted Ordinance No. l49 creating the Railway Administra­
tion of the Occupied Territories (usually referred to as 
the Regie), which replaced the former German administration. 
The ordinance placed all the railways in the old occupied 
territories under the administration of the Regie, which 
was to be headed by a French director and a Belgian and 
French assistant director, to whom all personnel were re­
sponsible. Article 2 made special provisions which allowed 
the exemption of the railways in the British zone from the 
authority of the Regie.^
^Tirard to Poincare, No. 161-I63, February 25» 1923» 
A.N., Aj9 3324; Poincare to Tirard, No. 243» March 1, 1923» 
and copy of Ordinance No. 149» A.N., AJ9 3324; Kilmarnock 
to FO, No. 90, March 1, 1923» FO 371/8718, C 3815/313/18. 
The Franco-Belgian High Command extended the authority of 
the Regie to the Ruhr ; see Toynbee, Survey, p. 286. The 
British government made no protest whatsoever against the 
establishment of the Regie.
124
During March, the question of French military trans­
portation through the British zone itself continued to cause 
difficulties. On March 3, Kilmarnock and General Godley, 
General Officer in Command of the British Army of the Rhine, 
met in Düsseldorf with Generals Dégoutté and Payot to dis­
cuss the proposals worked out between Captain Georgi and 
the Germans in Frankfurt on February 26. The French in­
sisted that trains journaliers should not be included in 
the ten military trains a day and suggested other modifica­
tions. The two sides, unable to reach a conclusion, met 
again on March 5 and after lengthy discussion drew up an 
agreement which Godley brought to London the following day. 
The draft agreement gave France permission to run ten mili­
tary trains and two trains journaliers (limited strictly to 
focd-stuffs) per day, the figure to be non-cumulative. In 
addition, cars could be removed from French trains outside 
the British zone and attached to no fewer than five German 
trains passing through it, and detached French soldiers 
could use all German trains crossing the British zone.^
Having made concessions to France about the terms 
of the proposal, the British government during the next 
three weeks pressured the Germans to accept it. On March 9 
D'Abernon was told to inform the German government of the 
agreement and ask that German railway authorities be
^G.H.Q. Rhine Army to War Office, No. 408, March 3» 
1923, FO 371/8719, C 3954/313/18; Kilmarnock to FO, No. 97, 
March 6, 1923, FO 371/8719, C 4283/313/18.
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instructed to put it into operation. When the Germans 
failed to respond promptly, the Foreign Office on March l4 
told him to expedite the German reply, and two days later 
the German Foreign Minister reported that his government 
was studying the agreement. Saying that it exceeded the 
limils of the proposals agreed upon in Frankfurt, he sug­
gested modifications that might help to overcome the German
7objections.
The situation, nevertheless, dragged on. When Kil­
marnock reported that Payot called on him on March 22 to 
inquire about the state of the railroad question and to 
ask that the agreement be put into effect, Lampson declared 
that the Germans were delaying in order to split the Brit­
ish from the French. Others agreed, and on March 24 the 
Foreign Office instructed Sir Somerville Head, Chargé 
d*Affaires in Berlin, to tell the German government that 
since the draft agreement was "reasonable and in spirit of 
original proposals which the German government accepted [on 
February I?]" the British would not ask France to reduce 
its request. If the Germans wanted an understanding on the 
railway question, they should instruct the President of the 
Cologne Railway Direction to make arrangements to put the 
agreement into force; should they fail to do so, Britain
^FO to D'Abernon, No. 55, March 9, 1923, FO 37I/872O, 
C 4447/313/18; No. 58, March l4, 1923, FO 371/8721,
C 4526/313/18; D'Abernon to FO, No. 129, March I6 , 1923,
FO 371/8723, C 4998/313/18.
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gmight have to withdraw from Cologne. Faced with the Brit­
ish threat, the German government on March 27 accepted the 
railroad agreement. The following day Curzon informed 
Saint-Aulaire that instructions had been made for putting 
the agreement into force, and on March 29 Poincare told 
Tirard of the agreement and Kilmarnock reported that it was 
in force and that trains would begin running after technical 
details were worked out. According to Tirard, operations
Qbegan on April 3* Although the Godley-Payot agreement did 
not always work smoothly,France was able to use the vital 
railways through the British zone for military transport.
In its other relations with Germany during March and 
April, the British government, as it had done in the rail­
road negotiations, seemed to take a pro-French stand. The
^Kilmarnock to FO, No. 156, March 22, 1923i 
FO 371/8724, C 5406/313/18; FO to Head, No. 71 and No. 74, 
March 24, 1923, FO 371/8724, C 5457/313/18.
^Head to FO, No. l49, March 27, 1923, and Curzon to 
Saint-Aulaire, March 28, 1923, FO 371/8725, C 5750/313/18; 
Poincare to Tirard, No. 359, March 29, 1923, A.N., Aj9 3324; 
Paul Tirard, La France sur le Rhin. Douze années d'occupa­
tion rhenane (Paris ; Librairie PÏon, 1930), pi 366. A 
telegram from Poincare to Tirard indicates how important 
the railroad agreement was to France. Poincare told him 
that since the railroad agreement had been made, he no 
longer saw any reason for him and his Belgian colleague to 
delay bringing before the High Commission the question of 
the expulsion of the German Commissioner; see Poincare to 
Tirard, No. 367, April 1, 1923, A.N., Aj9 3904.
T, Reynolds stated that because of "a complete 
absence of goodwill on the German side" and little on the 
French, the agreement caused a volume of recriminatory cor­
respondence between Britain and France; see Prelude to 
Hitler (London: Jonathan Cape, 1933), p. 82.
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available Foreign Office correspondence fails to substan­
tiate the allegations of several writers, both French and 
ICitgLish, that the British government encouraged Germany to 
continue passive resistance. Although it seems that Lord 
D'Abernon did sustain German determination and chat the 
German government, despite evidence to the contrary, con­
tinued to hope for British intervention, the British gov­
ernment in many ways indicated that it had no intention of 
intervening on Germany's b e h a l f . A s  it had done previ­
ously, the government failed to accept publicly Germany's 
contention that the occupation was illegal. When Sthamer 
delivered an eight-page memorandum demonstrating the ille­
gality of the Ruhr occupation and measures taken within the 
Ruhr, the Foreign Office decided on March 3 to send no an­
swer or acknowledgment. On March 6 he protested Rhineland 
ordinances prescribing death sentences for railway sabotage 
and allowing army commanders to send the condemned to for­
eign prisons and to regulate capital punishment; again there
12was no response. Other protests were similarly ignored.
René Pinon, L'avenir de 1 'Entente franco-anglaise 
(Paris : Librairie Pion, 1924), p. 139; W. M. Knight-
Patterson, Germany from Defeat to Conquest. 1919-1933 (Lon­
don: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 19^5), p. 3^5 i Jean-Claude
Favez, Le Reich devant 1'occupation franco-beige de la Ruhr 
en 1923 (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1969)» pp. II6 , 251 ; Alfred
Emile Cornebise, "Some Aspects of the German Response to the 
Ruhr Occupation, January-September, 1923" (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation. University of North Carolina, 1965)1 P» 196.
12Sthamer to FO, No. A. 5 3 9 1 February 2 3 1 1 9 2 3 1 
FO 371/8718, C 3938/313/18; No. A 690/23, March 2 4 , 1 9 2 3,
FO 371/8719, C 4196/313/18.
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Instead of encouraging Germany, the British in some 
cases forced it to comply with Franco-Belgian demands. As 
has been shown, Britain exerted pressure to make Germany 
accept the Godley-Payot agreement, and early in March it 
intervened in another situation. Kilmarnock reported on 
March 1 that the Prussian Prime Minister planned to visit 
Cologne on March 4 to speak about the Germans' struggle 
against the invader. Because he feared that the visit 
would cause trouble and necessitate intervention by Brit­
ish military authorities, the Foreign Office on March 3 
instructed D'Abernon to inform the German Foreign Minister 
that the British zone could not become the "sounding board 
of anti-French harangues by German ministers" and that the 
Germans should, therefore, forbid their ministers to visit 
the British zone. After talking to D'Abernon, the Foreign 
Minister stated that the Prussian Prime Minister had aban­
doned his planned visit
In addition, the British government in mid-March 
began hinting that Germany take positive action to end the 
occupation. When, on March l4, Sthamer was discussing the 
critical situation in Germany, Curzon suggested that if the 
German government had proposals for ending the situation, 
it should communicate them directly to all the powers
^^Kilmarnock to FO, No. 891 March 1, 1923» afid FO 
to D'Abernon, No. 51, March 3, 1923, FO 371/8718,
C 3814/313/18; D'Abernon to FO, No. I07, March 3, 1923, 
FO 371/8718, C 3842/313/18.
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concerned, including the American government if it so de­
sired. Four days later, Curzon wrote Crewe about another 
conversation with Sthamer: "Bonar and X saw the German on
Friday [March l6J and told him that his government must get 
a move on, and that it was no good dishing up bread and 
milk to the French, who would require some rather stronger 
substance." After the Germans made no move, Lampson re­
minded Sthamer on April 11 that Germany should seriously
Ikconsider making reasonable proposals to France.
Although the British government had persuaded the 
Germans to make concessions and had failed to intervene 
on their behalf, it was not on good terms with the French 
government, and during March and April, as will be shown, 
there were many points of disagreement between the two 
former Allies. When at times the British, in effect, told 
the French that they should go no further, the French often 
appeared conciliatory. For example, when Sir Eyre Crowe 
talked to Monsieur de Montille on March 2 and warned him 
that if the French and Belgian governments continued to 
extend the authority and competence of the Rhineland High 
Commission to matters outside its scope of authority, the 
British government might have to withdraw from the Commis­
sion, Monsieur de Montille promised to call this to the
^^Conversation between Curzon and Sthamer, March l4, 
1923, FO 371/8632, C 4876/1/18; Curzon to Crewe, March 18, 
1923, in Earl of Ronaldshay, The Life of Curzon (3 vols.; 
London: Ernest Benn, Ltd., 1928), 111, 347 ; Conversation
between Lampson and Sthamer, April 11, 1923, FO 371/8727,
c 6749/313/18.
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attention of his government. A week later Kilmarnock re­
ported that France was doing the utmost to make things easy 
in the Uritxsh zone, and on March l4 Poincare told Tirard 
to satisfy British requests as often as possible.
In spite of French efforts to avoid annoying the 
British, however, several factors caused friction, and 
chief among them were commercial problems. Trade difficul­
ties arising out of Franco-Belgian independent action in 
the Rhineland and Ruhr continued to plague the British, 
who, feeling their vital, immediate interests threatened, 
finally displayed some initiative. Much of the trouble 
stemmed from German reaction to French moves, for the Ger­
mans refused, after the beginning of the occupation, to 
recognize the inter-Allied licencing organization at Bad- 
Ems, which had since 1921 granted licences for export of 
goods from the Rhineland to England. Moreover, the French 
and Belgian authorities were levying a 10 per cent duty on 
British goods crossing the external frontier of occupied 
territory, but the Germans in Cologne— refusing to recog­
nize the Franco-Belgian customs certificates— were also 
levying duties on goods arriving in the British zone. In 
order to try to improve the situation, the Foreign Office 
on March 3 instructed D'Abernon to approach the German
l^Note by Crowe, March 6, 1923, FO 371/8719,
C 4153/313/18; Kilmarnock to FO, No. 115, March 9, 1923, 
FO 371/8720, C 4426/313/18; Poincare to Tirard, No. 480, 
March l4, 1923, A.N., AJ9 3296.
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government about Bad-Ems licences, point out that they were
not a new requirement based on Franco-Belgian action in the
Ruhr, and request suspension of the previous instructions
for ignoring the Bad-Ems office. On March l4 he was told
to announce that because the British could not continue to
allow their traders in Cologne to pay a double duty, the
(iormans were not to levy a duty upon British goods which
had already paid or would later have to pay duties to Allied
16customs agencies.
The French and Belgians themselves were also respon­
sible for direct interference with British trade. Although 
on March 3 and 8 the High Commission made decisions intended 
to facilitate the position of British traders, the excep­
tions thus granted were poorly observed. After receiving 
several complaints, the British government informed France 
that delays and losses in British trade caused by Franco- 
Belgian measures were creating a very unfortunate impres­
sion and exposing it to attacks from both Parliament and 
interested professional groups. In order to prevent this, 
the French should insure that the concessions approved 
earlier in the month were rigidly and immediately observed 
in both the Rhineland and Ruhr.
^^Mr. Fountain (Board of Trade) to Lampson, March 1, 
1923, FO 371/8719, C 3975/313/18; Minute by Lampson,
March I3 , 1923, FO 371/8721, C 4704/313/18; FO to D'Abernon, 
No. 52, March 3, 1923, FO 371/8719, C 3975/313/18; No. 57, 
March 14, 1923, FO 371/8721, C 4704/313/18.
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On another occasion in March the French also antag­
onized British traders. Although the High Commission had 
decided on March 1 that foreign coal destined for unoccu­
pied Germany could pass freely and without tax through 
occupied territory, Kilmarnock reported on March 13 that 
the French and Belgians were holding up cargoes of British 
coaI at Duisburg, Ruhrort, and Düsseldorf and demanding a 
lO per cent import tax in some cases and a 40 per cent 
coal tax in others. Should this situation continue, im­
ports of coal from Britain would cease, causing great fi­
nancial losses to that nation. Soon after learning of the 
situation, the Foreign Office told Eric Phipps, British 
Chargé d*Affaires in Paris, to stress that the British gov­
ernment was quickly losing patience at the "vexatious re­
strictions on legitimate British trade" and to demand that
the French instruct their local authorities to stop requir-
17ing payment of duty and tax. On March 1?» Phipps relayed 
the rather vague and indefinite French reply to both the 
March 13 communication from the British Embassy and the 
Foreign Office telegram of March l6: it merely stated that
the French government hoped to overcome all the difficul­
ties speedily. Two days later, however, he reported that 
trade cases endorsed by Kilmarnock would receive special
17British Embassy, Paris, to French government, 
March 13, 1923, A.N., AJ9 3296; Kilmarnock to FO, No. 128, 
March 13, 1923, and FO to Phipps, No. 126, March l6, 1923, 
FO 371/8722, C 4766/313/16.
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l8treatment and be granted facilities. Although the French 
had thus promised to grant special consideration to the 
British traders, frequent complaints made to the Foreign 
Office about trade difficulties indicate that they often 
failed to do so. It seems that the French throughout the 
occupation usually made barely enough concessions to mol­
lify the British government.
Another factor causing animosity between Britain and 
F% ance was the rising tide of British public opinion and 
the absence of clearly-defined Franco-Belgian aims. Curzon 
brought up the subject on March 21 when he read and pre­
sented to Saint-Aulaire a secret memorandum which surveyed 
British policy since the beginning of the occupation and 
labeled it one of benevolent neutrality. According to the 
memorandum, the British government had tried to create as 
few difficulties as possible for its Allies and had held 
aloof and avoided taking sides in the Ruhr controversy.
It had, nevertheless, advised the Germans to accept the 
situation in which they were involved. This policy had 
placed British occupying authorities in embarrassing posi­
tions and was coming under increasing attack from both press 
and Parliament. Debates in the House of Commons were show­
ing "a rising tide of restlessness and even irritation" with 
the government's passive policy, and demands were being made
1 oPhipps to FO, No. 308, March 17, 1923, and No. 317, 
March 19, 1923, FO 371/8731, C 9076/313/I8.
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that the question be brought before the Council of the 
League of Nations on April 10, a move which the government 
hoped to avoid. Because of these circumstances, the memo­
randum asked the French government to help strengthen the 
position of the British government in forthcoming debates 
by making a "clear and authoritative statement of the aims 
to which Franco-Belgian policy is directed, and of the 
manner in which the measures so far taken or yet to be 
taken, are expected to bring about its realisation" in
order to permit the British government to discuss these
19questions with critics of its policy.
The French response displeased the Foreign Office.
In a memorandum addressed to Saint-Aulaire and communicated 
to the British government on March 23» Poincare declared 
that the French government had at the London Conference in 
December and the Paris Conference in January, as well as 
in later declarations by the French and Belgian governments, 
made known the objects of the Ruhr occupation: it was able
to add nothing to these declarations. The occupation, the 
memorandum reiterated, had been necessitated by German re­
calcitrance and failure to pay reparations. The French gov­
ernment would have preferred British assistance in the
^^Curzon to Phipps, No. 1011, March 21, 1923, and 
Memorandum from Curzon to Saint-Aulaire, March 20, 1923, 
FO 371/8724, C 5302/313/18. Saint-Aulaire asked that the 
communication of the memorandum be kept secret, for if it 
were known it might be considered as an attempt at inter­
vention. Curzon agreed to do so.
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occupation but had decided to act without it. Because the 
pledge currently held could not be released in exchange for 
simple promises, France and Belgium would evacuate the Ruhr 
and newly-occupied territories on the right bank of the 
Rhine only in proportion to Germany's execution of its rep­
arations obligation. As soon as the German government made 
direct written proposals, the British government would be 
informed. "France and Belgium have gone into the Ruhr to
obtain a definitive settlement of the reparations problem. 
.,,20
The memorandum, it should be noted, failed to answer
the second part of Curzon’s question. Although it said, in
effect, that France's object was securing reparations, it
said nothing about how "the measures so far taken, or about
to be taken" were supposed to attain that object. Lampson
wanted Curzon to tell Saint-Aulaire that he was disappointed
with the reply, but after meeting with Bonar Law on March 25,
Curzon said that there was no use in pursuing the subject at 
21that time. Once more the British government failed to 
take decisive action.
The British press and Parliament, who were writing 
and reading accounts of French atrocities in the Ruhr, trade 
restrictions, and the powerlessness of British Rhineland
gPoincare to Saint-Aulaire, March 23, 1923,
FO 371/8724, C 5302/313/18.
21Minutes by Lampson and Curzon on the March 23 
French Memorandum, FO 371/8725, C 5783/313/18.
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officials, and who were impatient with the government's
inactivity, gave up less easily. They wanted to know
whether the goal of the French was security or reparations.
If it were the latter, how much money did the French insist
upon? An article in The Times on February 23 depicted
British confusion about French objects :
Ostensibly the ground for French action in the Ruhr 
was the German default in respect of reparations, 
but it has been an open secret that, in addition,
France sought security. . . .  So mixed are French
motives that it would be difficult to state which 
was the predominant purpose.22
As will be seen, the French press and official statements
gave no clear-cut answer to these questions and further
increased British apprehension. First, the French gave
varying figures about the exact reparations total they
would require. Le Matin on April 9 declared that
26,000,000,000 gold marks was the irreducible minimum
France could accept. That evening, Louis Loucheur, a
former French minister and prominent businessman, told
Eric Phipps that France would require somewhat more than
the 26,000,000,000 gold mark figure recently discussed in
the French press, and the next day Poincare told him that
France absolutely could not accept such a small amount as
that mentioned. Uncertainty increased on April 17 when a
semi-official statement in L* Écho de Paris declared that
the French government adhered to the reparations figure
00The Times (London), February 23, 1923» P* 12.
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of May 5» 1921, and would evacuate the Ruhr only when Ger­
many had completely paid its debt. The occupation would 
last thirty-six years if it took Germany thirty-six years
to pay; if payment were completed in ten years, the occupa­
nttion would last only that long.
Furthermore, almost contradictory statements about
the goals of the occupation came from various French sources.
, 24In an article in L*Echo de Paris early in March, Pertinax
stated that if America and Britain wanted to encourage 
France to leave the Ruhr, they must guarantee both payments 
from Germany and Franco-Belgian security. On March 9, 
Poincare told the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Chamber 
of Deputies that France would accept no mediation or indi­
rect conversations and would not, for simple promises, 
abandon security and the pledges it had been forced to take. 
When Phipps talked to the President of the Comité des Forges 
on March 28, the latter stressed that France's vital need 
was security. Although in the cases mentioned above both 
security and reparations were labelled goals of the occupa­
tion, Poincare took another position on March 29 in the 
Chamber of Deputies. After saying that France had no ul­
terior motives of annexation, he declared: "We have always
^^Le Matin, April 9» 1923» P» 1» Phipps to FO, No. 
377, April 10, 1923, FO 371/8633, C 6480/1/18; No. 382, 
April 10, 1923, FO 371/8633, C 6482/1/18; L'Écho de Paris, 
April 17, 1923, p. 3.
24 , ,Andre Geraud, the paper's foreign affairs expert.
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said that we went into the Ruhr to seek economic ends."
Nowhere in the statement did he mention security. Within
a few days, however, Lc Journal des Débats reverted to the
former theme: "Hut, finally, it [the Ruhr occupationj is
only a means and the main point is not to occupy the Ruhr;
it is to regulate the problem of reparations and of our
25security. . . . "  It seems that the public and govern­
ments in both Britain and France were trying to make an 
artificial distinction between the two goals of the occu­
pation; but the two questions of reparations and security 
could not be separated. Although France definitely sought 
to attain both of them throughout the occupation, its em­
phasis changed from time to time. For example, when the 
unprofitableness of the Ruhr operation became apparent in 
March, the security aspect received more prominence than 
it had previously.
Beginning in mid-March, the question of the disposal 
of the proceeds of customs duties collected by France and 
Belgium increased ill will between the British and French 
governments. After Kilmarnock heard that the proceeds were 
being deposited in Allied banks in occupied territory in 
the name of a special Allied committee, on which no British 
member sat, and that the committee was supposedly holding
Écho de Paris, March 2, 1923» p. 1» Le Temps, 
March 11, 1923» p* 1; Phipps to FO, No. 3^5» March 2Ô, 1923» 
FO 371/8725» C 5825/313/18; J.O., Chambre, March 30, 1923» 
p. 1705 ; Le Journal des Debats, April 7» 1923, P* 1-
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the funds at the disposal of the Reparation Commission, 
the Foreign Office on March ik telegraphed Phipps to ask 
into what fund the proceeds would be paid. Upon learning 
that the Reparation Commission had received no notification 
that the funds were being held at its disposition, the For­
eign Office told Kilmarnock to ask his French and Belgian 
colleagues about the matter. On March l8 he reported that 
although he had been unable to see either Tirard or the 
Belgian Commissioner, he had learned from their deputies 
that the French and Belgian governments intended to hand 
over only the amount of sanctions receipts left after the 
deduction of expenses incurred in collecting them. The 
Reparation Commission had not been notified because there 
would be no surplus for February; however, a surplus was 
anticipated for March.
Kilmarnock's telegram and the March 23 Memorandum 
from Poincare to Saint-Aulaire were the first official in­
dications that France considered the costs of the occupa­
tion as a first charge on the sanctions receipts, and For­
eign Office personnel objected strongly. Lampson felt that 
according to Article 248 of the Versailles Treaty, France 
had no right to make any such deduction. Since that article 
stated that "a first charge upon all the assets and revenues
Kilmarnock to FO, No. 113, March 8, 1923,
FO 371/8720, C 4414/313/18; FO to Phipps, No. 121, March l4, 
1923, FO 371/8722, C 4813/313/16; FO to Kilmarnock, No. 88, 
March I6 , 1923, FO 371/8722, C 4813/313/18; Kilmarnock to 
FO, No. 140, March 18, 1923, FO 371/8723, C 5046/313/18.
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of the German Empire and its constituent states" was im­
posed for reparation, he did "not see that Kj*niice can pos­
sibly claim that anything she may extract from the Ruhr 
does not fall under the article.
In response to Lampson*s March 24 request for obser­
vations, the Treasury on April 4 asked that representations 
be made immediately to the French and Belgian governments, 
Lampson then sent a telegram to Phipps, but told him to 
take no action upon it until he was authorized to do so.
The draft telegram instructed him to tell the French gov­
ernment that because the Franco-Belgian sanction had not 
been "decided upon by the Allied Powers" but had been car­
ried out by the French and Belgian governments "acting 
independently and against the wishes" of the British govern­
ment, and because the British position was governed by Ar­
ticle 248 of the Treaty, the entire amount collected from 
Germany should be given to the Reparation Commission. Four 
days later, however, Lampson told Phipps to continue to 
hold the draft telegram in abeyance for the moment, and 
that night he wrote Robert Vansittart, Curzon’s Private 
Secretary, who was with Curzon in Tours, France, to suspend 
all action because Bonar Law did not want to bring the
28matter to the attention of the French government. Once
27 ,Memorandum from Poincare to Saint-Aulaire, March 231
19231 cited above; Minute by Lampson, March 24, 1923 «
FO 371/8725, C 5783/313/18.
^^Laropson to the Secretary to the Treasury, March 24, 
1923, FO 371/8723, C 5046/313/18; Phipps (Treasury) to
l4l
more Bonar Law had intervened and the British government 
had failed to challenge openly the legality of a French 
move.
Nevertheless, when two ordinances of the Rhineland 
High Commission caused difficulty, the British government 
did question their validity. On March 15, the High Com­
mission, Lord Kilmarnock abstaining, passed Ordinance No. 
153 and No, 154, According to the first of these, the 
Commission seized "all machines and other articles, includ­
ing animals, belonging to the German Government in the oc­
cupied territories intended to be applied in conformity 
with the Treaty of Versailles for purposes of restitution," 
as well as "all material, goods, and property of every kind 
belonging to the Allied Governments or their nationals and 
being in the occupied territories in whatsoever custody 
they may be, other than that of the said Governments or 
nationals." Under the second ordinance, the Commission
sequestrated and seized all chattels in the occupied 
territories which are the subject of orders on the 
port of the Allied Governments or their nationals 
from the German Government or its nationals, in pur­
suance of Part VIII of the Treaty of Peace, or any 
subsequent agreement.29
Lampson, No. F.5715, April 4, 1923* and FO to Phipps, No.
 , April 5» 1923* FO 371/8726, C 6183/313/18; Lampson to
Phipps, April 9, 1923, FO 371/8726, C 6183/313/18; Lampson 
to Vansittart, April 9, 1923, FO 371/8726, C 6379/313/18. 
Lampson, unfortunately, failed to reveal the reasons for 
Bonar Law's decision.
^^Kilmarnock to FO, No. 121 and No. 123, March 15, 
1923, FO 371/8731, C 9076/313/18.
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On March 23i the Foreign Office instructed Phipps to point 
out that the ordinances went far beyond the powers given 
the High Commission under the Rhineland Agreement and in­
fringed upon the rights of the Reparation Commission in 
that they purported "to confer power on other and unau­
thorised bodies to dispose of assets on which the Repara­
tion Commission have a charge." He was to tell Poincare 
that since the ordinances appeared to be "altogether ultra 
vires" and would cause hostile criticism in the forthcoming 
debate in Parliament, the British government urged their 
annulment.
Poincare responded on March 28. He said that Ordi­
nance No. 153 was designed only to insure the delivery of 
material and livestock due for delivery to the French gov­
ernment under the 1922 Restitution Agreement, which had 
been initialled by the Reparation Commission. The seizure 
ordered by the High Commission was, therefore, only "a 
safeguard, the purpose of which was to prevent the German 
Government from disposing of these articles elsewhere; it 
resulted only in assuring the execution of decisions ap­
proved by the Reparation Commission." Concerning Ordinance 
No. 154, he stated that it
envisaged the seizure of objects and products of all
kinds situated in the occupied territories, and being
^°F0 to Phipps, No. 141, March 23, 1923, FO 371/6724,
C 5498/313/18; British Embassy, Paris, to Poincare, March 24, 
1923, A.N., F30 582.
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the object of orders by the Allied Governments or 
their nationals under Part VIII of the Treaty of 
Peace and subsequent agreements. There can be no 
injury to the rights of the Reparation Commission, 
the products and objects in question having to be 
delivered by the German Government to the Allied 
Governments under the programme of deliveries in 
kind drawn up by the Commission itself or approved 
by it.
He closed by saying that in adopting these ordinances the 
High Commission, which was the supreme representative of 
the Allied Powers in occupied territory, had merely fol­
lowed the procedure used in the case of customs and coal
tax, and this procedure had not been protested by the
31British government.
The French reply caused much consternation in the 
Foreign Office, and on March 30 Lampson asked the Treasury 
Secretary for observations on the ordinances. He wrote 
that since it was difficult to see how these ordinances 
were designed "to secure the maintenance, safety and re­
quirements of the Allied forces in the Rhineland," they 
probably were not valid under the Rhineland Agreement.
The Treasury replied on April 18 that the French govern­
ment's note should not be left unanswered, and Lampson
32began preparing a reply to the French. For a time the 
matter remained in abeyance.
^^Poincare to Phipps, March 28, 1923, A.N., f30 582, 
32Lampson to Secretary, Treasury, March JO, 1923*
FO 371/8725* C 5837/313/18; Secretary, Treasury, to Crowe, 
No. F.6115, April 18, 1923. FO 371/8728, C 6979/313/18.
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Although the British government had challenged 
France about the validity of the two Rhineland High Commis­
sion ordinances, it remained reluctant to question openly 
the legality of the occupation itself. This hesitation was 
significant, for the legality issue and British drift were 
closely related in that any British effort to challenge 
France would be much more effective if founded upon a dec­
laration of the illegality of French measures. The ques­
tion arose again when Lord Crewe on March 10 communicated 
the French government's reply to the German note of Febru­
ary 15» The German note, which had been delivered by 
Sthamer to the Foreign Office on February 23, stated that 
the French and Belgians had violated the Treaty of Ver­
sailles, the Rhineland Agreement, the Hague Conventions, 
and international law. In their reply, the French refuted 
each charge. To the German statement that Paragraph 18 of 
Annex II to Part VIII of the Treaty did not justify taking 
military measures, France countered that when on two pre­
vious occasions— the Protocol of Spa and the May 3, 1921, 
ultimatum— the Allies had considered that Paragraph l8 con­
templated the occupation of territory, the German govern­
ment had not protested. In answer to the German protest 
against the French interpretation of the word "respective" 
in Paragraph l8, France pointed to the October 28, 1920,
33statement by Austen Chamberlain in the House of Commons.
^^Crewe to Curzon, No. 600, March 10, 1923» 
FO 371/8721, C 4535/313/18.
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The Foreign Office had to decide what move to make 
next. Even though he did not want to take part in the 
Franco-German legality discussion, Lampson wrote that since 
Sir John Simon had on March 12 asked in the House of Commons 
whether the Foreign Office had solicited the opinion of the 
Law Officers on the legality under Paragraph l8 of France's 
Ruhr action, perhaps they should be consulted. He asked 
advice from C, J. B. Hurst, Legal Adviser to the Foreign 
Office, whose response was most revealing. Hurst declared 
that although the French reply to Germany was not a con­
vincing document, he had made no detailed commentary upon 
it. He explained his reasons for failing to do so and made 
a shrewd observation about British policy:
Whether or not it is worth while at the present stage 
to consult the Law Officers seems to me to depend upon 
the question how far H.M.G. [His Majesty's Government] 
intend to allow the French to go on. If the attitude 
of benevolent neutrality is to continue, it does not 
matter very much whether we consider the French action 
legal or illegal because I am not clear what steps
H.M.G. would take if the Law Officers reported that 
the French action is illegal. It might render it more 
difficult for H.M.G. not to adopt an attitude of defi­
nite opposition.
Sir Eyre Crowe noted that he, too, hesitated to consult
the Law Officers, but Curzon said that they should be 
34consulted
Lampson wrote to the Law Officers on April 4, send­
ing to them and commenting upon fifteen documents, including
34Minutes by Lampson on March 13» 1923, Hurst on 
March 17. 1923, Crowe and Curzon on March 19. 1923.
FO 371/8721, C 4535/313/18.
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the March 10 response to the German note. After a lengthy 
explanation of Foreign Office opinion on the issues under 
consideration, he asked for their opinion on eight points, 
three of which were of psirticular importance :
1. Whether, in view of the terms of the Reparation 
Commission's note of the 21st March, 1922, Germany is 
entitled to claim that her default in making the de­
liveries stipulated therein only justified the exac­
tion of further cash payments.
2. Whether Germany's default in fulfilling her rep­
aration obligations justifies the occupation, under 
the treaty, of German territory, in addition to that 
provided for in article 428 of the Treaty of Ver­
sailles and in the Rhineland Agreement.
6. Whether paragraphs 17 and l8 of Annex II to Part 
VIII of the Treaty of Versailles justify action by 
individual Allied Governments when the Reparation 
Commission notify a default.35
The Law Officers replied on April 11, and their an­
swer to the first question was negative:
. . .  it seems to us impossible seriously to contend 
that she is entitled to make voluntary default in the 
deliveries in kind and then to claim that she is dis­
charged from all responsibility if she adds to the 
cash liabilities which she has already stated she can­
not pay, a sum equivalent to these deliveries.
]n their opinion, German default gave the Allied powers the
right to act under Paragraph l8. They then reported that
they had experienced great difficulty in considering the
second question but had concluded that the answer was also
negative :
In our opinion the words "economic and financial pro­
hibitions and reprisals" indicate the kind of measures 
that the paragraph has in view, and the general words
^^Foreign Office to Law Officers of the Crown, 
April 4, 1923, FO 37l/8?21, C 4535/313/18.
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following must be interpreted in the light of those 
words and must be limited to measures of the kind so 
indicated.
To the surprise of the Foreign Office, the answer to 
the sixth question, also labelled difficult, was in the 
.'iff irmntive :
J t seems to us that the scheme of the annex is for the 
Reparation Commission to give notice to the interested 
Powers in the event of default, and for the respective 
Governments of those Powers to take such measures 
within paragraph l8 as they may determine to be neces­
sary. We do not think that they must all agree or act 
in concert.
In the two final paragraphs of their reply, the Law 
Officers cautioned the Foreign Office. Pointing out that 
it was difficult to reconcile the opinion they had just 
made with the action threatened by Great Britain and the 
other Allies in March and May of 1921, they advised against 
attempts to base any British protest upon their view of the 
meaning of Paragraph l8. "It would therefore be better, so 
far as possible, to avoid laying stress upon the legal stand­
point, although for the reasons stated we believe it to be 
s o u n d . T h e  Law Officers' report was to make the Foreign
^^Law Officers of the Crown to Curzon, April 11, 1923, 
FO 371/8721, C 4535/313/18. The Law Officers' report, it 
seems, contradicts statements made in two works surveyed in 
this study. In Versailles, Twenty Years After (London:
George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 19^1)V P* 299, Paul Birdsall 
wrote: "Law Officers of the British Crown vainly pronounced
the action illegal under the terms of the treaty. . . ."
G. E. R. Gedye stated: "In spite of French abuse, Britain
loyally kept silent concerning the damning fact . . . that
the British Law Officers of the Crown . . .  gave their con­
sidered judgement that the occupation of the Ruhr was abso­
lutely illegal." See The Revolver Republic. France's Bid 
for the Rhine (London: Arrowsmith,1930), p. 81.
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Office increasingly hesitant to deal with the question of 
the legality of French action.
After studying the report, Second Secretary Ralph F. 
Wigram on April 12 wrote a detailed commentary. In it he 
tried to show that action threatened by the Allied nations 
in March and May, 1921, would have been based upon "the 
right which is open to every nation to compel the observance 
of a treaty to which it is a party" rather than upon Para­
graphs 17 and l8. He felt that the British government could 
easily base a protest upon its interpretation of the meaning 
of Paragraph l8. Lampson noted, however, that whatever were 
the explanations concerning British action in 1921, nine out 
of ten people would say what the Law Officers had said in 
their concluding paragraphs: Lloyd George's 1921 threats
would weaken the British case if the government chose to 
argue that France was acting illegally. Sir William Tyrrell 
concurred: "1 entirely agree . . .  that paragraph 9 of the
Law Officers' opinion represents the overwhelming sense 
amongst the public. Mr. Lloyd George's consent given in 
1921 places the French in a very strong position." After 
reading these minutes, Curzon commented that Britain could
do no good by raising the legal question and that he had no
37intention of doing so.
37'Minutes by Wigram on April 12, 1923, Lampson on 
April 13, 19231 Tyrrell on April l4, 1923» and Curzon on 
April 15, 1923, FO 371/8727, C 6636/313/18.
149
By mid-April, as will be shown, many Englishmen were 
harshly condemning British passivity and wondering why the 
Bonar Law government took no action against France. Had 
they known that Bonar Law had suppressed two dispatches 
designed to protest French action, they would certainly 
have wanted an explanation. Fortunately for the historian, 
an April l8 telegram (marked "Secret. Private and Per­
sonal") from Bonar Law to Jan Smuts, Governor-General of 
the Union of South Africa, gives some answers to these 
questions and helps explain British policy.
Bonar Law said that although both he and the British 
government, like Smuts, agreed that conditions in the Ruhr 
were very serious and that "an economic loss is taking 
place with no compensations," he was unable "to see any 
course open to us other than that which we have adopted." 
This was true partly because two years ago Britain, to­
gether with France, had threatened Germany with occupation 
of the Ruhr. Then he made further explanations about Brit­
ish policy: "In January I was certain that whatever we
might do the French would occupy the Ruhr and no action 
then or since seemed possible which would not have made 
us seem pro-German and anti-French." Furthermore, he did 
not believe that "direct pressure" was practicable at the 
present time. Commenting on Smuts' March 29 message, Bonar 
Law said that he felt that the Governor-General was wrong 
in believing that French policy was "based on the desire to
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take Germany's pre-war position on the Continent"; instead, 
France had acted impulsively because of disappointment, the 
need for reparations, and a sense of insecurity. His clos­
ing statements reiterated the belief that British hands were 
tied: "In fact no new policy seems to me possible which
would not be to take directly the side of the Germans against 
the French. I am sure that this would be unpopular in this 
country. . . ." Finally, he mentioned another factor which 
may have influenced the formulation of British policy: the
British government had heard that public opinion in both
o Othe Dominions and the United States was very pro-French.
This telegram reveals that Bonar Law doubted that either 
39British or American opinion would support pressure against
France,
Although some historians have written that American
(lOopinion was sympathetic to the German cause, several
^®Bonar Law to Smuts, April l8, 1923. FO 37I/8728,
c 7186/313/18.
^^In late March, Sir Charles Mendel, Paris repre­
sentative, Foreign Office News Department, had talked to 
Lord Hardinge, recently-retired British Ambassador to Prance, 
who told him that "public opinion at home in its great major­
ity , outside the City, viewed with admiration the stand that 
the French are taking against the Germans 1Î" See Mendel to 
Tyrrell, March 29, 1923, FO 395/382, P 520/2/117.
^®Rene Albrecht-Carric wrote: "popular reaction in 
Britain and America rankled," and Koppel S. Pinson stated 
that "public opinion . . .  in the United States condemned 
the French action as an expression of aggressive militarism 
and imperialism." See Albrecht-Carrie, France, Europe and 
the Two World Wars (Geneva: Librairie Ex! Droz, I96O), p.
133Î Pinson, Modern Germany; Its History and Civilization 
(2nd ed.; New York; The Macmillan Co., I966), p. 430.
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dispatches from Sir Auckland Geddes, British Ambassador 
to the United States, did indeed cause the Foreign Office 
to believe that American opinion in early 1923 was pro- 
French. As early as February 8 he reported that Secretary 
of State Hughes informed him that public opinion was lean­
ing more and more toward France in her effort to make Ger­
many pay, and on March 28 he relayed the result of a poll 
conducted by the Spokesman-Review. Of 239 papers surveyed, 
l46 were emphatically in favor of Franco-Belgian action,
65 against, and 24 conditionally favorable. Commenting on 
an April 20 dispatch which said that sympathy for France
was still increasing, Lampson wrote that from the beginning
4lAmerican feeling had definitely been pro-French. This 
awareness of the American position probably added to Brit­
ish caution in dealing with France, for Britain, seeking 
to bring America back into the European diplomatic scene, 
wanted to do nothing to alienate it.
Meanwhile, the British Parliament became increasingly 
restive and critical of the government's foreign policy. On 
March I3, Sir John Simon moved a reduction in the Foreign 
Office Vote because of the government's inaction in the Ruhr
^^Geddes to FO, No. 62, February 8, 1923, FO 371/8711,
C 2461/313/18; No. 385, March 28, 1923, FO 371/8727,
C 6789/313/18; No. 491, April 20, 1923, FO 371/8730,
C 7583/313/18. On March 5, Consul General Basil S. Cave re­
ported that several delegates of the American Chamber of 
Commerce had told him that American commercial groups be­
lieved that Germany was able to pay and that France was jus­
tified in demanding payment; see Cave to FO, No. 16, March 5,
1923, FO 371/9397, W 1856/1856/17.
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imbroglio and called attention to the virtual encirclement 
of the British zone by French outposts, the damage to Brit­
ish trade, and the danger of violence in the Ruhr. Simon 
questioned the legality of French policy, and speakers
from all parties urged the government to take action of 
Losome sort. Another major Ruhr debate occurred on 
March 28, and again several speakers tried unsuccessfully 
to urge the government to adopt a more active policy. 
Asquith asked if the government intended to continue fol­
lowing its policy of "benevolent impotence," and J. Ramsay 
MacDonald, leader of the Labour peirty, attacking the gov­
ernment harshly, said that people from all parties were 
asking why the British government did not say where xt 
stood. Since Bonar Law was unable to speak, Baldwin de­
livered the government's reply and stated that the British 
government was being careful not to interfere prematurely. 
It had, he believed, been able to preserve the friendship 
of France and Belgium since the begiiming of the occupation 
and perhaps would later be accepted as a negotiator by them 
and Germany. The Easter recess began on March 29, and 
after Parliament reconvened in April there was for a time 
no major Ruhr debate. The government, nevertheless,
LoIn spite of opinions expressed in the House of 
Commons during this debate, the Cabinet, in its March l4 
meeting, concluded: ". . . a t  the moment there was no new
factor which would justify any departure from the general 
policy of the Government in regard to this question."
See Cab 23/45» 15(23)6(a).
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continued to be faced with frequent questions in Parliament
43about the Ruhr occupation.
While the House of Commons was the scene of frequent 
criticism of British policy, the Chamber of Deputies virtu­
ally abdicated after the Ruhr occupation began. The French 
Senate and Chamber of Deputies had, it will be recalled, 
voted on January 11 to postpone questions on foreign policy 
until the first Friday in February. Although dissatisfac­
tion grew in French parliamentary circles when it soon be­
came evident that the Ruhr venture would produce no imme­
diately favorable results, Poincare on February 1 requested 
another adjournment of all interpellations on foreign policy. 
After acrimonious debate, the Chamber voted postponement 
sine die by a 488 to 68 margin, only Socialists and Commu­
nists opposing. The question was to come up again only on 
May 8, when Poincare would once more request postponement 
sine die, make the issue a question of confidence, and win 
by a 487-71 vote. Not until May 22 would a full-scale Ruhr 
debate take place in the French Chamber. As the occupation 
continued, opposition to the government came to be consid­
ered disloyalty to the state, and the ministry escaped the
44influence of effective parliamentary criticism.
^Annual Register, 19231 pp. 31-35, 46. On March 1, 
1923, p. 1, Le Temps declared: "The House of Commons dis­
cusses Ruhr affairs more often than the French Chamber."
44Frederick Lewis Schuman, War and Diplomacy in the 
French Republic. An Inquiry into Political Motivations and 
the Control of Foreign Policy (New York: McGraw-Hill Book
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During March and the first half of April, the gov­
ernment also suffered only moderate criticism from the 
French press, most of which continued to come from the pen 
of Robert de Jouvenel, proprietor of the leading opposition 
organ, L*Oeuvre and André Tardieu, follower of Clemenceau 
and advocate of a harsh peace at Versailles, in L*Écho 
National. Several tendencies characterized the French 
press during the March 1-April 19 period. First, glowing 
statements of inqprovement of the situation in the Ruhr 
virtually disappeared. Even though this was true, a note 
of determination was prevalent, and Pertinax wrote on 
April 12 that France would stay in the Ruhr until complete 
payment of reparations was made* Another theme was the 
insistence that France would accept no mediation, would 
listen to no indirect approaches from Germany, and would 
refuse to participate in any conference designed to settle 
the Ruhr question. Closely related to this were suggestions 
that the French government itself should draw up a repara­
tions plan in order to be prepared when the German surrender 
came. Both L*Écho de Paris and La Matin published repara­
tions schemes.
Company, Inc., 1931), pp. 293-294; John E. Howard, Parlia­
ment and Foreign Policy in France (London: The Cresset
Press, 1946),^pp. 64, 76•
^^L*Oeuvre, April 6, 1923» p. 1» L ’Écho de Paris,
April 12, 1923, p. 1; Le Temps, March 111 16, and 18, 1923»
p. 1. See reparations schemes published in L ’Écho de Paris, 
March 3» 1923» p. 3» April I7 » 1923» p. 3; and Le Matin,
April 9, 1923» p. 1.
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Several characteristics also marked the British press 
during the same period. First, beginning around the middle 
of March, the amount of space devoted to Ruhr events de­
creased significantly in all papers. The most prevalent 
theme of those articles still written about the Ruhr was 
a sense of frustration at the inactivity of the British 
government in face of the ever-tightening French grip on 
the Ruhr. Articles in several papers condemned Britain's 
lack of a well-defined policy, with particularly bitter 
attacks coming from the Manchester Guardian and the Mew 
Statesman. N o  newspaper editor seemed pleased with the 
current trend of events. On the other hand, although the 
press generally bemoaned British inactivity, there were
only a few concrete suggestions of alternatives for the
47government to pursue. ' Neither the French nor the British 
press and Parliament were able to speak firmly enough to 
modify the policy of their respective governments.
Even though no source was given for the numerous 
British newspaper reports that France and Germany were 
negotiating and Germany was seeking a way out of the
Manchester Guardian, March 7 and l4, 1923» p. 8; 
New Statesman, March 3» 1923, pp. 619-620; March 24, 1923, 
p. 709» March 31» 1923» pp. 7^0-741. See also Spectator, 
March 10, 1923» p. 393» March 31» 1923» p. 537» Observer, 
March 11, 1923» p. 12, April 1, 1923* p. 10; The Times 
(London), March 14 and 29» 1923» p. 13.
^^See The Times (London), March 23» 1923, P* 12; 
New Statesman, March 31» 1923» p. 737.
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48impasse, these rumors were not completely without founda­
tion. During March, the Germans spoke frequently of inter­
vention and approached the English and the French through 
both official and unofficial channels. On March 10, Sthamer 
told Crowe that the German government, hoping to find a way 
out of the Ruhr deadlock, wanted to suggest that it would 
accept in advance the decision of an international body 
which would determine what Germany ought to pay, how much 
it had paid already, how much it could pay, and how payment 
might be made. Because Germany was reluctant to address 
the French directly, he wondered if the British government 
would communicate the proposals to them. Crowe replied 
that since Poincare had often stated that he would accept 
no intervention by third parties, Germany would be well 
advised to approach France directly or at least to submit
its suggestions to all the Allies simultaneously. Curzon
49repeated Crowe’s advice to Sthamer four days later.
Evidence of German desire for mediation came from 
several other sources. On March 12, Kilmarnock reported 
that local indications confirmed the impression that many 
Germans were ready to negotiate. He related that Dr. Konrad
^®See, for example, Daily Mail, March 7, 1923, p. 8; 
Manchester Guardian, March 26, 1923, P* 9-
49Conversation between Sthamer and Crowe, March 10, 
1923, FO 371/8721, C 4585/313/18; Conversation between 
Sthamer and Curzon, March l4, 1923, FO 371/8632,
c 4876/1/18.
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Adenauer, Chief Burgermeister of Cologne, had declared 
that negotiations were urgently necessary and had suggested 
an armistice in order that they might begin. Although Am­
bassador D'Abernon telegraphed on March l8 that the German 
Chancellor and Foreign Minister had said that they saw no 
immediate solution and insisted that evacuation of the Ruhr 
must precede any negotiations, the British Chargé d'Affaires 
in Berlin wrote a few days later that among the Germans 
there was a growing weariness and desire for intervention.^^ 
The Germans, during the last two weeks in March, 
made two more efforts to find a way out of the impasse, 
one indirect and the other direct. When Hugo Stinnes, the 
powerful German industrialist, requested French Deputy 
Paul Reynaud to visit him to discuss conditions of an 
entente, Reynaud on March l6 informed the Quai d'Orsay 
that he was leaving for Wiesbaden. Thinking that he could 
not see Reynaud before he left Paris, Poincare telegraphed 
Tirard to meet the Deputy upon his arrival and tell him 
that if he talked with Stinnes he would have him expelled 
from the Chamber because the government considered his ac­
tion contrary to national interest. Later that day Poin-
e 1care informed Tirard that Reynaud had renounced the trip.
^^Kilmarnock to FO, No. Il4, March 12, 1923t 
FO 371/8723, C 4987/313/18; D'Abernon to FO, No. I36,
March I8 , 1923, FO 371/8723, C 5710/313/18; Head to FO,
No. 207, March 21, 1923, FO 371/8724, C 5520/313/18.
^^Poincare to Tirard, No. 322 and No. 326, March I6 , 
1923, A.N., AJ9 3904. Reynaud tells a little bit about the
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After Baldwin's March 20 speech in the House of Commons, 
Sthamer called again on Curzon and said that he believed 
that one passage in the speech indicated British willing­
ness to intervene when the right moment came. Sthamer 
interpreted it to mean that Britain was prepared to under­
take independent intervention in the near future, and Curzon 
replied that the Ambassador had exaggerated the meaning of 
the statement. The British position was unchanged: the
British government would intervene only when it could do so
by general desire. In closing, Curzon reminded the Ambas-
ysador of his previous advice to Germany to take the first 
step,^^
It appeared in early April, however, that France 
itself was taking the first serious step toward negotia­
tions. Louis Loucheur, "the most eminent and richest of 
businessmen-politicians in France" and a powerful political 
figure, went to England for a conversation with Bonar Law 
at Torquay on April 4 and a visit with Lloyd George, whom 
he had known for years. Although the Loucheur visit re­
ceived intensive press coverage, both his purpose in coming 
to England and the nature of his mission have remained un­
certain because French and British press accounts, as well
incident in Paul Reynaud, Mémoires, Vol. I: Venu de ma
montagne (Paris: Flammarion, I960), p. I70.
^^Conversation between Curzon and Sthamer, March 29« 
1923, FO 371/8725, C 5906/313/18.
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as diplomatic dispatches and minutes, gave conflicting
53accounts. Some facts, however, do exist.
It is certain that in his conversations with Bonar
Law the Frenchman made specific proposals for settling the
reparations question and guaranteeing French security.
The financial section of his program called for fixing the
German debt at 40,000,000,000 gold marks, plus the British
debt to America and the service of the French and Italian
debts to America, making a total much larger than that
proposed in the Bonar Law plan. The section relating to
French security contained the following proposals : the
Rhineland should be separated from Prussia (although it
would remain an integral part of Germany) and completely
demilitarized; an international gendarmerie should be
organized and controlled by the League of Nations ; the
Rhine railways should be operated by an international
board under League supervision; and a special Saar State
should be created and controlled by the League, but the
54coal mines should continue to be French property.
5 3D. W. Brogan, The Development of Modern France, 
1870-19391 Vol. II; The Shadow of War, World War, Between 
the Two Wars (rev. ed.; New York: Harper & Row, 19^5),
p. 593« It is regrettable that Royal J. Schmidt, who util­
ized Loucheur*s papers in writing Versailles and the Ruhr : 
Seedbed of World War II, does not even mention the Loucheur 
visit.
54Suggestions Put Forward by M. Loucheur for a Set­
tlement of the Whole Reparations Question and for a Guar­
antee of the Security of France, Communicated by Bonar Law, 
April 7, 1923, FO 371/8632, C 6300/1/lB.
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Interpretations vary about the nature of and reasons 
for the Loucheur visit. In communicating the Loucheur pro­
posals to the Foreign Office, Bonar Law reported that 
Loucheur had given him the following account. Poincaré, 
he said, had asked him to come to England on an official 
mission, but he had declined to do so, saying that he pre­
ferred to explore the situation on his own account. Should 
the results of his exploration be favorable, he would re­
port to Poincare and Millerand and then return to England 
the following week in an official capacity. He said that 
Millerand was in virtually complete agreement with him and 
that if his plan were received favorably in England and 
Poincare chose not to accept it, he, as leader of the ma­
jority in the Chamber, would bring the matter before the 
Chamber and make his position clear. It is likely that 
several events interacted at this juncture to confuse the 
situation. First, Loucheur talked too much: he should
not have revealed to the press his visits with Bonar Law 
and especially with Lloyd George, whom most Frenchmen de­
tested. Second, on May 5 the Daily Telegraph published an 
article discussing, in a mysterious fashion, a proposed 
settlement which came to be attributed to Loucheur and
^^Ibid. Phipps wrote that Loucheur, feeling the 
Ruhr venture was failing, probably saw a chance to gain 
personal success and to extricate France from an impasse. 
When he announced his intention to go to England, Poincare 
was more willing than he let people know; see Phipps to 
FO, No. 971* April l8 , 1923. FO 37I/8728, C 6988/313/18.
l6l
caused a furor in the French press. At this point, it 
seems that the publicity frightened Poincare. As Saint- 
Aulaire revealed in an April 12 conversation with Bonar 
Law and Tyrrell, the President of the Council feared that 
Loucheur's visit would be interpreted by Germany as a sign 
of French weakness and desire for mediation, and this would 
encourage German resistance. When it also became clear 
that his Belgian allies, who had not been informed of the 
visit, were disturbed, Poincare denied that he had sent 
Loucheur to England.
When Loucheur returned to Paris, the mysteries con­
cerning his visit increased rather than diminished. Phipps 
talked to him on April 9 and reported that the Frenchman 
was extremely optimistic and had said that he believed 
that both British and French public opinion had changed so 
much that the gap between them had been narrowed and could 
be easily bridged. He assured Phipps that both Millerand 
and Poincare had changed recently, had come to hold mod­
erate views, and were anxious to negotiate with England on 
a highly reasonable basis. Phipps, of course, was skep­
tical of the validity of these statements, and a discussion
^^Phipps to Crowe, April 6, 1923, FO 371/8728,
C 7018/313/18; Daily Telegraph. May 5. 1923, p. H ;  Phipps 
to FO, No. 364, April 6, 1923, FO 371/8632, C 6246/1/18; 
Memorandum by Tyrrell, April 12, 1923, FO 371/8727,
C 6697/313/18; Tyrrell to Curzon, April 13, 1923,
FO 371/8730, C 8384/313/18; L'Écho de Paris, April 9, 192), 
pp. 1, 3Î Edouard Bonnefous, Histoire politique de la Ille 
Republique, Vol. Ill; L'après-guerre. 1919-1924 (Paris : 
Presses Universitaire de France7 1959), p. 331.
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with Poincare on the following day confirmed his doubts. 
Poincare stated that he feared that Loucheur was mistaken 
in his belief that the British government had recently 
come around to the French point of view and would make 
proposals more favorable than the Bonar Law plan. He re­
affirmed that France was in no hurry and would stay in the
57Ruhr until Germany paid. '
French press reaction to Loucheur's visit was at 
first mixed. Pertinax voiced a common opinion when he 
wrote in L'Écho de Paris that the visit was inopportune 
in that it would cause other nations to believe that French 
determination was waning and would encourage German propa­
ganda and determination. Predictably, L*Oeuvre expressed 
satisfaction with the visit, saying that England and France
had both wanted to talk but had not known how to begin a 
58conversation. Unfavorable comment, nevertheless, soon 
became predominant. Temps criticized Loucheur for paint­
ing such an optimistic picture of the about-face of British 
opinion and, in order to guard against this danger, reaf­
firmed the guiding principles of the French government: 
France would claim the payment of reparations as defined 
by Poincare at the Paris and London Conferences, and French
^^Phipps to FO, No. 377, April 10, 1923, FO 371/8633, 
C 6480/1/18; No. 382, April 10, 1923, FO 371/8633, 
C 6482/1/18.
^^L'Écho de Paris, April 6 , 1923, p. 3; L* Oeuvre, 
April 8 , 1923, p. 1; see also Le Temps, April ?, 1923, P- 1-
163
troops would stay in the Ruhr until payment was made. Sev­
eral days later, Pertinax wrote that the Loucheur visit was
entirely unofficial and that the time had not yet come for
59a rapprochement between France, England, and Belgium.
British press response to the Loucheur episode was 
much less critical than that across the Channel. Although 
most British newspapers felt that he had misjudged British 
opinion and were uncertain about the purpose of his coming, 
they expressed hope that the visit would lead to improved 
Anglo-French relations. The Manchester Guardian guessed 
that France had been considering a change in policy and 
had sent Loucheur to ascertain whether it would be accept­
able in England. Both this paper and the Spectator declared 
that he was mistaken in believing that British opinion was 
more favorable to France than previously. The Observer 
praised the visit, however, saying that it had led to a 
better understanding between the two countries and that 
private and public discussion of Europe's most important 
problem had been beneficial.
The Loucheur visit, it seems, was a serious French 
attempt to break the Ruhr deadlock. It should be noted that
^^Le Temps, April 9, 1923» p. 1* L'Écho de Paris, 
April 14, 1923, p. 3.
^^Manchester Guardian, April 7» 1923, p. 10;
April 10, 1923, p. 8; Spectator, April l4, 1923, p. 6l8; 
Observer, April 8, 1923, p. 12; see also Daily Telegraph, 
April 7, 1923, p. 7; April 10, 1923, p. 10; New Statesman, 
April 14, 1923, p. 1.
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Poincaré did not, as he had done earlier with Paul Reynaud, 
prohibit Loucheur's leaving France, Evidence indicates 
that Poincare privately authorized the mission, but when 
the politician's ineptness and the publicity given the 
journey rendered it ineffective and the French press criti­
cized, Poincare repudiated him publicly. Although Loucheur 
had planned to return to London within a week, he failed to 
do so, and his proposals were never discussed officially. 
While the affair spawned hope in England for an end to the 
stalemate, it stiffened the French attitude and made that 
nation more determined than ever to pursue the occupation 
and find both security and reparations in the Ruhr, Loucheur 
had failed; deadlock prevailed.
By mid-April, the British government had, as has been 
shown, refused to be budged by increasing Parliamentary and 
press criticism, which was merely used at times as a weapon 
to threaten the French government. Among Foreign Office 
officials there were rumblings and some hints of action, 
but no firm suggestion that the policy of drift should soon 
be abandoned. Although this inactivity cannot be fully ex­
plained, two factors seem to have been primarily responsible. 
First, the British government still felt its legal position 
compromised by the 1921 threats to occupy additional German 
territory. The second factor was the influence of Prime 
Minister Bonar Law. Believing strongly in the necessity of 
maintaining the Entente and feeling that American, Dominion,
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and even a large segment of British opinion would condone 
no anti-French moves, he continued to thwart Foreign Office 
efforts to challenge French action.
CHAPTER IV
A DEPARTURE FROM DEADLOCK? CURZON'S APRIL 20, 1923, 
ADDRESS AND THE GERMAN REPARATIONS PROPOSALS 
OF MAY 2 AND JUNE 7, 1923
Within the Ruhr, the situation remained basically 
unchanged from late April through early June : the Rhine­
land High Commission passed eighteen additional ordinances 
tightening the French and Belgian grip, and the German gov­
ernment and Ruhr population continued the policy of passive 
resistance, which occasionally flared into sabotage and 
open resistance. During this period, the spotlight moved 
from the Ruhr itself to the diplomatic scene, the exchange 
between the major powers became somewhat more public, and 
Britain, France, and Germany made clear declarations of 
their position. Because the British government finally 
took the initiative, many people believed in late April 
that the deadlock might soon be broken. Although these 
hopes seemed to be dashed in early May, they revived at 
the beginning of June.
The stimulus for hope for an end to the diplomatic 
impasse came from London, where Curzon, in response to
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public demands for a clear statement of the government's 
Ruhr policy, addressed the House of Lords on April 20,
First, he traced the background of the current crisis, 
going hack to the July, 1922, German request for a mora­
torium and continuing through the London Conferences of 
August and December, 1922, and the Paris Conference of 
January, 1923. Then he began a discussion and defense of 
Britain's Ruhr policy by referring to Bonar Law's declara­
tion, at the close of the Paris Conference, that although 
the British government was unable to take part in French 
measures, the feeling of friendship remained unchanged.
This declaration, widely approved at the time, had been 
the basis of British policy since the beginning of the 
occupation, and Britain had followed a policy of neutrality 
by refusing to participate in Rhineland High Commission 
decisions growing out of French action, refusing to take 
sides in Franco-German controversies, and trying to main­
tain order and prevent clashes between French and Germans 
in the British zone. Efforts in these directions had been 
basically successful, and the presence of British troops 
had been acceptable to both sides. Although trade difficul­
ties had arisen, recent Board of Trade figures indicated 
that British trade with Germany was greater than during the 
corresponding period of the previous year
^Parliamentary Debates. House of Lords, Vol. 53» 
cols. 781-786.
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The Foreign Secretary next explained why the govern­
ment had failed to follow suggestions that it intervene in 
the struggle. It had done so because it believed that out­
side interference would be useless and harmful until Ger­
many and France could get together. Since speeches by 
French Cabinet members indicated that France would resent 
interference, and since Germany seemed unwilling to profit 
from advice, intervention would have failed. Curzon also 
explained British policy by discussing two possible alter­
natives: had Britain assisted France, it would have parti­
cipated in an act whose wisdom it doubted, and had it sup­
ported Germany, it would have been disloyal to the Allies. 
The British government could not do the latter, for the 
Entente must be maintained:
Our guiding consideration throughout has been that 
the Entente between France and Britain and their 
Allies should not be broken. We are profoundly 
convinced that the Entente is the basis of European 
recovery and of the European peace. . . .  If that 
Entente be broken down, I see no limit to the chaos 
that would result and to the perils to European 
peace and to recovered prosperity that might e n s u e . 2
He then declared that the British policy of neutral­
ity was not, as had been charged, one of impotence. He was 
unable to agree that the British government had done noth­
ing; instead, it was avoiding mistakes and waiting for the 
opportune time to intervene. This policy had been accept­
able to both Germany and France and had left Britain in a
^Ibid., col. 788.
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position to intervene effectively at any moment. Those 
who attacked the government's policy should realize that 
no concrete, workable alternatives had been proposed and 
that French determination and German resistance had closed 
most diplomatic doors. The suggestion that the League of 
Nations intervene was no solution for two reasons. In the 
first place, the reparations problem had been entrusted to 
other international bodies; second, the League of Nations 
would probably be unable to bear such a burden, and there 
was always the possibility that the French would withdraw
3from Geneva*
How, then, could the deadlock be broken? Curzon 
suggested that Germany, the debtor, should take the first 
step :
. . .  I cannot help thinking, for my part, that if 
Germany were to make an offer of her willingness and 
intention to pay and to have the payment fixed by 
authorities properly charged with the duty, and if 
she were at the same time to offer specific guaran­
tees for the continued payments, an advance might be 
made. . . .4
After he reaffirmed that British policy was based upon the 
Entente, the Foreign Secretary tried again to pave the way 
for negotiations by saying that although the British govern­
ment still advocated the proposals of the Bonar Law plan, 
they were not immutable and could be discussed. Further­
more, it was willing to discuss the security problem and
^Ibid., cols. 788-794. ^Ibid., cols. 795-796.
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to help both parties if an offer were made for breaking
5the stalemate.
Neither the French nor British press unanimously 
applauded the British effort to break the deadlock. In 
fact, French press reaction to the address disappointed 
Curzon severely, for even though a few Paris papers ac­
knowledged his warm expressions about the Entente, most 
of them criticized, saying that the speech showed that 
the British had made little advance from their January 
position and intended to remain independent. While 
Pertinax declared that it would encourage Germany to re­
sist, René Pinon, in his "Chronique de la quinzaine" in 
La Revue des deux mondes, protested the British effort to 
return to the center of the diplomatic stage. He assailed 
Curzon for placing Germany on the same foot with France 
and Belgium and for saying that any guarantees of security 
would have to be reciprocal. Imagine the victims of Ger­
many’s aggression in 1914 giving guarantees to it
Curzon*s statement, which was labelled the most 
definite explanation of the government's position and policy 
since the beginning of the occupation, met a warmer response 
in the British press than in the French. Although the Daily
^Ibid., cols. 796-797.
^Conversation between Saint-Aulaire and Crowe,
April 25, 1923, FO 371/8729, C 7516/313/18; L'écho de Paris, 
April 22, 1923, p. 3; La Revue des deux mondes, 93rd Year, 
7th Period, Vol. I5 (May 1, 1923), 238-239.
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Mail disagreed with Curzon*s assertion that the British 
people had supported the policy of neutrality, most papers 
felt that he had been correct. They emphasized that the 
speech was not an offer of mediation but merely an invita­
tion to make proposals directly to the Allies rather than 
through Britain. There was, however, some mild criticism. 
The Manchester Guardian said that the speech indicated that 
the government was standing "fast in an attitude . . .  of 
impotence," and the Spectator expressed disappointment that 
Curzon had failed to elaborate a definite plan "which would 
act as a rallying point for sane opinion in Germany, in
7France, in Britain, and elsewhere."'
Curzon*s address gave a glimmer of hope to the German 
government by leading it to believe that if it were to make 
an offer which England considered reasonable it could count 
on British support. Very quickly the German government
Dacted upon the British hint. When it began to draft the 
offer, however, the government experienced difficulties in 
trying to make proposals that would satisfy both Allied
^Daily Mailr April 21, 1923, p. 8; Manchester 
Guardian, April 21, 1923» p. 10; Spectator, April 28, 1923» 
p. 697.
oErich Eyck, A History of the Weimar Republic, trans. 
by Harlan Hanson and Robert G, L. Waite, Vol. I: From the
Collapse of the Empire to Hindenberg*s Election (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts : Harvard University Press, 19^2), p. 244;
Eric Sutton, trans. and ed., Gustav Stresemann, His Diaries, 
Letters, and Papers (2 vols.; New York: The Macmillan Com-
pany, 1935)» I, 62; Minute by Crowe, April 23» 1923,
FO 371/8728, C 7177/313/18.
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demands and the aroused German populace, which would con­
demn any appearance of capitulation. In desperation, the 
Germans appealed to the British for assistance. On April 22 
the German Foreign Minister asked D'Abernon what kind of 
offer he felt that Germany should make and explained that 
since it would be difficult for the parties in Germany to 
agree on precise reparations figures he wondered if a more 
general proposal would be acceptable. After considering 
D'Abernon's dispatch, the Foreign Office told him under no 
circumstances to participate in the formulation of an offer
9to be made to France. The Germans, nevertheless, per­
sisted. When Dufour-Feronce, Counsellor of the German 
Embassy, called on Lampson on April 25 and asked whether 
the impending German proposals should name a definite sum, 
Lampson replied that he could express no opinion. Un­
daunted, Dufour-Feronce met him again two days later and 
said that Sthamer had received semi-official suggestions 
about the terms Germany should propose. Lampson stated 
that any such suggestions were entirely unofficial and that 
Curzon had made it very clear to Sthamer that he would give 
no hints about the contents of the offer. Meanwhile, the 
Germans were also meeting British refusal for assistance in 
Berlin, for D'Abernon reported on May 1 that he had given
Carl Bergmann, The History of Reparations (London: 
Ernest Benn Limited, 1927), p# 192; Eyck, Weimar Republic, 
I, 245 ; D'Abernon to FO, No. 176» April 22, 1923, and FO 
to D'Abernon, No. 86, April 25» 1923» FO 371/8728,
c 7177/313/18.
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the German government no a d v i c e . T h e  Germans had to 
formulate their own proposals, and they did so rapidly.
After submitting the offer to party leaders and 
representatives of the federal states on May 1, the German 
government the following day communicated it to the Allied 
governments. The tone and content of the note were scarcely 
designed to elicit French favor. In the opening paragraphs 
the Germans condemned the Ruhr occupation and stated that 
they would neither abandon "the principles underlying their 
juridical point of view" nor renounce passive resistance, 
which would continue until the evacuation of all territory 
"occupied beyond the Treaty of Versailles." The note then 
turned to specific financial proposals but prefaced discus­
sion of these by saying that in order to fulfill them Ger­
many must re-establish its credit and raise foreign loans.
It proposed that Germany's total reparations obligations be 
fixed at 30,000,000,000 gold marks, which would be raised 
by floating loans on international money markets in three 
installments : 20,000,000,000 by July 1, 1927, another
5.000.000.000 by July 1, 1929» and the remaining
5 1000.000.000 by July 1, 1931. Should it be impossible to 
raise the last two installments under normal conditions, an 
"impartial international commission" would "decide whether,
^^Conversation between Lampson and Dufour-Feronce, 
April 25 and 27, 1923, FO 371/8633, C 7744/1/18; D'Abernon 
to FO, No. 190, May 1, 1923, FO 371/8733, C 11094/313/18.
when and how the rest is to be raised." Germany would also 
continue making deliveries in kind as set forth in earlier 
agreements. These proposals represented the "utmost limit 
of what Germany is able to pay," and perhaps exceeded its 
capacity; should others fail to agree, it would "submit 
the whole reparations problem to an international commis­
sion uninfluenced by political considerations," such as the 
one mentioned by Secretary of State Hughes in December, 
1922. It would also "provide special guarantees for the 
proposed payment," and these would be determined by nego­
tiating with the syndicate making the loan and with the 
Reparation Commission.
All of these proposals, the note declared, were 
dependent upon the stabilization of German currency, the 
future cessation of the "high-handed seizure of pledges 
and sanctions," and the rapid restoration of the adminis­
trative unity of Germany. In closing, it referred to the 
problem of security and said that Germany would be willing 
to make agreements insuring peace if these were reciprocal. 
Before, however, negotiations could begin on any of the 
points set forth in the communication, the status quo ante 
would have to be restored; territory occupied beyond the 
stipulations of the Versailles Treaty must be evacuated,
imprisoned Germans released, and those expelled allowed to
11return to their homes and work.
c 7832/1/18.
^^Sthamer to Curzon, May 2, I923, FO 371/8633,
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The Germans, by virtually refusing to budge, turned 
a large segment of British and French opinion more strongly 
against themselves and made France even more intransigent. 
Most British newspapers criticized the German note, the 
most bitter condemnation coming from the Daily Telegraph 
and the Daily Mail. The Telegraph asked what purpose the 
Germans possibly imagined could be served by such a docu­
ment , which marked no advance toward the desired goal, was 
stiff-necked about passive resistance, and offered an in­
adequate reparations figure. Although The Times said that 
it was "stupidly worded," gave "only the vaguest guaran­
tees ," and irritated French susceptibilities, both it and
the Observer stated that the note should serve as the basis
12of negotiations and should not be rejected summarily. 
Nevertheless, the French press violently attacked the Ger­
man offer and almost unanimously proclaimed the rejection 
against which The Times had warned. The non-partisan Le 
Petit Parisien called it derisory, said that it could not 
be used as the starting point for conversations, and con­
demned the suggestion of allowing an international commis­
sion to fix Germany’s capacity to pay. In the moderately 
conservative, nationalistic L ’Écho de Paris, Pertinax de­
clared that Germany was trying to draw England further 
toward mediation. While the moderately chauvinistic Le
Daily Telegraph, May 3, 1923» p. 10; Daily Mail, 
May 3, 1923» P 8; The Times (London), May 3» 1923» P» 13» 
Observer. May 6, 1923» p. 12.
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Journal des Débats remarked that the note offered nothing 
but appearances in return for evacuation of the Ruhr, Le 
Temps said that it, in effect, would make a clean sweep 
of the Allied victory and entail the negotiation of a new 
treaty.
French governmental reaction to the German commu­
nication was hostile and hasty. On the day the note was 
delivered. Lord Crewe reported that feeling at the Quai 
d'Orsay was highly incensed and that Paris was looking 
toward London to see what attitude Curzon would take 
toward the insult to France. When the French Council of 
Ministers met the morning of May 3 to discuss the German 
note with Poincare, it unanimously rejected the proposals. 
Later that day, Poincare informed Saint-Aulaire, as well 
as the French Ambassadors in Washington, Rome, and Tokyo, 
that since the German proposals were unacceptable and 
could not even serve as a basis for discussion, the French 
government was unanimous in rejecting them and would, after
collaborating with the Belgian government, reply directly 
l4to Germany.
Le Petit Parisien, May 2, 1923» P; 1» L'Écho de 
Paris, May 2, 1923» p. 1» Le Journal des Debats, May 3»
1923» p. 1; Le Temps. May 3, 1923» P- 1.
l^Crewe to FO, No. 449» May 2, 1923» FO 371/8633»,
C 7833/1/18; Le Temps, May 4, 1923» P- 6 ; France, Ministère 
des Affaires Étrangères, Documents diplomatiques: Docu­
ments relatifs aux notes allemandes des 2 mai et 5 juin sur 
les reparations (2 mai-3 août 1923) (Paris: Imprimèrie
nationèle, 1923)» pp. 10-11. Documents diplomatiques en­
tries will hereafter be cited as follows: Doc. dip.:
notes sur reparations, page.
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The British government's reaction to the May 2 note 
was also basically unfavorable. Although Curzon in a May 3 
telegram to D'Abernon expressed no official opinion, he 
observed that Germany should be prepared for French refusal 
to accept the proposals, for France would probably regard 
the financial provisions inadequate and be incensed at both 
Germany's refusal to abandon passive resistance and its 
insistence that the Ruhr be quickly evacuated. Meanwhile, 
Foreign Office and Treasury personnel considered the note 
and its implications. Lampson wrote on May 3 that France 
would almost surely consider the financial offer unsatis­
factory since it was considerably less than the amount 
suggested in the Bonar Law plan. He went on to say, never­
theless, that the figure was inconsequential: more impor­
tant was Germany's capacity to pay. The German suggestion 
for having an impartial body of experts determine its ca­
pacity was worthwhile, but getting France to consent would 
be difficult.
The following day, O. C. Niomeyer relayed Treasury 
observations on the German reparations offer. These pointed 
out that the proposal embodied no workable provision for 
control over German finance and that it was highly unlikely 
that Germany would be able to borrow the proposed
20,000,000,000 gold marks by 1927. Furthermore, even though
15po to D'Abernon, No. 674, May 2, 1923, FO 371/8633, 
C 7896/1/18; Minute by Lampson, May 3, 1923, FO 371/8633,
c 7832/1/18.
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the Ruhr occupation was lengthening the moratorium period, 
there was no justification for reducing total payment to
30,000,000,000 gold marks--an amount which would barely 
cover the costs of restoring Prance's devastated regions, 
leaving nothing for England or other countries. In closing, 
Niemeyer said that what was truly significant was Germany's 
offer to refer the whole problem to an impartial tribunal. 
England should express its willingness to accept this solu­
tion because it needed to bring the occupation to an end 
for economic reasons. While the occupation had at first 
stimulated some British industries, that effect was wearing 
off, and both the rising price of coal and difficulties in 
textile trades were causing serious trouble. Predicting a 
depression in British industry and saying that a change in 
the Ruhr would help remove it, he asked that the Foreign 
Office not hastily endorse any French rejection of the 
proposals
Although Niemeyer's comment, it should be noted, 
either contradicted or superseded Curzon's April 20 state­
ment that the occupation had stimulated British trade, it 
did affect the thinking of Foreign Office personnel and 
cause them to treat the German offer cautiously. After
Niemeyer to Crowe, May 4, 19231 FO 371/8634,
C 7894/1/18. In the Minutes on Niemeyer's letter, Lampson 
wrote: "Of course the essence of the whole problem is
whether a settlement is genuinely desired or not? And if 
so, are we prepared to see a widening rift in our relations 
with France in order to achieve it?"
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consultation, Curzon told Lord Crewe and Sir George Grahame, 
British Ambassador to Belgium, to inform the French and Bel­
gian governments that the British government would like to 
hear their views before deciding what action to take on the 
German note and to remind them that even though France and 
Belgium were most directly concerned with the matter, the 
other powers were also involved and would have to reply,
"I need hardly point out how desirable it is that there
should be no divergence of opinion or action in a matter
17of such grave international importance." The next day 
the Foreign Secretary publicly proclaimed his desire for 
a collective reply when he discussed the German note in a 
speech before a Primrose League demonstration at the Albert 
Hall. After admitting that many people considered the offer 
inadequate, he said that whether it was good or bad, it con­
cerned all the nations, who could "only emerge from this 
difficult . . .  situation by concerted action, and if the 
Germans are confronted with the advice, decision and action 
of all the principal Powers concerned the chances of success
18will be greatly increased."
After his speech, Curzon continued to exert official 
pressure to conq>el France to consult with the Allies before 
replying, but even before his Albert Hall appearance France
^^FO to Crewe, No. 191» and FO to Grahame, No. 66, 
May 3» 1923, FO 371/8633, C 7832/I/18.
^^The Times (London), May 5, 1923» P* l4.
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wns drafting a reply to Germany. When Lord Crewe on May 3 
relayed Curzon's request for French views on the German 
offer, Poincare told him that the Council of Ministers had 
decided upon the response that morning. After Belgium 
assented to the precise wording, he would give Crewe a 
copy, and the reply would probably be given to Germany on 
May 5» It would be a reasonable document which would set 
forth the inadequacies of the German proposals but would 
reflect no desire to close any door to acceptable propos­
als in the future. The subject of a common response came 
up in London the next day when Saint-Aulaire informed 
Crowe that France and Belgium were working together on the 
reply to the note. Crowe reminded the French Ambassador 
that Poincare had previously asserted that in spite of its 
independent action in the Ruhr the French government re­
garded the reparations question as an inter-Allied issue. 
Because of these declarations, he should exchange views 
with the Allies before replying to Germany. Saint-Aulaire 
pointed out that if unanimity could not be obtained in such 
discussions, great disadvantages might ensue, for Germany 
would see clearly the divergence between the Allies. Crowe, 
while recognizing the risk, felt that the effort was worth 
making.
l^Crewe to FO, No. 4$4, May 3, 1923i FO 371/8634,
C 7903/1/18; Conversation between Crowe and Saint-Aulaire, 
May 4, 1923, FO 371/8634, C 7988/I/I8 ; Saint-Aulaire to 
Poincare, May 4, 1923, Doc, dip.: notes sur reparations,
p. 13.
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still the Foreign Office refused to give up. On 
May 4 it instructed Crewe to see Poincare ;igain and tell 
him that the British government was surprised that the 
answer to Germany had already been settled, remind him of 
his assurances that the repeurations issue was an inter- 
Allied one, and urge him to delay sending a reply to Ger­
many until he had exchanged views with the Allies. When 
Crewe talked to Poincare later that day, however, he re­
fused to delay beyond May 5- The President of the Council 
justified his decision by saying that there was no need to 
collaborate on the terms of a reply when the reply itself 
was merely a refusal to consider propositions which in­
volved a breach of the Treaty. Were methods of payment 
or French proposals to Germany under consideration, he 
would certainly consult the Allies, but this was not the 
case. The French government would never prepare a repara­
tions program without its Allies, but it could not delay
sending a refusal to the German propositions, for French
20public opinion would not condone it.
21The numerous British pleas for consultation failed, 
and on May 5 Saint-Aulaire read to Curzon the Franco-Belgian
^°F0 to Crewe, No. 192, May 4, 1923. FO 371/8634,
C 7903/1/18; Crewe to FO, No. 457, May 4, 1923, FO 371/8634, 
C 7966/1/18; Poincare to Saint-Aulaire, May 4, 1923, Doc. 
dip.: notes sur réparations, p. l4.
21Two dispatches written in early May suggest one 
possible reason for Poincare's haste in replying to the 
German note. On May 5, Sir George Grahame reported that
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reply, which he said was being given to German Embassies
in Brussels and Paris at that time. Curzon was furious.
He declared that Poincare had broken his promise to consult
the British government before answering and had informed it
of the terms of the reply just as it was being given to the 
22Germans. When Saint-Aulaire said that France and Belgium 
could themselves reply to a matter so directly affecting 
them, Curzon answered that only because of his speech in 
the House of Lords had Germany made proposals. Without 
even consulting him, the French had slammed the door he 
had attempted to open and had revealed divergence between 
the two nations. He warned that he would have to tell the 
whoj e story to Parliament the following week. When Saint- 
Aulaire called the German proposals derisory, Curzon re­
plied that though they were in some respects unsatisfactory, 
they should not be refused with contempt. It was absurd, 
he declared, for Poincare to go on talking about a
132,000,000,000 gold mark reparations total; new figures
several important Belgian officials had told him that Poin­
care wanted to avoid being drawn into a conference as a 
result of the German offer. A few days later Crewe said 
that the Belgian Ambassador had told him that he knew that 
the statement was true. Poincare's fear that the attempt 
to write a joint reply would lead to a new conference had 
been the main reason for his refusal to work with the 
other Allies. See Grahame to FO, No. 99i May 5» 1923,
FO 371/8634, C 8048/1/18; Crewe to FO, No. 484, May 10, 
1923, FO 371/8635, C 8379/1/18.
22Curzon seems to have been mistaken, for the 
records surveyed in this study reveal no promise by Poin­
care to consult the British before sending a reply to 
Germany.
183
must be fixed, and the Allies would have to do this 
23together.
On May 6 the French government communicated its 
reply to von Hoesch, German Charge d'Affaires in Paris.
The document, which was longer than the German note to 
which it was replying, opened with a refutation of Ger­
many's allegation that Franco-Belgian independent action 
was contrary to the Versailles Treaty. It declared that 
France and Belgium had not violated the Treaty, but the 
proposals formulated by Germany opposed it in several 
ways. Contrary to what the German note declared, France 
had at first carried out this seizure of pledges without 
violence, but orders from Berlin prevented the cooperation 
it had envisioned. Until the so-called passive resistance 
ceased, France and Belgium would consider no German propos­
als. Furthermore, because this resistance included opposi­
tion to the normal functions of the Military Control Com­
mission it was a breach of the Treaty.
Then the French note set forth a long declaration 
of the unacceptability of the German reparations proposals. 
It first noted that the figures offered were inadequate in 
amount, for 30,000,000,000 gold marks represented less than 
one-fourth of the total fixed by the Reparation Commission 
and accepted by Germany in 1921. France and Belgium had
23Conversation between Curzon and Saint-Aulaire, 
May 5, 1923, FO 371/8634, C 80?l/l/l8.
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several times declared and now repeated that they could
accept no reduction of their own credits, and "that if they
are prepared to set off a part of them against inter-Allied
debts they are absolutely obliged to obtain payment of the
remainder in order to recover from the terrible disasters
24which the German invasion inflicted upon them." They 
were also unacceptable by virtue of being in several ways 
indefinite in form. The value of the offer would in prac­
tice amount to less than 30,000,000,000 gold marks because 
the interest up to July 1, 192?i to the issuers of the
20,000,000,000 mark portion of the loan was to be deducted 
from the proceeds of the loan itself. Since the first 
payment was to come due only on that date, Germany was, 
in effect, asking for a complete moratorium for four and 
one-half years. There were even fewer guarantees for the 
two supplementary portions of the loan, and Germany would 
probably try later to have part of the 30»000,000,000 mark 
figure cancelled. In addition, the reparations proposals 
were unacceptable in that they, like the Bonar Law plan, 
suggested depriving the Reparation Commission of the au­
thority given it by the Versailles Treaty to be the judge 
of the partial reduction of debts and postponement of 
payments.
Then the note criticized the German security pro­
posals, saying that they were vague and illusory and.
24 , _Poincare to von Hoesch, May 6, 1923» Doc. dip.:
notes sur reparations, pp. 13-16.
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amazingly, completely omitted Belgium. This was astounding 
when one remembered how Germany, one of the guarantors of 
Belgium's neutrality in 1914, had acted toward it, France 
and Belgium were unable to accept mere reciprocal guaran­
tees : they required certainties. Finally, the note at­
tacked the conditions upon which the German offer had been 
based. France and Belgium could not, as Germany demanded, 
restore the status quo ante by evacuating newly-occupied 
territories and repealing measures taken by the Rhineland 
High Commission. If they did so, it would mean that for 
four and one-half years--the period in which they most 
needed cash payments and deliveries in kind--they would 
have to sit patiently, without pledges or guarantees, until 
Germany got ready to pay something. This they refused to 
do. As previously declared, they would leave the newly-
25occupied areas only in proportion as payments were made.
The French reply, as press reaction revealed, in­
creased bitterness between Britain and France. Predictably, 
it met a warm response in the Paris press. Even before it 
was published, most papers defended Poincare's willingness 
to disregard the British request for consultation among 
the Allies, saying that it was inconceivable that Britain 
would have consented to France's two essential points: 
cessation of passive resistance and no evacuation until 
Germany was actually making payments. Jean Herbette,
^^Ibid., pp. 16-19.
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foreign affairs expert of Le Temps, who was in close con­
tact with the Quai d'Orsay, wrote that it was neither 
France nor Belgium who preferred isolation to solidarity; 
instead, England had several times since the eirmistice 
broken the Allied front in order to save a Germany who was 
paying nothing. The following day he praised the French 
reply and said that the response it would evoke in Berlin 
would depend to a great extent upon English action since 
Germany was counting on British support against France and 
Belgium. Again the next day he pursued the same theme in 
an article entitled "Berlin Awaits 'His Master's Voice,'" 
in which he became more bitter toward England, pointing 
out that it was the latter who had set the example of in­
dependent action. After referring to Chamberlain's Octo­
ber, 1920, statement in the House of Commons, he charged 
that Curzon had made the speech which resulted in the May 2
26German note without consulting the Allies. British press 
comment focused more upon France's refusal to send a col­
lective reply than upon the note itself. Most papers con­
demned France and Belgium for refusing to heed Curzon's 
advice made in the Albert Hall speech and had difficulty 
in trying to understand Poincare's reasons for independent 
action, which they felt was a grave diplomatic blunder 
meaning renewal of the deadlock. Only The Times referred 
specifically to the French reply. While this paper said
^^Le Temps, May 7» 8, and 9, 19231 P- 1
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that the French response, though skillfully worded, was 
unbusinesslike, unconvincing, and as controversial as the 
German note had been, both it and the New Statesman thought 
that there might be one good result of Poincare's precipi­
tate reply: it would give Britain more freedom in making
27its own reply to Germany.
The German government having made an offer as sug­
gested by Curzon, and the French having categorically re­
jected it, the initiative passed once more to the British 
government, which began to deal with the dismal situation. 
Once again it seemed to be groping for the step to be taken 
next. The day after Saint-Aulaire read the French response 
to Curzon, the Foreign Office prepared a Minute criticizing 
it, but the Minute was mild in tone, focused upon several 
minor details, basically side-stepped the issue of legality, 
and, in short, offered no substantive criticism. When the 
Cabinet met on May 7 to consider the reparations question, 
Curzon presented over twenty-five dispatches relevant to 
the current problem, including the German May 2 note and 
a British draft reply to it. After he gave an extensive 
account of the recent diplomatic exchanges, the Cabinet 
agreed to approve the draft reply subject to a few amend­
ments and any changes the Treasury might consider necessary. 
It asked that the amended dispatch be communicated to
^^The Times (London), May 8, 1923» P* 15 ; New 
Statesman, May 12, 1923» p. 129«
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Mussolini through the British Ambassador at Rome. When 
Italy concurred, it should be given to the German Ambassa­
dor in London and, on the same day, to the Belgian and 
French governments. Finally, the Cabinet decided that 
since so many questions had arisen in the House of Commons
identic statements would be made the following day in both
ij 28Houses.
The statement made by Curzon in the House of Lords 
on May 8 was very brief, said almost nothing new, and re­
vealed again the indecisiveness of the British government.
He pointed out that since the German note had been addressed 
to all of the Allied powers and the reparations problem 
deeply concerned each of them, the British government felt 
that France, Britain, Italy, and Belgium should send a col­
lective reply. It would have been possible, he believed, 
to write a collective answer, "reserving for separate treat­
ment by the French and Belgian Governments, if they so de­
sired, the questions arising directly out of the recent oc­
cupation of German territory by their military forces."
The British government regretted both the "unnecessary pre­
cipitancy" of the Franco-Belgian hasty answer and the "loss 
of the opportunity which . . .  had been presented of once 
more testifying, by a joint communication, to the solidar­
ity of the Allied Entente." This chance having been lost.
n OForeign Office Minute (Central Department), May 6, 
1923, FO 371/8634, C 8068/1/18; Cab. 23/45, 24(23)l(a,b,c, 
d).
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the British government itself would soon reply to the Ger­
man note, the Italian government would probably do the
same, and the British reply would be published as soon as
29it was communicated to Germany.
On May 13 Sthamer received the British reply which, 
though framed in less emotional terms than the French an­
swer to Germany, was nevertheless a rejection of the May 2 
note. Curzon said that the German proposals disappointed 
him greatly. They corresponded neither "in form or in 
substance" to what the British government expected, and 
the German government should have guarded against the un­
favorable impression it knew they would make upon the 
Allies. The Foreign Secretary's criticism dealt with two 
specific points. First, the sum offered was inadequate, 
being less than the figure suggested in the Bonar Law plan, 
and the payment of even this small sum was contingent upon 
German procurement of international loans, which he doubted 
Germany could secure. Second, instead of giving "concrete 
and substantial" guarantees for the payment of the figure, 
the Germans had given only "vague assurances and references 
to future negotiations." If Germany truly wanted to lead 
the way to a solution of the severe problems troubling 
Europe economically and politically, it should make serious 
and precise proposals which would form a stable basis of
^^Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, Vol. $4, 
cols. 2-4.
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discussion and should discard "all irrelevant or controver- 
30sial issues." Curzon* s reply, it should be noted, failed 
to mention Germany's offer to abide by the decisions of an 
international committee of experts.
Because the British reply totally rejected the Ger­
man proposals, the French press, which was supposedly in­
spired, responded to the May 13 note more favorably than 
did the British. Curzon*s reply seemed to create a good 
impression in France, and newspapers there discussed it in 
a calm, rather detached fashion, even though they pointed 
out that it mentioned neither the Ruhr nor productive 
pledges. While Le Petit Parisien expressed satisfaction 
with the British note, it reiterated French demands for 
cessation of passive resistance and evacuation by install­
ments and expressed some fear that England and Italy might
31be collaborating too closely."^ British press reaction was 
moderately critical, indicating that the government's policy 
fully satisfied no one. Although some of the papers barely 
mentioned the British note and others discussed it fully, 
all agreed that it held the door open for further negotia­
tions. Both the Manchester Guardian and The Times regretted 
Curzon's ignoring Germany's offer to let an international 
commission determine its reparations obligation, The Times
^^Curzon to Sthamer, May 13, 1923, FO 371/8635i 
c 8311/1/18.
^^Le Petit Parisien, May l4, 1923, P* 1; see also 
L'Ère Nouvelle, May 14, 1923, p. 1.
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wished that Curzon had stated the British case in a more
comprehensive and explicit manner, and the Spectator said
that he should have explained what he thought the German
32note ought to have been.
When the German government began formulating the
new offer which Curzon had called for, it turned once more
to the British for advice. D'Abernon reported on May 19
that the Germans would try to get hints from London about
what kind of proposal would be considered acceptable or
appropriate. Remembering instructions given him to refrain
from participating in the formation of the first German
note, he said on May 25 that he had not given the Germans
33advice about the terms of their forthcoming offer. Still 
the Germans sought British assistance. When Sthamer told 
Curzon on May 29 that he had been instructed to ask his 
views on the subject of reparations so that the German gov­
ernment could make acceptable proposals in its impending 
note to the Allied powers, the Foreign Secretary replied 
that he could not at all discuss the matter. The Ambassador
^Ranchester Guardian, May l4, 1923, p. 6; The Times 
(London), May 14, 1923, p. 13; Spectator, May 19» 1923» PP- 
836-837. The Annual Register. 1923» p. 49» noted that the 
British reply satisfied neither the government's critics 
nor its friends. It explained British policy by pointing 
to the existence of "a section of the Conservative Party 
and of the Cabinet itself which was not disposed to follow 
the Premier's lead, and to which he was repeatedly forced 
to make concessions."
^^D'Abernon to FO, No. 208, May 19» 1923» FO 371/8636, 
C 8918/1/18; No. 212, May 25» 1923» FO 371/8637» C 9253/1/18.
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then complained of the difficult position of his government,
which, he said, was having to proceed upon guesswork since
it had no ideas what proposals would be satisfactory. This
failed to move Curzon, who closed by saying that if the
German government would look at press criticism both on
the Continent and in England it would find ample informa-
34tion about the omissions or blemishes of the May 2 note.^
While Germany was preparing a new reparations offer,
attention in both Britain and France centered for a time on
the domestic political scene. Suffering from throat cancer,
Bonar Law resigned on May 21, and the following day Stanley
Baldwin became Prime Minister. Although Curzon, who had
believed that he would receive the appointment, was bitterly
35disappointed, he continued to serve as Foreign Secretary.
The French government welcomed Baldwin's appointment partly 
because Saint-Aulaire had heard that he was, along with 
Derby, very favorable to the French cause. The French Am­
bassador wrote that Baldwin's sympathies for France were
34Conversation between Curzon and Sthamer, May 29, 
1923, FO 371/8637, C 9451/1/18. The information contained 
in the above-mentioned telegrams from D'Abernon and in the 
record of the Curzon-Sthamer conversation seems to contra­
dict the statement made by Keith Middlemas and John Barnes. 
They wrote that the new German note "took shape under Brit­
ish influence." See Middlemas and Barnes, Baldwin: A Bi­
ography (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969), pi 181.
35Leonard Mosley told of Curzon's intense resentment 
of Baldwin's appointment. He declared that the Foreign 
Secretary "had little more than contempt" for Baldwin.
After the May crisis, Curzon's health failed rapidly; see 
Mosley, Curzon. The End of an Epoch (London: Longmans,
i960), pp. 275-27^, 279.
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well known and that he had fewer illusions than Bonar Law 
about Germany, and Baldwin's most recent biographers have 
also said that he was francophile and believed in the ne- 
cessity of maintaining the Entente.
Baldwin's actions during his first days in office
encouraged the French to hope that relations with Britain
might improve. In his first week as Prime Minister he
talked with Philippe Millet, a leading French journalist,
and soon afterwards 1^ Petit Parisien published a brief
and conciliatory open message from Baldwin to the French
people. He stated that although he could not at that point
say in what particular fashion basic Anglo-French problems
could be solved, he hoped to be able soon to discuss them
with French leaders. Until he could do so, he wanted to
emphasize a few things. First, he was confident that there
was no problem, regardless how difficult, on which France
and England would be unable to find common ground and adjust
their policies. Second, England realized the importance of
France's need for security and wanted to insure European
peace. Finally, he would work to settle the difficulties;
even though at first there might be temporary set-backs,
37success would come.
36Auguste de Saint-Aulaire, Confession d'un vieux 
diplomate (Paris: Flammarion, 1953 H  pp. 655-656, 65Ô ;
Middlemas and Barnes, Baldwin, p. I8I.
^^Annual Register, 1923» P» 66 ; Le Petit Parisien, 
June 4, 1923, p. 1.
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As Baldwin was taking over the reins of government 
in England, the French government asked for credits to 
meet Ruhr expenses, and on May 22 a week-long debate began 
in the Chamber of Deputies. During the course of the de­
bate, which was destined to be the only major foreign af­
fairs discussion in the Chamber for several months, the 
government’s Ruhr policy was attacked from both right and 
left, contradictory figures were given about the results 
of the occupation, but Poincare successfully defended the 
invasion of the Ruhr.
On May 24, Vincent Auriol, Socialist leader, launched 
a vigorous attack against the government's Ruhr policy, 
criticizing it on both economic and political grounds. He 
first asked what were the government's intentions in going 
into the Ruhr. After asking if it had gone there merely 
to extract the small deficit in Germany's coal deliveries, 
he answered that that was merely a pretext. If Prance did 
not enter the Ruhr to find coal and coke, had it done so to 
obtain productive guarantees? Was it a means of coercion 
or force, or did France seek to gain both political and 
economic profits through a permanent occupation? If France 
went there to seize guarantees, how could the occupation of 
the Ruhr by itself solve the tedious reparations problem, 
the transfer problem, and the question of inter-Allied 
debts? After asking numerous questions, he charged that 
the occupation was being poorly conducted and that France
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was, through its harsh military occupation, wrecking the 
delicate industrial machinery of Germany.
Then he turned to the economic results of the ven­
ture and said that the figures told the story. Whereas 
France had received 332,000,000 francs worth of coal during 
the first four months of 1922 that figure had dropped to
36,000,000 francs during the corresponding months of 1923» 
When Poincare replied that Auriol was juggling the figures, 
the Deputy reported that it was the President of the Council 
who had done so, for he had said that civil and military ex­
penses for the occupation totalled 63,648,000 francs and re­
ceipts 62,500,000. This balance sheet was incorrect because 
it failed to include expenses for administration of the rail­
roads and also because it included all the receipts from the 
sale of seized coal, part of which belonged to the Allies ac­
cording to the Versailles Treaty, Furthermore, the balance 
sheet was incorrect in that it failed to mention that since 
December the price of coal had risen from 95 to 198 francs 
per ton and the franc was selling at 69 per pound rather 
than 62. Whatever were France's objects, it had failed to 
attain them. Poincare had thought that he could drive a 
wedge between the German workers and industrialists, but, 
forgetting the force of nationalism, he had brought about 
militaristic reaction and hindered a final and practical
O  Q
solution of the war-debts and reparations problems.
^^J.O.. Chambre, May 25, 1923, pp. 2091-2096.
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Before long, Poincare intervened in the debate. He 
first defended himself by attacking Germany, listing once 
more its failure since 192I to meet the reparations obliga­
tions, and declaring that while undertaking massive public 
works programs it had failed to reform its finances, levy 
sufficient taxes, and make the industrialists pay. He then 
mentioned England, and every reference to it in his speech 
was basically friendly. Although France regretted that 
England had abstained from supporting the other Allies in 
the Rhineland High Commission decisions, it acknowledged 
that this abstention had been very courteous, thanks prin­
cipally to Bonar Law and also to Curzon, Derby, and the new 
Prime Minister, Baldwin. This British isolation had, nev­
ertheless, led Germany to believe that there was a rupture 
in the Allied front and had thus stimulated resistance. 
Contrary to what Auriol had said, French thoughts were not 
unclear and confused: France had forseen and prepared well
the different phases of the occupation, which had been car­
ried out no more harshly because France wanted to show its 
moderation to the whole world.
Next the President of the Council turned to financial 
matters. After saying that inflation would have occurred 
even had France not gone into the Ruhr, he declared that 
France and Belgium would turn over to the Reparation Commis­
sion the net proceeds it collected. He reported that re­
ceipts from the Ruhr had grown in the past weeks and were
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increasing daily. Since March 25 the daily total of coke 
loaded had grown from 1,000 to 11,000 tons, and the current 
figure of 11,000 tons of coal per day should soon reach
15,000. Since French exploitation of Ruhr coal was produc­
ing favorable results, France could wait patiently for Ger­
many to regain its senses. In addition, the Regie was pro­
ducing increasingly favorable results: on April 15 it was
carrying only 17,000 passengers daily, but this figure had 
grown to 30,000.
Referring to Curzon's April 20 speech and the German
May 2 note, he expressed regret that Curzon had invited
Germany to make an offer and said that France had taken no
such initiative because it was convinced that the best way
to compel Germany to make serious proposals was to hold 
30pledges.^ Although the French government hoped to be able 
to concert in a collective response before long, it had for 
several reasons been unable to try to form a common reply 
to the German note: first, it could consent to no reduction
of the French share of German reparations ; second, the Ger­
man note contested the legality of the Ruhr operation; third, 
Germany had made false accusations of violence against France 
and Belgium; finally, the German propositions were subordi­
nated to the continuation of resistance. Because of all of 
these factors France had to reply to Germany immediately :
"No! no! we will not talk, we will not listen at all until
^^Ibid., pp. 2101-2105.
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ho 'you have ceased your resistance!" In closing, Poincare 
refuted charges that France was seeking territorial aggran­
dizement. He said that it was absolutely untrue that France 
harbored any ulterior motive of annexation, and those who 
said so lied.
We do not claim today, we will not claim tomorrow, we 
will never claim any territorial advantage for France 
against the wishes of the populations. . . .  If we 
have entered the Ruhr, it is not to establish our­
selves permanently and finally. . . .  We have entered 
it . . .  as the Germans occupied a major portion of 
France from I87O to the end of l8?3i in order to be 
paid.^1
At the close of his address, the President of the Council 
received a standing ovation.
The debate continued into the following week and 
ended on May 29, when Poincare and the occupation came under 
sharp attack from the right, represented by Pierre-Étienne 
Flandin and André Tardieu. The nature of their criticism
^°Ibid., p. 2105.
^^Ibid., p. 2106. A letter written by the French 
Finance Minister on May 31 seems to corroborate Poincare's 
assertion that France wanted to annex no German territory. 
He said that since the Ruhr occupation was "the pivot of 
all French policy," perhaps France ought to tell Belgium 
what payments it wanted to receive before it would evacu­
ate the Ruhr. In discussing a tentative financial plan, 
part of which involved Germany's securing loans in France, 
he stated: "In order to show, however, that France is not
trying, through these loans, to remain indefinitely in the 
Ruhr, it would be stipulated that Germany at the end of a 
certain time would have the right to repay these loans in 
advance and consequently to demand the evacuation of a 
correlative part of Ruhr territory." See Le Ministre des 
Finances a Mon. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères (Sous- 
Direction des Relations Commerciales), No. 3 .204.S.A.,
May 31, 1923, A.N., F30 12?6.
199
differed from that of Auriol, for they called for an inten­
sification of the occupation. Flandin urged the employment 
of more forceful methods to make Germany pay and the use of
direct exploitation in the form of sequestering and auction-
1̂ 0ing German property. Tardieu began by saying that he and 
his friends would vote for the Ruhr credits, as they had 
voted for the occupation on January 11, because they felt 
that the occupation was necessary in order to make France 
the master of German will and of the production of the Ruhr. 
Unlike Auriol, who was opposed to the occupation, he wanted 
to discuss ways of assuring maximum success for the endeavor.
Tardieu then criticized the manner in which the occu­
pation had been carried out. He said that planning an in­
visible occupation had been a bad psychological mistake and 
that it was unbelievable that Poincare had thought that Ger­
many would cooperate: did he not read the newspapers? Fur­
thermore , France had failed to utilize enough force in car­
rying out its plans and, amazingly, had prepared no economic, 
political, fiscal, or monetary régime for the Ruhr. After 
using several illustrations to point out the ineffectiveness 
of planning and execution, the Deputy turned to economic 
aspects. He asked why a blockade was declared only after 
February 1 and why France had not started getting coal much 
more quickly. Then he charged that the Mission of Control 
(MICUM) was ineffective and really controlled nothing, that
A pJ.O., Chambre, May 30, 1923. PP- 2l8l-2l84.
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Dégoutté had not been granted the necessary powers, that 
German will had not been broken, and that the financial 
results of the operation were only mediocre. While deliv­
eries from the Ruhr had decreased, coal purchases from 
England had increased, and there was certainly no exploita­
tion of the Ruhr1 France had two pledges--Rhineland and 
Ruhr--but neither was productive.
Then Tardieu asked questions about the future.
When Poincare resumed discussion with the Allies would 
France fall under a system of payments based on a produc­
tive pledge or under the old 1921 Schedule of Payments?
To any schedule of payments he would prefer a modest annu­
ity resulting from the control of Ruhr production, for this 
would permit France to get outstanding international loans. 
In closing, he called for new methods and said that France 
should send more divisions to the Ruhr and replace the 
January 11 notification of the occupation with one estab­
lishing a new regime for the Ruhr— a regime of a state of
43siege and military law.
Poincare's response to Tardieu's attacks was much 
less informative than that to Auriol five days before. Al­
though he refuted most of the Deputy's charges about the 
inefficiency of the Ruhr operation, he devoted much more 
time to a personal duel, declaring that Tardieu had said 
nothing that had not already been written in his newspaper
^^Ibid., pp. 2185-2195.
201
articles, which were, unfortunately, widely reproduced in 
Germany where they caused the Germans to maintain that 
Prance was obtaining no results from the Ruhr. He denied 
that the occupation had been poorly organized and reported 
that for months before January the plans had been carefully 
made. Although Poincare failed to refute Tardieu's alle­
gation that the occupation had been financially unprofit­
able, he survived all criticism, and when the Chamber voted 
on the Ruhr credits, the government won by a 481-73 vote. 
The following month the Senate approved the credits unani- 
mously. Once again the French parliament had failed to
alter the Ruhr policy, and because of the contradictory 
statements and figures given in both the Chamber and the 
press no one knew the actual financial results of the occu­
pation to that point.
Even though the focal point of European interest 
during late April and May was the open exchange of repara­
tions notes, correspondence continued between Britain and 
France on matters arising directly from the occupation, 
several trends initiated during the first weeks of the oc­
cupation persisted, and some unfinished business remained 
to be discussed. First, England continued both the attempt
44^^Ibid., pp. 2195-2199.
LcFrederick Lewis Schuman, War and Diplomacy in the 
French Republic. An Inquiry into Political Motivations and 
the Control of Foreign Policy (New York; McGraw-Hill Book 
Company, Inc., 1931)7 p. 294.
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lo nvoid irritating France and the refusal to acknowledge 
most German protests. On April 21, Home Secretary Bridge- 
mnn wrote Curzon that Joseph King requested permission to 
bring to England three German ladies who were social workers 
in Essen and Düsseldorf and wanted to give first-hand re­
ports about conditions in the Ruhr and Rhineland. Curzon 
wrote Bridgeman immediately that he could not permit the
46introduction of German anti-Ruhr propaganda into England.
The Foreign Office also maintained its policy of either 
failing to acknowledge German protests or acknowledging 
them in a brief and formal fashion. When Sthamer on 
April 23 protested Rhineland High Commission Ordinance No. 
156, protecting all persons who assisted or worked for oc­
cupying forces, the Foreign Office waited ten days before 
acknowledging receipt of the protest and even then expressed 
no opinion. On May 10, Sthamer protested the sentences 
passed by a French court-martial against Krupp directors, 
whom the French had accused of instigating the March 31 
disturbances in Essen. Although Lampson called French ac­
tion "a monstrous proceeding" and Curzon labelled the sen­
tences "absolutely barbarous," the Foreign Office failed to
47acknowledge the protest in any fashion.
Home Secretary to Curzon, April 21, 19231 a^d Cur­
zon to Home Secretary, April 22, 1923, FO 371/8729,
C 7300/313/18. King was a bitter critic of the French Ruhr 
activities.
^^Sthamer to FO, No. A.1201, April 231 1923 ; Cadogan 
to Sthamer, May 3, 1923, FO 371/8729, C 7534/313/18; Sthamer
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The controversy over Rhineland High Commission Ordi­
nances No. 153 and No. 1$4 was renewed in May. As will be 
48recalled, France had on March 28 replied to the March 23 
British protest against the ordinances. The French reply 
having displeased the Foreign Office, Curzon on May 11 in­
structed Crewe to mention the matter again and make the 
following observations. The fact that the British govern­
ment had not protested the High Commission ordinances deal­
ing with Franco-Belgian collection of coal tax and customs 
in occupied territory did not mean that it admitted their 
validity. Instead, it had avoided questioning their va­
lidity so as not to "cause unnecessary embarrassment to 
the French Government, to act in complete accordance with 
the spirit of the undertaking given by the Prime Minister 
at the close of the Paris Conference." Since, however, 
France had brought up the subject, the British government 
had "to reserve in the most formal manner all expression 
of opinion" about the validity of the customs and coal tax 
ordinances. Britain also failed to accept the French con­
tention that Ordinances No. 153 and No. 154 had "only the 
effect of securing the execution of the restitution and 
reparation clauses of the treaty. . . . "  A study of the 
ordinances revealed other motives and possible results:
to FO, No. A.l4ll, May 10, 1923» and Minutes by Lampson 
and Curzon, May 15, 1923, FO 371/8730, C 8436/313/18.
48Supra, pp. i4l-l43.
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their enforcement would divest the Reparation Commission 
of its authority to receive, sell, hold, and distribute 
German reparations payments and would infringe the rights 
and property of the British government and British na­
tionals. Crewe, therefore, should call these items to
Poincare's attention and protest the ordinances as ultra 
49vires.
Part of Poincare's May 25 reply shocked British 
diplomats. The French leader said that France had never 
contested the right of the Reparation Commission to act 
as the sole agent for receiving, selling, holding and dis­
tributing reparations payments to be made by Germany.
When, however, that body declared Germany's intentional 
default, it abandoned its rights in favor of the Allied 
governments who, under Paragraph l8, could decide upon and 
execute measures to compel Germany to pay. Since the 
Rhineland High Commission was the representative of those 
governments in occupied territory, it had the duty to apply 
the measures taken under Paragraph l8.^^
Although most Foreign Office personnel considered 
dangerous this direct reference to France's view of its 
rights under Paragraph l8 and agreed that it should not be 
allowed to pass without comment, they were uncertain of the
4oCurzon to Crewe, No. 1627• May 11, 1923i 
FO 371/8730, C 8035/313/18.
^°Poincare to Crewe, May 25, 1923, FO 371/8732,
c 9404/313/18.
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ri'Siilts of contesting it. A Minute by Wjgram reveals some­
thing of the dilemma:
As regards paragraph 18, we have so far considered 
that a dispute with the French over this question 
would be most dangerous, as, besides raising highly 
controversial disputes, it would be difficult to 
explain its intricacies to public opinion here.
But all the same, if we let this French claim pass 
now, it will be tantamount to admitting their in­
terpretation of paragraph iB. This would, I think, 
be as undesirable as having a row with them.
Hurst wrote that if the French statement were taken liter­
ally, it would mean "the end of the functions of the Rep­
aration Commission so far as German reparations are con­
cerned." After consultation, Lampson on June 6 sent to 
the Treasury for concurrence a draft reply to the French 
note.^^
While Britain and France were awaiting the new rep­
arations proposals, affairs within Germany attracted the 
attention of both governments. In mid-May the British 
began receiving reports about the projected duration of 
German resistance. Julian Piggott, Cologne Commissioner, 
Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission, wrote on May 10
^^Minutes by Wigram on May 31» 1923» and Hurst on 
June 1, 1923; Lampson to Secretary to the Treasury, June 6, 
1923, FO 371/8732, C 9404/313/18. Throughout the period 
covered by this chapter, the British continued to evade 
challenging the legality of the occupation. Evidence in­
dicates that they did so because they believed that par­
ticipation in the 1921 sanctions compromised their posi­
tion and because they wanted to avoid making relations 
more difficult with Franco-Belgian officials in the occu­
pied territories. See Minutes by Cadogan on May 19» 1923» 
and Lampson on May 12 and 28, 1923» FO 371/8732,
C 9456/313/18; FO to D'Abernon, No. 711» May 11, 1923»
FO 371/8733» C 11094/313/18.
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that he believed the struggle had entered its most critical 
phase and feared internal dissensions might result in the 
disintegration of Germany. German eyes were turned toward 
England in the hope that Curzon would bring the combatants 
to the conference table, and some Germans had told him that 
the limit of endurance was two months. On May l6, Kilmar­
nock stated that although he was unable to share the alarm 
of Piggott, he did believe that Germany was beginning to 
feel that it could not financially support passive resist­
ance much longer. He also reported that the general feel­
ing seemed to be that resistance could last two months at 
52the longest. About two weeks later, Germany tried again 
to approach France indirectly. Tirard reported that Mon­
seigneur Kaas, a Reichstag Deputy from Treves and a leading 
figure in the Center party, had asked that some members of 
his party be permitted to talk to a representative of the 
French government in order to avoid the next German note's 
encountering a new French refusal. Peretti de la Rocca 
sent the reply: "I can only repeat to you that the French
government is absolutely opposed to an intermediary, no 
matter how qualified he might be. . . .  The French govern-
53ment will examine only propositions delivered officially.”
^^Piggott to Lampson, May 10, 1923, FO 371/8730,
C 8542/313/18; Kilmarnock to FO, No. 292, May I6 , 1923•
FO 371/8731. C 8890/313/18.
^^Tirard to Poincare, No. 341, June 2, 1923, A.N.,
AJ9 3898; Peretti de la Rocca to Tirard, No. 439. June 5.
1923. A.N., AJ9 3904.
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Toward the end of the month, the Foreign Office, 
cognizant of the grave conditions in Germany, grew restive. 
In a conversation with the Italian Ambassador on May 31, 
Curzon said that British public opinion, as well as economic 
and commercial conditions in the Ruhr, would make it impos­
sible for the British government to continue much longer 
its policy of doing nothing. Although he was not sure what 
action Britain would take, he definitely wanted to avoid 
another conference like that of January because "another 
failure like that would mean the rupture of the Entente." 
Only one thing was clear: whatever action was taken would
t z Lbe "united action." One member of the Foreign Office
staff was, nevertheless, already contemplating independent
action. In his Minute on D'Abernon's May 23 report that
the German Foreign Minister was seriously worried about
the growth of Communism in Germany, Miles W. Lampson had
hinted about a possible new British policy:
The thought suggests itself that the moment may be 
fast approaching when, in the interests of the social 
order of the world . . .  we may have to take a firmer 
line with France. My personal belief is that if we 
told her point blank that, in order to have done with 
this insufferable Reparation question, we were pre­
pared to go ahead if necessary alone with an impartial 
assessment of Germany's capacity to pay and to accept 
the 22% (i.e. Spa percentage) of that assessment as 
the share due to the British Empire even if France 
did not come with us, we should then find that Prance 
came along behind pretty quickly. We should then be 
done with the Reparation Commission and all its
54Conversation between Curzon and the Italian Ambas­
sador, May 31, 1923, FO 371/8638, C 9592/1/18.
208
attendant evils. The French would no doubt scream: 
but sooner than be isolated and see us get our money 
they would follow our lead. The idea is at least 
worth consideration. . . .  But the time is not yet.
When the next German offer materialises perhaps it 
might be at least weighed in the balance.55
During the first week in June all eyes turned expect­
antly to Germany. On June 7 the German government delivered 
a second reparations note, which differed remarkably in tone 
from the more lengthy document of May 2. The note declared 
that Germany had previously stated its sincere belief as to 
its capacity to pay : to promise more than this in order to
alleviate current political difficulties would be unwise. 
Since other countries perhaps held different opinions about 
that capacity, Germany would "accept the decision of an im­
partial international tribunal as to the amount and method 
of payment" and, in order to help this body make a decision, 
would allow inspection of all of its financial records and 
provide information about German industrial resources.
Since the loan proposals of the previous note had been un­
satisfactory, it would substitute a scheme of annuities and 
make specific guarantees for payment. Included among these 
would be the detachment of the German railway system from 
other national property : the railways would have their own
administration and upon them would be issued a mortgage of
10,000,000,000 gold marks at 5 per cent interest from July 1, 
1927» thus producing an annual payment of 500,000,000 marks.
^^D'Abernon to FO, No. 210, May 23» 1923 » end Minute 
by Lampson, May 25, 1923, FO 371/8637, C 9217/1/18.
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In addition, Germany would from the same date offer an an­
nuity of 50,000,000 marks to be paid by taxation and based 
upon a mortgage of 10,000,000,000 marks on landed property, 
"whether industrial, municipal, agricultural or forest." 
Finally, Germany offered as additional pledges the proceeds 
of duties on luxuries, the excise duties on alcoholic bev­
erages and sugar, and the receipts from the spirits monop­
oly, In conclusion, the note declared that no real progress 
in settling the reparations tangle could be made by exchang­
ing written documents. The problem must be solved orally 
at a conference table, where Germany could have "direct con­
sultation with those who are to receive payment." In the 
last paragraph the German government inserted a statement 
acknowledging its liability to make reparations payments.
The June 7 note had voiced none of the antagonism of its 
predecessor. Although Germany failed to agree to abandon 
passive resistance, it neither made the new proposals con­
tingent upon French and Belgian evacuation of the Ruhr nor 
called Franco-Belgian action illegal.
Since the document in several ways appeared to be 
more wisely framed, observers wondered how both France and 
Britain would react. The prospects for a solution were 
only slightly encouraging, for Britain, after having taken 
the initiative in April, had lapsed again into passivity.
Sthamer to Curzon, June 7 » 1 9 2 3 » FO 37I/8638,
c 9926/1/18.
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and France had shown no willingness to budge. On the other 
hand, Germany had in the second reparations document made 
some concessions, and a few members of the Foreign Office 
had, after three months of inactivity, begun to consider 
seriously the possibility of acting to end the stalemate. 
Would there be a departure from deadlock?
CHAPTER V
NO REPLY; THE DIPLOMATIC AFTERMATH OF THE 
JUNE 7, 1923, REPARATIONS PROPOSAL
Even though France and Belgium did not send an in­
dependent reply to the new German reparations proposal, the 
hope that the offer would lead to an end of the Ruhr dead­
lock was to be dashed during the months of June and July. 
Whereas the two communications from Germany had been the 
focal point in the previous period, correspondence between 
France and Britain now occupied the center of the diplomatic 
stage as Britain took the lead in trying to devise a common 
reply to Germany. Because of a French request, none of the 
major documents was published in the press. Leaks never­
theless occurred, and as July passed the ill will of Britain 
and France toward each other reached a new height, the occu­
pying powers used increasingly harsh methods in the Ruhr, 
passive resistance weakened somewhat, and Germany continued 
to wait for a reply.
The Foreign Office began on June 7 to analyze the 
German proposals and think about future British action. A 
Central Department Minute written just before receipt of the
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note discussed the situation in the Allied countries and 
Germany. It declared that France, who had all the security 
it needed presently, intended to stay in the Ruhr until all 
reparations were paid. German resistance, however, had 
made the Ruhr venture unproductive, and Germany, although 
"at the end of her tether," was "encouraged in her resist­
ance by the belief that by maintaining it she may conceiv­
ably bring about a break in the allied ranks. . . . "  Un­
predictable Italy— which after sending only a few engineers 
into the Ruhr had ceased to participate in the occupation-- 
wanted to end the present state of tension in Europe and 
get all the money it could, and Belgium was terrified of
French encirclement and did not want to see France in the
Ruhr permanently. Since Britain wanted all the reparations 
Germany could pay, it wanted to get Prance out of the Ruhr, 
for the occupation meant that Germany could pay no one. 
After listing these circumstances, the Minute concluded 
that the Allies would have to agree enough to "compel the 
Germans to recognize that they have lost the game, and that 
they must abandon 'passive resistance' and accept a settle­
ment," for unless it were abandoned, it "seems clear that
German reparation proposals are so much waste paper. . . .
In a June 9 memorandum on the German offer itself, 
Sir Eyre Crowe said that four main points arose from the
^Foreign Office Minute (Central Department), June 7, 
1 9 2 3 , FO 3 71/8 6 4 0, c 10375/I/18.
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document: an international inquiry into Germany's capacity
to pay and the method of payment, guarantees of payment, 
the cessation of passive resistance, and the evacuation of 
the Ruhr. He discussed each point at length. Since it was 
unlikely that France and Germany alone could reach an agree­
ment, a broader discussion was necessary, and an interna­
tional inquiry would have great merits, for settlement by 
an independent body would be preferable to the Allies' 
thrashing out the matter themselves through either direct 
governmental consultation or the Reparation Commission.
There was, furthermore, little substance in the French con­
tention that referring the issue to an impartial commission 
would violate the Versailles Treaty. This body, like the 
Reparation Commission, could merely recommend that the 
Allied governments should cancel a certain part of Germany's 
obligation. Although Crowe said little about the question 
of guarantees, pointing out that financial experts would
have to consider these, he did note that the new proposal
2at least offered specific guarantees.
He then considered the topics of passive resistance 
and Ruhr evacuation. Evidence indicated that Britain would 
soon receive a Franco-Belgian request to associate itself 
with the demand that Germany cease passive resistance as a
OA note from the Treasury on June 9 stated that the 
new guarantees were a step forward. Their value, however, 
depended on balancing the budget and stabilizing the mark; 
see Niemeyer (Treasury) to FO, June 9i 1923, FO 371/8638,
c 10065/1/18.
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prerequisite for further discussion of the reparations prob­
lem. Such a request would present a dilemma, for France had 
contended that because it was applying a sanction set forth 
in Part VIII of the Treaty, Germany was bound not to regard 
the occupation as an act of war. Having dissociated itself 
from this French view of legality, how could Britain demand 
that Germany cease resistance? If, on the other hand, the 
end of passive resistance was indeed a prerequisite for any 
solution acceptable to Belgium and France, the British gov­
ernment should seek a practical way out of the difficulty. 
Crowe mentioned a possible solution:
It might be suggested that, without making a formal 
demand. His Majesty's Government might take advantage 
of the undoubted fact that Germany places confidence 
in the fairness of the British attitude to give them 
informal advice to the effect that, as they must them­
selves see, they have no hope of coming to an arrange­
ment with France, and therefore of getting rid of the 
French occupation of the Ruhr, so long at least as 
passive resistance continues, and that . . .  they 
would only act in accordance with the dictates of com­
mon prudence if they withdrew the measures or enact­
ments by which they officially enjoined passive re­
sistance on the German population under heavy penalties.
In closing, he suggested a procedure to be followed : after
receipt of the French and Belgian responses Britain should 
exchange views with Italy; then all the Allies should ac­
knowledge receipt of the June 7 note, tell Germany that
they were considering it, and exchange views in a conference
3of some sort rather than through a flood of telegrams.
^Foreign Office Minute (Central Department), June 9, 
1923, FO 371/8639, C 10092/1/18.
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Poincare wasted no time in reacting to the German 
note. On June 7 he instructed Saint-Aulaire and the French 
Ambassadors in Rome and Brussels to inform the Allied gov­
ernments that the German offer was totally unacceptable for 
four reasons: it said nothing about ceasing passive re­
sistance, failed to propose a reparations total, called for
dispossessing the Reparation Commission by an international
4body, and spoke only of theoretical guarantees. In dealing 
with the note, Poincare as will be shown, focused more upon 
the cessation of passive resistance than upon the June 7 
offer itself. The next day he sent a telegram to Saint- 
Aulaire discussing, in ten points, the steps Germany would 
be expected to take to end resistance. These, of course, 
called for withdrawing all German ordinances ordering pas­
sive resistance, but they also entailed virtually complete 
cooperation of the German population with the occupying 
powers. He said that for the moment, however, Saint-Aulaire 
should refrain from discussing details and state only the 
principle of cessation.^
Saint-Aulaire called on Crowe and, after reading 
Poincare’s June 7 telegram which declared the German offer 
unacceptable, said that ho hoped the Allies could consult
k ,Poincare to French Ambassadors at London, Rome, and 
Brussels, June 7, 1923, Doc, dip.: notes sur reparations,
pp. 32-33.
^Poincare to Saint-Aulaire, No. 755-739, June 8, 
1923, A.N., AJ5 342.
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and give a joint reply. In order for them to do so, how­
ever, Poincare expected the reply to support the French 
point of view. The Ambassador then asked the question 
Crowe had been anticipating: had England considered join­
ing France and Belgium to demand the cessation of resist­
ance as a preliminary to consideration of the German note? 
When Crowe asked what was meant by cessation, Saint-Aulaire 
gave no clear answer, and the Under-Secretary said that it 
would be difficult for the British government to take a 
step which would imply that France was justified in occu­
pying the Ruhr. He emphasized that if the German offer 
were not a basis for discussion it could at least serve as 
a point of departure for finding such a basis and added 
that he, too, hoped a common response could be made.^ Upon 
hearing of this conversation, Poincare replied that he sin­
cerely hoped that the Allies could send a common reply, but 
he reaffirmed that France and Belgium had recently decided 
in Brussels to examine no German proposition so long as 
passive resistance continued.^
The June 8 conversation between Crowe and Saint- 
Aulaire and the June 7 and 9 telegrams from Poincare to 
his Ambassador marked the beginning of a lengthy, vital.
^Conversation between Crowe and Saint-Aulaire, June 8, 
1923, FO 371/8639. C 10067/1/18; Saint-Aulaire to Poincare, 
June 8, 1923. Doc, dip.: notes sur réparations, pp. 33-34.
^Poincare to Saint-Aulaire, June 9. 1923. Doc. dip. : 
notes sur reparations, p. 34.
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and frustrating diplomatic exchange on the response to be 
made to Germany. Poincare made the first move on June 10 
when he sent to Saint-Aulaire a telegram instructing him 
to contact the Foreign Office in order to present the in­
formation contained therein and to repeat that since the 
only object of the occupation was to create in Germany the 
will to pay, France and Belgium would evacuate the Ruhr as 
payments were made. When Saint-Aulaire saw Curzon the fol­
lowing day, he presented a memorandum based upon the tele-
ggram. The memorandum stated again that France would con­
sent to an inter-Allied examination of the German proposals 
only after the cessation of passive resistance. This hav­
ing occurred, the following principles would need to be 
considered in examining the German note. First, the occu­
pation of the Ruhr would continue, "but under different 
conditions and with the collaboration of the German organi­
zations." Second, Prance refused to give up its share of
the A and B bonds, but would exchange part of the C bonds
gfor the settlement of inter-Allied debts. Although Germany
^Poincare to Saint-Aulaire, No. 01215-01221, June 10, 
1923, A.N., AJ5 342.
^On April 21, 1921, when the Reparation Commission 
announced that Germany's reparations obligation was
132.000.000.000 gold marks, it divided the total into three 
series of bonds. Series A bonds (12,000,000,000 marks) 
were to be issued by July 1, 1921, and Series B 
(38,000,000,000 marks) by November 1, 1921. The
80.000.000.000 mark balance was to be covered by Series C 
bonds, to be issued at the discretion of the Reparation 
Commission when it felt Germany was able to make larger
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might require a moratorium to set its finances in order, 
it must immediately give the Allies certain resources, in­
cluding the left bank railways, some Ruhr coal mines, de­
liveries in kind, and some customs d u t i e s . W h e n , in 
the following bitter conversation, Curzon asked Saint- 
Aulaire what he meant by the cessation of passive resist­
ance, the Ambassador mentioned most of the points in Poin­
care's June 8 telegram. These, it should be noted, would 
have amounted to virtually active German cooperation in 
the Pranco-Belgian exploitation of the Ruhr, for Germany, 
in addition to having to withdraw all decrees forbidding 
its people to assist the invaders, would have had to tell 
them to obey all High Commission decrees, resume all de­
liveries, and recognize the validity of the Allied action, 
and would also have had to order the railway staff to re­
turn to work and grant amnesty to those persons punished 
for obeying Belgian and French decrees.
After Saint-Aulaire asked the British government to 
assist France in urging Germany to cease resistance, Curzon 
made a surprising statement. He informed the French
payments than those required for servicing the A and B 
bonds. The British in 1923 considered the C bonds worth­
less. See David Lloyd George, The Truth about Reparations 
and War Debts (London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1932},
pp. 61-62; Harold G. Moulton and Constantine E. McGuire, 
Germany's Capacity to Pay: A Study of the Reparation
Problem (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1923), p. 374.
^^Saint-Aulaire to Curzon, June 11, 1923,
FO 371/8639, C 10224/1/18.
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Ambassador that Britain had "from the start questioned not 
merely the expediency but the legitimacy of the French and 
Belgian occupation" and that the Law Officers had advised 
that France was incorrect in saying that its action was 
based upon the Treaty of Versailles. How, therefore, could 
Britain advise Germany to stop resisting proceedings which 
were i l l e g a l S a i n t - A u l a i r e  answered that although he 
was aware of this British contention, he believed that a 
discussion of legal considerations was useless, for France 
had acted upon the basis of decisions made by a majority 
of the Reparation Commission, which was the only body qual­
ified to make an opinion about the legality issue. After 
saying that the legal question should not be so lightly 
dismissed, Curzon moved on to another topic.
He pointed out that passive resistance was the only 
weapon the Germans had and asked what they would get in 
exchange for giving it up. Because France had laid down 
no conditions about future evacuation of the Ruhr, he re­
quested more precise information about the new form of the 
occupation and said that France should state precisely the 
fixed times and methods of evacuation. Finally, the For­
eign Secretary asked through what avenue France intended 
the German proposals to be examined: did it envisage
Allied conversations from which Germany would be excluded?
^^Conversation between Curzon and Saint-Aulaire, 
June 11, 19231 FO 371/86391 C IOI85/I/18.
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After Saint-Aulaire replied that he imagined that Poincare 
would want the Allies to reach an agreement, which they 
would hand to Germany, Curzon objected that this would be 
merely a second ultimatum. Instead, Germany should be per­
mitted to participate in some fashion in the formulation of 
a new settlement. He also warned that France should not 
take lightly the new German proposals, for the British pub­
lic felt that they were appreciably better than the first
12ones and would not allow them to be turned down as useless.
In closing, he promised to discuss the situation with the
Cabinet that afternoon and report to the French Ambassador
13as soon as possible.
Once again the British had to grapple with the prob­
lem. The Foreign Office Central Department analysis of the 
June 11 memorandum termed it in every respect unsatisfac­
tory, primarily because the statement about the modified 
form of occupation to follow the cessation of resistance 
was so vague as to be obscure and because the British gov­
ernment could not accept France's plans for paying its debt 
to England by giving up a share of C bonds. This would
See Daily Herald, June 8, 1923, p. 1; Manchester 
Guardian, June 6, 1923, pp. 8-9 ; Daily Telegraph, June 9, 
1923» p. 8; The Tiroes (London), JÜÎne o, 1923, p. 13! New 
Statesman. June 9, 19231 p. 253.
13Conversation between Curzon and Saint-Aulaire, 
June 11, 1923, cited above ; Saint-Aulaire to Poincare, 
June 11, 1923, Doc, dip.: notes sur réparations, pp. 37-
38. Curzon*s account of the conversation is much more de­
tailed than that of Saint-Aulaire. The latter failed to 
relate to Poincare the intensity of Curzon's dissatisfac­
tion with the French memorandum.
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mean that "France cancels her debts to us for worthless 
German paper . . .  and maintains intact her effective rep­
aration debt [A and B bonds] from Germany." In addition, 
France, while saying that a German moratorium was necessary, 
had set forth conditions that would render it nugatory.
Such proposals were unlikely to elicit from Germany the
l(iabandonment of resistance. That afternoon Curzon in­
formed the Cabinet members of both the French memorandum 
and his conversation with Saint-Aulaire, and the Cabinet, 
unable to accept the conditions stipulated in the memoran­
dum, agreed unanimously to his suggestion that Prance be 
asked for more precise explanation of several points.
Curzon presented the so-called "questionnaire" to 
Saint-Aulaire on June 13. Although the document focused 
upon two questions, it was in reality a detailed criticism 
of and commentary upon the June 11 memorandum and the points 
made verbally by the French Ambassador on that day. The 
questionnaire asked for both a precise definition of the 
cessation of passive resistance and a detailed account of 
the nature of the Franco-Belgian occupation after resistance
^^Foreign Office Minute (Central Department),
June 11, 1923, FO 371/8639, C 10223/1/18.
^^Cab 23/46, 30(23)1; Keith Middlemas and John 
Barnes, Baldwin; A Biography (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolsonl 1969), pp. 183-184. Baldwin's biographers wrote 
"Baldwin's closest advisers in the Treasury and several of 
his Cabinet, however, disliked the adroit way in which Cur­
zon was avoiding a rupture" to the detriment of long-term 
German recovery; see p. l84.
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ended. First, Curzon asked what France meant when it asked 
Germany to cease resistance: did this mean merely that the
German government should withdraw decrees ordering its citi­
zens to refuse to assist Allied authorities and pay taxes to 
them, or did it mean that so long as individual German citi­
zens failed to cooperate France would refuse to discuss the 
reparations problem?^^ If France meant merely the with­
drawal of official decrees, would it return evicted and 
imprisoned Germans? Next he moved to an item that did in­
deed call for clarification, for France had made only vague 
statements about Franco-Belgian policy in the Ruhr after the 
end of resistance and had offered no inducements to Germany. 
How long, he asked, would the occupation continue and in 
what form? The Foreign Secretary added that since France 
had always said that it occupied the Ruhr to bring about 
the payment of reparations, it should help devise "a defi­
nite plan for settling the whole reparation question in a 
manner that can be accepted as practical and equitable by 
all parties. . . . "  Having a precise plan ready would also 
give a strong inducement to Germany to end resistance. He 
remarked that France had in the June 11 memorandum mentioned 
only a few aspects of such a plan, and part of what it had 
discussed was unacceptable. The British government could 
no more in July than in January agree that France could, no
16Since most of these questions had been answered 
verbally by Saint-Aulaire on June 11, Curzon must have been 
pressing for a written reply.
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matter what happened, insist upon its present share [52 per
cent] of the A and B bonds and pay its inter-Allied debts
by giving up a portion of the C bonds because this would
mean that any lowering of the German debt would be at the
17expense of the other Allies.
On June I5 , Saint-Aulaire called on Curzon again, 
basing his remarks on a June 12 telegram from Poincare.
A response to Saint-Aulaire's June 11 conversation with 
Curzon, the telegram said that Poincare, like Curzon, 
thought it useless to discuss the legal aspects of French 
Ruhr action, for the French contentions were absolutely 
correct. It then discussed conditions that would follow 
the end of German resistance and said, in effect, that 
after resistance ended France would install the kind of 
régime envisaged on January 11: there would be only
enough troops to prevent hostile acts, the MICUM would 
work directly with the Germans, and trade would resume be­
tween occupied and unoccupied Germany. There would, nev­
ertheless, be no changes "in the exploitation of pledges, 
customs, licences, forests . . .  the railway system, etc.," 
and evacuation would come in three or four gradual stages 
to be determined according to the payments made by Germany.
Curzon to Saint-Aulaire, June I3 , 1923, FO 371/8639, 
C 10272/1/18. Edouard Bonnefous stated that the French con­
sidered Curzon*s questionnaire a curt ultimatum; see Histoire 
politique de la Ille République, Vol. Ill: L*après-guerre, 
1919-1924 (Paris: Presses Universitaire de France, 1959)»
p. 356.
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At the moment it was impossible to state the fixed times, 
for this could be done only after Germany's obligations 
were firmly established. Poincare then told Saint-Aulaire 
to reaffirm that France "had no intention whatever of re­
maining in the Ruhr longer than necessary . . .  and had 
neither political nor annexationist aims." Although Ger­
many could not presently participate in an examination of 
the reparations problem, France was ready for inter-Allied 
discussions on the topic. France could not, however, dis­
cuss the question of Germany's capacity to pay, for the 
Germans had hidden visible signs of their capacity while
18conserving their real riches.
Curzon's account of the conversation, which, it 
should be noted, barely resembled that of Saint-Aulaire, 
offers a glimpse into the difficulty the two diplomats ex­
perienced in dealing with each other during this crucial 
period. The Foreign Secretary said that the Ambassador, 
as he did frequently, failed to make clear whether or not 
his remarks were intended as an official communication:
His Excellency is in the habit of reading extracts from 
personal telegrams from M. Poincare to himself, and
Poincare to Saint-Aulaire, No. 01229-01237,
June 12, 1923, A.N., AJ5 342. After talking to Curzon, 
Saint-Aulaire reported that since the Foreign Secretary 
failed to accept the French thesis about the legality of 
the occupation he felt that it would be preferable not to 
bring up the subject again. Curzon's remarks had led him 
to expect a lengthy and detailed discussion of what France 
meant by the cessation of passive resistance; see Saint- 
Aulaire to Poincare, June I5 , 1923, Doc, dip.: notes sur
reparations. p. 48.
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then, when I ask him to give me more precisely the 
points of what he has said, he remarks either that 
he has not the authority to do so, or that the com­
munication is one intended for himself alone. . . .
X am therefore constantly left in a position of em­
barrassment as to the amount of importance to be 
attached to his intimations.19
When Saint-Aulaire complained of Curzon*s failure to accept 
his previous definition of the cessation of passive resist­
ance, the latter answered that he could not remember every­
thing he had been told on June 11 and that the Cabinet had 
asked several questions which he had been unable to answer 
because of "the obscurity of the Ambassador's language.
. . ." At this point, Saint-Aulaire, reading rapidly from 
Poincare's June 12 telegram, amplified what he had said 
previously. After Curzon asked whether this was an offi­
cial reply or a forecast of such a reply and Saint-Aulaire
answered that it was intended for himself, the Foreign Sec-
20retary said that he would wait for the official response.
For over a week there was a lull in Anglo-French 
correspondence. As Britain awaited a response to the 
June 13 questionnaire. Lord Crewe reported on June 15 that 
comment in Paris was basically more optimistic than it had 
been recently and said he heard that Poincare's answer had
^^Conversation between Curzon and Saint-Aulaire, 
June 15, 1923, FO 371/8640, C 10512/1/18. Perhaps this 
partially explains why Curzon constantly requested precise 
statements on topics. It seems that Poincare usually gave 
detailed instructions to Saint-Aulaire, but the latter 
sometimes failed to transmit the information.
^®Ibid.
226
been drafted the day before and sent to Belginm for 
approval. Although the Belgian response might be de­
layed because of a Cabinet crisis, this could be benefi­
cial in that it would give the French and British public 
21time to think. While England waited for the French re­
ply, France stalled and waited for the end of the Belgian 
Cabinet crisis.
Before resuming the narrative, it would be helpful 
to assess the diplomatic situation in mid-June. Even 
though the Foreign Office had come to believe that the 
cessation of German resistance must precede any French 
concessions, it had not called upon Germany to take that 
step and thus far had merely asked France for fuller ex­
planations of its future policy. France, who had already 
answered many of these questions, refused to change its 
position. Deadlock still prevailed, and it seemed that 
no one could break it. These conditions were especially 
frustrating to some of the British leaders. Although they 
believed that the occupation was illegal, they realized 
that Britain had perhaps waited too long to announce that 
fact and they wondered what Britain could do to end the 
impasse. For several reasons the British could not use
Blcrewe to FO, No. 591. June 15, 1923, FO 371/8640, 
C 10463/1/18. The Belgian Cabinet resigned on June 14 
over a Senate vote concerning the University of Ghent.
On June 28 it was reconstituted with no alteration in its 
composition. See Grahame to FO, No. 143, June l4, 1923. 
and No. 155. June 28, 1923, FO 371/8736, C 12747/313/18.
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force against France: first, they were militarily unpre­
pared; second, a rupture with France would delay even fur­
ther the restoration of Europe to normal conditions; third, 
neither the British government nor public opinion unani­
mously condemned French action. On the other hand, the 
British could not coerce Germany, for many people believed 
that the payment of reparations was impossible and that the 
whole Versailles settlement should be revised. It seemed 
that all the nation could do was attempt to coax Poincare 
into making enough concessions to induce Germany to end
22resistance so that the reparations problem could be solved.
Negotiations resumed on June 24 when Crewe talked to 
Poincare about the German note. After objecting strongly 
to British allegations that the Ruhr occupation was a fail­
ure and saying that it was a complete success, the President 
of the Council complained that British statements to the 
contrary merely encouraged Germany to continue passive re­
sistance. When Crewe asked what changes France would make 
in the occupation if resistance ended, Poincare replied 
that he could make no promises beforehand and could say 
only that the occupation would certainly become less mili­
tary in nature. Crewe then questioned him about the pos­
sibility of conferring with the Germans about a new repara­
tions settlement. Poincare was unyielding, and the most he
22See Middlemas and Barnes, Baldwin, p. 185; Carl 
Bergmann, The History of Reparations (London: Ernest Benn
Limited, 192?), p. 197.
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would concede was that after Allied agreement had been
reached Germany might be invited to come to a meeting as
had been done at Spa. After the conversation ended the
Ambassador reported that he was not hopefully impressed
with Poincare's general attitude concerning a common reply,
for the Premier had said that he hoped conversations would
continue in London and Paris without the exchange of written
documents and that there was no need to send a quick reply
to Germany. Furthermore, he had said that if Britain and
France were unable to agree on an answer, perhaps none
23would be sent.
This message displeased the Foreign Office, which 
told Crewe to see Poincare again and tell him that the 
British government failed to share his opinion that an an­
swer to Germany could be indefinitely delayed or perhaps 
not sent at all. He should stress that British public 
opinion, already impatient with the failure to solve the 
Ruhr and reparations crisis, "will not much longer admit 
continuance of the disastrous interference and inconveni­
ence to which British trade and employment are thereby 
24subjected." Since matters must not be allowed to drift
^^Crewe to FO, No. 6lO, June 24, 1923, FO 371/8640,
C 10983/1/18, In the Minutes on this dispatch, Curzon 
wrote: "Lord Crewe did not half hold up our end. He ought
to have dissented sharply from M. Poincare's contentions.
He only pulled out some rather stale remarks of my own in 
previous conversations."
24It should be noted that although Curzon frequently 
used both public and Parliamentary opinion to threaten the
229
indefinitely, the British government expected a full state­
ment of French views and an answer to its questions, and if 
joint Allied action could not be taken soon, "His Majesty's
Government . . .  may soon be driven by the force of public
25opinion to take steps of their own. . . . "  Crewe, unable 
to see Poincare, contacted Peretti de la Rocca on June 27 
and relayed the warning that if agreement were not soon 
reached, Britain might have to take independent action.
When he asked when a reply might be expected, Peretti de la 
Rocca answered perhaps early the next week.^^
Crewe's warning that Britain might take independent 
action if France continued to procrastinate was not mere 
sham, for the Foreign Office was contemplating such a 
course. On June 9» Miles W. Lampson, who, it will be re­
called, had earlier suggested that France might have to be
told that Britain would proceed with an impartial investi-
27gation of Germany's capacity to pay, brought up the sub­
ject again and asked Sir C. J. B, Hurst, Foreign Office 
Legal Adviser, for advice. Although Hurst pointed out
French, he seldom let this influence modify British policy. 
Another point to notice is that as the occupation continued, 
concern centered more upon damage to British trade than upon 
political aspects and conditions in Germany.
^^FO to Crewe, No. 2 7 6 , June 2 7 , 1 9 2 3 , FO 371/8 6 4 0 ,
c 10983/1/18.




legal difficulties in British action of this sort, he
28thought it might be useful to use the threat. When 
France displayed unwillingness to cooperate in sending 
a common reply to the June 7 German note, Lampson called 
again for consideration of his proposal. He wrote on 
June 22 :
I admit that the idea suggested in my minute en­
tails all the legal difficulties pointed out by Sir 
C. Hurst. But it occurs to me as possible that the 
moment may be fast approaching when we may be forced 
to seek a practical solution regardless of legal dif­
ficulties. For instance I think we might contend 
with some justification that when we entered into the 
joint obligations regarding Reparations embodied in 
the Treaty we did not anticipate the blind obstruc­
tiveness of France. Must we be bound indefinitely 
when it is evident that France is determined to 
smash Germany rather than to enable her to pay the 
Reparation of which 2296 is due to us? I believe 
that we could make out a perfectly good case. . . .
Further I have a conviction that the bulk of pub­
lic opinion not only in this country but in the world 
at large would be with us if we took some such bold 
step to force a real solution to this question. . . .
Crowe suggested that Lampson and Hurst discuss the matter
with a Treasury representative, and Curzon agreed, saying
" . . .  clearly a time may arrive when independent action
29will be forced upon us."
In accordance with Curzon‘s instructions, Lampson, 
Hurst, Wigram, and 0. Niemeyer of the Treasury met on 
June 26. After encountering several technical difficulties
28Lampson to Hurst, June 9» 1923, and Hurst to 
Lampson, June 12, 1923, FO 371/8639, C IO29I/I/I8.
^^Minutes by Lampson and Crowe on June 22, 1923, 
and by Curzon on June 23, 1923, FO 371/8639, C 10291/1/18.
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they decided to get the advice of J. Fischer Williams,
Legal Adviser to the British Representative on the Rep-
30aration Commission. When he arrived from Paris they met 
on June 28 to discuss two basic questions : what were the
possibilities under the Treaty of Britain's accepting Ger­
many's request for an independent inquiry? If such an in­
quiry were possible, how could it be made effective? They 
agreed that Britain's accepting the German plea for such 
an assessment would not necessarily be contrary to the 
Treaty. Although their answer to the second question was 
more difficult, they expressed the belief " . . .  that if 
we got Italy and possibly Belgium with us, France fearing 
isolation might fall into line and . . .  then the assess­
ment at which the impartial enquiry had arrived would even-
31tually be accepted by the Reparation Commission." The 
following day, as the German mark continued to depreciate 
rapidly, the Foreign Office composed a seven-page memoran­
dum on possible independent British action. Although it 
was decided to circulate it to neither the Cabinet nor the 
Prime Minister at that time, the memorandum served as the 
basis of a program of action proposed by Crowe. He said 
that if England were unable to agree with France about the 
answer to be sent to the last German note, it should ask
^^Lampson to Crowe, June 26, 1923» FO 371/8639» 
c 10291/1/18.
^^Lampson to Crowe, June 28, 1923» FO 371/8639 »
c 10291/1/18.
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Italy, Japan, and America to participate in a separate 
inquiry into Germany's capacity to pay. If they con­
sented, England should tell Belgium and France it in­
tended to accept Germany's offer of an inquiry and then 
ask them if they still refused to participate. If they 
refused, England should make its proposal to Germany, and 
Sir John Bradbury should in the Reparation Commission 
raise the question of legality of French proceedings since 
January 11. If the Commission reached a deadlock, he 
might refer the matter to the International Court at the 
Hague or let it come before the League of Nations. To 
this first proposal for concrete British action to break
the deadlock, Curzon wrote: "Let us first await the
32French and Belgian replies."
^^Foreign Office Minute (Central Department),
June 291 1923» and Minutes by Lampson, Crowe, and Curzon 
on June 30, 1923, FO 371/8641, C Il456/l/l8. The British 
press also hinted about independent action. Articles in 
the Observer and the Daily Mail in early July stated that 
England demanded a written reply to its June 13 question­
naire and would accept no verbal answer. The Observer 
stated that Britain intended to answer the June 7 German 
note. "If France refuses to participate in this, then no 
alternative will be left to the British Government but to 
take independent action. . . .  The British Government is 
determined to force an issue with France within a week."
The Daily Mail's political correspondent wrote; "If Mr. 
Baldwin should find it difficult to act in concert with 
the French Government, it is hinted that he will take 
steps to make separate arrangements with Germany to secure 
for Great Britain a payment of sufficient moneys per annum 
to secure the interest on the British debt to the United 
States." See Observer, July 1, 1923, p. 13 ! Daily Mail,
July 2, 1923, p. 9 . Both articles caused a furor in France, 
with even L'Oeuvre attacking them; see Le Temps, July 2 and 
3, 1923, p. 1; L'Oeuvre, July 2, 1923, P» 3; L'Echo de Paris,
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In early July, a French reply to the June 13 ques­
tionnaire still seemed far away, for the French government 
continued to delay, and its pretext for doing so centered 
around the form the reply should take. When Crowe told 
Saint-Aulaire on July 2 that he preferred a written answer, 
the Ambassador replied that Poincare said that it should be 
oral. Whereas a precise, written answer would merely accen­
tuate the marked differences between the two governments, 
perhaps he could say something verbally to explain the 
French position and cause Britain to modify its own. Crowe 
informed him that this was an absurd contention: France
needed to make a clear statement so that both nations would 
know where they stood. The following day Poincare himself
told Crewe that he objected to a regular system of exchanged
33notes on the Ruhr. The British government, nevertheless.
July 2, 19231 p. 3; Le Matin, July 2, 1923. p. 1.
On July 2, Sir Arthur Willert of the Press Bureau 
reported that Baldwin's Private Secretary told him that 
neither the Prime Minister nor his staff had inspired the 
articles. He thought, however, that they should do more 
good than harm, particularly since no one could suspect 
collusion between the two papers; furthermore, the warning 
given by the usually pro-French Daily Mail might be very 
effective; see Willert to Crowe, July 2, 1923, FO 371/8642,
c 11725/1/18.
33Conversation between Crowe and Saint-Aulaire,
June 2, 1923. FO 371/8641, C II5O6/I/I8 ; Conversation be­
tween Crewe and Poincare, July 3» 1923, FO 371/8641,
C 11578/1/18. When Crewe talked to Millerand on July 4, 
the French President agreed with Poincare that it was dan­
gerous to utilize a formal system of notes when the two 
countries held such notoriously different viewpoints. He 
did state that perhaps a combination of oral and written 
communications would be useful. See Crewe to FO, July 5. 
1923, FO 371/8642, C 11717/1/18.
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continued to insist upon a written reply when Curzon talked 
to Saint-Aulaire on July 3 and said that he could not under­
stand why France was unable to reply to the questionnaire he 
had sent three weeks earlier. The Ambassador stated that 
although he would telegraph Poincare for permission to give 
a summary of the French views, this would be rather useless, 
for Curzon already knew what they were because he had told 
him three weeks earlier. France still would not discuss 
modification of the occupation, and Germany, who could be 
brought to reason only "by menace and fear," must simply 
be told to stop resistance. Curzon objected violently to 
this statement, saying that the method of argument and per­
suasion was preferable, and warned that since the trend of 
British public opinion, particularly in the House of Com­
mons, was anti-French, Britain might have to act to protect
its own interests if France persisted in the attitude just 
34sketched.
34Conversation between Curzon and Saint-Aulaire, 
July 3. 19231 FO 371/8642, C Il639/l/l8. Saint-Aulaire*s 
remarks in both this conversation and the previous one 
with Crowe were based upon a June 29 telegram from Poin­
care. This telegram reflected how intensely France be­
lieved that Germany had not accepted defeat, had tried to 
elude payment, and had tricked Britain into accepting its 
allegations. Only force could make Germany pay and keep 
it from splitting the Allies. The telegram also showed 
the depth of French fear of Germany and some of the rea­
sons France felt that it could not accept British views 
without risking its independence. If France started 
talking to Germany before resistance ended, England would 
appear the mediator, and Germany could say that it was the 
strongest and had imposed its will on France. See Poin­
care to Saint-Aulaire, June 29, 1923 « Doc, dip.: notes
sur réparations, pp. 50-56.
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Saint-Aulaire on July 6 delivered the long-awaited 
French reply which was, amazingly, dated June ik. Before 
addressing itself to the British questionnaire, the document 
defined the position of the French government: France and
Belgium had occupied the Ruhr under rights given by the 
Treaty of Versailles, and in December and January the Brit­
ish government had raised no legal objections ; they would 
examine no German proposal until resistance had ceased. The 
French also requested that the present Allied conversations 
remain secret so as not to encourage German resistance and 
said that no conference could be called until they and the 
British had prepared the ground and reached an agreement.
The document then turned to the British question­
naire and declared that in order for passive resistance to 
end the German government would have to withdraw the decrees 
that had enjoined resistance. Although this did not mean 
that the government would be responsible for the acts of 
the population committed without its consent, it should try 
to stop such acts. The population would not be compelled 
to cooperate with Allied authorities, but it should not be 
allowed to obstruct them. Even though many minor officials 
and railwayman might be allowed to return after resistance
ended, there could be no amnesty for murderers, saboteurs,
35or high officials responsible for revolts or strikes.
^^Response of the French Government to the British 
memorandum of June 13, Doc, dip.: notes sur reparations,
pp. 56-58.
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France, the document made clear, wanted no British media­
tion between itself and Germany on the subject of passive 
resistance because if Britain were to appear as a mediator 
Germany would draw dangerous conclusions and increase its 
demands. When "the affirmation of an unshaken determina­
tion" had made the Germans yield, "the relations between 
Prance and Germany can become in all respects what they 
were on the left bank of the Rhine, and consequently the 
military character of the occupation will become less and 
less emphasized. . . . "  Finally, France asserted again 
that the object of the occupation was to secure payment 
of the German debt, which had, in accordance with the Ver­
sailles Treaty, been established at 132,000,000,000 gold 
marks.
Under the treaty the debt thus assessed cannot 
be reduced except with the unanimous consent of 
the Allies. No consideration as to the capacity 
for payment can therefore result in a reduction of 
the debt. They can only entail the grant of mora­
toria until such time as German capacity for pay­
ment shall have improved.
In these circumstances, the French Government, 
who abide by the treaty and simply demand its appli­
cation, have no proposal to m a k e . 36
Curzon expressed keen disappointment in the communication, 
saying that Poincare had failed to recede from his pre­
vious position and seemed to think that a reply to the 
German note was unnecessary. Such views would displease
ogIbid., p. 59* Middlemas and Barnes called the 
French response "utterly hostile"; see Baldwin, p. l86. 
This description seems somewhat harsh.
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his colleagues, who would feel that Britain could no longer
3?remain silent.
Both a letter from Curzon to Crewe and Cabinet Min­
utes revealed that other British officials did indeed dis­
like the French July 6 response. On July 8 the Foreign 
Secretary wrote:
Even the pro-French element in the Cabinet. . . .  
are indignant with Poincare and are hot for inde­
pendent action. We have shown patience, toleration, 
even weakness. But now we mean to move. . . .  You 
may rely upon me to go as far as is possible in 
keeping together the Entente. But act we must andwill.38
The Cabinet, meeting on July 9» declared the French document 
intolerable and agreed that Curzon and Baldwin should make 
identic announcements in Parliament on July 12 about British 
reparations policy. Cabinet members outlined the points to 
be covered in the Parliamentary statement and said that it 
"should be couched in terms of extreme friendliness to 
France. . . ." They also instructed Curzon to begin pre­
paring a draft reply to the June 7 German note and a draft
39response to the French communication transmitted on July 6 . 
When the Cabinet met again on July 12, it considered two
37Conversation between Curzon and Saint-Aulaire, 
July 6, 1923, FO 371/8642, C II803/I/I8 ; Saint-Aulaire to 
Poincare, July 7, 1923, Doc, dip.: notes sur reparations,
pp. 61-62.
^^Curzon to Crewe, July 8 , 1923, in Earl of Ronald- 
shay. The Life of Curzon (3 vols.; London: Ernest Benn,
Ltd., 1926), I I I , 357.
39Cab 23/46, 35(23)l(a,b,d).
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drafts of the statement to be made in Parliament that 
afternoon, one prepared by Cnrzon and a shorter one by 
Baldwin. Curzon, who was to have prepared the statement, 
had finished his draft between midnight and 3*00 A.M. on 
July 11. Derby complained that it failed to pressure 
Germany to comply, and Baldwin felt that it was provoca­
tive. That evening at a party he and his secretary,
J. C. C. Davidson, formulated a new draft. The Cabinet 
accepted Baldwin's version with minor modifications, and 
the Prime Minister read it in the House of Commons at 
3:45 P.M.^®
Carefully worded, the statement sought to avoid 
offending France. It began by saying that the Allied 
powers disagreed only about the most effective method of 
collecting reparations and bringing about European secur­
ity. Britain, although as determined as anyone else that 
Germany should pay to the extent of its capacity, had, 
correctly, believed since January that the Ruhr occupation 
could not effectively produce the maximum return. Cur­
rently , the Allies were receiving smaller payments than 
they had before the occupation began, and while Germany 
was moving rapidly toward economic disaster other coun­
tries were suffering economically. Public opinion through­
out Europe had grown alarmed, and it seemed that both the
p. 187.
^®Cab 23/46, 37(23)1 ; Middlemas and Barnes, Baldwin,
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recovery of the world and the preservation of peace were 
endangered. Because of these conditions, Britain must 
act quickly, for the situation could not correct itself.
There will, I believe, be general agreement to 
the following propositions : that the period of con­
flict should as soon as possible be terminated; that 
the indefinite occupation by one country of the ter­
ritory of another in time of peace is a phenomenon, 
rare and regrettable in itself, to which an honour­
able end should as soon as possible be found; that 
the debtor should not merely be called upon to pay 
his debts, but should be placed in a position where 
he can do so; that his capacity, where it is in 
doubt, should be tested and determined, and that 
united efforts should be made to accomplish these 
ends •
Peace will not finally be obtained and recovery 
will not be ensured until a solution has been found 
to three great questions. They are (l) the payment 
of reparations, (2) the settlement of inter-Allied 
debts, and (3) the security of a pacified Europe.^2
In order to achieve these goals, the British government
planned to prepare a draft reply to Germany's June 7 note
and submit it to Prance, Belgium, and the other Allies in
the hope that they would be able to agree about the terms
43and engage in united action. After another month of 
inaction and delay, Britain had, therefore, taken the 
initiative once more.
French official and public reaction to Baldwin's 
address was rather restrained, perhaps indicating a desire 
to avoid antagonizing Britain unnecessarily. Most news­
papers commented on the friendly sentiments expressed by
^^Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol. l66, 
cols. 1584-15B?.
^^Ibid., col. 1587. ^^Ibid., cols. 1588-I589.
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Baldwin in the House of Commons and Curzon in the House 
of Lords. Le Matin, at that time supposedly in close 
touch with Poincare, said that in spite of its friendly 
tone the speech revealed that disagreement persisted. It 
objected to both the failure to condemn passive resistance 
and the view that Germany was an honest country paying all 
it could. The paper, nevertheless, hoped conversations 
would continue and Britain would try to understand France.
Le Temps, after remarking that the address contained state­
ments that were inaccurate and failed to propose a real 
solution, urged that England end its aloofness in the 
forthcoming draft reply to Germany and stop encouraging 
Germany to resist. Saint-Aulaire told Curzon on July l6 
that although France appreciated the warm sentiment ex­
pressed by Baldwin it especially regretted that Germany 
had not been urged to abandon passive resistance and was
disappointed that the Prime Minister seemed frequently to
44 'support Germany. When Poincare made one of his usual
Sunday addresses at Senlis on July 15 « it was evident that
neither the recent diplomatic exchange nor Baldwin's July 12
statement had changed his outlook. He denounced German war
crimes, praised France's role in the war, and said that
44Le Matin, July 13, 1923, p. 1; Le Temps, July l4, 
19231 p. 1; see also L*Oeuvre, July 13» 1923, P« 1» L'Ere 
Nouvelle, July 13, 1923, p. 3; Le Petit Parisien, July 13, 
1923, p. 1; L'écho de Paris, July 13, 1923, p. 1; conver­
sation between Curzon and Saint-Aulaire, July I6 , 1923,
FO 371/8 6 4 3 , C 12370/1/18.
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France did not seek German collapse, for no creditor wanted 
the dissolution of its debtor. In closing, he declared that 
he, as always, faithfully supported the Franco-British alli­
ance and believed that the Allies would eventually recognize 
that France was right. France must carefully execute the 
Versailles Treaty to prevent destruction of the whole diplo­
matic framework constructed at the close of the war, and in 
defending its own rights it was defending those of all the 
Allies.
British press reaction to the Baldwin speech was 
mixed. Several of the papers remarked that the speech 
said nothing new and that France should be pleased by its 
conciliatory tone. The Daily Mail, which during the first 
week of July again started publishing several pro-French 
letters each day, called it "guarded and colorless" and 
said that it left the situation unchanged. On the other 
hand, both the Manchester Guardian and The Times felt it 
indicated that Britain was going to move from a passive 
to an active policy and once more take the initiative.
J, L. Garvin, writing for the Observer, praised it highly: 
"The nation has found a man to its mind. . . .  Mr. Bald­
win's declaration was not merely a speech. It was also 
a great State Paper, ranking as one of the principal docu­
ments of European history after the war." After "six
^^Le Temps, July l6, 1923* P« 2,
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months of impotence," the British government had "ceased
46to be a cipher" on questions vital to its existence.
Soon after the July 12 Parliamentary statement, as 
Curzon and Crowe began preparing the draft reply to Germany, 
Lord Crewe made a specific suggestion about the contents of 
the document. He wrote that he could not emphasize strongly 
enough the necessity of referring to the cessation of pas­
sive resistance, for that omission from the July 12 address 
had caused much criticism in Paris. Furthermore, because 
French public opinion had recently shown more signs of 
willingness "to make concessions on both the occupation of 
the Ruhr and on the question of inter-Allied debts," he be­
lieved that if the reply contained "even a pious wish re­
garding the cessation of passive resistance," the public 
might condemn Poincare if he rejected the d r a f t O n  
July 191 Curzon presented to the Cabinet a draft reply to 
the German June 7 note and a draft covering letter to the 
Allied governments. After hearing reports from Curzon, the 
Cabinet discussed the two documents and suggested several
Daily Mail, July 13» 1923, p. 8; Manchester Guard­
ian, July 13» 1923» p. 8; The Times (London), July 13» 192^»
p. 13; Observer, July 15» 1923» p. 12.
^^Crewe to FO, No. 68O, July l4, 1923» FO 371/8643»
C 12240/1/i 8. Several articles in the Paris press during 
the next few days confirmed Crewe's opinion. Even L*Oeuvre, 
which usually criticized Poincare's policy, said that no 
compromise was possible on the question of passive resist­
ance. See L'Oeuvre. July 1?» 1923» p. 3; Le Petit Parisien.
July 15, 1923» p. 1; Le Temps. July 20, 1923» P* 1.
243
modifications. That the pro-French element in the Cab­
inet had not been completely alienated by the July 6 
note is obvious, for most of the alterations made re­
flected its influence. For example, the Cabinet advised 
that in t-^ 7’/"ase "the whole case for a further mora­
torium would emerge in a new perspective," reference to 
the word "moratorium" should be omitted since it was 
"unacceptable to the French Government." For that 
phrase should be substituted the following : "The whole
problem would assume a different aspect." The Cabinet 
then agreed that since the draft covering letter should 
be revised by the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minis­
ter, they would meet the following day to consider the 
revised draft. Revision was, they felt, necessary for 
the following reasons :
In its present form the covering note is likely 
to be less acceptable to the French Government than 
the draft repl^ to the German Government. There 
was a risk that the more grudging attitude of the 
covering note might interfere with the good impres­
sion which the draft note to Germany was otherwise 
likely to produce. It was therefore felt to be 
important to amend the covering note, not only be­
cause of the immediate impression it might produce 
on the French Government, but also in order that, 
if it were eventually published, it might make a 
favourable and conciliatory impression on French, 
no less than on British and world public opinion.^®
After Curzon and Baldwin revised the documents, the Cabi­
net on July 20 approved them with only minor alterations.
^®Cab 23/46, 38(23)1(0,b,c)
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one being the addition of a paragraph indicating British
49willingness to consider the security question.
On that day, the Foreign Office dispatched both 
documents to the Allied Ambassadors in London and communi­
cated copies privately to the American Embassy. The cover­
ing note— the longer of the two documents--pointed out that 
the German note of June 7 had remained unanswered for seven 
weeks and traced British efforts to obtain Franco-Belgian 
participation in a collective reply. Speaking of the 
June 13 questionnaire, the covering note remarked ; "The 
replies that have been returned to these questions have 
not completely lifted the veil of uncertainty in which the 
situation is still in parts involved." While deadlock pre­
vailed, the international situation was daily becoming more 
acute, and ". . . the occupation of the Ruhr, whether jus­
tified or not in its conception, fails to produce the de­
sired effect ; Allied unity is strained. . . . "  So long as 
Germany's chief industrial area was under military rule 
and suffered political agitation, none of the problems 
could be solved. The note then made a major concession 
to French demands by saying that if passive resistance was 
the chief obstacle to recovery, Britain would be willing 
to join the Allies in calling for its cessation. Before
Cab 23/46, 39(23)1. See Middlemas and Barnes, 
Baldwin, pp. I88-I89, for a brief discussion of the for­
mulation of the two July 20 documents.
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it could do so, however, two conditions would have to be 
satisfied: Germany's capacity to pay— not its liability—
must be determined, and "proposals should be made for the 
restoration of the Ruhr to that condition which will enable 
it to become an area of fruitful production, rather than 
one of international strife."
With reference to the first of these two conditions, 
the note stated that the 1921 reparations figure "no longer 
corresponds to the realities of the situation" and that 
even though the Treaty of Versailles had provided for a 
reduction of the debt total only through the approval of 
the governments concerned, there was no reason that those 
governments or the Reparation Commission could not turn to 
some expert body for assistance and advice. If Germany 
were to accept the advice to cease resistance, the British 
government believed--and hoped that Prance and Belgium 
agreed— that the nature of the occupation should quickly 
change. The number of troops in the Ruhr "should be re­
duced as rapidly as possible; and . . .  assurances of ul­
timate and complete evacuation, when the guarantees have 
been put into effective operation, should not be withheld," 
and coercive measures should be cancelled or relaxed. In 
closing, the note urged the opening of inter-Allied dis­
cussions, "whether by conference or otherwise, for the 
purpose of elaborating a comprehensive plan of a general 
and final financial settlement."
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The draft note, which summarized the May 2 and 
June 7 German notes and discussed the unacceptable facets 
previously called to Germany's attention, focused upon 
and attempted to give the views of the Allied govern­
ments concerning the three major points mentioned in the 
June 7 document: the offer to let an impartial interna­
tional commission establish the amount and methods of 
payment, the proposed guarantees for payment of the 
liabilities established by the commission, and a confer­
ence to discuss the solution of all those questions. It 
accepted, somewhat cautiously, the suggestion for an 
impartial examination of Germany's capacity to pay, 
stipulating that this must be done within the framework 
of the Treaty. It reserved opinion on the guarantees 
offered by Germany because their economic value depended 
upon factors not mentioned in the June 7 note— stabilizing 
the mark and balancing the German budget--and said that 
no guarantees would be acceptable without some type of 
international control over German finances. Germany, 
as provided in the Treaty, should be consulted and al­
lowed to present its case, but before the Allies could 
discuss any of these questions, the Germans would have 
to cease passive resistance. The draft note devoted a 
long paragraph to this subject and specifically called 
upon Germany "to withdraw without further delay the ordi­
nances and decrees which have organised and fomented this
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form of resistance. . . . Since Britain had, it ap­
peared, finally offered to meet French demands concerning 
passive resistance, diplomats wondered if this step would 
suffice to win French assent to sending the collective 
reply.
While France and England were arguing about a reply
to the second reparations proposal, the occupying powers
continually tightened their grip on the Ruhr and Rhineland.
Around June 10 the French occupied the A11enessen-Katernberg-
Wanne-Herne railroad line and all stations but one in Essen,
and the Rhineland High Commission, Kilmarnock abstaining,
voted on June 12 to occupy the port of Karlsruhe to facil-
51itate customs collection. On the same day General 
Dégoutté, saying he feared German attempts to destroy 
bridg 3 across the Rhine, requested and received High Com­
mission authorization to forbid night traffic on the Rhine 
within established distances of any bridge or permanent 
work.^^ On June 30 a delayed-action bomb placed in a Bel­
gian leave train exploded on the Duisburg-Hochfeld bridge 
killing ten soldiers and wounding forty. Because of this 
sabotage and intelligence reports that more saboteurs were
^^Curzon to French, Italian, Belgian, and Japanese 
Ambassadors, July 20, 1923, FO 371/8644, C 12540/1/18.
^^Acting Consul-General Charlton to FO, No. 252,
June 11, 1923, FO 371/8732, C IO358/313/I8 ; Kilmarnock to 
FO, No. 362, June 12, 1923, FO 371/8736, C 127^7/313/18.
^^Kilmarnock to FO, No. 36I , June l4, 1923,
FO 371/8732, C 10499/313/18.
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arriving from unoccupied Germany, the High Commission on 
July 1 closed to Germans all circulation in both directions 
between occupied and unoccupied territories for a period of 
two weeks and later extended the restrictions for a brief 
time. On July 26 the High Commission adopted an ordinance 
forbidding the stockage or deposit of merchandise along the 
banks of navigable waterways in occupied territories. Al­
though the French used as a pretext the possibility of the 
introduction by water of explosives for sabotage and the 
need for leaving docks free for military transport, Kilmar­
nock felt that the true purpose lay elsewhere: since the
Germans, seeking to avoid using Regie trains, transported
most local merchandise by river, he believed Dégoutté sought
53to stop this and force them to use the trains.
Beginning in June, British newspaper accounts charged 
the French and Belgians with preventing food supplies from 
entering the Ruhr. After being pressed by Parliament on 
the subject, the Foreign Office on June 21 questioned Kil­
marnock, who reported three days later that the charges 
seemed to be false. The Regie had offered to transport 
foodstuffs, German authorities in the Ruhr had made no com­
plaints, and most of the difficulties resulted from German 
refusal to use railroad lines under French control. Early
^^Kilmarnock to FO, No. 304, June 30, 1923,
FO 371/8736, C 12747/313/18; No. 306, July 1, 1923,
FO 371/8742, C 16674/313/18; No. 315, July 20, 1923,
FO 371/8736, C 12609/313/18; No. 316, July 26, 1923,
FO 371/8736, C 12896/313/18.
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in July he said that although food reserves were low at
Essen and Bochum, he believed that supplies would be
maintained, for the French had no desire to starve the 
54population.
While France was exerting increasingly intensive 
pressure upon the Germans, the British government, al­
though it had shown some initiative in trying to devise 
a common reply to Germany, still acquiesced in the face 
of most French moves in the occupied territory and did 
nothing there to make the position of the invaders un­
tenable . Several events in the Ruhr involved the British 
government directly, one of them being the railroad prob­
lem. The High Commission on June 12 authorized the Regie 
to double the track between Euskirchen and Duren--just 
west of the British zone— because France and Belgium 
wanted to improve the transport of troops to and from
^^FO to Kilmarnock, No. I65, June 21, 1923,
FO 371/8733, C 10692/313/18; Kilmarnock to FO, No. 299, 
June 22, 1923, FO 371/8733» C IO916/313/18; No. 468,
July 4, 1923, FO 371/8735, C 11740/313/18. The French 
complained frequently of British reports of Ruhr condi­
tions and events, which they claimed were frequently dis­
torted. In late May, Poincare told Tirard to try to exer­
cise some influence on British correspondents in newly- 
occupied territory, and Tirard replied on May 25 that he 
had instructed André François-Poncet, head of the Press 
Bureau in the Ruhr, to send one of his staff members to 
Cologne to give reports daily to British correspondents. 
In this way he hoped to counteract the "intentionally 
misleading information" the British had been receiving 
from German sources. See Poincare to Tirard, No. 1174, 
May 24, 1923, A.N., AJ9 4311; Tirard to Poincare, No,
9760, May 25, 1923, A.N., AJ9 30^6. This move appears 
to have had little effect on the nature of British 
reporting.
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the Ruhr and increase reparations coal deliveries. When 
Kilmarnock reported that this step, by diverting much traf­
fic from the British zone, would avoid a possible French 
request for additional traffic facilities through Cologne, 
the Foreign Office decided not to protest, even though the 
labor cost of the project was to be taken from Regie re-
55ceipts and the material to come from seized German stocks. 
Another incident in July reflected British concern to avoid 
irritating France. Kilmarnock on July 4 wrote that the 
Kolnische Zeitung had been publishing violent articles 
against France. Since British efforts to urge moderation 
on the publishers had been unsuccessful, he wondered if he 
could suppress the newspaper if such articles continued to 
appear. The Foreign Office replied the following week that 
he could do so if inflammatory articles appeared in the 
future.^^
When trade difficulties in the occupied territory 
continued to trouble them, however, the British frequently 
made formal complaints to France. In June and July, French 
authorities entered the Badische Company at Ludwigshafen
Kilmarnock to FO, No. 36O, June 14, 19231 and 
Minute by Lampson on June 20, 1923» FO 371/8732,
C 10493/313/18; British Delegation, Reparation Commission, 
No. B.R.305/23, July 5, 1923» FO 371/8735» C 12019/313/18; 
Kilmarnock to FO, No. 553» July 23» 1923 » and Minute by 
J. C. Sterndale Bennett, July 28, 1923 » FO 371/8736,
c 12862/313/18.
^^Kilmarnock to FO, No. 468, July 4, I923 » and FO 
to Kilmarnock, No. 173» July 10, 1923» FO 37l/8?42,
c 16674/313/18.
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and seized dyestuffs earmarked for England. Only after a 
lengthy correspondence did the British government succeed 
in having them released and shipped to their destination.
The British also encountered delays in obtaining licences 
for shipment of large quantities of steel to British buyers, 
but Lord Kilmarnock eventually worked out a relatively 
satisfactory solution. On June 19> in discussing the steel 
licence situation, he made an interesting observation about 
trade problems. He said that although the French had done 
much to postpone the issue of licences, the British traders 
themselves were not entirely blameless, for they had de­
layed applying for the full quantities needed. Further­
more, British merchants had, under the influence of London 
newspaper accounts, been led to believe that no goods could 
come in or out, and they had often failed to make applica­
tion for licences: these statements were inaccurate, and
most licences were being issued for the heavy steel Britain
57needed. '
During the exchange of correspondence between Britain 
and France over the German reparations proposals, various 
British officials continued to consider the question of the 
legality of Franco-Belgian action. Discussion of Rhineland
^^Board of Trade to FO, No. I.M.195/23, June 27» 
1923, and Curzon to Crewe, July 4, 1923» FO 371/8733»
C 11224/313/18; Crewe to FO, No. 66O, July 8, 1923»
FO 371/8735» C 11808/313/18; Kilmarnock to FO, No. 395» 
June 19» 1923» FO 371/8742, C 12747/313/18. During June 
and July, scores of dispatches dealt with trade problems.
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Ordinance No. 153 and No. 154 resumed in early July. As
58mentioned earlier, France had on May 25 stated, in effect, 
that when the Reparation Commission declared Germany's de­
fault, its functions had ended, and Lampson had on June 6 
sent the Treasury a draft reply challenging the French con­
tentions. O. Niemeyer on July 3 transmitted the Treasury 
response, which said that although the French note was com­
pletely unsatisfactory, it might be unwise to send an an­
swer at that time. In accordance with a suggestion by the 
Treasury, Lampson requested the Law Officers' advice on the 
matter, and their July 30 opinion somewhat surprised the 
Foreign Office. The Attorney-General and Solicitor-General 
failed to agree about one of the main points--whether the 
Rhineland High Commission or the respective governments 
should decide the measures to be taken under Paragraph I8 . 
Because of this, the Foreign Office decided that it could 
not protest the French claim that after the declaration of 
default the Rhineland High Commission could, by a majority 
vote, take measures justified under Paragraph I8. In addi­
tion, the Law Officers' report disappointed the Foreign Of­
fice in that it said that measures contemplated in Paragraph 
18 could be taken in the Rhineland. Lampson decided that
Treasury officials should be consulted to see if they wished
59to pursue the matter further. Throughout this period.
^®Su£ra, pp. 203-205.
^^Treasury to FO, No. F.6II5 . July 3, 1923Î FO to 
Attorney-General and Solicitor-General, July 12, 1923» Law
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notably in the July 20 covering letter to the Allied gov­
ernments, the British government failed to act upon Cur­
zon' s June 11 statement to Saint-Aulaire labelling French 
action illegal and continued to refrain from openly chal­
lenging the legality of French coercive measures. When 
J, Fischer Williams in July prepared a lengthy memorandum 
stating that the threatened May, 1 9 2 1 , occupation of the 
Ruhr in no way prevented Britain from contesting the le­
gality of current French action because it would have been 
a measure "taken in accordance with international practice," 
Crowe simply noted that the document might be valuable 
later on and that the arguments contained therein were 
sound, although not new.^^ It seems that the British gov­
ernment remained silent on the legal issue because it 
feared that the public would be unable to differentiate 
between action purportedly based on a specific Treaty pro­
vision and that previously threatened upon the basis of 
nebulous "international practice,"
While working for a collective reply to the German 
June 7 note, the British government carefully watched do­
mestic affairs in France. Several reports in June and 
July indicated that Poincare might be meeting increasing
Officers of the Crown to Curzon, July 30, 1923, FO 371/8734, 
C 11608/313/18; Minute by Lampson, August 2, 1923,
FO 371/8736, C 13098/313/18.
^^Williams to Hurst, July 3, 1923, and Minute by 
Crowe, July 25, 1923, FO 371/8734, C 11652/313/18.
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internal opposition^ especially from MiHerand. Crewe 
heard from "a reliable opposition source" that Millerand, 
Loucheur, and Barthou resented Poincare's inflexible atti­
tude and wanted to begin conversations with Britain, and 
on June 25 the Foreign Office learned that Monsieur Bompart, 
Secretary to Millerand, said that the President, fearing 
France would be isolated by an Anglo-German rapprochement, 
wanted to remove Poincare so that England and France could 
cooperate. Phipps wrote on July 30 that Millerand, who 
seemed to realize that the occupation was a failure and to 
believe that France should extricate itself from the Ruhr 
if possible, was reportedly criticizing Poincare for not 
having presented a definite reparations program.
Those who read of the French Senate session of 
June 29 should not, however, have been very encouraged. 
After listening to Poincare speak and giving him a standing 
ovation, the Senate unanimously voted 30?,000,000 francs 
for Ruhr expenses. The President of the Council's speech 
reflected absolutely no modification of his position: once
more he traced in detail Germany's failure to pay and re­
peated that France and Belgium, who had occupied the Ruhr 
under Treaty provisions in order to preserve the peace set­
tlement, were there only to take guarantees and to create
^^Crewe to FO, No. 58I, June 10, 1923, FO 37I/8638, 
C 10052/1/18; S.I.S. to FO, No. CX/521/Ia., June 25, 1923, 
FO 371/8733, C 11241/313/18; Phipps to FO, No. 719,
July 30, 1923, FO 371/8737, C 13108/313/18.
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in Germany the will to pay. Had they had annexationist 
designs, they would have instead occupied the valley of 
the Main in order to separate Bavaria from Prussia and cut 
Germany in two. Poincare then devoted quite a bit of time 
to statistical information and indicated that the endeavor 
was becoming increasingly profitable. Contrary to what the 
Germans said, France was not trying to keep food supplies 
out of the Ruhr : instead, more foodstuffs were entering
the area than before the beginning of the occupation, and 
France had organized shops and soup kitchens at a cost of 
over 100,000 francs monthly. Finally, he repeated the old 
theme that the German government alone had initiated pas­
sive resistance and that such resistance was useless, for 
France and Belgium were determined to bring the Ruhr policy 
to a successful conclusion and keep the Ruhr until they 
were paid.^^
The report of a July 22 conversation between Phipps 
and Poincare also cast gloom over the Foreign Office.
Crewe described the encounter in graphic terms; "His atti­
tude, which was personally most friendly, left me breath­
less from the political point of view. Unless he waters 
considerably his very potent wine he will shortly present 
to His Majesty's Government a draught which they may well 
decline even to sip." Phipps said that it was, amazingly, 
the question of passive resistance that provoked Poincare—
.0., sénat, June )0, 1923, pp. 1355-1361.
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this in spite of the prominent place given that issue in
61the draft reply. French press response on the eve of 
the Franco-Belgian replies was only slightly more encourag­
ing, with two articles in the semi-official 1^ Temps being 
of particular interest. On July 26 Herbette argued that 
because the hope of British intervention sustained German 
resistance, France had to hold firm to its principles and 
could neither "prejudice the cessation of passive resist­
ance by any promise," nor submit a settlement of the rep­
arations question to the arbitration of any new interna­
tional organization. Referring to the part of the cover­
ing letter which reflected British willingness to discuss 
the security question, he wrote the following day that be­
cause security and reparations were two completely separate 
questions and must remain so, France could not make a fi­
nancial sacrifice in exchange for any promise of military 
64guarantee.
Although the Annual Register said later that while 
England was waiting for Poincare's delayed reply to the 
July 20 documents, "Not a voice was raised in Parliament
^^Phipps to FO, No. 696, July 22, 1923, FO 371/8644,
C 12613/1/18. Crowe wrote the following day; "It looks 
as if those were right who believe that M. Poincare does 
not really desire a settlement, preferring to remain in 
the Ruhr and to see Germany reduced to impotence, as ends 
valuable in themselves." See Minute by Crowe, July 23,
1923, FO 371/8644, C 12619/1/18.
64Le Temps. July 26, 1923, P» 3» July 26, 1923, p. 1. 
The tone of Le Petit Parisien differed somewhat from that of 
Le Temps; see Le Petit Parisien, July 27, 1923, p. 1.
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or the country while British interests were being visibly
sacrificed and British influence on the Continent fading
away," the statement was not completely true, for some
British newspapers anxiously watched the diplomatic scene.
In the days following the dispatch of the covering letter
and draft reply, The Times had several leading articles
pointing out both the rapidly growing chaos in Germany
and the danger of delay, and on July 27 it said that since
Britain had taken the first step it could not let this in-
65itiative "be thwarted by any intentional delays." The
Spectator also voiced alarm:
If France continues to demand her full pound of flesh, 
whether it kills or does not kill her prisoner, we 
cannot merely regret her action and deplore its con­
sequences. We must actively oppose her and do our 
very best to prevent the destruction, moral and eco­
nomic, of a nation whose existence, whatever her 
past crimes, as a stable working community is essen­
tial not only to the welfare of Europe, but to the 
continuance of civilization. . . .  We shall not, of 
course, attempt to use force against France to stop 
her progressive occupation and destruction of Ger­
many, but if France persists in her present course 
we must pursue a line of policy which cannot but end 
in her isolation.66
Even though a portion of the British press was ex­
pressing intense concern over the impact of the occupation 
upon Germany, the diplomatic scene had remained basically 
unchanged during June and July as France, sensing the ap­
proach of German defeat, refused to change its position.
Annual Register. 1923, p. 77; The Times (London), 
July 23, 1923, p. 13; July 27, 1923, p. 11.
^^Spectator, July 28, 1923, P» 109.
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Although the British government had resumed the initiative 
by dispatching the June 13 questionnaire and July 20 draft 
reply and by offering to call on Germany to cease resist­
ance, it had failed to follow up on these moves. When 
France delayed and refused to be precise about the form 
the occupation would take after the end of passive resist­
ance, the British merely asked for clearer explanations.
It seems that the indecisiveness of Curzon and the influ­
ence of the pro-French element in the Cabinet stymied the 
efforts of those Foreign Office officials who were urging 
the government to take independent action to end the impasse. 
As July drew to a close, however, all eyes turned expect­
antly toward Paris. British diplomats wondered if President 
Millerand had been able to modify Poincare's unyielding po­
sition and if France would agree to communicate the draft 
reply to Germany.
CHAPTER VI
PROCLAMATION TO PARLIAMENT AND PUBLIC APPEALS THROUGH 
PUBLICATION, JULY 3O-AUGUST 20, 1923
From July JO through August 20, Britain and France 
engaged in a battle of notes. Because the British govern­
ment considered the July 30 French response to the covering 
letter and draft reply unsatisfactory and noted grave con­
ditions in Germany, it decided to appeal for world support 
through a statement in Parliament, publication of the post- 
June 7 reparations correspondence, and a detailed response 
to the latest French note. France, believing that German 
resistance was about to end, replied to the British docu­
ment with an extremely lengthy, unyielding statement of its 
own position, and the two documents, which were published 
in full, increased animosity between Britain and France. 
After the position of each country had been clearly exposed, 
some observers expected immediate action to end the crisis.
The French reply of July 30, which Curzon and some 
British officials believed controversial and hostile in 
tone, was in reality more dispassionate and conciliatory 
than several previous French pronouncements and included
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no detailed legal justification for Franco-Belgian action. 
It nevertheless reflected little modification in the French 
position and indicated that France was stalling. Although 
it discussed most of the points in the British covering 
letter, the note hardly mentioned the draft reply. It 
said that while France appreciated and shared the British 
desire for a settlement of the reparations question and 
wanted to seek a solution together with the British, it 
did not believe that the June 7 proposals indicated any 
desire to execute the Versailles Treaty, particularly since 
they made no promise to end passive resistance. After in­
dicating a willingness to answer further British questions, 
the note emphasized a previously-stated principle: France
and Belgium would evacuate the Ruhr only in proportion as 
they received payments from Germany; they could not abandon 
the pledge for mere promises.
In dealing with the British question concerning the 
nature of the occupation after the cessation of passive 
resistance, the French were no more specific than they had 
been in previous verbal and written communications. "As to 
passive resistance, if Germany discontinues it completely, 
we will introduce into our occupation the modifications 
which we consider compatible with the safety of the troops 
and engineers and with the retention of the pledge in our 
hands." They then denied the British assertion that the 
occupation had failed to produce the desired effect and
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explained that France knew that it could not obtain "the
immediate and total payment of reparations" even if the
German government cooperated. It had another purpose:
What we wanted was first and foremost to create in 
Germany, by a seizure of pledges and by coercion, 
the will to pay; it was to cause such inconvenience 
in the economic and political organisation of the 
Reich that it would prefer the execution of the 
Treaty of Peace to this inconvenience; it was to
obtain what we have not obtained for four yeeirs,
i.e., the recognition by Germany of her obligations, 
not from the general and theoretical point of view, 
but from the practical point of view.
The note contended that had Germany not counted on a split
between the Allies it would have quickly capitulated. The
Germans themselves were responsible for trade and commercial 
difficulties because they refused to apply for Allied li­
cences and to use Regie trains. France then reaffirmed that 
cessation "must be preliminary and could not possibly be ac­
companied by immediate advantages" and that it could never 
enter into negotiations with Germany before resistance ended.
Having made these preliminary remarks, the French 
turned to the two factors Britain had said must precede a 
demand for cessation of resistance: the establishment of
Germany's capacity to pay and the return of the Ruhr to pro­
ductive condition. First, they questioned the necessity of 
making a new assessment of the total reparations figure, 
asking why an estimate made in 1923 by so-called experts 
should be more accurate than the one made in 1921 and why 
figures determined in 1923 would still be accurate in ten 
or fifteen years. Furthermore, since a state's capacity to
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pay was a variable thing, it should not be determined once 
and for all. Because of this, Article 2^4 of the Treaty 
had called for periodic reassessment by the Reparation Com­
mission itself. France, believing that it would be foolish 
to fix Germany's debt at a time when its capacity to pay 
was at the lowest point, would consent neither to fixing a 
final total nor to cancelling a part of Germany's debt-- 
except in exchange for a cancellation of a like portion of 
its own debt. Moreover, it would never be possible to de­
termine a figure which Germany would accept as just and 
reasonable. At this point French nationalism, which char­
acterized the entire note, became obvious:
We cannot forget that in I87I no one in the world 
thought of finding out whether France found the Treaty 
of Frankfurt just and realisable. No one then pre­
vented Germany from occupying a considerable portion 
of French territory pending total payment of an in­
demnity . . .  claimed by a victorious country which 
had not been invaded, and which had suffered no war 
damage, and which stole two provinces from the 
vanquished.
Turning to the Anglo-German suggestion for utilizing 
an impartial expert commission in the assessment of Ger­
many's capacity to pay, the note asked about the relation­
ship of the experts to the Reparation Commission. What 
would be the nature of the opinion they would give, and 
how and by whom would they be chosen? While welcoming 
more active American participation, it asked what members 
other than American ones could be called impartial and said 
that before France reached a definite opinion it needed more
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precise answers to these points. France did not at this 
time, it should be noted, totally refuse to consider the 
creation of such a body.
After reaffirming that they could not evacuate for 
mere guarantees and refusing to make specific promises about 
the reduction of troops, modification of High Commission 
ordinances, and the return of expelled German nationals, the 
French declared that "Details of the measures which will be 
adopted cannot be settled in advance as they will depend on 
the attitude of the Reich and the population." Finally, 
they asked if the British government included the question 
of inter-Allied debts when it talked of a "general and final 
settlement." With reference to the last paragraph of the 
July 20 covering letter, in which the British had expressed 
willingness to discuss French security, they said that al­
though France would always be pleased to discuss the matter, 
it should be discussed separately because it had nothing to 
do with the Ruhr occupation.^
Foreign Office reaction to the July 30 note was imme­
diately unfavorable. Curzon, upon perusing the document 
presented by Saint-Aulaire, told the Ambassador that it was 
disappointing, disquieting, and a rebuff to Britain, for it 
met every British suggestion with either opposition or ques­
tions, seemed designed to lead to correspondence that might
Saint-Aulaire to Curzon, July 30, 1923, FO 371/8645, 
C 13105/1/18. See this also in Doc, dip.: notes sur rep­
arations , pp. 76-82.
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last weeks or even months, and gave no hope for a collec­
tive reply to the June 7 note. On July 31, Sir Eyre Crowe 
and Counsellor Miles W. Lamp son prepeured Minutes commenting 
upon the French note and discussing future British action, 
and within a few days the Treasury prepared a memorandum
on reparations and Allied debts, as well as observations
2on the French note. Before criticizing several sections 
of the French reply. Lampson, asking what Britain could do 
next, suggested that publication of the recent reparations 
correspondence might be advantageous; this would "make 
clear to British and world opinion the attitude and motives" 
of the British government and "simplify the question of what 
answer (if any) is to be returned to Germany." In his crit­
icism of the contents of the French note. Lampson condemned 
particularly the French failure to mention the draft reply 
to Germany and the refusal to make commitments in advance 
about the nature of the occupation after passive resistance 
ended. Believing that the French had destroyed all possi­
bility of sending a joint reply to Germany, he suggested
^Conversation between Saint-Aulaire and Curzon,
July 30, 1923» FO 371/8645. C I3162/I/I8 ; Minute by Lampson,
July 31. 1923, FO 371/8646, 0 13519/1/18; Minute by Crowe,
July 31, 1923, FO 371/8648, C 13562/I/I8 ; Treasury Memoran­
dum on Reparations and Inter-Allied Debts, August 4, 1923, 
FO 371/8647, C 13584/1/18; Treasury Observations on the 
French Reparation Note of July 30, August 8 , 1923,
FO 371/8647, C 13591/1/18. The Treasury Memorandum on 
Reparations declared that Britain could discuss inter- 
Allied debts only after Germany's reparations obligation 
had been determined. The Treasury observations formed part 
of the forthcoming British reply.
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once more that the British go ahead with an independent
3investigation.
The comments of Permanent Under-Secretary Crowe upon 
the July 30 note give a keen insight into the unenviable 
position held by Britain. Crowe confessed that the field 
of British action was severely restricted: "We are not
really in a position to advocate a separate line of policy, 
since it is in France's power, by her mere opposition, to 
frustrate any separate arrangement that we could propose 
to Germany," and even if an independent inquiry were con­
ducted, it would do little good as long as France remained 
in the Ruhr. Britain could neither join with France in the 
occupation nor use a policy of force to get it out of the 
Ruhr, for it had no means of carrying "out a policy of con­
straint, and, if we had, it is doubtful whether our public 
opinion would approve it." He felt that only one course 
lay open to Britain: "Stand aside, dissociating ourselves
as openly and clearly from the French occupation, appealing 
to public opinion, in the hope of producing a revulsion of
ilfeeling in France itself."
The French reply also caused both consternation and 
uncertainty among Cabinet members. While Baldwin showed 
keen disappointment with the French reply and the Belgian 
one of the same date, several members of the Cabinet wanted
^Minute by Lampson, July 31 « 1923< cited above. 
4Minute by Crowe, July 31 * 1923, cited above.
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to drop the whole problem and leave matters as they were. 
Lord Robert Cecil, on the other hand, suggested that the 
neutrals be allowed to bring the matter before the League 
of Nations, but Curzon refused to adopt either of these 
courses.^ When the Cabinet met on July 31, Curzon circu­
lated the French and Belgian replies and reported on his 
July 30 conversations with the French, Belgian, German, 
and Italian Ambassadors. The Cabinet decided to meet the 
next day to discuss future British action in the face of 
the "somewhat discouraging and negative tenour of the French 
N o t e . A t  the August 1 Cabinet meeting, Curzon analyzed 
the French and Belgian replies in detail, emphasizing that 
the French note indicated that France wanted no immediate 
settlement and intended to prolong negotiations until Ger­
many had collapsed. After lengthy discussion the Cabinet 
instructed Curzon to draw up for Baldwin's approval a 
statement on the reparations question to be made in both 
Houses of Parliament the following day. After outlining 
the contents of the statement, the Cabinet instructed Curzon 
to consult the Allies about publishing the key documents 
pertaining to the June 7 German note and to begin preparing 
for Cabinet consideration a reply to the July 30 notes from
Harold Nicolson, Curzon: The Last Phase, 1919-1925
A Study in Post-War Diplomacy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 193^71 p% 364; Keith Middlemas and John Barnes, 




France and Belgium. This reply should be couched in con­
ciliatory terms, include a statement of British reparations 
policy, and be designed as "an appeal to the public opinion 
of the world, setting forth the reasons of the British ac­
tion in proposing a joint reply to Germany and deeply de-
7ploring that their efforts had met with so little response."
When Curzon appeared before the House of Lords and 
Baldwin before the House of Commons on August 2— the last 
day of the session— those bodies were clamoring for infor­
mation about the July 30 notes. The relatively brief state­
ment traced the course of events since receipt of the June 7 
note and discussed the major points of the July 20 draft 
reply to Germany, emphasizing that it had encouraged the 
Germans to cease passive resistance. Turning to the French 
and Belgian replies of July 30, Baldwin said that, although 
written in a cordial and friendly fashion, they contained 
no material for formulating a collective Allied reply to 
the German note--in fact, they did not even mention the 
draft reply. Instead of showing concern about "an early 
alteration of the situation in the Ruhr, or of the commence­
ment of the discussions about reparations, to both of which 
His Majesty's Government had eagerly looked forward," they 
appeared to envisage weeks of conversation among the Allies
g
before anything could be done to end the current situation.
^Cab 23/46, 44(23)3(a,b,d,e). 
oParliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol. 167 
cols. 1773-1775.
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He declared that because European conditions were growing 
constantly more precarious, the British government could 
agree to no such prolonged conversation. Faced with these 
conditions, it had decided to publish the pertinent docu­
ments as soon as possible in order to explain the entire 
situation and to "convince the world of the imperative
9necessity of prompt and united action to deal with it."
French press reaction to the address was, with a 
few exceptions, basically dispassionate. Pertinax, writing 
for the conservative and strongly nationalistic L* Écho de 
Paris, was among those who wrote that France had nothing to 
fear from publication, which would show the strength of its 
position. The semi-official Le Temps warned that publica­
tion might boomerang and cause much disagreement among Ger­
many's creditors. The popular Le Matin criticized the Brit­
ish suggestion for an expert inquiry into Germany's capacity 
to pay, the proposed international control of German finance, 
and the suggested plan for a general financial settlement, 
and both Le Temps and Journal des Débats condemned the 
apparent British effort to mediate between France and Ger­
many. The two leading opposition papers, however, took a 
somewhat different position. L'Oeuvre wrote that the tone 
of the declaration was friendly, there had been no rupture,
^Ibid., cols. 1775-1776.
^^L'Écho de Paris, August 3» 1923, p. 1; Le Temps, 
August 3 and 4, 1923, p. 1; Le Matin, August 3, 19231 P. 1; 
Le Temps, August 4, 19231 p. 1; Le Journal des Debats, 
August 4, 1923, p. 1.
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and England was still attached to the Entente. L'Ère 
Nouvelle expressed surprise at the statement that Brit­
ain had agreed to call on Germany to abandon resistance
and asked why this information had not previously been
^  11 released.
Ambassador D'Abernon reported that the Parliamen­
tary statement met a cool reception in Berlin. German 
newspapers noted British failure to condemn the illegal­
ity of French action and criticized the portion of the 
draft note calling for financial control of Germany.
They said that the essential point in that document was 
the demand for the abandonment of passive resistance; 
unless England altered this part of its note, negotia­
tions with Germany would be fruitless from the beginning.
The German Foreign Minister told D'Abernon on August 7
12that Germany would resist to the end.
In Britain, the Parliamentary statements brought 
into focus the rising tide of impatience with the current 
course of events in Germany. The British press agreed 
almost unanimously that they indicated the gravity of the 
diplomatic situation. While none of the papers surveyed 
lauded the Prime Minister's speech, some condemned it.
Oeuvre, August 2 and 3, 1923» p. 1» L'Ère 
Nouvelle, August 3, 1923» p. 1.
^^D'Abernon to FO, No. $04, August 6 , 1923»
FO 371/8648, C 13765/1/18; No. 264, August 7 , 1923» 
FO 371/8737» C 13589/313/18.
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The Conservative Daily Telegraph, which during the preced­
ing week had grown extremely critical of British policy and 
demanded definite action, said that the speech revealed 
that the government was determined to let the matter drift 
no further, considered negotiations with France closed, and 
was "invoking the aid of publicity to solve a problem that 
baffles the diplomatists." While The Times said that the 
government had taken "a definite step forward" and praised 
the draft reply to Germany, the Manchester Guardian and the 
Observer, both Liberal organs, were pessimistic about the 
picture painted by Baldwin. The Guardian, noting that there 
was no hint of what step Britain planned to take after pub­
lication, wondered if the government had decided upon a 
definite policy. Although he had praised Baldwin’s July 12 
Parliamentary statement, J. L. Garvin, impatient with the 
government's passivity, wrote in the Observer that the Au­
gust 2 debate was "the very gravest to which the House of 
Commons has listened in our time, or perhaps in any time" 
and that the country wanted more than good speeches: "What
the nation wants and demands is the power of action. Of 
that capacity, Ministers have given no sign as yet." Al­
though the country was waiting, it would not do so long.
The British government must realize, he said, that the 
military supremacy of France was more absolute than in the 
days of Louis XIV or Napoleon; furthermore, after publica­
tion of the documents it must establish Germany's capacity
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to pay and prevent Poincare's breaking up Germany and ob-
13taining a "huge coal and iron combine."
The Foreign Office quickly began to enact the meas­
ures outlined in the Parliamentary statements. On August 2, 
Crowe asked the French Ambassador for permission to publish 
correspondence concerning the second German reparations 
proposals, specifically the June 7 note, the June 13 ques­
tionnaire, the French reply delivered on July 6, and the 
July 30 French and Belgian notes. The following day Saint- 
Aulaire called on Crowe and read extracts from a telegram 
from Poincare giving permission to include the French docu­
ments and stating that the French government itself would 
at once publish parts of the correspondence without waiting 
for publication in London. Saint-Aulaire then said that 
Poincare had no intention of ending Anglo-French talks de­
signed to reach agreement about the solution of the repara­
tions problem. When, however, Crowe asked what additional 
steps Poincare contemplated and pointed out that the July 30 
note held little prospect of reaching an agreement on essen­
tial points, the Ambassador was unable to answer. Saint- 
Aulaire next asked whether Curzon, who was going to Bagnoles 
at the end of the following week, would pass through Paris. 
If he were to do so, perhaps a meeting could be arranged 
with Poincare since even a brief talk between these two men
^Daily Telegraph, August 8, 1923» P» 8; The Times 
(London), August 3, 1923, p. 11; Manchester Guardian, Au­
gust 3, 1923, p. 8; Observer, August 5, 1923, P* B.
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might do some good and serve as a preliminary to a Baldwin- 
Poincare conversation. Crowe replied that he did not know 
Curzon*s travel plans and added that a meeting between Brit­
ish and French Prime Ministers might accentuate the differ-
l4ences between the two governments.
Soon after the August 1 Cabinet meeting, British 
officials began discussing and disagreeing about the policy 
the government should follow and the contents of the forth­
coming reply to the July 30 notes. When Lord Robert Cecil 
went to Paris to talk to both Millerand and Poinceire, Colo­
nel Requin, a close friend of the Premier, told him that 
Poincare considered security more important than repara­
tions and wanted to find a way out of the impasse. Hearing 
this, Cecil proposed a new mutual guarantee treaty. His 
activities, however, irritated Curzon, who on August 7 wrote 
Baldwin complaining about Cecil's interference in Paris :
"If he is to be at liberty to go over there . . .  and pro­
pound a policy of his own . . .  it renders my position quite 
impossible, and I shall have no alternative but to ask to be 
relieved of i t . T h e  same day the Foreign Secretary told
l4Conversations between Saint-Aulaire and Crowe, Au­
gust 2, 1923, FO 371/8646, C 13333/1/18, and August 3, 1923, 
FO 371/8646, C 13356/1/18. The French that day published 
the June l4 instructions sent to Saint-Aulaire and the 
July 30 note. On August 13 the British government published 
a White Paper containing the documents mentioned above, the 
covering letter and draft reply of July 30, and the British 
note of August 11.
^^Curzon to Baldwin, August 7» 1923, in Middlemas 
and Barnes, Baldwin, pp. 190-191*
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Crewe to notify Cecil that the line of policy he presented 
to Millerand conflicted with the policy suggested by the 
Treasury: "1 cannot therefore authorise you to speak in
the same sense to M. Poincare, and you must make it abso­
lutely clear that the suggestions you have put forward have 
no authority. . . ." Later in the day, Cecil sent a tele­
gram through Phipps to the Prime Minister telling him about 
Curzon's message and sharply criticizing government policy: 
"I must, therefore, ask very respectfully what are the views 
of the government. At present it appears to me that we have 
no policy and the dangers of that situation, always great, 
are in the present state of European affairs overwhelming." 
He requested that the Cabinet meet to agree upon a British
« T  16policy.
When the Cabinet met on August 9» the first item of 
business was consideration of the draft of the reply to 
France. Although many people later called it one of Cur­
zon' s masterpieces, Crowe had written the reply, the For­
eign Secretary had condensed it and toned down some of the
17more biting phrases, ' and Baldwin had revised the Curzon- 
Crowe draft. The Cabinet gave general approval to both the
^^FO to Crewe, No. 296, August 7* 1923, FO 371/8647, 
C 13536/1/18; Phipps to FO, No. ?40, August 7, 1923,
FO 371/8647, C 13547/1/18.
^^The Earl of Ronaldshay quoted an August 24 letter 
from Lord Curzon to Lady Curzon telling about the note :
"The famous British Note . . .  was written by Crowe, and 
all I did was to tone down some of its worst asperities
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document and the summary of the argument prepared by the 
Treasury. When francophile members of the Cabinet began 
to redraft the reply, however, Baldwin and Curzon agreed 
to examine it again and soften some of the sections that 
might offend French public opinion. The Cabinet also in­
structed them to revise the summary in order to make it 
more suitable for publication in the newspapers which 
would not publish the whole document.
Even though the Cabinet had adopted a detailed re­
sponse to France, the last section of the minutes of the 
August 9 meeting indicates that it had failed to formulate 
a clearly-defined British plan of action. The minutes 
stated that the Cabinet agreed:
In view of the difficulty in present conditions 
of determining a policy more than a few weeks ahead, 
to reserve the question of the next step to be taken, 
and more particularly as to the possible "separate 
action" referred to in the last paragraph of the 
Draft Note, until a reply had been received from the 
French and Belgian Governments, and the general ef­
fect of the publication of the Note was known.19
and curtail and re-write parts that had been badly ex­
pressed." See The Life of Curzon (3 vols.; London:
Ernest Benn, Ltd., 192Ô), III, 3^2. Curzon to Crowe,
August 6 , 1923» FO 371/8647, C 13588/I/I8 , shows Cur­
zon' s revision of Crowe's draft notes.
1 oMiddlemas and Barnes, Baldwin, p. 190; Cab 23/46, 
46(23)2(b,c). Saint-Aulaire wrote that Baldwin disapproved 
the note hut felt unable to prevent its being sent; see 
Auguste de Saint-Aulaire, Confession d'un vieux diplomate 
(Paris: Flammarion, 1953), P» ^^3» Nicolson, as well as
Middlemas and Barnes, indicated that Curzon pressured 
Baldwin and the Cabinet to accept and send it. See 




Saint-Aulaire received the massive British note on 
August II. Composed of fifty-five numbered paragraphs, 
plus a twelve-paragraph memorandum on inter-Allied debts, 
it was a response to both the French note delivered by 
Saint-Aulaire on July 6 and the French and Belgian replies 
of July 30, as well as a statement of the official British 
position on the Ruhr, reparations, and Allied debts prob­
lems. The note first expressed disappointment in the 
French and Belgian responses to the July 20 covering let­
ter and draft reply. Although Britain, seeking to avoid 
offending France, had endeavored to avoid infringing the 
rights of the Reparation Commission and had suggested that 
Germany abandon passive resistance, the French and Belgians 
had responded negatively and caused the British government 
to believe that they refused to modify their views at all. 
Particularly astounding was the French failure to mention 
the draft reply— the focal point of British efforts.
Turning to the reparations issue, the note said that 
the Belgians and French had indicated that they would con­
sent to no assessment of Germany's capacity to pay unless 
they received some corresponding advantage. Although the 
Belgian note had claimed no precise figures, official and 
semi-official French and Belgian statements had indicated 
that France insisted on receiving a minimum of 26,000,000,000 
gold marks above its debts to England and the United States, 
and Belgium required 5*000,000,000 marks, for part of which
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it asked for further priority. These demands were exces­
sive, for even under existing reparations agreements, the 
present value of annuities was 6$,000,000,000 gold marks.
The French share of this, according to the Spa percentages, 
would be 34,000,000,000 marks, and since France owed about 
12,000,000,000 marks to Britain and 15,000,000,000 to the 
United States, it would have a balance of only 7,000,000,000 
even if (Germany were able to pay the figures established by 
the Schedule of Payments. The British also condemned Bel­
gium for seeking a special priority for restoring its own 
and France's devastated areas and said that to do this 
would, in effect, be to select only certain types of dam­
ages to receive priority. This would be unfair to Britain 
and would, in reality, alter the Spa percentages in favor 
of France and Belgium.
No justification for such a proposal can be found in 
the armistice terms or in the Peace Treaties. . . .
Sunk ships and cargoes rotting at the bottom of the 
sea may not shock the eye like the ruined villages 
of Prance and Belgium. But they are equally material 
damage caused by German aggression, and represent 
equally heavy losses of national wealth.
The British then said that although France had, in 
the form of numerous questions, completely rejected the 
suggestion of inviting an impartial expert commission to 
investigate Germany's capacity to pay, they would reply to 
several of them. It was unclear what Poincare meant when 
he said that he saw no reason why "an estimate made to-day 
by experts . . .  should be more exact than that made in
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1921," for in 1921 the Reparation Commission had merely 
estimated the amount of damages for which Germany could 
be held responsible. Since neither the Reparation Commis­
sion nor any other body had ever assessed Germany’s capac­
ity to pay, that task, called for in Article 234 of the 
Treaty, needed to be discharged. Furthermore, an impartial 
expert inquiry held to assist the Reparation Commission and 
the Allied governments in carrying out their duties under 
that article would in no way violate the Treaty. The Brit­
ish also questioned the French and Belgian contention that 
the Reparation Commission was well qualified to execute the 
inquiries, saying that since the American representative 
had failed to sit on the Commission it had "become in prac­
tice an instrument of Franco-Belgian policy alone." With 
reference to French questions about the composition and 
function of such an expert commission, the British note 
declared that "the more comprehensive its constitution, the 
greater will be the value of its findings." Britain would, 
nevertheless, listen to any French desires about its com­
position and, although willing to bind itself in advance 
to recommend that the Reparation Commission accept the 
findings of the expert commission, would agree, if France 
and Belgium preferred, that the experts would have a purely 
advisory function.
The British then focused upon the Ruhr occupation 
itself and declared that although they had shown willingness
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to advise Germany to cease resistance, they could not 
"subscribe to the thesis that passive resistance must 
cease unconditionally because it is contrary to the Treaty 
of Versailles." Britain was unable to accept the conten­
tion that Pranco-Belgian action was justified by Paragraph 
18 of Annex II to Part VII of the Versailles Treaty.
The highest legal authorities in Great Britain have 
advised His Majesty's Government that the contention 
of the German Government is well founded, and His 
Majesty's Government have never concealed their view 
that the Franco-Belgian action in occupying the Ruhr 
. . . was not a sanction authorised by the Treaty 
itself. But they would be quite willing that this 
or any other difference respecting the legal inter­
pretation of vital provisions of the Treaty— in so 
far as they cannot be resolved by unanimous decision 
of the Reparation Commission . . .  should automati­
cally be referred to the International Court of Jus­
tice at the Hague or other suitable a r b i t r a t i o n . 2 0
At this point in the note the British, utilizing the argu­
ments prepared much earlier by J. Fischer Williams and 
certain Foreign Office personnel, said that France was 
wrong in charging them with inconsistency for having on 
two previous occasions threatened an occupation of the
20Neither the International Court of Justice nor 
any other international legal body ever settled the ques­
tion of the legality of the French occupation. Erich Eyck 
wrote that jurists were still divided on the issue; see 
A History of the Weimar Republic, trans. by Harlan Hanson 
and Robert G. L. Waite, Vol. I: From the Collapse of Empire
to Hindenberg's Election (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press, 1962), p. 3OI. Of the works surveyed in 
this study, I5.6 per cent said that the legal position was 
unclear, 37*3 per cent called the occupation illegal, and 
46.9 per cent considered it legal. The authors' nationality 
does not appear to have been a factor in determining their 
position, for some Frenchmen called it legal and others il­
legal. The same was true of British and American writers.
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Ruhr and for having actually participated in the occupa­
tion of Düsseldorf, Duisburg, and Ruhrort. They argued:
The action taken then or threatened was never 
claimed to be in pursuance of the Reparation 
Clauses of the Treaty, The Allies jointly de­
cided to threaten Germany with the occupation 
of further territory just as they might have 
threatened her with a renewal of war, for her
failure to perform her Treaty obligations some
of which had no connection whatever with 
Reparations.
The British also stated that Paragraph l8 authorized no 
military occupation of territory.
The note then criticized several parts of the French 
July 30 reply. It remarked that if the French went into 
the Ruhr in order to create the will to pay, they were 
foolish, for "the will to pay is useless without the 
power," and the occupation was diminishing Germany's 
power to pay. It also attacked the reference to the in­
demnity and occupation imposed upon France in l8?l: "the
recovery after the short campaign of I87O-7I of an indem­
nity equivalent to 4 milliards of gold marks . . .  is not 
really comparable to the enforcement of a thirty-three 
fold claim against a country financially exhausted by four 
years of strenuous warfare and blockade." Britain was, in 
addition, perturbed about the French failure to make spe­
cific proposals for ending the occupation after resistance 
ceased. Since both France and Belgium seemed to indicate 
that they would evacuate the Ruhr completely only after 
Germany had paid its total reparations obligations, and
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since they insisted on the entire 132,000,000,000 mark 
figure, it appeared that they planned to remain in the 
Ruhr for at least thirty-six years, and perhaps in per­
petuity if the Schedule of Payments could not be met.
Such a condition, which would create a threat to interna­
tional peace and prosperity, had already had a gravely 
detrimental effect on the economy of Germany, Europe, 
and perhaps the world.
Before presenting a five-paragraph summary of its 
argument and talking about the future, the note condemned 
the French snubbing of the British offer to discuss the 
security question. The summary affirmed that the British 
government had never contemplated relieving Germany of all 
reparations payments. Germany should pay to the maximum 
of its capacity, and that capacity should be determined 
"by impartial inquiry into the facts" rather than by ask­
ing Germany's creditors how much they would like to re­
ceive. After Germany's reparations obligation had been 
accurately ascertained, Britain would deal generously 
with the question of inter-Allied debts, asking from 
Germany and the Allies only the amount necessary to cover 
its debt to the United States. In the final paragraph of 
the note, the British government hinted about a new course 
of action:
It is the hope of His Majesty's Government that 
the above explanations will convince the French and 
Belgian Governments of the reasonableness of the
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British position, and will win their assent to its 
acceptance. They are reluctant to contemplate the 
possibility that separate action may be required 
in order to hasten a settlement which cannot be 
much longer delayed without the gravest consequences 
to the recovery of trade and the peace of the world.
Attached to the British note was a memorandum on 
inter-Allied debts which focused on two topics. First, it 
reaffirmed that Britain would require from Germany and the 
Allies only the 1^,200,000,000 gold marks necessary to pay 
the United States. The figures to be paid by the Allies 
could, of course, be settled only after the reasonable and 
practicable determination of Germany's obligation. The 
memorandum then forcefully reminded France of its own du­
ties as a debtor: "That a French Government Treasury bill
given to the British Government for value received is a 
less binding obligation than a similar bill given to a 
private investor is a doctrine inadmissible. . . . "  It 
reminded France that when, during the war, the French gov­
ernment was unable to raise sufficient loans directly from 
British investors, the British government intervened and 
gave its own securities to the individual lenders for the 
amounts needed by France, thus enabling France to borrow 
a larger amount, and at a lower rate of interest, than 
would have otherwise been possible. Currently, the Brit­
ish government itself was paying interest on those French 
Treasury bills. When the loans were made, France had not 
said that repayment would depend on the collection of money 
from Germany. Although the British government had continued
282
to renew the bills since the war, it must remind France 
that redemption "remains an obligation of the French Gov­
ernment which cannot honourably be repudiated," that inter­
est could not continuously be added to capital, and that at
least interest payments should begin as soon as the sterling-
21franc exchange became reasonably stable.
This clear statement of the British position and 
open declaration of the illegality of the occupation caused 
a furor in France and revealed clearly the chasm that had 
developed between the two countries. French press reaction 
to the August 11 British proclamation was utterly hostile 
and, for the first time since the beginning of the occupa­
tion, united. Even L*Oeuvre, previously the most consistent 
supporter of the British case, attacked England in an arti­
cle which asked if the note were a denunciation of the 
Entente. This paper, along with several others, remarked 
that it was unjust for France to be asked to pay England 
even if Germany did not pay. Furthermore, it resented the 
charge that the occupation was illegal and doomed to fail­
ure. French newspapers in general objected to England’s 
putting the German and French debts on the same footing, 
and Le Matin declared that the document— a marvel of con­
fusion and contradiction— blamed, argued, grasped, and 
exacted 1^,000,000,000 marks. It also resented the British
c 13659/1/18.^^Curzon to Crewe, August 11, 19231 FO 371/8648,
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statement that the French debt could not "be repudiated
with honor" and said that France was unaccustomed to re-
22pudiating its debts. The usually moderate Le Journal 
des Debats and Temps were no less biting in their crit­
icism. The former declared that France had to face the 
possibility of a definite rupture. "France is asked to 
pay for everyone and would find herself in the position 
of the defeated party economically and financially. The 
war debt and the German reparations debt are lumped to­
gether. Such a theory is monstrous." Temps argued at
length against the British contention of the illegality
of the occupation and denied that France had on July 30
23rejected the offer of security.
News from the United States indicated that Britain's 
effort to rally American support was somewhat unsuccessful. 
On August 151 Henry G. Chilton, Chargé d'Affaires in Wash­
ington, reported that American press comment was divided. 
The New York Times had attacked the note bitterly, called 
it awkward in tone and ill-timed, and said that Britain 
implied that American non-participation in European affairs
0 0 L*Oeuvre, August 13» 1923» P» 1» Le Matin, Au­
gust 13, 1923» p. 1; see also L'écho de Paris, August 13»
1923» p. 1 .
Le Journal des Debats, August l4, 1923 » p. 1; Le 
Temps, August 14, 1923» pi Ï1 Saint-Aulaire said that he 
telegraphed the French government on August l4 asking the 
French press to abstain from "dangerous and unjust gener­
alizations." He feared that inconsiderate attacks against 
England would "paralyze our numerous friends" and result 
in the fall of Baldwin; see Confession, p. 698.
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was the basic cause of the most serious problems. It also 
stated that the note tried, in terms reminiscent of the 
Balfour Note, to make America appear the hard-hearted cred­
itor who prevented Britain from giving its European debtors 
24easy terms.
Predictably, the August 11 note met a more enthusi­
astic response in the British press than in either France 
or the United States. Only the Rothermere papers attacked 
it severely, with the Daily Mail accusing Baldwin and his 
colleagues of deliberately trying to divide the Allies and 
saying that the British people did not support their gov­
ernment in this attempt. Perhaps the most laudatory com­
ments came from the New Statesman, which called the note 
the "first frank and authoritative statement of British 
views and British policy that has been made since Mr. Lloyd 
George originally became Prime Minister" and said that the 
outlook had become brighter because the note marked "a new 
era in European politics." Both the Spectator and the 
Manchester Guardian said that the plain speaking of the 
note was welcome, even though it had startled some people,
and the Guardian felt that Britain should have long before
25openly declared French action illegal.
24“ Xhilton to FO, No. 353. August 15, 1923,
FO 371/8649, C 14086/1/18. In the Minutes on this tele­
gram, Tyrrell noted: "The most influential American Press
is I am sorry to say not favourable to us."
^^Daily Mail, August 13, 1923, p. 6; New Statesman, 
August l8, 1923, p. 536; Spectator, August 18, 1923, P» 209;
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The Times and the Spectator, nevertheless, expressed 
concern about the future implications of the British state­
ment and said that Britain, having finally taken a definite 
position, must act upon it. This concern was evident in an 
article in the Spectator, which declared: "To denounce the
policy of a friendly nation as the British Government have 
denounced that of France and then to do nothing more would 
be self-stultification and humiliation." The Times expressed 
a similar opinion:
What chiefly concerns us at this moment however is 
not the strength of the argument, but the effect it 
may be expected to produce, the consequences to which 
it may lead. . . .  The British Government foreshadow 
the possibility of taking alternative action on their 
own account. . . .  The danger is lest British policy, 
after long delays, should now lag far behind events, 
lest in the growing confusion it should not be able 
to gain directive power. . . .  If the British Govern­
ment is to act she must act quickly, for her own sake 
and for the sake of E u r o p e . 26
The French press, therefore, had reacted to the August 11
note with more unanimity than its British counterpart.
In Germany, the impact of the British note was strik­
ing. On August 12--the day before the note was published--
the conservative cabinet of Wilhelm Cuno resigned and Gustav
27Stresemann became both Chancellor and Foreign Minister.
Manchester Guardian, August 13, 1923, p. 6 ; see also Daily 
Telegraph, August 13» 1923, p. 9» Observer, August 19» 1923
p. s T
Spectator, August l8, 1923 » p. 212; The Times 
(London), August 13» 1923» p. 9»
^^D'Abernon to FO, No. 273» August 12, 1923 » and 
No. 276, August 13» 1923» FO 371/8743, C 16916/313/18.
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The new government and the German people enthusiastically 
received news of the August 11 note, which the government 
distributed widely in both the original and a German trans­
lation. This threat to put pressure on France encouraged 
Stresemann to seek assistance in Britain, and German credit 
and confidence revived. D'Abernon wrote on August l6 that 
it helped restore order, courage, and the determination of 
the ruling classes to save themselves. Nevertheless, as 
R. B. Mowat pointed out, it also strengthened German
28resistance.
While the exchange of notes occupied the center of 
the diplomatic stage, events in the occupied territory con­
tinued to attract attention. During August, British news­
papers printed articles almost daily telling about severe 
food shortages or even starvation as well as French acts 
of terrorism and brutality against the Ruhr population.
From August 8, 19231 through June 25, 1924, the British 
Bureau for Ruhr Information published twenty-three issues 
of its Bulletin, each containing excerpts from various
28Henry L. Bretton, Stresemann and the Revision of 
Versailles. A Fight for Reason (Stanford, California; 
Stanford University Press, 1953)1 p. 6l; Eyck, Weimar 
Republic, I, 255; Middlemas and Barnes, Baldwin, p. 192; 
Nicolson, Curzon, p. 365; Viscount D'Abernon, An Ambassador 
of Peace. Pages from the Diary of Viscount D'Abernon (Ber^ 
lin, 1920-1926K  Vol. II: The Years of Crisis: June 1922-
December 1923 (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1929), p. 233;
D'Abernon to FO, No. 2?8, August l4, 1923, FO 371/8649,
C 13991/1/18; R. B. Mowat, A History of European Diplomacy, 
1914-1925 (London: Edward Arnold & Co., 1927), p. 252.
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newspaper accounts depicting abysmal Ruhr conditions.
The French, on the other hand, declared that such reports 
were the work of German propaganda. Because contradictory 
statements appeared in the press, as well as in pamphlets 
and books, it is difficult to ascertain the veracity of 
the charges made against France.
Conflicting reports were also given by men who vis­
ited occupied Germany late in the summer of 1923. V. S. 
Bainbridge, Commander of the New York Grand Commandery, 
Military Order of Foreign Wars of the United States, trav­
elled in the Ruhr and Rhineland in July and August, 1923. 
Having heard reports of French brutality, he demanded free 
access so as not to be subjected to a biased or staged 
view. In the twenty-eight page record of his visit, he 
stated that the French had been unduly criticized: there
was no starvation, the prisons were sanitary and well-run, 
and Düsseldorf and other cities were operating normally, 
their shop windows filled with both luxuries and necessi­
ties, and their theatres, cafes, restaurants, and beer 
gardens full. Soup kitches provided food for all those 
who needed it, most people were adequately clothed, and 
even strikers were well nourished. He also reported that 
charges that the colored troops abused the inhabitants 
were exaggerated.^^ On the other hand, both Joseph King
00W. S. Bainbridge, A Report on Present Conditions 
in the Ruhr and Rhineland (New York: Office of the
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and C. J. C. Street painted a dismal picture of French
activities in the Ruhr. King declared that very early
the French began turning machine guns on crowds and
forcing the Germans to provide buildings, furniture, and
30women for brothels. Street, who travelled in the Ruhr 
in August and September, 1923, reported that in Düsseldorf 
"French soldiers filled the streets, French officers dec­
orated the tables of all the cafes. Their attitude was
31frankly that of a conquering race. . . ." After charg­
ing that the German towns had to quarter imported officials 
and their whole families, he described in the most deroga­
tory terms the behavior of colored troops and said that 
the population was dragooned, terrified, and constantly
Commandery, 1923), passim. An anonymous publication en­
titled Misstatements and Facts Concerning Conditions in 
the Ruhr (Paris;Impremerie Rouffe [1924J), attempted 
to refute many charges made against the French. It listed 
several individual complaints and countered each with in­
formation said to be taken from official French and German 
reports. In Prelude to Hitler (London: Jonathan Cape,
1933)1 p. 85, B. T. Reynolds stated that the French troops 
"behaved extremely well under very trying circumstances."
A report by Sir William Larke, director of the National 
Federation of Iron and Steel Manufactures, who travelled 
in the Ruhr in late July, indicated that although trade 
was restricted and production had virtually ceased, there 
was no apparent food shortage, and the population seemed 
well-clothed; see Andrews (Department of Overseas Trade) 
to Bennett, No. 2OI6O/F.W., August 16, 1923, FO 371/8738,
c 14160/313/18.
^^Joseph King, The Ruhr. The History of the French 
Occupation of the Ruhr : Its Meaning and Consequences
(London: British Bureau for Ruhr Information, 1924),
pp. 13, 21, 27»
^^C. J. C. Street, Rhineland and Ruhr (London: 
Alfred Couldrey & Co., LtdTl 1923), P» 19•
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watched by French spies who reported the "smallest actions
32to the secret police. . .
Available evidence seems to indicate, nevertheless, 
that the German propaganda machine and anti-French elements 
in Britain fabricated much of the information about French 
cruelty and German hardships. Koppel S. Pinson, in dis­
cussing conditions in the Ruhr, said that the German gov­
ernment, which sent agents into the Ruhr to direct resist­
ance, issued
a flood of propaganda . . .  both in Germany and 
throughout the world, charging the French with car­
rying out a policy of terror, brutality, rape, de­
struction, abuse of justice, sadism, and willful 
creation of starvation and disease. Accounts of 
the so-called "national passive resistance" have 
been greatly exaggerated.33
Keith L. Nelson wrote that Germany, which had since 1920 
had a very active propaganda machine for creating horror 
stories about the misconduct of black troops in the Rhine­
land, utilized that machine extensively for another purpose 
in 1923 : "Much of the German propaganda attacking the Ruhr
occupation bore a striking resemblance in form to the atroc-
34ity stories of previous years. . . ."
^ Ibid., pp. 591 63-68. Keith L. Nelson has recently 
written that because Poincare during the Ruhr occupation 
purposely refrained from sending black troops to the Ruhr in 
order to avoid criticism, there were very few of them pres­
ent; see "The 'Black Horror on the Rhine': Race as a Factor
in Post-World War I Diplomacy," Journal of Modern History, 
XLII, No. 4 (1970), 623-624.
^^Modern Germany; Its History and Civilization (2nd 
ed,; New York: The Macmillan Co., I966), p. 431.
34Nelson, "The 'Black Horror on the Rhine,'" p. 624.
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Even though accounts of French brutality were exag­
gerated, the French definitely continued to use the Rhine­
land High Commission ordinances in intensifying the occupa­
tion, and the Germans experienced severe economic hardships. 
For example, because the French and Belgians found it in­
creasingly difficult to obtain reparations coal when stocks 
of coal and coke accumulated in the Ruhr approached exhaus­
tion, the High Commission on August 5 passed Ordinance No. 
199, which gave the MICUM full authority to seize all col­
lieries- -including those privately owned— and to work them 
either directly or through concessionnaires. It also em­
powered them to charge to the German government the cost
35of working the seized properties. German economic condi­
tions were so severe that on August 11 Ambassador Sthamer 
told Assistant Under-Secretary Lindsay that his government 
would, after that date, temporarily cease to deliver rep­
arations in kind to Britain because it could no longer af­
ford to pay German producers for the necessary materials.
It did hope, however, to resume deliveries after German 
finance was more firmly established.
^^Kilmarnock to FO, No. 634, August 5, 1923,
FO 371/8743, C 16916/313/18.
36Conversation between Sthamer and Lindsay, Au­
gust 11, 1923, FO 371/8743, C 16916/313/18. When D'Abernon 
reported that Germany had also suspended deliveries to 
Greece, Italy, Yugoslavia, Portugal, and Rumania, the For­
eign Office replied: "You should at once give a strong
hint in the proper quarter that Germany will be better ad­
vised to drop this stupid proposal before worse occurs and 
to refrain from a measure involving direct evasions of
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As conditions grew worse in Germany, there were 
rumors of unofficial negotiations between France and cer­
tain German industrialists. As early as July 30, Ambassa­
dor D'Abernon reported from Berlin that the French were 
making inquiries about German readiness to discuss terms 
with them. Although these were, he heard, carried on by
persons in close touch with Poincare, there was no evidence
, 37that Poincare was behind them. Similar accounts appeared
in the British press fairly often in August.
During that month, the British complained of fewer 
trade difficulties than previously. Kilmarnock reported 
on August 11 that the MICUM was permitting the import of 
coal covered by valid licences, and a Board of Trade note 
dated August 1 stated that orders for imports and exports 
placed before February 1 were being filled. Trade problems, 
nevertheless, continued to cause ill will between the two 
countries. After receiving complaints from the President 
of the Bradford Chamber of Commerce about a circular from 
a French firm offering to sell miscellaneous goods at low 
prices, the Foreign Office instructed Phipps to warn France 
to avoid placing any considerable quantity of seized German
treaty obligation, which may quite conceivably leave His 
Majesty's Government no alternative but to modify their 
whole attitude." See D'Abernon to FO, No. 2?4, August 13, 
1923, and FO to D'Abernon, No. 135» August 29» 1923»
FO 371/6743» C 16916/313/18.
^^D'Abernon to FO, No. 486, July 30, 1923»
FO 371/8646, C 13373/1/18.
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goods on the market in competition with British goods and
38selling them at less than world prices. Another source 
of contention grew out of the December 29» 1922, French 
prohibition of the export or re-export of iron and steel 
waste and scrap. In practice, the embargo had since that 
date been applied to Britain, but not to Italy and Belgium. 
Britain had protested that this violated Article 3 of the 
Anglo-French Convention of 1882 and had requested supplies 
of scrap iron for its firms. Although on July 26 the 
British government threatened to demand arbitration if 
France continued the embargo, it received no reply during 
August
Meanwhile, as the British were awaiting a reply to 
the August 11 note, Baldwin began to consider meeting 
Poincare. According to Middlemas and Barnes, the Prime 
Minister discussed the matter with Sir William Tyrrell,
"his most trusted adviser," on August l4-l6. About the 
same time, Eric Phipps reported that some permanent Quai 
d'Orsay officials, including Jacques Seydoux, wanted Poin­
care to meet Baldwin when the latter journeyed through
^^Kilmarnock to FO, No. 329, August 11, 1923»
FO 371/8743» C 16916/313/18; Shackle (Board of Trade) to 
Duff Cooper, August 1, 1923» FO 371/8737» C 13324/313/18; 
Board of Trade to FO, No. C.R.T. 4344/23» July 3I , 1923» 
and FO to Phipps, No. 2550, August 7, 1923» FO 371/8737»
c 13190/313/18.
^^Crewe to FO, No. 15» January 1, 1923» FO 371/9389» 
W 138/138/17 ; Curzon to Phipps, No. 2444, July 26, 1923,
FO 371/9389» W 5837/138/17.
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koParis on his way to a holiday at Aix-les-Bains. Never­
theless, no concrete plans materialized before receipt of 
the French reply.
During the nine-day period that separated publica­
tion of the British and French notes, correspondence be­
tween London and Paris decreased, and a sense of expectancy 
gripped both capitals. Phipps wrote on August l6 that in 
France there seemed to be a growing desire to find a solu­
tion to the impasse. Hoping that this desire might affect 
Poincare, he did not want to contact the French Premier, 
for to do so might make him "assume that typically unyield­
ing attitude," When the Charge d'Affaires did meet Poin­
care two days later, however, the Frenchman assured him 
that there would be no change in his previous position. 
Although he agreed with Phipps that Britain's claiming 
only 1^,200,000,000 gold marks was a hopeful factor, he
stated that Germany could easily pay 50,000,000,000 gold
klmarks after a moratorium of a year or two. In a speech 
the following day at Charieville, the President of the 
Council's tone was, nevertheless, much more conciliatory 
than usual--a fact warmly received in the Paris press, 
which now seemed to be desirous of mitigating Franco-British
^^Middlemas and Barnes, Baldwin, p, 193* Phipps to FO, 
No, 761* August 17, 1923, FO 371/8649, C I4l45/l/l8,
^^Phipps to FO, No, 759, August I6 , 1923, FO 371/8649, 
C 14096/1/18; Phipps to FO, No, 765, August I8 , 1923,
FO 371/8650, C 14216/1/18,
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misunderstandings. After giving an account of the mili­
tary operations in that district during the war, he made 
a long appeal for Allied unity. Discussing the Ruhr occu­
pation, he denied the charge that it was responsible for 
unemployment and economic problems in Britain and stated 
that while British unemployment had been higher in 1922 
than it was in 1923, British imports and exports were
greater than during the same period of 1922. Surprisingly,
42he barely mentioned the issue of legality. In the last 
few days before the dispatch of the French reply to the 
August 11 note, even the tone of the French press was rel­
atively subdued. L*Oeuvre called upon Poincare to produce 
a specific plan, like Britain had done when it called for
14,200,000,000 gold marks, and then to draw Germany into 
the new conversations. Discussing the possibility of 
reaching some solution. Le Journal des Débats declared 
that the question of legality must be set aside, for if 
Britain made France plead its case before a court of jus­
tice , no progress could be made. Instead, both powers 
should discuss ways in which France could recover from 
Germany the sums necessary for reparations and Britain 
could receive the 14,200,000,000 gold marks it claimed.
42Le Temps, August 20, 1923, p. 2.
43-'L*Oeuvre, August 16, 1923, p. 3; Le Journal des 
Debats, August 17 and 20, 1923, p. 1; see also L*Ere 
Nouvelle, August l6, 1923« P« 1; Le Matin, August 16, 
1923, p. 1.
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The British press during the same period expressed 
little optimism about the diplomatic scene and the impend­
ing French reply. Both the Manchester Guardian and The 
Times mentioned the Entente. The former declared that the 
Entente, so far as it implied Anglo-French cooperation on 
important questions, was dead: Prance was afraid of Ger­
many, and England was not, and so long as Poincare re­
mained in power, there would probably be no basic change. 
The Times, refusing to believe that the August 11 note 
had resulted in the death of the Entente, said that since
Britain had clearly stated its policy there was still time
44to solve the basic problems confronting Europe. Poin­
care's Charleville speech caught the attention of several 
British newspapers. Although The Times agreed with his 
desire for united action, it reminded the world that it 
was France who occupied the Ruhr "in spite of the express 
disapproval" of Britain. It then mentioned a familiar 
theme in British newspapers: the occupation must end be­
cause British trade was suffering from the air of uncer­
tainty in Europe. The day after the Charleville speech,
Labour's Daily Herald said that Baldwin had to prevent
, Lkany attempt by Poincare to prolong discussions.
44Manchester Guardian, August 16, 1923» P» 7» 
August 20l 1923, p. 8; The Times (London), August I6 ,
1923, p. 9.
^^The Times (London), August 20, 1923» p. 11 » 
Daily Herald, August 20, 1923» p. 1. On August 15» the
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The French sent their reply to Belgluib for consid­
eration on August 17 f and after a brief delay Belgium ap­
proved. Phipps received the note on August 21, and it was 
published the following day. This voluminous document was 
three and one-half times longer than its British counter­
part, and Sisley Huddleston marveled at Poincare's ability 
to write in one day a 13,000 word answer to a British note 
which had been in preparation well over a week.^^ After 
devoting approximately 7O per cent of the document to a 
general survey of the reparations question since 1919, 
Poincare wrote an annex consisting of a paragraph by para­
graph reply to the August 11 note and memorandum on inter- 
Allied debts. The tone of the survey section was more 
cordial than that of the annex, which was very caustic in 
several places. As a summary of the repetitious document 
will reveal, it abounded in statements previously made by 
Poincare and revealed no French willingness to budge in 
the slightest detail.
In setting forth a general statement of the French 
position, the Premier, as he had done so often, began with 
the Treaty of Versailles and the fixing of Germany's
Daily Telegraph had written: "It is not the legality or
illegality of the occupation which interests the British 
public . . .  but its disastrous effect upon British com­
merce directly and indirectly"; see p. 8.
^Shipps to FO, No. 761, August 17, 1923, FO 371/8649, 
C i4i45/1/18; No. 773, August 20, 1923, FO 37I/865O,
C 14319/1/18; Sisley Huddleston, Poincare : A Biographical
Portrait (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1924), p. 34.
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reparations debt. Charging that Germany, who was respon­
sible for its own financial difficulties, had from the 
beginning failed to fulfill its obligations, he justified 
the Ruhr occupation by citing previous threats against 
Germany. The Allies had at San Remo and Spa in 1920 and 
at Paris in January, 1921, threatened to occupy additional 
German territory, and at an Allied conference in London in 
February and March, 1921, even Lloyd George had attacked 
Germany for failure to pay and had threatened and then 
assented to the occupation of Duisburg, Ruhrort, and Düs­
seldorf. Furthermore, the Allies had planned to occupy 
the Ruhr valley if Germany refused to accept the Schedule 
of Payments in May, 1921.
The five following pages were devoted to a defence 
of the legality of the Ruhr occupation. Poincare quoted 
Paragraphs 17 and l8 and stated:
This text is clear, and if any measure taken in 
pursuance of it were allowed to be referred to the 
League of Nations, under the pretext that this meas­
ure involved a menace of war, it is evident that this 
would result in the pure and simple suppression of 
the text. . . .
He reaffirmed that after the Reparation Commission declara­
tion of German default, "France was perfectly entitled to 
act alone and still more entitled to act with the assist­
ance of Belgium and the technical participation of Italy." 
In addition, the Premier argued that Britain was incorrect 
in saying that Paragraph l8 authorized no military occupa­
tion of Territory, for when, at the London Conference in
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March, 1921, the German delegate said that this paragraph 
authorized the occupation of no territory in addition to 
the left bank of the Rhine and the bridgeheads, Lloyd 
George had failed to agree with his contention.
After this affirmation of the legality of the occu­
pation, the note made the familiar statement that France 
occupied the Ruhr because Germany had for three years 
"fulfilled none of her obligations." If France had had 
political or territorial objects, it would have occupied 
the Main valley, but it had no ulterior motives of annexa­
tion; instead, the only object was "to seize pledges and 
to exercise pressure on a recalcitrant Germany." Although 
France had planned no military occupation, the German gov­
ernment, through so-called passive resistance, had caused 
it to retaliate. Poincare then declared that when the 
resistance ceased, progressive evacuation would take place 
"in accordance with the payments effected." France would 
work closely with German organizations, and a "considerable 
alleviation in the burdens of the occupation" would result, 
as had been set forth in the latest Yellow Book. He re­
peated that France wanted to remain in the Ruhr no longer 
than necessary.
The French Premier then discussed reparations and 
inter-Allied debts. He said that France, who had "advanced 
enormous sums on the German account" and could neither in­
terrupt the reconstruction work nor continue it indefinitely
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at its own expense, asked the Allies, "if they refused all 
priority for reparations," to allot it 26,000,000,000 gold 
marks of A and B bonds (France’s share according to the Spa 
percentages) and sufficient C bonds to pay the amounts 
claimed from it for inter-Allied debts. In a rather far­
fetched effort to justify the French statement that re­
ceipts from Germany should precede the payment of inter- 
Allied debts, Poincare discussed an Allied economic con­
ference held in Paris on June l4, 1916, and quoted one of 
the resolutions adopted at that time.
In proclaiming their unity for the restoration of 
the countries which are victims of destruction, 
spoilation, and improper requisitioning, the Allies 
decide to seek in common the means of having restored 
to these countries ^  matter of privilege or of 
aiding them to reconstitute their raw materials, their 
industrial and agricultural equipment, their live 
stock, and their mercantile marine.
This, he said, showed that "it was clearly in the minds of 
the Allies that debts contracted between them for collec­
tive war expenditure could not be recovered before the 
payment of reparations." He used further examples to try 
to support his contention and asked if Allies could make 
demands upon each other before Germany had paid: "In
other words are friends going to be treated more severely 
than the enemies of yesterday?"
Next, a lengthy section of the note discussed Ger­
many's capacity for payment. In it Poincare categorically 
rejected any adoption of the British suggestion for having 
a so-called impartial committee determine this capacity,
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saying that the proposal "would entail the destruction of 
several essential clauses of the diplomatic document signed 
at Versailles by the Allies," There was no need to go back 
on the figure fixed by the Reparation Commission in April, 
1921. Furthermore, the Reparation Commission itself was, 
according to Article 234, the proper body to examine Ger­
many's capacity to pay, and it already had all the powers 
which could be attributed to the type of body suggested 
by Britain and Germany. Poincare also objected that the 
proposal that Germany's obligation be definitely and fi­
nally fixed contradicted Article 234, which called for 
periodic reassessment. It was particularly astonishing 
that Britain contemplated making such an estimate at a 
time when Germany's capacity to pay was severely reduced.
If this were done, it would mean that Germany, through an 
economic and political maneuver, would have evaded the 
payment of reparations and gotten rid of its internal 
debts. After repeating that any settlement could be en­
trusted to the Reparation Commission, which had "always 
given proof of loyalty, of competence, and of a spirit 
of justice," he attacked the British statement that the 
Commission had become a tool of French policy, pointing 
out that all declarations of German default had been 
decided by a majority of three votes.
In the conclusion of his general stirvey of the 
reparations question, Poincare said that France remained
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willing to discuss any questions with the Allies and had 
published the recent notes only because the British had 
forced it to do so. He felt, however, that it would be de­
sirable for future negotiations to be conducted more dis­
creetly. France requested that the Allies strengthen rather 
than weaken the Reparation Commission so that it could per­
iodically estimate Germany's capacity for payment. During 
the period in which Germany was re-establishing its finances, 
it should make cash payments and deliveries in kind as de­
termined by the Commission, and the Allies would continue to 
hold their pledges.
The annex was much more bitter. In several cases 
Poincare failed to reply directly to the basic points raised 
in the corresponding paragraphs of the British note of Au­
gust 11, and many statements merely repeated what had been 
discussed in the earlier part of the document. He began by 
saying that the French reply of July 30 should have caused 
no disappointment in London, for Britain had long known 
French views; furthermore, he failed to see where the Brit­
ish government had made any effort to conciliate its point 
of view with the French one. France had ignored the draft 
reply because the British, contrary to what they said, did 
not in their note and draft reply take into consideration 
the French insistence that any reply to the German note of 
June 7 must deal solely with the abandonment of passive 
resistance.
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Poincare then turned again to the question of Ger­
many's debt and capacity to pay;
We confess that we cannot follow the reasoning of 
the British note in regard to the capacity of payment 
of a country. German capacity of payment actually is 
equal to zero, by wish of the Reich itself. . . .  Does 
the British Government wish entirely to suppress the 
German debt, on the ground that the capacity of pay­
ment of Germany is temporarily reduced to zero?
France had never said that it would demand the 34,000,000,000 
mark figure mentioned in the British note: its claim, "as
theoretically fixed," was for 68,000,000,000. Since the 
Schedule of Payments in effect reduced Allied claims on Ger­
many, why should not French debts be reduced? Curzon was 
correct in saying that unanimity of Allied governments was 
necessary for reducing the German debt, but this unanimity 
did not exist, for France would give up none of its claim. 
Furthermore, the French declared "that Germany is and will 
always be rich enough to pay us; all that is required is 
that she should wish to do so." Once more he attacked the 
idea of utilizing an expert commission: "Either this com­
mission of experts is the Reparation Commission itself and 
its agents; in which case why all this discussion? Or else 
it is a substitute for the Reparation Commission, and then 
it is contrary to the Treaty." When Britain used the word 
"impartial" to describe the expert commission it was, he 
believed, inq>lying that the Reparation Commission was par­
tial. This was false, for the French chairman of the Com­
mission had used his casting vote only one time, and that 
concerned an Hungarian question.
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Then Poincare returned to the legality question and 
said that France was unable to accept the British assertion 
that passive resistance was not contrary to the Treaty. 
Furthermore, the British government, "by definitely coming 
out on the side of the German contentions, takes up a po­
sition in contradiction to that repeatedly upheld by Eng­
land in the past." France had no need to refer its inter­
pretation of Paragraph l8 to any court : all it had to do
was quote the opinions "previously expressed by the British 
government themselves." Britain was in error in asserting 
that its previous threats to occupy German territory were 
not based on the reparations clauses of the Treaty, The 
President of the Council next discussed the British refu­
tation of the parallel France had drawn between the obli­
gations imposed on itself in I871 and those imposed on 
Germany in I919. The indemnity placed on Germany was not, 
he argued, thirty-three times greater than that paid by 
France in I87I , for the value of money had changed greatly. 
Whereas France, who in I87I had paid the total cost of the 
war, was willing to pay, Germany was not. That was the 
main point of difference.
When he turned to the British statements about inter- 
Allied debts, Poincare waxed bitter and attacked the claim 
that when Britain paid America, any deficiency in its re­
ceipts from Germany should be made up by the Allies.
Thus it will be the Allied debtors of England 
who will pay her what Germany does not pay of the
14,200,000,000 due to the United States. The
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British Cabinet thereby links up Germany and her own 
Allies, and places war debts and inter-Allied debts 
on the same footing.
Is it, however, possible, to mix up the sums which 
the Allies spent to win the war with those which Ger­
many owes for having ravaged our territories?
Every pound and every dollar which France owes to 
England or the United States represents a saving of 
Allied blood. The gold marks of Germany represent 
an expenditure of Allied blood.
He also remarked that the 14,000,000,000 which Britain
claimed represented exactly the British percentage (22 per
cent) of the 65,000,000,000 gold marks which it considered
the current value of the German debt. "On the basis of
these figures England, therefore, renounces nothing of the
London Schedule. Where then is the sacrifice which she is
to make in return for those which she demands from her
Allies?"
In closing, Poincare briefly touched upon several 
items. He declared that France did not say in the July 30 
reply that it was uninterested in discussing the security 
question; instead, it merely intended that the two ques­
tions should be discussed separately. France, he reaffirmed, 
remained ready to discuss the problem of security. In next 
to the last paragraph, he ignored the British offer to waive 
a major portion of inter-Allied debts and, finally, said 
that France, like Britain, wanted world peace. His reply 
to the memorandum on inter-Allied debts can be summed up by 
reference to the concluding paragraph:
France has never repudiated her debts, nor will she 
do so, but she is convinced that no British Government 
will ever bring to bear on an Allied country the pres­
sure which the London Cabinet does not think it possible
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to bring to bear today on the ex-enemies of France 
and England. We can therefore only repeat that we 
shall only be able to repay our debt to England, or 
even to pay interest thereon, when payments from 
Germany shall have placed us in a position to com­
plete the reparation of damages caused to our coun­
try by invasion and the shock of w a r .^7
The August 20 note, therefore, indicated that Poin­
care, whose power was at the time virtually unchecked, ap­
peared to be more unyielding than ever. After refusing to 
utilize the impartial expert commission suggested by Germany 
and Britain and saying that France would consent to no reduc­
tion of the German debt, he had declared that it would not 
even pay interest on the French debt to Britain until after 
receipt of payments from Germany. Thus the August battle 
of notes had, it seemed, failed to hasten a solution. In 
fact, even though the British government had finally become 
so exasperated that it openly called the occupation illegal.
^Poincare to Crewe, August 20, 1923, FO 37I/865O,
C 14380/1/18. Most secondary sources surveyed in this study 
hold that Poincare defeated Curzon in the August battle of 
notes. Both French and British writers, as well as some 
German ones, take this position. For examçle, see Edouard 
Bonnefous, Histoire politique de la Ille Republique, Vol. 
Ill: L*après-guerre. 1919-1924 (Paris : Prèsses Universi-
taire de France, 1959), p. 3$7, who called it a "magester- 
ial expose"; Paul Reynaud, Mémoires, Vol. I: Venu de ma
montagne (Paris : Flammarion, I960), p. 1?2, who said that
the note was one of "rigorous logic." Eyck, Weimar Repub­
lic , I, 2551 said that even Poincare's opponents had to 
agree that he won the "paper skirmish." Harden, Germany, 
p. 305* praised it, and Huddleston, Poincare, p. 153, said 
that Poincare easily scored more points than Curzon. For 
similar opinions see Jacques Chastenet, Raymond Poincare 
(Paris: René Julliard, 1948), p. 24?; Middlemas and Barnes,
Baldwin, p. 192; R. B. Mowat, Diplomacy, 1914-1925, p. 253; 
Frank H. Simonds, How Europe Made Peace Without America 
(Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Page & Company, 192?),
p. 253.
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neither France, Britain, nor Germany had changed the basic 
positions held in Janusory, for Germany was determined to 
continue passive resistance, France was determined to break 
the German will, and Britain was making ineffective attempts 
to end the strife between the two Continental neighbors. 
Since, however, Britain had on August 11 threatened to take 
independent action if France failed to make a serious effort 
to settle the reparations question, and since Poincare had 
made absolutely no concessions, observers wondered if the 
hostile French response would finally cause Britain to take 
decisive action to bring an end to the stalemate.
CHAPTER VII
EXASPERATION, VACATION, INFLATION, HESITATION, 
CONFRONTATION, AND CAPITULATION: THE RUHR
OCCUPATION, AUGUST 21-SEPTEMBER 26, 1923
Although the Foreign Office criticized the French 
reply of August 20 and felt that it offered no way out of 
the impasse, the British government failed to take the 
threatened independent action. While the British hesi­
tated, Poincare, who saw signs of diminishing resistance, 
refused to modify his policy. With Britain and France 
thus immobile, Germany came to occupy the center of the 
diplomatic stage as Stresemann attempted to secure conces­
sions for his inflation-ridden nation. When the Chancellor 
was unable to bring about any modification of the occupa­
tion, Baldwin met Poincare on September 19 in an effort to 
break the deadlock. After the press communique issued at 
the close of the encounter led them to believe that Baldwin 
had been overpowered by Poincare and that they could no 
longer hope for British assistance, the Germans capitulated 
and ceased passive resistance the following week.
Not one hopeful, kind, or positive word is to be 
found among the many pages of Foreign Office comment on the
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August 20 note. Laropson remarked that France remained 
immovable, that many of the note's financial sections dis­
played no common sense, and that Britain was right where 
it had been in January. A Treasury memorandum said that 
the document contained neither a sign of weakening in the 
French attitude nor a constructive suggestion. France's 
statement that Germany could borrow vast amounts while its 
reparations debt stood at 132,000,000,000 gold marks and 
the invaders were in the Ruhr indicated no capacity to 
grasp financial matters. The Treasury, adding that some 
of the paragraphs of the annex were sheer effrontery, par­
ticularly objected to the French allegation that Britain 
had offered to make no sacrifice in return for what it 
asked of the Allies. According to the French evaluation 
of the Schedule of Payments, Britain was to receive 
1(1,300,000,000 marks from Germany, and the Allies owed it 
2(1,000,000,000, making a total of 38,300,000,000: this
meant that it was offering to abandon 24,000,000,000 meirks. 
Crowe said that the note contained several misrepresenta­
tions and that Poincare was weak on both financial and legal 
aspects and had, in the annex, failed to deal effectively 
with any of the British arguments. Britain would have no 
difficulty in continuing the controversy if it wished to do 
so.^
^Minute by Lampson, August 22, 19231 FO 37I/865O,
C 14380/1/18; Treasury to FO, August 22, 1923» FO 371/8650,
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The Central Department, under Lampson*s supervision, 
prepared a voluminous set of documents criticizing the 
French note. This body of material was composed of a sixty- 
six page Central Department comment on the French note and 
eight appendices totalling fifty-five pages, as well as ad­
ditional memoranda. Among the appendices were notes from 
the Ministry of Labour giving 1922 and 1923 unemployment 
figures, one from the Department of Overseas Trade, another 
from the War Office, as well as one from the Board of Trade, 
all of which focused upon and attempted to refute particular 
sections of the French reply. Tyrrell relayed all of the 
material to Curzon for consideration on August 28. Having 
the mass of data on hand, British policy makers had to de­
cide how best to utilize it and what step to take next.
Faced with a truculent French response and a Germany 
nearing collapse, the British government hesitated and then 
did nothing. Why did the British, having in recent notes 
expressed concern for the perilous condition of Europe, 
lapse into a state of inactivity? A glance at the calendar 
gives a partial answer : it was August, and many Britishers
were in the midst of their annual holiday. Parliament, it
C l44$4/l/l8; Crowe to Lampson, August 23» 1923, FO 371/8651» 
C l46?8/l/l8. In an August 22 Minute, Tyrrell wrote: "It
has obviously been written for publication and M. Poincare's 
suggestion that publication should cease with his Note is 
decidedly ingenious. . . . "  See FO 371/865O, C l4380/l/l8.
2Foreign Office Memorandum (Central Department),
August 28, 1923» FO 371/8652, C 14733/1/18.
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will be recalled, had recessed on August 2 and was not 
scheduled to meet again until November 13, and Cabinet mem­
bers had scattered after their last meeting on August 9*
Even some key Foreign Office personnel were gone at the 
time the French note arrived: Sir Eyre Crowe was in Scot­
land, and Curzon, Wigram, and Hurst away from London; others
3were soon to leave. Even before receipt of the French note 
it had appeared likely that a British response would be for­
mulated slowly, Lampson had told Wigram on August l8 that 
he saw no reason for hurrying an answer, and after reading 
Poincare's epistle he said that only the Cabinet could de­
cide whether or not to send a reply to France. He also 
wondered if the Cabinet should move toward taking the sep­
arate action mentioned on August 11 or should wait to watch 
developments in Germany. Tyrrell replied that Baldwin, who 
wanted time to examine the French note, still planned to 
leave on his vacation in a few days, and Curzon, commenting 
on the August 20 note, said that he was opposed to playing 
Poincare's game by sending a long, controversial reply. Al­
though he listed several alternatives Britain could take,
4he endorsed none of them. Obviously, the British leaders 
at that point did not know what to do next.
^Crowe to Lampson, August 23, 1923. FO 371/8651.
C 14678/1/18, and Lampson to Wigram, August I8 , 1923.
FO 371/8739. C 14858/313/18, show that Hurst, Crowe, and 
Wigram were gone.
^Lampson to Wigram, August 18, 1923. cited above; 
Minutes by Lampson and Tyrrell, August 22, 1923. and by 
Curzon, August 23, 1923, FO 371/8650, C l4380/l/l8.
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During the next four or five days, Lampson suggested 
that the government act, but Baldwin, Curzon, and Crowe—  
all groping for a policy and showing a lack of leadership-- 
seemed to prefer delay. Crowe wrote that although he felt 
Britain would have no trouble answering the note, he re­
mained "doubtful as ever as to what action or general line 
of policy" was open to it. He believed that no decision 
should be made before both the Cabinet and the Dominions—  
at the Imperial Conference scheduled to meet in October-- 
had thoroughly discussed the question of general policy. 
This delay would give Britain "breathing space" and an 
opportunity to see how conditions developed in the Ruhr. 
Baldwin, too, felt that a "pause for reflection" was de­
sirable and wrote Curzon on August 25 that he saw no neces­
sity for an immediate Cabinet meeting. That day the Prime 
Minister left for his annual holiday in Aix-les-Bains.^ 
Lampson, nevertheless, remained convinced that Britain 
should take action. In the Central Department comment on 
the August 20 note, he suggested three alternatives, in­
cluding referring the matter to the League of Nations.
The course he preferred, however, was telling France that 
if it refused to accept an expert committee's assessment 
of Germany's capacity to pay, Britain would be released 
from its proposals to reduce inter-Allied debts and would
Crowe to Lampson August 23» 1923» FO 371/8651 »
C 14678/1/18; Baldwin to Curzon, August 25 » 1923 » in Keith 
Middlemas and John Barnes, Baldwin: A Biography (London:
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, I969), P 193
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ins lead, claim nil of the debts due it. If Frenchmen 
rtialized that the obstinacy of their government was de­
priving them of an advantageous settlement, they might 
force Poincare's hand. Later that day, however, he noted 
that no decision could be made until Curzon had consulted 
the Cabinet and Baldwin had returned from his holiday. 
Meanwhile, the Foreign Secretary, who had gone to Bagnoles 
for a cure, wrote on August 28 that no one knew what Brit­
ain should do next and that he foresaw "prolonged discus­
sions --indefinite delay--and a harmful result.
Perhaps a bit of the government's inaction stemmed 
from the reaction of the British press to the August 20 
note, which was published in full in several papers. Al­
though some of them criticized, none attacked it nearly as 
bitterly as the Foreign Office personnel. While the Daily 
Herald said that the note showed clearly that France re­
mained where it was and that its policy was one of no 
change and declaured that the exchange of notes had accom­
plished nothing, some of the papers took a more lenient 
view. After saying that the note indicated that Britain 
could not let itself be drawn into "protracted negotiations
^Foreign Office Memorandum (Central Department), Au­
gust 28, 1923, FO 371/8652, C 14733/1/18; Minutes by Lamp­
son, August 28, 1923, and by Curzon, August 29« 1923,
FO 371/8650, C 14380/1/18; Harold Nicolson, Curzon; The 
Last Phase, 1919-1925 : A Study in Post-War Diplomacy
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1934), p. 368, Nicol­
son said that Curzon "amused himself by writing his book 
on British Government in India."
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based on some slender hope of agreement," the Spectator 
acknowledged that the plain-speaking on August 11 had done 
more good than harm: Poincare had at least suggested a
definite financial compromise. The Daily Telegraph, noting 
that Poincare's language was courteous and conciliatory, 
welcomed his statement that France wanted the occupation 
to end and promised that it would be modified after the 
cessation of passive resistance. Surprisingly, the Man­
chester Guardian failed to denounce the note, writing 
instead :
M. Poincare . . .  goes an enormous long way round in 
the attempt to reach the point, but without ever 
reaching it. Still, it is something that he should 
realise that there is a point which has got to be 
reached if there is to be any agreement. . . .  That 
is in itself a step forward, even a considerable 
step, and shows goodwill if not much more.
The Guardian had no clear advice about the next step, but 
it warned that the British government could be neither in­
credulous nor indifferent. Even The Times responded in a 
positive fashion. It noted that "the tone of the reply is, 
generally speaking, moderate and friendly" and said that 
no responsible person in Britain wanted a break with France, 
Three more times the article commented about the friendly
•jtone of the note.' Since Ruhr coverage decreased signifi­
cantly in most British newspapers during the last week of
7Daily Herald, August 23» 1923» P. 1» Observer, Au­
gust 26, 1923» p. 8; Spectator, August 25» 1923 » p. 241; 
Daily Telegraph, August 23 and 24, 1923» p. 8; Manchester 
Guardian, August 23» 1923 » p* 6; The Times (London), Au- 
gust 23, 1923, p. 11; see also Daily Mail, August 23» 1923
p. 6 .
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August, it seemed that the British press and public were, 
along with their government, more interested in vacationing.
German and American response also failed to encourage 
the British government to take independent action. Lord 
D'Abernon reported that German press reaction to the French 
note was skeptical and negative, but not violent. The gen­
eral consensus was that it might constitute some progress 
regarding evacuation before completion of payment, but there 
was much suspicion of French ambitions. Most papers felt 
that Germany should concentrate on internal reconstruction 
instead of hoping for outside help. At the same time, in­
formation from several sources indicated that the United 
States, although it did not strongly endorse the August 20 
note, tended to support the French. Even as late as the 
end of August, many Americans declared their sympathy with
QFrench policy in the Ruhr. It seemed in late August, 
therefore, that the British had failed in the effort to 
turn crucial American opinion against the French occupation.
In general, the French press enthusiastically approved 
the terms of Poincare’s reply. Many French organs expressed 
the hope that the note would end the open, written stage of 
the controversy and that the two countries would return to 
a system of negotiating through conversations. Temps
oD'Abernon to FO, No. 28?, August 23, 1923,
FO 371/8650, C 14463/1/18; Chilton to FO, No, 1049, Au­
gust 23, 1923, FO 371/8740, C 15165/313/18; Phipps to FO, 
No. 2012, August 30, 1923, FO 371/8740, C 14902/313/18.
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said that Poincare had attempted to save the Entente at a 
perilous moment: if others wished to break it, they must
assume the responsibility for doing so. The exchange of 
notes had accomplished at least one thing, for France, 
Belgium, and England, by announcing how much they intended 
to claim, had fixed a rough total of the German debt. Le 
Journal des Debats, however, took a slightly different ap­
proach. It declared that although nothing in the French 
note made maintenance of the Entente more difficult, noth­
ing facilitated or improved relations between the two 
countries. Hoping that France and England would again try 
to reach an agreement, it urged France to abandon theoret­
ical discussions and to take the first step toward decisive
onegotiations by formulating definite and clear proposals.
Two leading French politicians and journalists echoed 
some of the sentiments expressed in Le Temps and Le Journal 
des Débats and revealed that not all Frenchmen welcomed the 
strife between their country and Britain. On August 23» 
Phipps talked to Robert de Jouvenel, proprietor of the lead­
ing opposition organ, L*Oeuvre, and his brother Henri de 
Jouvenel, editor of Le Matin, a Senator, and likely candi­
date for President of the Council should Poincare fall.
The fact that the two brothers of very different political 
leanings had coinciding views caught Phipps' attention.
9, l»e Temps, August 23» 1923» P» 1» Le Journal des
Débats, August 23» 1923» p. 1.
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They felt that England and France should quickly return to 
quiet conversations behind closed doors, and although Poin­
care’s reply seemed uncompromising, they felt that it made 
some advance toward the British viewpoint. Henri de Jouvenel 
wanted France to agree to the appointment of an international 
commission, under the Reparation Commission, empowered to 
determine not Germany's capacity to pay, but the guarantees 
it might offer for an international loan. When the Chargé 
d'Affaires met them again five days later they continued to 
reflect a marked desire for agreement between France and 
England. Henri de Jouvenel, who emphasized that conversa­
tions should begin at once, wanted to help prepare the 
groundwork for them: since he was going to Geneva to rep­
resent France at the League of Nations early in September, 
he proposed going from Geneva to Aix-les-Bains to talk over 
matters with Baldwin. Phipps pointed out the risks of such 
a venture, recalling the ill effects of the Loucheur visit, 
but de Jouvenel said that there would be no danger, for his 
conversation with Baldwin would appear to be that of a French 
journalist interviewing the Prime Minister about the beauties 
of France. In reality, he would be preparing the way for a 
more meaningful conversation between Baldwin and Poincare in 
the future. He emphasized that both Millerand and Poincare 
wanted to find a way out of the impasse, and this could be 
done only through friendly conversations. After hearing 
that the Foreign Office approved of the proposed conversa­
tion, the Charge d*Affaires told de Jouvenel to be careful
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to avoid giving the impression that he was attempting to 
go behind Poincare's back.^^
Talk of a Baldwin-Poincare meeting came from addi­
tional sources in France. Knowing that Baldwin was leaving 
in two days for Aix-les-Bains, the French Ministry for For­
eign Affairs on August 23 called Phipps to ask if the Prime 
Minister were coming through Paris, and Phipps replied that 
he planned to go directly to Aix without stopping in Paris. 
Frequently in the latter part of August, various Paris news­
papers urged a meeting between the two heads of state. For 
example, 1^ Journal des Débats remarked that the interven­
tion of the human element was badly needed to prevent the 
two countries from quarrelling at the moment when conditions 
for an agreement were present. A conversation designed to 
get to the bottom of things was the only chance of preserv­
ing the Entente, and since no one appeared to be taking the 
initiative in proposing a meeting, Poincare should suggest 
such a move to Baldwin.
During the period covered in this chapter, both 
Prance and Britain tended to follow previously-established
^°Phipps to FO, No. 778, August 23, 1923, FO 371/8650, 
C 14484/1/18; No. 791, August 28, 1923, FO 371/8652,
C 14752/1/18; No. 2038, September 2, 1923, FO 371/8654, 
c 15069/1/18.
^^Phipps to FO, No. 780j August 23, 1923, FO 37I/865O, 
C 14465/1/18; Le Journal des Debats, August 31, 1923, p. 1. 
On August 23, Phipps reported that Philippe Millet was also 
anxious for Baldwin to see Poincare on his return from Aix
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patterns of action in dealing with occupied Germany: France
continued to tighten its grip on the Ruhr through such meas­
ures as the almost indiscriminate seizure of marks and the 
holding of German hostages for Regie railway workers seized 
by the Germans, and when the Germans protested these actions, 
the British remained unwilling to intervene. As conditions 
in occupied territory grew worse, Germany, in spite of Brit­
ish protests, continued to suspend deliveries in kind, say-
12ing that it could not afford to pay producers for them. 
Although food shortages in some towns remained severe, the 
food situation improved in others primarily because of good 
crops, and several British diplomats in the Rhineland re­
ported that most food shortages continued to grow out of 
German refusal to offer goods for sale and use Regie trains. 
When, in early September, some German districts asked for
British assistance in obtaining food, the Foreign Office de-
13cided to make no response. One German problem, however, 
grew increasingly critical. As the following chart indi­
cates, the value of the German mark declined drastically:
and wanted to talk to him beforehand to try to explain the 
situation to him; see Phipps to Tyrrell, FO 37I/865I,
c 14707/1/18.
^^Ryan to FO, No. 732, August 28, 1923. FO 371/8739, 
C 14850/313/18; Kilmarnock to FO, September I7 , 1923. and 
Minute by Cadogan, September 24, 1923. FO 371/8741,
C 16293/313/18; D'Abernon to FO, No. 283. August 21, 1923, 
and Conversation between Tyrrell and Sthamer, August 27. 
1923. FO 371/8743, C 16916/313/18.
^^Kilmarnock to FO, No, 692, August 21, 1923.
FO 371/8739. C 14433/313/18; No. 786, September 11, 1923.
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After September 12, the mark plummeted even more, and the
14crisis in public finance was complete.
In the face of such conditions, German determination 
began to waver. During the first two weeks in September, 
articles appeared frequently in both the British and French 
press, as well as in some German newspapers, indicating 
that passive resistance was waning. The Ruhr population, 
it was said, desired more than anything else to see the 
conflict end. On September 8, Colonel Ryan, Acting British 
High Commissioner, reported that in the past ten days the 
attitude of German workers and employers had changed greatly, 
the struggle seemed to be nearing the end, and even those 
districts which had resisted most bitterly realized they 
soon had to surrender.Nevertheless, Germany refused
FO 371/8741, C 16189/313/18*, Thurstan to FO, No. 353, Sep­
tember 3, 1923, FO 371/8740, C 15305/313/18.
l4Henri Lichtenberger, The Ruhr Conflict : A Report
Supplementing the Report Entitled "Relations Between France 
and Germany” (Washington; Carnegie Endowment for Interna- 
tional Peace, 1923), p. 9.
^^Le Matin, September 7, 1923, P» 1; Foreign Office 
Memorandum (Central Department), September 7, 1923,
FO 371/8740, C 15528/313/18; Ryan to FO, No. 768, Septem­
ber 8 , 1923, FO 371/8741, C 15723/313/18; D'Abernon to FO, 
No. 637, September 16, 1923, FO 371/8741, C 16303/313/18.
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to take the big step, for it still hoped for British 
intervention.
Anglo-French relations in occupied territory were 
marked by somewhat less acerbity than in previous weeks.
The completion of doubling the railway track between Duren 
and Euskirchen diverted most Franco-Belgian military and 
Regie traffic from Cologne, thus removing a source of 
constant friction between France and Britain. In addi­
tion, complaints about interference with British trade 
diminished, even though the Foreign Office continued to 
warn France to avoid selling seized German goods at prices 
below market level.
After having on August 11 called the Ruhr occupa­
tion illegal, the British in the following weeks failed 
to press the legal issue. Evidence indicates that they 
did so because some Foreign Office personnel believed that 
it would be difficult to condemn current French action 
while justifying previous British threats to occupy the 
Ruhr. An August 27 memorandum by Hurst, the Foreign Office 
Legal Adviser, illustrated this:
From the point of view of arguing a case before an 
arbitration tribunal, we need not fear M. Poincare's 
precedents [in the August 20 note], but I do not feel 
confident that the man in the street will understand
^^Ryan to FO, No. ?09, August 24. 1923  ̂ FO 371/8739, 
C 14613/313/18 ; Ministers des Affaires Etrangères to Brit­
ish Embassy in Paris, August 27, 1923, FO 371/8740,
C 14874/313/18; Central Department to the Chancery, Paris, 
September 24, 1923, FO 371/8?4l, C 14964/313/18.
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the somewhat subtle distinction between coercion in 
the form of an occupation of German territory ap­
plied by the Allies jointly because of general Ger­
man backwardness in fulfilling the obligations of 
the Peace Treaty and occupation of German territory 
by individual Powers because the Reparation Commis­
sion has notified a default in the execution of 
certain specific obligations.
In the face of M. Poincare's categorical state­
ments, the British explanations--ev en though sound—  
would look obscure, and the public at large would 
become doubtful.
Hurst then said that the British government should continu­
ously emphasize its willingness to submit its view of the 
legal question to the decision of an international court.
The Legal Adviser showed additional reservations by saying 
that the earlier British threats to occupy territory--espe­
cially the Ruhr--and the consent to the occupation of the 
three right bank towns required "a good deal of explaining." 
Moreover, the Coal Protocol and the Disarmament Protocol 
signed at Spa weakened the British contention that Part XIV 
of the Versailles Treaty "excluded the occupation of German 
territory other than the Rhineland as a means of enforcing 
the Treaty." When he turned to the March, 1921, Allied 
occupation of the three German towns, he expressed even 
more concern:
I feel bound to add that personally I have always 
believed and advised that the occupation of these 
three towns was inconsistent with the Treaty of 
Versailles and we may find it difficult to justify 
this part of our action if the present controversy 
with the French is submitted to arbitration.^7
^^Foreign Office Minute (Sir C. Hurst), August 2?, 
1923, FO 371/8739, C 14734/313/18.
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All that Britain could do would be to repeat that the
earlier threats differed from the current occupation in
that they were based upon the "general right of one party
to apply coercion to another party to the Treaty who flouted
18its terms" and not upon Paragraphs 17 and I8 .
The British government also hesitated to call for 
League of Nations discussion of the Ruhr and reparations 
problems even though various articles and speeches had 
urged League intervention almost from the beginning of the 
occupation. On August 24, Lord Robert Cecil, British dele­
gate to the League of Nations, wrote that he felt it would 
be impossible to avoid dealing with the question in the 
September session at Geneva. Believing that one or more 
of the neutral nations would almost certainly bring up the 
question, he asked Baldwin what course he should pursue : 
could he, before the session began, talk to Henri de 
Jouvenel, the French delegate, about possible courses of 
action they could take if the matter were discussed? He 
wanted to suggest to de Jouvenel that they state that al­
though the League was unable to intervene in a question 
between the Allies and Germany since that matter had been 
dealt with by the Treaty, perhaps it could intervene in 
the Anglo-French dispute over how best to compel Germany
18Foreign Office Minute (J. 0. Sterndale-Bennett), 
August 28, 1923, FO 371/87391 C 14793/313/18. Lampson 
wrote that Bennett's Memorandum was useful and should be 
kept in reserve until Britain knew "what reply (if any) 
is to go to France,"
323
to pay. Britain would, of course, accept any reconunenda-
19tion made by the League Council. In his answer to Cecil, 
Curzon agreed that the neutrals were likely to bring up the 
matter before the League Assembly and approved Cecil's talk­
ing to de Jouvenel. If, as he feared, de Jouvenel refused 
to accept the proposal, Cecil should telegraph for instruc­
tions before acting further. Curzon then repeated what he 
had said on earlier occasions: even though Britain wanted
to take any action necessary to facilitate a solution of 
the reparations problem, it wanted to do nothing that might 
wreck the League.
I remain more than sceptical whether the question is 
ripe for the League— or rather whether the League, 
which is still young, has sufficient strength to 
carry such a burden on its shoulders. At the moment 
the prospect of a Reparation settlement seems remote, 
and all our information as to the attitude of France 
should the matter be referred to the League is most 
discouraging. It would never do for us to add to 
the existing complications by imperilling the exist­
ence of the League itself.20
That day Sir William Tyrrell drafted a note to the 
British Ambassador to Switzerland, as well as to the Brit­
ish representatives in Sweden, Norway, and the Netherlands, 
saying that the Foreign Office had heard rumors that those 
governments intended to raise the reparations question in 
Geneva. It requested them to ascertain the truth of th«
^^Cecil to Baldwin, August 24, 1923i FO 37I/865I.
c 14704/1/18.
20Curzon to Cecil, August 27, 1923, FO 37I/865I,c 14704/1/18.
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rumor, but asked that the information be obtained cau­
tiously. "You should use utmost discretion in making your 
enquiries, so as to avoid all appearance of our wishing in 
any way to encourage or promote such an intention." Within 
three days the responses to this telegram indicated that
neither Norway, Switzerland, nor the Netherlands intended
21to raise the question at the forthcoming session. Al­
though Henri de Jouvenel said on September 3 that the line 
of action proposed by Cecil would do no harm and might be 
beneficial, nothing positive was acconq>lished. De Jouvenel 
reported on September 19 that Poincare violently opposed 
any discussion of the reparations question in the Assembly,
and, furthermore, wanted Cecil to prevent anyone else from
22raising the question. Cecil acquiesced.
While Britain was standing still, diplomatic activ­
ity on the Continent accelerated in early September. After 
hearing several reports that France and Germany were se­
cretly negotiating a settlement of the Ruhr question, the 
Foreign Office asked Phipps and D ’Abernon for confirmation. 
D'Abernon quickly answered that official German sources
^^FO to Sir M. Cheetham, No. 1?» August 27i 1923, 
FO 371/8651, C 14643/1/18; M. Findlay to FO, No. 47, Au­
gust 29, 1923, FO 371/8652, C 14827/1/18; M. Cheetham to 
FO, No. 19, August 30, 1923, FO 371/8654, C 14923/1/18; 
C. Marling to Fo, No. 369, August 28, 1923, FO 371/8652,
c 14999/1/18.
B^cecil to FO, September 3, 1923, FO 371/8654,
C 15247/1/18; Consul London (Geneva) to FO, No. 67, 
September 1 9 , 1 9 2 3 , FO 37I/8656, C 16327/I/18.
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indicated that nothing serious was going on; nevertheless, 
since receipt of the August 11 note, the French attitude 
had changed somewhat, for France and Belgium seemed more 
eager to get in closer touch with Germany. While believing 
that French agents were still trying to negotiate unoffi­
cially, he felt that the Germans were skeptical about this 
type of activity. Crewe replied that he had no reason to 
suppose that secret Franco-German negotiations were taking 
place on the Ruhr question. Poincare had said too many
times that the cessation of resistance was a preliminary
23for the resumption of negotiations.
Two days before Lord Crewe's telegram, however, 
France and Germany had begun official negotiations. On 
September 3, Monsieur de Margerie, French Ambassador to 
Germany, called on Chancellor Stresemann, who told him 
that the French and Germans should begin discussing mat­
ters meaningfully instead of making long speeches. Before 
he could negotiate with Prance, he must know whether it 
would be satisfied with economic guarantees, for he could 
not suggest that the Germans abandon resistance unless he 
knew precisely what France would offer in exchange.
^^FO to D'Abernon, No. 142, and to Phipps, No. 315i 
September 1, 1923, FO 371/8740, C I5OO8/I/I8 ; D'Abernon to 
FO, No. 298, September 1, 1923, FO 371/8740, C 15039/313/18; 
Crewe to FO, No. 828, September 5, 1923, FO 371/8740,
C 15340/313/18. Paul Raynaud wrote that in late August and 
around September 5, Stresemann invited him to come to Ger­
many to talk. Poincare refused to let him go either time; 
see Mémoires, Vol. I: Venu de ma montagne (Paris: Flam-
marion, I960), pp. 173-174.
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Although Germany, he admitted, had great financial diffi­
culties, he would make no agreement between Germany and 
France alone. After he said that any agreement must be 
between Germany and the Allies, de Margerie hinted that 
Britain was not directly involved in the affair. Strese­
mann replied that it was indeed concerned: because the
Ruhr crisis was making it impossible for Germany to pay 
reparations, England was suffering. He added that even 
though French and German industrial groups might in the
future make private arrangements, the German government
24could participate in no such negotiations. On Septem­
ber 8, Monsieur de Montille, then French Chargé d'Affaires 
in London, informed Sir William Tyrrell of the de Margerie- 
Stresemann conversation. According to the Charge d'Af­
faires, Stresemann discussed the question of security by 
suggesting a pact between France, Belgium, England, Swit­
zerland, Holland, and the United States which would guar­
antee frontiers between Germany and France. He also sug­
gested that before he could call off passive resistance. 
Franco-Belgian-German conversations should attempt to for­
mulate a proposed settlement of the reparations problem. 
The French Ambassador, under instructions from Poincare, 
had repeated that the cessation of passive resistance must
o IlD'Abernon to FO, No. 302, September 4, 1923,
FO 371/8654, C 15335/1/18; Eric Sutton, trans. and ed., 
Gustav Stresemann, His Diaries, Letters, and Papers 
(2 vols.; NewYork: The Macmillan Company, 1935)i I, 99•
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precede any discussion and had reaffirmed, as Poincare had
done on August 20, that there was no connection between
25reparations and security.
Soon after his conversation with de Margerie, Strese­
mann made proposals for a settlement of the reparations 
question. He told D'Abernon on September 4 that he was 
considering accepting the conditions set forth in the Brit­
ish draft reply of July 20. To think of thus abandoning 
passive resistance was painful, but the current condition 
of Germany necessitated it. He asked that the decision be 
kept secret because premature disclosure might cause his 
fall. About the same time, the Chancellor contacted the 
Belgian Minister in Berlin and made more specific proposals 
for a settlement: concerning security, Germany suggested a
reciprocal pact guaranteeing the current frontier; with 
reference to productive pledges, it would offer a mortgage 
on all industrial and agricultural property within the na­
tion and consider both a mortgage on railways and Allied 
participation in German industry. Germany would contemplate
25Conversation between Tyrrell and Monsieur de Mon­
tille, September 8, 1923, FO 371/8654, C 15565/1/18. The 
Foreign Office comment on the conversation between Tyrrell 
and Monsieur de Montille contains a lucid statement of 
British aims in early September: "Our main objects are
two. (l) to get rid of the incubus on British trade which 
the Ruhr situation represents: (2) to clear up our finan­
cial situation by ascertaining how much money we can ex­
pect from Germany and our Allies and when we can expect 
it. A subsidiary object perhaps is to get the French out 
of the Ruhr." See Foreign Office Memorandum, September 10, 
1923, FO 371/8655, C 15855/1/18.
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cessation of passive resistance if an agreement in princi­
ple cotild be reached on those bases and the evacuation of 
the Ruhr could be discussed at the same time.^^
During the second and third weeks of September, 
Chancellor Stresemann solicited British assistance and 
intervention. On September 7» the German Charge d'Af­
faires, Herr Dufour-Feronce, after telling First Secretary 
Cadogan that Germany could continue resistance four weeks 
at the longest, requested financial assistance and warned 
that if Britain failed to help, Germany would either col­
lapse or "throw herself into the arms of France" and ac­
cept any conditions dictated by the victor. In addition, 
Britain would be excluded from a Franco-German industrial 
alliance which might follow Germany's surrender. Cadogan 
replied that the Foreign Office would consider the request 
but explained that similar informal requests had previously 
been denied. Were Britain to assist Germany financially,
it would destroy almost all hope of reaching an Allied
27agreement on the reparations question. Having received
^^D'Abernon to FO, No. 303, September 4, 1923»
FO 371/8654, C 15320/1/18; Grahame to FO, No. 200, Septem­
ber 5 » 1923, FO 371/8654, C 15404/1/18. The following day, 
D'Abernon said that he believed that Stresemann could carry 
out the conditions indicated to the Belgian Minister. Tnis 
could be done, however, only if he received some immediate 
financial assistance. The Ambassador urged his government 
to advance funds to Germany for this purpose. The Foreign 
Office made no reply to D'Abernon's request for assistance 
for Germany. See D'Abernon to FO, No. 306, September 6, 
1923, FO 371/8654, C 15459/1/18.
27Conversation between Cadogan and Dufour-Feronce, 
September 7» 1923, FO 371/8746, C I8305/313/I8.
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no reply to the Dufour-Feronce request, Stresemann talked 
to D'Abernon one week later. He reported that he had made 
little progress in his conversations with de Margerie, for 
the French continued to insist upon cessation of passive 
resistance before negotiations could begin. This made 
progress impossible because his government would fall at 
once if he ordered the end of resistance without having 
been guaranteed counter-concessions. Stresemann asked 
Britain to intervene to try to help Germany make terms 
acceptable to France and to secure from France terms which 
he could accept "without destroying foundations of orderly 
government and risk of social revolution." Since the gov­
ernment had already agreed to accept the basis set forth 
in the July 20 dispatch, he suggested that Britain inter­
vene in the discussion on this basis. If it would do so, 
and if German prisoners were liberated and evicted citi­
zens returned to their homes, he would bring about the
oftresumption of work in the Ruhr.
Ambassador Sthamer, who called on Tyrrell the next 
day to make a similar plea, asked whether he thought it 
would be safe for the Germans to call off resistance.
They feared that doing so would leave them to deal with 
France alone and worse off than when they had to deal with 
all the Allies. He also asked Tyrrell if he agreed that
oftD'Abernon to FO, No. )l6, September Ik, 1923,
FO 371/8655, C 16013/1/18.
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France iras determined to dismember Germany, and the Assist­
ant Under-Secretary answered that France had repeatedly 
promised that as soon as conversations were resumed with 
Germany it wanted Britain to join them. He also reminded 
Sthamer that Poincare had frequently declared that France 
had no political aims in occupying the Ruhr. When the Am­
bassador asked Britain to mediate between the two parties, 
Tyrrell reminded him of Poincare's previous statements that 
France would accept no mediation and advised him that the
only obstacle to the resumption of negotiations seemed to
29be passive resistance. For a few more days, Germany con­
tinued the attempt to convince England to pressure France 
into granting at least some appearance of concessions so 
that it could surrender without stirring up domestic reac­
tion. Stresemann even threatened that if French and Belgian 
troops were not soon withdrawn Germany might have to con­
sider itself no longer bound by the Versailles Treaty.
These pleas, however, failed to prod Britain into action.
The day Tyrrell talked to Sthamer, Wigram wrote that since 
Britain's efforts to intervene would invite a rebuff from 
France, it could not do so. The Germans must first cease 
resistance and then submit to all the Allies proposals for
inter-Allied discussions. Until that occurred, Curzon
30wrote, Britain's task was to stand aside.
29̂ Conversation between Tyrrell and Sthamer, Septem­
ber 14, 1923, FO 371/8741, C 16199/313/18.
30Henry L. Bretton, Stresemann and the Revision 
Versailles. A Fight for Reason (Stanford, California :
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While Germany was seeking British intervention, 
Poincare continued to make Sunday speeches, which reflected 
no change in the French outlook. At Damvillers on Septem­
ber 9 he mentioned recent guarantees offered bv Stresemann 
in a September 2 speech at Stuttgart and declared that these 
added nothing to the securities already possessed by the 
Allies in their lien over all German assets. When he spoke 
the next Sunday at Dim-sur-Meuse, the Premier disappointed 
those who had hoped that in answering Stresemann*s speech 
he might outline a definite plan for the actual payment of 
reparations. He recalled the suffering inflicted on the 
town's population by the Germans during the war and said 
that since defeated Germany had sworn to pay for the dam­
ages it committed, these promises should not be forgotten 
in the midst of all the talk about France's excessive claims. 
The duty of fixing Germany's debt and the conditions under 
which it was to be paid had been delegated to the Reparation 
Commission. Those who wanted to remove that duty from the 
Commission did so because they believed it was unlikely to 
grant additional concessions. Such concessions would be
illegal, and France was determined to keep the pledges until
31it had received satisfaction. On September 23 he spoke at
Stanford University Press, 1953)t pp. 64-6$; Antonina Val 
lentin, Stresemann. trans. by Eric Sutton (London: Con­
stable and Company, 1931)i P* 106; Minutes by Wigram and 
Curzon, September 15, 1923, FO 371/8?4l, C l6l99/313/l6.
31Le Petit Parisien, September 10, 1923, P* 1;
Le Temps. September 17 and 18, 1923, p. 2.
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Champenoux and Toul. At the former he stated that Germany 
had forgotten how generously It had been treated by its 
conquerors* German nationalists, pretending that their 
country had not been defeated, were leading it toward fur­
ther disasters by encouraging resistance. In the second 
speech he declared again that Germany's prosperity had not 
been seriously diminished by the war and that not even the 
current crisis had permanently lessened the nation's capac­
ity of payment. He reminded his listeners that Germany, 
who had started and lost the war, must execute the promises
it made. Until it did so, the French would remain where 
32they were.
Four days before the Champenoux and Toul speeches, 
however, the hoped-for conversation between Baldwin and 
Poincare had been held in an effort to try to find a way 
out of the diplomatic stalemate. Although conflicting ac­
counts have been given of its origin and contents, there is 
less dispute about the results of the encounter between the 
two Prime Ministers. Both Saint-Aulaire and Harold Nicolson 
have given the French Ambassador most of the credit for ar­
ranging the meeting. Saint-Aulaire wrote that he, from the 
time Baldwin became Prime Minister, had felt that only 
through a direct confrontation between the two men— away 
from Curzon--could a solution be reached. When the Corfu 
crisis at the beginning of September caused a loss of
^^Le Temps, September 24, 1923, p. 2.
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British prestige and weakened Curzon*s authority in the 
British Cabinet, the Ambassador thought the time advanta­
geous for arranging the Baldwin-Poincare meeting which had 
been urged by both the British and French press for at 
least two weeks. Saint-Aulaire reported that he arranged 
the visit with the assistance of Sir William Tyrrell.
Both the Middlemas and Barnes biography of Baldwin and some 
Foreign Office papers have, however, shed new light on the 
origin of the September 19 meeting. As mentioned previ­
ously, Baldwin and Tyrrell discussed the possibility of 
such a conversation as early as August 14. After receipt 
of the uncompromising French reply of August 20, the Prime 
Minister "decided to assert himself directly in policy­
making." In doing so, he did not mean to ignore Curzon, 
but to do something that the Foreign Secretary could not 
do :
A Prime Minister must, as a Foreign Secretary need 
not, retain a free hand to dispense with established 
procedure. . . .  Baldwin decided to exercise an op­
tion which could only be r.seful once, but which, if 
fortunate, might serve to break through the en­
trenched barriers of mistrust and national p r i d e . 34
While Middlemas and Barnes wrote that after the Au­
gust l4 meeting with Tyrrell, Baldwin's decision to meet 
Poincare never changed, Lampson mentioned to Wigram on
33Auguste de Saint-Aulaire, Confession d'un vieux 
diplomate (Paris: Flammarion, 1953)» pp. 666-667» Nicolson,
Curzon, p. 372.
34Middlemas and Barnes, Baldwin, pp. 192-193*
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August 18 that although Tyrrell wanted the two to meet, 
Baldwin was uncertain about the wisdom of doing so. Never­
theless, a week later the Prime Minister wrote Curzon that 
he told the Foreign Office that if Poincare wanted to see
him privately he would agree because he felt that the time
3*5for a personal encounter was drawing near. The same day 
that he wrote Curzon, Baldwin left for his holiday at Aix- 
les-Bains, and Monsieur de Montille, who came to Victoria 
Station to see him off, was given a hint that the Prime 
Minister would welcome an invitation from Poincare. During 
the first week in August, J. C. C. Davidson and the Marquis 
de Chambrun--Baldwin's private secretary and a French polit­
ical leader— were working in Paris, where they laid the 
groundwork for the meeting by sounding out Poincare and
talking to leading French journalists in an effort to create
36a favorable press response.
By September l4, the meeting had been arranged, and
on that date Baldwin wrote Curzon asking him to send Tyrrell
to Paris on September I8 to brief him on events since his
departure from London. The Prime Minister set forth his
purpose in the forthcoming talk with Poincare:
My chief desire in seeing this singularly difficult 
President of Council, is to get into his head that 
our Government speaks the truth and can be trusted.
^^Lampson to Wigram, August I8 , 1923. FO 371/8739, 
C 14858/313/18; Baldwin to Curzon, August 25. 1923. in 
Middlemas and Barnes, Baldwin, pp. 193-194.
36Middlemas and Barnes, Baldwin, p. 194.
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and that the P.M. and the P.O. speak with one voice.
I am convinced that profound distrust of Lloyd George 
was the primary cause of the lessened confidence be­
tween Paris and London; the feeling grew in France 
until it became an obsession. If I can make him be­
lieve I speak the truth X propose to tell him of the 
various currents of feeling in England. An attempt 
to settle properly with Germany and to provide other 
sanctions in the military occupation will infallibly 
alienate English sentiment. . . .  In short, my object 
is to work for the Entente and for a prompt settle­
ment by every means that may occur to me. If I can­
not move him, we shall have a difficult course to 
steer. . . .37
Unfortunately, no similar account of Poincare's objectives 
for the conversation is available. Even though no one 
seemed to know what to expect from it, the impending en­
counter between the two Prime Ministers had received much 
publicity in the British and French press, and a sense of 
expectancy gripped both countries. Perhaps Baldwin and 
Poincare could manage to bridge the chasm between the two 
Allies and break the deadlock that had been plaguing Europe.
After lunch at the British Embassy with Lord Crewe 
and President Millerand, Poincare and Baldwin, with the 
assistance of an interpreter, talked privately and infor- 
mally for over two hours.^ The record of the conversation 
approved by both men reveals that although Baldwin spoke 
more frequently than Poincare, he failed to win concessions 
from the French leader. Baldwin began by saying that he 
regretted the absence of Franco-British confidence and
p. 196,
38
^^Baldwin to Curzon, September l4, 1923, in ibid.,
Ibid., p. 197*
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harmony necesseury to preserve the Entente. This, he felt, 
had resulted from the failure of the 1919 guarantee pact 
and the loss of French confidence in the British government 
since the days of Lloyd George. He requested France to 
trust him as it had trusted Sir Edward Grey, and Poincare 
agreed to do so, saying that he firmly believed in the 
necessity of maintaining the Entente. The British leader 
then discussed public opinion in his country and said that 
the "English people were puzzled by the inq>ression that 
France apparently no longer wanted England to be with her." 
Baldwin stressed that France should take seriously British 
opinion, for it was not manufactured by the government; in 
fact, the British press was entirely independent of the 
government. Instead of being deceived by what appeared in 
the Rothermere press, France should realize that almost the 
entire Liberal and Labour parties were taking an anti-French 
stand, and even some Conservative party members were doing 
so. They resented French refusal to acknowledge the British 
offers to cancel a large portion of inter-Allied debts, con­
demned the delay in settling the reparations question, and 
believed that events since January 11 had impaired the pos­
sibility of a settlement. He then stressed another source 
of British antagonism:
English temperament was peculiar in certain respects 
and was doubtless difficult to French understanding; 
but the average Englishman pre-eminently disliked the 
military occupation of a civilian district; it antag­
onised and roused him. . . .  No British Government 
would be able to co-operate fully in order to make
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the Entente what it ought to be as long as the 
military character of the occupation of the Ruhr 
remained unchanged.
Balwin also warned Poincare about the reaction that might
follow their failure to work together :
I expressed the belief that no other Government in 
Great Britain could be found more willing or desir­
ous to work together with France; and that after his 
. . .  disagreement with Mr. Lloyd George and with 
Mr. Bonar Law in January last the British public 
would feel that the responsibility lay not with our­
selves but with the French Prime Minister if I too 
found it impossible to work with the French.
After telling Poincare that as recently as Septem­
ber 15 the Foreign Office had once more urged Germany to 
cease passive resistance and "to try and come to terms," 
he asked what France planned to do after Germany did stop 
resisting. Had he prepared any plans for the future? If 
so, he should let the British leaders consider them and 
reach basic agreements before they became public "in order 
to avoid abortive conferences." What ideas did Poincare 
have about a moratorium, stabilizing German currency, or 
establishing the rate of payment? In his concluding re­
marks, Baldwin once more revealed the primacy of economic 
interests: he said that England wanted a settlement first
because "she attributed the greater part of her unemploy­
ment to the present disorganisation in the trade of the 
world" and second because, "seeking order and peace, she 
feared that until this great question was disposed of there 
would be the more probability of disorder and fighting in a 
Europe which had already suffered far too much."
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According to the record of the conversation, Poin­
care "at the outset associated himself unreservedly with 
the views" presented by Baldwin and "expressed his appre­
ciation of the frankness" extended to him. He went on to 
say that the French government was not the master of the 
press in its country and that the government's Ruhr policy 
was, he believed, approved by at least 99 per cent of the 
French people. In discussing the origin of Franco-British 
discord, Poincare said that the real impetus for French 
action lay in the fact that "every time the Allies had met 
since the Treaty of Versailles French claims had been jeop­
ardised until she found her share of reparations dwindling 
away." When Germany asked for a moratorium and France in­
sisted upon guarantees, both Lloyd George and Bonar Law had 
objected; if, however, Britain had agreed to guarantees, 
no military occupation would have been necessary. Only be­
cause Germany had anticipated a fight between the Allies 
had it resisted, and all the trouble had arisen from this 
resistance— not from the occupation itself. Knowing that 
the resistance must collapse, he had "declined Lord Curzon*s 
offer of intervention at Berlin because Germany would then 
have capitulated on Great Britain's demand and not under 
French pressure. . . . "  Poincare, obviously, had failed 
to modify his earlier stand. The President of the Council 
then stated that although he wanted to continue exchanging 
personal views, "no alien factor should be allowed to
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intervene.” The "alien factor" he mentioned was the pos­
sibility of allowing the reparations issue to be discussed 
by the League of Nations— a move Prance could not tolerate.
The French leader then turned to some of the ques­
tions asked by Baldwin, and the answers were no more pre­
cise than previous ones. After saying that French plans 
for action following the cessation of resistance had al­
ready been given to Curzon in the Yellow Book, Poincare 
added that "he would be quite prepared to allow a certain 
latitude subject to conditions, in order to allow Germany 
to stabilise her position." Furthermore, he reaffirmed 
that there could be no solution to the problem until Ger­
many had discouraged resistance and ceased subsidizing it, 
"for by this means she was dissipating her resources and 
violating the Treaty." When he promised that as soon as 
resistance had ended France wanted to consult with the 
Allies through either the Ambassadors or additional per­
sonal conversations, Baldwin interpreted the statement to 
mean that Poincare had devised no definite future plans.
At the close of the interview the two Premiers agreed upon
/ 39a communique to be issued to the press.
Varying interpretations have been made about the 
September 19 encounter and its significance. One of Bald­
win's earlier biographers, George M. Young, wrote that
39 ,Note on Conversation with M. Poincare, Septem­
ber 19, 1923, FO 371/8657, C 17871/1/18.
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Poincare defeated and humiliated the British Prime Minister. 
According to the Annual Register. Baldwin gave Poincare 
"the strongest encouragement to persist in his policy," and 
Henry A. Turner wrote that Baldwin publicly endorsed Poin­
care's position. Wickham Steed declared that Poincare made 
promises about French policy following the cessation of 
resistance, and when he failed to carry them out, it ap­
peared that Baldwin had been duped; nevertheless, Baldwin's 
action had "staved off a serious crisis in Anglo-French
relations and brought home to the French people a sense of
4othe dangers involved in the Ruhr policy." Middlemas and
Barnes, like Steed, believed that Baldwin accomplished much
in the interview. According to them, the Prime Minister
won the discussion on the reparations question and did not
surrender Britain's position. Instead,
. . .  Baldwin had got what he wanted. He had won from 
Poincare a renunciation of any territorial ambition in 
Germany [this statement did not appear in the available 
record of the conversation]. The whole affair of the 
occupation was henceforth to be confined to the techni­
cal question of reparation and the enforcement of the 
Versailles Treaty. . . .  He had re-opened the channels 
of communication, effectively blocked since January, 
and in private had established a strong position. In
George M. Young, Stanley Baldwin (London: Rupert
Hart-Davis, 1952), p. 62; Annual Register, 1923, p. 102; 
Henry Ashby Turner, Jr., Stresemann and the Politics of the 
Weimar Republic (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 1963), p. 117; Wickham Steed, The Real Stanley 
Baldwin (London: Nisbet & Co., Ltd., 1930), p. 61. Steed
reported that Poincare's failure to keep his promise had a 
depressing effect upon Baldwin. It was "the first public 
sign of the 'passivity' which afterwards came to be re­
garded as Mr. Baldwin's characteristic fault in critical 
situations."
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effect, Poincare would now be deprived of any means 
to disguise the stark balance sheet of profit and 
loss in the Ruhr. . , .41
Although Young was inaccurate in saying that Poin­
care defeated and humiliated the British Prime Minister, it 
appears that Middlemas and Barnes were far too optimistic 
about Baldwin's achievements. Even if Poincare had re­
nounced territorial ambitions, this was no new development, 
for he had done so repeatedly since the occupation began.
In addition, Baldwin had been no more successful than Cur­
zon in extracting precise information about French plans 
for the future. The French Premier made absolutely no 
concessions, and the Prime Minister's efforts to mitigate 
the occupation and modify French policy seemed to have been 
futile.
There is less disagreement about the impact of the 
official communiqué issued at the close of the conversation. 
Drafted by Tyrrell, the document announced;
A meeting of the Prime Ministers of France and 
Great Britain took place this afternoon, of which 
they took advantage to proceed to an exchange of 
views on the general political situation.
It is not to be expected that in the course of one 
meeting M. Poincare and Mr. Baldwin were able to set­
tle upon any definite solution, but they were happy 
to establish a common agreement of views, and to dis­
cover that on no question is there any difference of 
purpose or divergence of principle which could impair 
the co-operation of the two countries upon which de­
pends so much the settlement and the peace of the 
world.
^^Baldwin, p. 201,
42Crewe to FO, No. 89O, September 19, 1923,
FO 371/8656, C 16279/1/18. Evidence indicates that both
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Baldwin, it seems, had agreed to the nebulous communique 
because he wanted to conceal the fact that he had been 
unable to win any concessions from the President of the 
Council. Since neither Poincare nor Baldwin released 
an account of the conversation, most people based their 
opinion upon the communique itself, and this led to much 
misunderstanding.
Official British reaction to the visit and commu­
nique was basically unfavorable. As late as September 25, 
not even the Foreign Office had received an official report 
of what occurred at the September 19 meeting. Curzon was 
horrified when he read the communique, which he interpreted 
as a repudiation of his policy. Like many others, he be­
lieved that Baldwin had abandoned the position assumed by 
Britain in the August 11 note. Nicolson reported that the 
whole incident strained relations between Curzon and Saint- 
Aulaire "to the point of rupture," and that from that time 
the Foreign Secretary refused to speak to the Foreign Office
official [probably Tyrrell] whom he believed responsible for
, 43the communique and the interview.
Harold Nicolson and W. N. Medlicott were in error in saying 
that Baldwin did not see the communique; see Nicolson, 
Curzon, p. 372; Medlicott, British Foreign Policy Since 
Versailles, 1919-1963 (2nd ed. : London: Methuen & Co.,Ltd.; p. 53-
43'^Minutes by Cadogan on September 21 and 22 reveal 
that the Foreign Office had received no report of the in­
terview; see FO 371/8656, C l6357/l/l8. and FO 371/8656,
C l6401/l/l8. On September 25 he wrote Charles Wingfield 
in Brussels saying that the Foreign Office might not even
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The communique, as Etienne Weill-Raynal pointed out, 
stupified the English political world. Many Britishers be­
lieved, like Curzon, that it wiped out the accomplishments 
of the August 11 note, weakened Britain's position, and
caused it to lose influence and become subordinate to
44 ,France. Most British newspapers found the communique
puzzling or even dangerous. Although at first most of 
them merely asked questions about what had occurred at 
the meeting and expressed skepticism about the statement 
that a sincere agreement had been reached, within a few 
days they were condemning both the interview and the com­
munique. The Times wrote that the document "misled public 
opinion, both in this country and in France. It was a 
psychological blunder to say so much when so little was 
intended." The New Statesman, even more critical, declared 
that the communique "vividly recalled the bad old days of 
Lloyd Georgian diplomacy. . . .  We had hoped that the days
receive a record; see Cadogan to Wingfield, September 25i 
1923, FO 371/8656, 0 16707/1/18. For reports of Curzon's 
reaction to the communiqué, see Medlicott, British Foreign 
Policy, p. 53; Saint-Aulaire, Confession, pp. 669-67O; 
Nicolson, Curzon, pp. 372-373; Viscount D'Abernon, An Ambas­
sador of Peace. Pages from the Diary of Viscount D'Abernon 
(Berlin, 1920-1926), Vol. ÏI; The Years of Crisis: June
1922-December 1923 (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1929)
p. 262.
44 /Etienne Weill-Raynal, Les reparations allemandes 
et la France, Vol. II: L'Application de I'etat des
paiements, l'occupation de la Ruhr et 1'institution du Plan 
Dawes (mai 1921-avril 1924) (Paris: Nouvelles éditions
latines, 1947), p. 497; Nicolson, Curzon, p. 374; Charles 
Loch Mowat, Britain Between the Wars, 1918-1940 (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1955), PP» 159-l60; 
D'Abernon, Diary, II, 262.
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when such silly lies were considered worth telling were 
gone forever. But here we have the silliest that was ever 
told." In another article on the same day, the New States­
man said that all over Europe the communique "appeared to 
mark the final triumph of French policy" and that Baldwin 
and Tyrrell had gravely injured Britain.
The French press, on the other hand, overflowed with 
favorable comments on the Baldwin-Poincare meeting. French 
newspapers unanimously labelled it an unqualified success 
even though both men maintained their respective viewpoints. 
In L*Oeuvre. Robert de Jouvenel stated that official circles 
were delighted with the interview and that Baldwin's coming 
breathed new life into the Entente at a time when it seemed 
to be dying. L'Écho de Paris praised the two men for strain­
ing every nerve to try to renew the Entente and declared that 
events were moving in favor of France. Le Matin, stressing 
the contrast between the September I9 communique and the 
talk of rupture which had previously filled the British 
press, emphasized that any disagreement between the two
countries was one over the methods to be employed to make 
46Germany pay.
The Times (London), September 24, 1923» p. 13* New 
Statesman, September 22, 1923» pp. 66I, 696. See also Man­
chester Guardian. September 20, 1923» p. 6 , and Daily Tele­
graph . September 20, 1923, p. 9»
46 £.L'Oeuvre. September 29» 1923» P* 1; L 'Echo de Paris,
September 20, 1923» P> 1; Le Matin. September 20, 1923» P* 1»
see also Le Petit Parisien, September 20 and 21, 1923» p.l;
Le Temps. September 21, 1923» P« 1.
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There is almost no disagreement about the impact 
of the communiqué upon Germany. It shocked Stresemann 
and other German leaders and revealed that aid from Eng­
land was unlikely: no longer could they hope that Britain
might pressure Poincare to end the stalemate in time to 
save them. The day after the communiqué appeared, the
Chancellor asked the Cabinet for authorization to begin
47planning the cessation of resistance. Thus the Septem­
ber 19 meeting and the blundering communiqué hastened the 
end of passive resistance.
As the mark plummeted, serious disturbances occurred 
with increasing frequency and there were rumors of impend­
ing insurrections. Believing that Germany was on the 
verge of a civil war and could no longer subsidize resist­
ance, Stresemann called Cabinet meetings on September 22 
and September 24, and the Cabinet agreed that the Ruhr 
impasse must be ended before any of the other problems 
could be solved. The Chancellor also discussed the situa­
tion with deputies from the Ruhr and Rhineland, workmen's 
representatives from those areas, and the presidents of 
the German states, and explained that since he had failed
4?Nicolson, Curzon, p. 373» Edouard Bonnefous, His­
toire politique de la llle République, Vol. Ill: L*apres-
guerre, 1919-1924 (Paris : Presses Universitaire de France,
1959), p. 358» Erich Eyck, A History of the Weimar Repub­
lic , trans. by Harlan Hanson and Robert G. L. Waite, Vol. I: 
From the Collapse of the Empire to Hindenberg's Election 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, I962),
p. 256; Turner, Stresemann and Politics, p. 11?.
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to obtain conditions from either France or Britain, there
48was only one course: Germany must capitulate. On Sep­
tember 26, he issued to the German people a proclamation 
concerning the cessation of resistance, the first sentence 
of which called Franco-Belgian action illegal. After de­
scribing the sufferings, expulsions, and murder inflicted 
upon the German population, it announced that the German 
government was no longer financially able to sustain resist­
ance and that Germany must surrender in order to avoid col­
lapse. The government, which would endeavor to have pris­
oners released and expelled persons returned, would cer­
tainly give up no German soil. The next day, the Chancellor 
delivered the proclamation to British, French, Italian, 
American, Belgian, and Japanese representatives in Berlin, 
and on September 28 he signed a proclamation cancelling all
the official instructions which had instituted and main-
49tained passive resistance.  ̂ Whether or not he planned it, 
Baldwin's consent to the publication of the communiqué and 
his failure to repudiate the interpretations given it had
48Kilmarnock to FO, No. 3^4, September 22, 19231 
FO 371/8741, C 14657/313/18; D'Abernon to FO, No. 328, 
September 23, 1923, FO 371/8741, C 16455/313/18, and No. 
331, September 25, 1923, FO 371/8742, C 16645/313/18;
S. William Halperin, Germany % i e d  Democracy: A Political
History of the Reich from 1918-1933 (New York: W. W. Nor­
ton & Company, Inc., 19^3), P* 2d4.
49Daily Telegraph. September 27, 1923, p. 10;
D'Abernon to FO, No. 33^, September 27, 1923, FO 371/8742,
C 16780/313/18, and No. 340, September 28, 1923,
FO 371/8743, C 16848/313/18.
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hastened Germany's capitulation. Poincare, it appeared, 
stood triumphant on September 26.
For a time, many Frenchmen believed that France was 
more victorious in September, 1923» than in November, 1918, 
for on the earlier occasion it had won as a member of a 
coalition, but in 1923 it triumphed with only the aid of 
Belgium. President Millerand, who called September 26 the 
greatest day since the armistice, believed that since Ger­
many, convinced that France wanted to remain in the Ruhr, 
was willing to make sacrifices, the time had come for France 
and Germany to begin direct negotiations. He wanted the 
French government to contact immediately both the German 
government and the great German industrialists and force 
the latter to give France a large share of the ownership 
of the industries of the R u h r U n e x p e c t e d l y ,  however, he 
encountered resistance from the President of the Council.
In the opinion of several French historians, Poin­
care, who failed to capitalize upon the German surrender, 
threw away the fruits of victory at the very moment of
50 f ̂ Mawice Baumont, Gloires et tragedies de la
Troisième République (Paris: Librairie Hachette, 1956),
^  341; Bertrand de Johvenel, D'une guerre a l'autre.
Vol. I : De Versailles à Locarno (Paris : Calman-Levy,
Éditeurs, 1940-1941), p. 328; Jacques Chastenet, Histoire 
de la Troisième République, Vol. V: Les années d'illusions,
1918-1931 (Paris: Librairie Hachette, I960), pp. 109-110;
Raoul Persil, Alexandre Millerand, 1859-1943 (Paris; So­
ciété d'éditions Françaises et Internationales, 1949), p. 
152; William L. Shirer, The Collapse of the Third Republic: 
An Inquiry into the Fall of France in 194o (New York: 
iPocket Books, 1971 ), p. 128.
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triumph. On September 26, important conversations took 
place among Millerand, Poch, Poincare, and Charles Reibel, 
the Minister of Liberated Regions. Although no account of 
those conversations was published for over twenty-five 
years, Reibel told in 1949 of the events of that crucial 
day. About 10:30 A.M., Millerand called him to the Elysée 
Palace and said that Germany had ceased resistance and that 
neither he, Seydoux, nor Poch had yet been able to get 
Poincare to specify the conditions to be imposed upon Ger­
many at the end of resistance. Reibel said that at noon 
Millerand sent him to talk to Poincare, who had just been 
informed by Baron von Hoesch of the end of resistance.
When Reibel congratulated him, the Prime Minister exploded, 
saying that the Minister should realize the terrible diffi­
culties France was going to encounter. Reibel replied that, 
to the contrary, there should be rejoicing, for Poincare was 
then "the absolute master of the situation" and should imme­
diately talk with Germany and impose conditions on it. When 
Poincare answered that to talk with Germany would embroil
him with England, Reibel declared that if he were afraid of
51doing that, he should not have gone into the Ruhr. The 
Minister of Liberated Regions then insisted that Poincare 
obtain all he could from Germany and rectify all the points 
of the Versailles Treaty that he had criticized. Prance
^^Charles Reibel, "Une grande occasion manquee: le
premier drame de la Ruhr," Écrits de Paris, No. 55 (May, 
1949), 26-28.
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should use the Ruhr resources to assure its security, the 
payment of reparations, and the union of Ruhr coke and 
Lorraine ore, and to assume a position of dominance over 
Germany. Poincare, sensing that Reibel was speaking for 
Millerand, answered that he would carry out no such policy 
and warned that if anyone tried to force him to do so, he 
would resign. Reibel immediately told Millerand of the 
conversation, and the startled President asked why Poincare 
had gone into the Ruhr if he did not want to negotiate with 
Germany.
After talking to Millerand the second time, Reibel 
saw Marshal Poch. The Marshal, who was jubilant over Ger­
many's capitulation and said that it was the greatest day 
since the armistice and was, in fact, a new armistice, 
asked if the government would bungle the armistice and the 
peace a second time. When Reibel told him what Poincare 
had said, Poch exclaimed: "I was sure of it: such men are
incapable of making a decision. . . . "  He added that at 
that moment Poincare "held in his hands the entire victory 
of Prance" and, with tears in his eyes, said that if Prance 
failed to negotiate immediately with Germany, the occasion 
would be forever lost. Because Reibel insisted, Poch went 
to see Poincare that afternoon, but at 4:00 o'clock he 
called to say that nothing would move the President of the
eoIbid.1 p. 28; Louis Guitard, La petite histoire 
de la Troisième République. Souvenirs de Maurice Colrat 
(Paris: Les Sept Couleurs, 1959)t p. lié.
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Council. The tragedy, according to Reibel, had occurred:
Poincare's refusal to negotiate directly with prostrate
Germany had caused France to lose a golden opportunity to
S3strengthen its position in Europe.
Several factors were, it seems, responsible for 
Poincare's refusal to follow the desires of Millerand and 
Foch and begin direct negotiations with Germany. One of 
the most important of these was revealed in his statement 
to Reibel--he was afraid that official Franco-German con­
versations would cause trouble with England. Louis Guitard, 
writing about that fear, said that Poincare suffered from 
the "complex of Delcasse," which had infested almost all 
French statesmen. The "complex of Delcasse" could be re­
duced to a sort of syllogism: because Germany was France's
hereditary enemy and France was unable to struggle alone 
against it, France must have the help of England; therefore, 
it must do everything possible to maintain England's friend­
ship, The "complex of Delcasse" meant that France could not 
say "no" to England, and in September, 1923, it "prevented
Reibel, "Une grande occasion manquee," pp. 29-30* 
Several French historians since 1949 have told of the Sep­
tember 26 conversations. Nearly all of them condemn Poin­
care for failing to negotiate with Germany when it was de­
feated and asking for terms; for example, see Chastenet, 
Troisième République, V, 107-109; Guitard, Troisième Répub­
lique, pp. 96-101, 116; Favez. Le Reich, çp. 343-344;
Maxime Mourin, Histoire des nations europeenes, Vol. X: De
la première à la deuxième guerre mondiale (1918-1939) (Paris 
Payot, 1962), pp. 90 9Ï; Persiïl Milierand, pp. 152-153; 
Reynaud, Mémoires, I, 173-174,
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him [Poincare] from preferring the passing discontent
of England to the lasting reconciliation of France and 
s4Germany."'^
Tiro additional reasons have been given for Poincare's 
passivity at the moment of Germany's surrender. The first 
of these is France's financial condition. Contrary to as­
sertions made by French statesmen, the occupation had been 
costly, and although taxes had been increased somewhat, the 
legislature failed to raise them sufficiently. The value 
of the franc had declined, France was unable to balance its 
budget, and efforts to secure loans had only meagre success. 
Adequate loans could be obtained only in Anglo-Saxon money 
markets, and if France were to continue antagonizing Eng­
land and the United States with a policy of force, these 
markets would be closed to it. Finally, Poincare's tem­
perament and character seemed to have played a significant 
role in the failure to conclude an agreement with Germany.
Guitard, Troisième République, pp. 94, 100. Other 
writers pointed to Poincare's fear of provoking trouble with 
England; see Baumont, Gloires, p. )4l; Bonnefous, Histoire 
politique. Ill, 388; Pierre Renouvin, Histoire des rela­
tions internationales, Vol. VII: Les crises du XXe siecle.
I. Be 1914 a 1929 (Paris: Librairie Hachette, 1957K  PP»
254-255; Shirer. Collapse of Republic, p. 128; Chastenet, 
Troisième République. V, 112.
^^Renouvin, Relations internationales. Vol. VII,
Part I, pp. 254-255. Chastenet, Troisième République, V,
112; Piotr S. Wandycz, France and Her Eastern Allies. 1919- 
25 : French-Czechoslovak-Polish Relations from the Paris
Pê ac'e Conference to Locarno TMÏnneapolis : The University
of Minnesota Press, 1962), pp. 290-291; Bonnefous, Histoire 
politique. Ill, 388-389.
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While Edouard Bonnefous pointed to his "horror of extreme 
solutions, his natural prudence, his desire to end in a 
legal settlement," Raymond Recouly and others, who were 
more critical, said that he was timid and powerless to 
bring the matter to a co n c l u s i o n , A n o t h e r closely re­
lated factor was involved— Poincare's legalism. Having 
consistently preached strict adherence to the Versailles 
Treaty and said that the Ruhr occupation was designed to 
make Germany observe it, the President of the Council, 
when he had obtained this result, returned to the inter- 
Allied procedure set forth in the Treaty. It seems that 
Poincare's respect for rules prevented his attempting to 
make an independent settlement with Germany.
Thus the period between the publication of the 
French note of August 20 and the cessation of passive re­
sistance on September 26 had ended ignominiously for both 
Britain and France. After having threatened to take
Bonnefous, Histoire politique. III, 386; Raymond 
Recouly, De Bismarck a Poincare. Soixante ans de diplomatie 
républicaine (Paris : les Éditions de France. 1932). p. 492;
Cari Bergmann, The History of Reparations ( London : Ernest 
Benn Limited; 192?) t P* 20?; Frank H. Simonds, How Europe 
Made Peace Without America (Garden City, New York: Double-
day, Page & Company, 192?)» p. 256.
^^Chastenet, Troisième République, V, 112; Favez,
Le Reich, p. 344; Shirer, Collapse of Republic  ̂ p. 128. A 
statement from Gordon Wright's work on Poincare as President 
gives credence to this view. He wrote that Poincaré left 
that office virtually unchanged: "His rigid legalism was
responsible for this fact. He had the Jurist's respect for 
rules. . . . "  See Raymond Poincaré and the French Presi­
dency (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press,
1942), p. 246.
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independent action, the British government stood passively 
by for a month. When Baldwin went to Paris on September 19 
to warn Poincare that Britain would not tolerate the con­
tinuation of military sanctions in the Ruhr, he failed to 
accomplish his purpose; in addition, he both endorsed and, 
for some inexplicable reason, later showed indecisiveness 
in failing to explain or repudiate an innocuous— yet decep­
tive— communique which discredited his government and has­
tened the end of German resistance. The performance of 
Poincare was, however, no more effective than that of the 
Baldwin-Curzon government. Although Poincaré had, in the 
interview, refused to make concessions and managed to pre­
vent the British government from pursuing independent ac­
tion, he was unprepared and unwilling to act when the long- 
awaited German surrender occurred. As September ended, 
Britain stood helplessly by as economic and political con­
ditions in Germany deteriorated, and Poincare displeased 




For a time after the cessation of passive resist­
ance, the Ruhr question was allowed to drift. Although 
many Frenchmen wanted Poincare to begin negotiations with 
the German government, the President of the Council did 
nothing. Saying that the Germans really had not ended 
resistance, he refused to talk, and during the rest of 
the year there were to be almost no modifications in the 
nature of the occupation. Meanwhile, the British contin­
ued to wait for him to act upon the promise to enter into 
negotiations with the Allies when resistance ended. When 
Germany on October 9 and 11 requested both Paris and 
Brussels to begin negotiations with it, however, Poincare 
again refused.^
Paul Reynaud, Mémoires, Vol. 1; Venu de ma 
montagne (Paris: Flammarion, I96O), p. 173; James Water­
house Angell, The Recovery of Germany (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1929), PP. 23-24; Annual Register, 1923, 
p. 103; Etienne Weill-Raynal, Les reparations allemandes 
et la France, Vol. 11: L'Application de I'etat des paie­
ments, l ’occupation de la Ruhr et 1'institution du Plan 
Dawes (mai 1921-avril 1924) (Paris: Nouvelles éditions
latines, 19(17)1 p. 497; Arnold Joseph Toynbee, Survey of 
International Affairs, 1924 (London: Oxford University
Press, 1928), p. 287
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Anglo-American efforts eventually ended the stale­
mate. At a September 26 Cabinet meeting, Curzon announced 
that he intended to approach the American Ambassador about 
the possibility of the appointment of an American repre­
sentative to the Reparation Commission. On October 1 1 , 
President Calvin Coolidge surprised most observers by an­
nouncing that the United States still supported the offer 
made by Secretary of State Hughes in December, 1 9 2 2, to 
participate in an international expert inquiry into Ger­
many's capacity to pay. The following day Baldwin, wasting 
no time, asked the United States to participate in the ap­
pointment of such a committee, and a little later he asked 
Poincare to agree to the procedure. The Frenchman con­
sented on October 26, and on November 30 the Reparation 
Commission established two committees : the first chaired
by an American, Charles G. Dawes, and the second by Brit-
2ain's Reginald McKenna.
Before the appointment of the two committees, how­
ever, France had taken new "productive pledges" in the form 
of the so-called MICUM agreements. On October 8 , the MICUM 
and the Wolff industrial group in the Ruhr concluded an
Cab 23/46, 47(23)2; W. M. Jordan, Great Britain, 
France, and the German Problem, 1918-1939: A Study of
Anglo-French Relations in the Making and Maintenance of 
the Versailles Settlement (London; Oxford University 
Press, 1943). p. 110; Annual Register. 1923, P* 110; 
Toynbee, Survey. p. 339} Frederick Lewis Schuman, War and 
Diplomacy in the French Republic. An Inquiry into Polit­
ical Motivations and the Control of Foreign Policy (New 
York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 193%), p. 297•
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agreement for coal deliveries « and similar ones were to fol­
low. On November 23, the MICUM signed a standard agreement, 
to run until April 15» 1924, with the Ruhr Bergbauverein, 
which controlled approximately 80 per cent of the Ruhr pro­
duction. The terms were onerous, and few people felt that 
they could be observed. By the beginning of 1924, Prance 
had concluded over forty such agreements, including one on 
November 30 between the Regie and the Management of the
3German State Railways. German economic and social prob­
lems were more severe than they had been before the cessa­
tion of resistance.
Although the future seemed gloomy, a solution was 
not far away. The two committees appointed by the Repara­
tion Commission began their work on January l4, 1924, and 
reported on April 9- In order to avoid offending France, 
they devised a plan which neither reduced the German rep­
arations debt nor established the number of annual payments. 
The so-called Dawes Plan called for a payment of
1.000.000.000 gold marks the first year it was in effect,
1.220.000.000 the second, 1,200,000,000 the third,
1 .750.000.000 the fourth, and 2 ,500,000,000 for the fifth 
and following years. If German economic conditions improved.
ĝToynbee, Survey, pp. 288-290; Joseph King, The Ruhr. 
The History of the French Occupation of the Ruhr : Its Mean­
ing and Consequences (London; British Bureau for Ruhr In­
formation, 1924), p. 21; G. E. R. Gedye, The Revolver Repub­
lic. France's Bid for the Rhine (London: Arrowsmith, 1930),
p. 148.
357
the payments could be increased. After the governments 
concerned accepted the recommendations of the two expert 
committees, a conference met in London from July l6 to Au­
gust 16, 192(1, to discuss putting the Dawes Plan into oper­
ation. On the closing day of the London Conference, all of 
the interested powers officially adopted the Plan on the 
condition that the Ruhr be evacuated within a year. Accord­
ing to Frederick L. Schuman, "the 1924 settlement consti­
tuted the first move in the direction of removing the rep­
aration problem from the sphere of international politics 
and power-and-prestige diplomacy into the realm of interna­
tional economic and financial administration." The Dawes 
Plan went into effect on September 1, 1924, and on July 3I ,
1925, France and Belgium completed evacuation of their
4troops from the Ruhr.
Thus ended a two and one-half year occupation that 
embittered Anglo-French relations. Had the venture solved 
France's dual problem of security and reparations? Neither 
French nor Anglo-Saxon historians have been able to agree 
among themselves about the success or failure of the 
operation.
Various figures have appeared concerning the economic 
results of the occupation, some indicating that it produced 
a net profit and others a deficit. It is difficult to
Jordan, Britain, France, p. 110; Schuman, War and 
Diplomacy, pp. 297-298; F. Lee Benns, European History Since 
1870 (New York; F, S. Crofts & Co., 1938), p. 549.
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assess the financial results because, as Schuman wrote,
"the complexity of the budget and the juggling of the ac­
counts" made it impossible to devise an accurate statement 
of financial results, and also because figures given in 
some sources cover a different period of time from those 
given in others. For example, while the anonymous French 
publication. The Franco-Belgian Achievement in the Ruhr, 
declared that the occupation yielded a profit of 4?9,195,000 
francs up to January 10, 1924, a member of the French Cham­
ber Commission of Finance estimated that it resulted in a 
net deficit of 134,000,000 francs.^ Most of the works sur­
veyed, however, declared that the occupation was financially 
unprofitable, with even some French authors taking that po­
sition.^ Although René Albrecht-Carrie and D. W. Brogan 
indicated that the occupation produced barely enough revenue
^Schuman, War and Diplomacy, p. 296; The Franco- 
Belgian Achievement in the Ruhr (Paris ; Imprémerie na­
tionale, 1924), p. 46. Poincare denied the validity of 
the statement about the deficit. Toynbee wrote that the 
figures given in The Franco-Belgian Achievement were chal­
lenged by foreign economists; see Survey, p. 292. Other 
figures concerning the economic results of the occupation 
are given in Maxime ^urin. Histoire des nations europeenes. 
Vol. I: De la premiere a la deuxième guerre mondiale (1918-
1939) (Paris: Payot, 1962), p. 58, and Camille Georges
Picavet, L ’Europe politique de 1919 a 1929 (Paris:
Librairie Felix Alcan, 193D, p. 84.
^A. de Gramont-Lesparre, Politique et reparations.
L'occupation de la Ruhr (Paris: Impremerie J. Mersch,
F . Seitz et Cie., 1925), p.,33; Jacques Kayser, Ruhr ou 
plan Dawes? Histoire des Reparations (Paris : André Del-
peuch. Editeur L1925J), p. 59; Pierre Renouvin, Histoire 
des relations internationales. Vol. VII: Les crises du
XXe siecle, I. De 1914 a 1929 (Paris : Librairie Hachette,
1957), p. 255.
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to meet expenses, many other writers indicated that it pro­
duced no profit whatsoever. Lloyd George said that France 
and Belgium received only one-sixth as much coal as in 1922, 
and Raymond L. Buell pointed out that the French franc de­
clined and that France received fewer reparations deliver-
7ies than in 1922. In spite of its apparent failure to 
extract large payments from Germany, the occupation may 
nevertheless have helped bring the reparations problem 
nearer solution, for French, English, and German writers 
have agreed that the Dawes Plan, which led to four years 
of relative calm, would have been impossible without the 
Ruhr occupation. André François-Poncet said that since 
the Dawes Plan sums were all France ever received from 
Germany and since the occupation had made these payments
gpossible, the endeavor must be considered a success.
^René Albrecht-Carrié, A Diplomatic History of 
Europe Since the Congress of Vienna iNew York: Harper &
Row, 19561, P. 39Ÿ; D. W. Brogan, The French Nation: From
Napoleon to Retain, l8l4-1940 (London: Arrow Books, Ltd.,
1961), p. 259; David Lloyd George, Is It Peace?(2nd ed.; 
London: Hodder and Stoughton Limited C1923J), p. vii;
Raymond Leslie Buell, Europe: A History of Ten Years (New
York: The Macmillan Conqpanyl 1929)« p. 59.
^André François-Poncet, De Versailles à Potsdçun— La 
France et le problème allemand contemporain, 1919-1945 
(Paris: Flammarion, 1945), p. 119; Mourin, Nations euro-
péenes, I, 57» Erich Eyck, A History of the Weimar Repub­
lic , trans. by Harlan Hanson and Robert G. L. Waite, Vol.
I ; From the Collapse of the Empire to Hindenberg*s Elec­
tion (Cambridge, Massachusetts : Harvard University Press,
1962), p. 302; T. W. Foerster, Europe and the German Ques­
tion (New York: Sheed fit Ward, 1940), p. 279» R. B. Mowat,
A History of European Diplomacy, 1914-1925 (London: Edward
Arnold fit Co., 1927), p. 245.
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Although it was not a striking financial achieve­
ment, the Ruhr occupation can in some respects be consid­
ered a French political victory. Several writers have 
pointed out that the occupation has been incorrectly 
judged unsuccessful because of the failure to collect 
large reparations payments. In their opinion, the most 
important result of the occupation was the change effected 
in the German attitude. Whereas before the occupation be­
gan Germany had virtually refused to fulfill its Treaty 
obligations, after 1923 it surrendered and agreed to per­
form them. France, with Belgian assistance, had broken 
German resistance— an impressive accomplishment. Germany 
had to admit that it stood alone and powerless, and German 
industrialists, seeing that France could hurt them, changed 
their attitude toward the payment of reparations and became 
willing to pay themselves in order to get France out of the 
Ruhr. They saw that French engineers could work Ruhr coal 
mines and operate the intricate railroad network and that 
France had the upper hand. This awareness, according to 
Sir Arthur Willert, placed the German government in a bet­
ter position to execute Treaty provisions. If, therefore, 
the aim of the occupation was to produce German acquies­
cence, the venture succeeded, for the Germany of 1924 was 
more compliant than that of 1921 and 1922, even though its
9hatred of France had reached an unprecedented level. This
9 /Albrecht-Carrie, Diplomatic History, p. 396; ^
Franco-Belgian Achievement, p. 48; Rene Albrecht-Carrié,
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political victory over Germany gave Prance a momentary 
sense of economic and military mastery and satisfied its 
self-esteem. During the negotiations which followed in 
early 1924, fear of the future seemed to subside, and as 
the French grew more confident, they became somewhat more 
compliant.^®
Although France had won a temporary psychological 
victory, it had failed to attain security. As mentioned 
previously, England at the time of the Cannes Conference 
in January, 1922, had offered a guarantee pact. After 
the occupation, France was forced to return to a system 
of conferences, but failed to attain even the previously 
rejected formal guarantees. In addition, the Ruhr ven­
ture weakened France's security by antagonizing many 
people and increasing its diplomatic isolation. S. Wil­
liam Halperin summarized the situation well : "It had
alienated opinion in Great Britain, whose support France 
needed to achieve the kind of security she wanted. It 
had evoked widespread sympathy for the Reich . . .  and
France, Europe and the Two World Wars (Geneva: Librairie
E. Droz, I960), p. 146; Benns, European History, p. 54?; 
Un An d 'occupation: L*oeuvre franco-belge dans la Ruhr
en 1923 (Düsseldorf: Imprimerie de l'armée du Rhin,
1924), pp. 69-70; Sir Arthur Willert, Aspects of British 
Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 192&),
p. 45; Rufus C. Dawes, The Dawes Plan in the Making (In­
dianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1925), p. 100;
Eyck, Weimar Republic, I, 302.
^^Toynbee, Survey, p. 293, Dawes, Dawes Plan, p. 
109; Pierre Miquel, Poincare (Paris : Librairie Arthème 
Fayard, 196I), p. 475.
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weakened the position of the republican elements In 
Germany.
The results of the May, 1924, elections reflected 
the constant feeling of Insecurity among the French.
When the Cartel des Gauches defeated the Bloc National, 
the formidable Poincaré— who personified a policy of 
coerclon--had to resign, and the Chamber soon forced 
President Millerand out of office. Most observers felt 
that Poincare's Ruhr policy caused his defeat. By 1924, 
Frenchmen were tired of complications, frightened by 
Isolation, and opposed to conscription and the growing 
tax burden. Many of them felt that the occupation had 
been a costly mistake, and even some of the extreme na­
tionalists had lost the will to break up and punish Ger­
many. Rightist foreign policy had been defeated and was 
never fully to recover, and the memory of Poincare's de­
feat was to haunt any of his successors who might con-
12template military action against Germany.
Renouvin, Relations Internationales, Vol. VII, 
Part I, p. 255» Buell, Europe, p. 71» David Lloyd George, 
The Truth about Reparations and War Debts (London: Wll-
11am Helnemann, Ltd., 1932), pp. 76-77» S. William Hal­
perin, Germany Tried Democracy: A Political History of
the Reich from 1918-1933 (New York; W. W. Norton & Com­
pany, Inc., 1965)» p. 288.
^^M. Baumont, La faillite de la paix. 1918-1939» 
Vol. I: De Rethondes a Stresa (1918-1935) (5th ed.;
Paris : Presses Universitaires de France, I967), p. 282;
D. W. Brogan, The Development of Modern France, 1870-1939» 
Vol. II: The Shadow of War, World War I, Between the Two
Wars (rev. ed. ; New York: Harper & Row, I966)', pp. 5^1,
583-584; J. Hampden Jackson, Clemenceau and the Third
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The Ruhr venture also had a detrimental effect upon 
the British government, whose policy during the occupation 
had met almost constant criticism. Particularly harmful 
was the failure of Baldwin and Curzon to take the inde­
pendent action threatened publicly in the August 11 note : 
when Britain did nothing, the unfulfilled threats caused 
it to appear ridiculous and to lose prestige. British 
diplomatic prestige, according to Frank Simonds and Brooks
Enemy, "sunk to the level it had known only in the age of 
13the Stuarts." Nevertheless, the British, as has been 
shown, took the initiative not long after the cessation 
of passive resistance and were to retain it in later dip­
lomatic encounters .
Many results of the Ruhr occupation can be detected 
in Anglo-French diplomacy between 1923 and 1939 « and the
Republic (New York: Collier Books, 1962), p. 162; E. H.
Carr, International Relations Between the Two World Wars, 
1919 1939 (New York: Harper & Row. 1966), p. 60; Arnold
Wolfers, Britain and France Between Two Wars : Conflicting
Strategies of Peace Since Versailles (New York: HarcourtT
Brace and Company, 1940), p. 5Ü; François-Poncet, Versailles 
a Potsdam, p. 7»
^^Sisley Huddleston, Poincare : A Biographical Por­
trait (Boston: Little, Brownl and Company, 192»), p. 153i
Frank H. Simonds, How Europe Made Peace Without America 
(Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1927),
p. 253; Harold Nicolson, Curzon: The Last Phase, 1919-
1925 : A Study in Post-War Diplomacy (Boston; Houghton
Mifflin Company, 1934), pp. 3n7-36B; Frank Herbert Simonds 
and Brooks Enemy, The Great Powers in World Politics. In­
ternational Relations and Economic Nationalism (New York: 
American Book Company, 1939), p. 566. Huddleston wrote : 
"There has been no greater fiasco in our time than the 
failure of the Baldwin-Curzon Government to follow up its 
threats"; see Poincare, p. 153»
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first of these was French abandonment of a policy of coer­
cion. Both Pierre Renouvin and J.-B. Duroselle noted that 
post-1919 French policy oscillated between two tendencies : 
one of using force to compel the execution of the Treaty 
and the other of conciliating Germany. Beginning to doubt 
the efficacy of a policy of strict enforcement, France 
adopted the latter after May, 1924, and grew reluctant to 
use its military supremacy. This stemmed from both unwill­
ingness to risk disapproval of the Allies— particularly 
from British insistence that the policy of military sanc­
tions be abandoned— and from the realization that the 
Treaty could be executed only with German cooperation,
which could be secured more readily through conciliation
l4than through threats. On the other hand, by causing the 
British government to believe that it must either combat 
an aggressive French policy or give France some guarantees, 
the occupation made Britain realize the desirability of 
meeting some of the French demands for security and thus
l4Renouvin, Relations internationales, Vol. VII, 
Part I, p. 247; J.-B. Duroselle, Histoire diplomatique de 
1919 a nos iours (4th ed.; Paris: Librairie Dalloz,
i960), p. lo7; Geneviève Tabouis, Albion perfide ou loy­
ale. De la guerre de cent ans à nos jours (Paris: Payot, 
193ft). p. 206; Brogan, Modern France, II, p. $80; Paul 
Reynaud, La France a sauvé 1*Europe (2 vols.; Paris : 
Flammarion, 1947), I, 38-39; Wolfers, Britain and France, 
p. 82; A. J. P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World 
War (2nd éd.; Greenwich, Connecticut: Fawcet Publica­
tions, Inc., 1965), pp. 53-54. Taylor wrote that after 
the Ruhr occupation France "did not lift a finger to as­
sert the system of Versailles. . . ." See Second World 
War, p. 182.
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25helped pave the way for Locarno. Taken together, the 
192(1 settlement, France's renunciation of the integral 
application of the Versailles Treaty, the German willing­
ness to come to terms, and the British readiness to give 
some satisfaction to French security demands led to the 
Locarno pacts of 1925 and the Bri and-Str es emann-Chamb er1a in 
period of improved Franco-German relations.
Sir Lewis Namier has written, however, that Locarno 
marked "a turning away of France from her satellites toward 
Britain. . . . "  After the Ruhr venture, as Arnold Wolfers 
affirmed, France indeed became increasingly dependent upon 
its British ally: when France abandoned Poincare's policy
of force and agreed to evacuate the Ruhr, "a trend was al­
ready setting in which was to lead eventually to France's 
complete submission to British l e a d e r s h i p . T h i s  in­
creasing French dependence on Britain was extremely com­
plicated and, in the long run, unfortunate. During the 
inter-war period, France was fettered to Britain at a time 
when the two nations had different conceptions of how best 
to handle Germany. Almost all Frenchmen, who wanted Brit­
ish assistance in controlling Germany, considered an agree­
ment with Britain— an alliance if possible— the essential
^Simonds and Enemy, Great Powers, p. 567; Tabouis, 
Albion perfide, p. 206; Miguel, Poincare, p. 4?3; Schuman, 
War and Diplomacy, p. 298.
^^Lewis B. Namier, Europe in Decay. A Study in Dis­
integration. 1936-19(10 (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd.,
1950T , p . 5; Wolfers, Britain and France, p. 79.
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element of their security. Believing that it needed Brit­
ish supportt France was caught in a vicious circle, for it 
was in no position to bargain lest it antagonize the nation 
upon whom it was psychologically dependent. Moreover, when 
Britain compelled its ally to make concessions to Germany, 
each act of revisionism strengthened Germany and made France 
even more dependent upon Britain. During the 1930*s, while 
Britain was disarming and encouraging France to follow suit, 
this dependence was to imperil the peace of Europe. Having 
failed in 1923 to enforce the Versailles Treaty independ­
ently of Britain, France refused thereafter to use force 
against Germany without British consent; in fact, France 
would take hardly any step without British approval. Ac­
cording to Gordon Wright, the Ruhr episode thus "marked 
the end of a really independent French policy in Europe; 
never again during the inter-war years was a French govern­
ment willing to act on its own, in defiance, if necessary, 
of world opinion.
The heritage of the Ruhr was one of the primary 
factors responsible for the French failure to stop Germany's 
overt challenges to the Versailles Treaty during the 1930*s.
17P. A. Reynolds, British Foreign Policy in the 
Inter-War Years (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1954), p.
21; Wolfers, Britain and France, pp. 35* 76-77* Arthur H. 
Furnia, The Diplomacy of Appeasement; Anglo-French Rela­
tions and the Prelude to World War II, 1931-1938 (Washing­
ton: The University of Washington Press, 1960), pp. 388,
10; Namier, Europe in Decay, p. 5* Gordon Wright, France 
in Modern Times. 1760 to the Present (Chicago: Rand
McNally & Company, 19&0), p. 442.
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When Germany began to disregard Treaty provisions with in­
creasing frequency, no one was willing to use force, for 
Ruhr memories were too vivid. Between 1931 and 1934 those 
French leaders who tried to oppose Britain's revisionist 
policy were unsuccessful partly because most of their 
countrymen feared antagonizing Britain. Only a forceful 
effort similar to the Ruhr occupation could have prevented 
German rearmament, but not even Louis Barthou was willing 
to risk the rupture with Britain which such a move would 
entail. When Hitler remilitarized the Rhineland in 1936, 
France acquiesced because Premier Flandin's military ad­
visers, who remembered that force had failed in 1923, knew 
that Britain would support no policy of sanctions and that 
French public opinion, which feared antagonizing Britain, 
would oppose any unilateral French action. Repeatedly, 
French leaders refused to take action against Germany be­
cause they believed that the Ruhr occupation had been a 
T 3failure. After 1923, therefore, no French government 
dared take independent military steps to force German com­
pliance with the Treaty of Versailles.
l8Taylor, Second World War, p. 54; Furnia, Diplo­
macy of Appeasement, pp. 391-392, 394-395» F. S. Northedge, 
The Troubled Giant; Britain Among the Great Powers. 1916- 
1939 (New York; Frederick A. Praeger. 1966). p. 431;
Paul A. Gagnon, France Since 1789 (New York: Harper & Row 
1964), pp. 346, 393-395; Wright, France, pp. 496-497.
CONCLUSION
From 1918 through 1923» British and French foreign 
policy tended to follow the traditions that had character­
ized it before 1914 in that Britain was motivated by a de­
sire to protect its economic interests and maintain the 
balance of power on the Continent and France was motivated 
by the fear of its neighbor, Germany. In two fundamental 
ways the working out of these policies led almost inevitably 
to conflict between the former Allies. First, when Britain 
sought to revive the German economy, France became alarmed, 
for it wanted no powerful country on its eastern border; on 
the other hand, French efforts to extract large reparations 
payments from Germany and keep it weak irritated Britain. 
Second, Britain, apparently overlooking the fact that the 
efforts of all the Allies had been required to defeat Ger­
many in World War I, concentrated its attention on prevent­
ing France— rather than potentially-strong Germany— from 
upsetting the balance of power ; this, of course, increased 
the friction between the two victor nations and intensified 
France's basic sense of insecurity. Even though these basic 
differences had characterized the foreign policy of France 
and Britain since late 1918, several years of intense
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disappointments, disagreements with Britain, and unsuccess­
ful efforts to collect reparations were necessary to induce 
France to take and persist in independent action to force 
Germany to comply with the Treaty.
On four occasions in 1920 and 1921, France threatened 
to occupy additional German territory in order to compel ob­
servance of the Treaty. In April, 1920, it occupied five 
German towns without British approval, but withdrew when 
Britain protested; on the three remaining occasions, how­
ever, the British joined France in threatening Germany with 
occupation. Moreover, when Germany refused to accept the 
Paris Resolutions in March, 1921, both nations, along with 
Belgium, occupied the towns of Duisburg, Ruhrort, and Düs­
seldorf. France learned from these 1920-1921 events that 
the threat of a Ruhr occupation was a useful tool in making 
Germany fulfill the Treaty and that even if England refused 
to participate in coercive measures against Germany, it was 
unlikely to interfere with them.
Several factors were involved in Raymond Poincare's 
decision to send French forces into the Ruhr in January, 
1923. This anti-German, ultra-patriotic French nationalist 
had created such a public furor through speaking and jour­
nalism that he was trapped and had almost no alternative 
after the breakdown of the Paris Conference; furthermore, he 
remembered that Briand had fallen for appearing to make con­
cessions to England and Germany. Although the official 
French notification to the German government declared that
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France occupied the Ruhr in order to extract reparations 
payments from a defaulting debtor, political motives were, 
it seems, significant. The question of security, which was 
one of the most important political motives, was closely 
linked with that of reparations : because Britain failed to
guarantee its security, France wanted to collect reparations 
in order to weaken Germany, to be able to exert some control 
upon its affairs, and to make it cede and acknowledge defeat.
Evidence indicates, however, that Poincare inaccu­
rately assessed the ease with which Germany could be forced 
to capitulate. Failing to anticipate the extent of German 
resistance to the MECBM's collection of repeurations payments, 
he made inadequate preparations for the occupation; when the 
Germans resisted, the French government found it impossible 
to execute the operation effectively, and much of the loss 
of life came from bungling rather than purposeful slaughter. 
On the other hand, both German resistance and British oppo­
sition, which had stimulated French nationalism even fur­
ther, made it impossible for Poincare to halt the occupation. 
Even though French statements about the objects of the occu­
pation became increasingly confused as Germany continued to 
resist, Poincare refused to modify his stance on any of the 
basic questions and never wavered in the determination to 
procure a German surrender.
Contrary to French assertions, the British government 
did not encourage Germany to resist the invasion; in fact, 
the opposite was true. From the beginning of the occupation
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British leaders and diplomats suggested that resistance was 
unwise and encouraged Germany to acknowledge defeat. In 
several instances, moreover^ they compelled the Germans to 
acquiesce: among these were the insistence that Germany
recognize Allied import and export licences and the demand 
that it accept the Godley-Payot railroad agreement. Rather 
than heed the advice to yield, the Germans, encouraged by 
Lord D'Abernon and the anti-Prench utterances of the British 
press, continued to hope for British intervention, and in 
trying to capitalize upon the Franco-British quarrel in or­
der to elude Treaty obligations, they frequently paralyzed 
British efforts to aid them. Furthermore, the British gov­
ernment throughout the occupation failed to protest Franco- 
Belgian action and turned a deaf ear to most German com­
plaints. Instead of placing obstacles in the path of the 
French invaders, it assisted them in several vital matters: 
after allowing French troops to cross the British zone at 
the beginning of the occupation, it also permitted them to 
collect customs and arrest recalcitrant Germans, and in late 
February and early March it facilitated their efforts by 
ceding the portion of territory containing the Gravenbroich- 
Duren railway and permitting a fixed daily number of French 
trains to traverse Cologne. Since continuation of the occu­
pation might have been impossible without this assistance, 
the British government must assume a major portion of the 
responsibility for the Ruhr imbroglio.
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Many factors explain British passivity. The most 
important of these in the early stages of the occupation 
was Bonar Law's declaration at the close of the Paris Con­
ference : having said that Britain would do nothing to ob­
struct the French effort to collect reparations, the Prime 
Minister kept his promise and on several occasions prevented 
the Foreign Office from challenging French moves. In addi­
tion, Bonar Law and Baldwin, as well as other British lead­
ers, believed that the country could not afford to isolate 
itself by breaking with France; because they realized the 
necessity of preserving the Entente, they hesitated to of­
fend France by condemning and obstructing the occupation. 
Moreover, the range of potential British action was, in re­
ality, quite limited. Britain lacked the military strength 
to force France out of the Ruhr, and not all British leaders 
believed that the war-weary British public would support or 
tolerate coercive measures against the war-time ally. Fi­
nally, although newspapers and diplomats complained of the 
disastrous economic results of the occupation, British im­
ports and exports from January through July, 1923i had in­
creased significantly from the figures for the first seven 
months of 1922— a fact which probably removed part of the 
financial sting from French action.
Several observers have asked why Britain failed to 
force French withdrawal by formally questioning the legality 
of the occupation in its early stages instead of waiting 
until August 11 and thus rendering the move ineffective.
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As has been shown, the Foreign Office, which at first com­
pletely dodged the legality question by saying that France 
was acting outside of rather than violating the Treaty, 
waited until April to ask for a ruling by the Law Officers 
on the matter. Although a portion of the Law Officers' re­
port indicated that French action was illegal, the British 
government delayed bringing up the matter with France pri­
marily because it felt that the October, 1920, statement by 
Austen Chamberlain, along with earlier British threats to 
occupy the Ruhr and participation in the 1921 occupation, 
had con^romised its legal position. The legal weapon was, 
therefore, useless.
During the occupation the aims of each country re­
mained relatively constant. Even though Poincare at first 
said that France entered the Ruhr to collect reparations 
and later said that it sought to create in Germany the will 
to pay, economic and political motives were intertwined and 
could not be separated. Evidence does indicate, however, 
that Poincare had no territorial ambitions in the Ruhr. 
Repeatedly the President of the Council declared that France 
had no annexationist designs in the Ruhr, and it seems that 
he was sincere in those statements in spite of the desire of 
some French nationalists to detach the Rhineland from Ger­
many. Although the British government was, as usual, inter­
ested in preserving a favorable balance of power on the Con­
tinent, during the course of the occupation it expressed 
much more concern about eliminating trade disruptions and
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restoring Germany's purchasing power than about getting 
France out of the Ruhr and maintaining the balance of power.
Because of its own powerlessness, France's determina­
tion, and Germany's failure to cooperate, Britain was unable 
to bring an end to the conflict. Throughout the occupation, 
neither France nor Britain made any sincere attempt to un­
derstand and accept the other's point of view; although 
Curzon frequently criticized Poincare's obstinacy and re­
fusal to negotiate before the cessation of passive resist­
ance, the British themselves were scarcely more pliable. 
During the first nine months of 1923 the diplomatic strug­
gle among Britain, France, and Germany had shown the ineffi­
cacy of the policy of all three nations, none of which had 
been able to break the deadlock. Germany had prevented the 
occupation from being financially profitable for France but 
had impaired its economy and political structure in doing 
so, and Britain, which had indirectly encouraged German re­
sistance, had been unable to prevent France from punishing 
Germany. Although France had disciplined Germany, it had 
been unable to extract a permanent settlement and was caught 
with no plan when passive resistance ended; Poincare, who 
would probably have fallen from office in 1923 had he not 
initiated the occupation, was defeated at the polls in 1924 
for having undertaken it* The occupation of the Ruhr, which 
marked the nadir of Anglo-French diplomatic relations be­
tween the wars, had, therefore, ended in the humiliation of 
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APPENDIX I 
NOTE ON DOCUMENTARY CITATIONS
The major documentary collection used in this study 
is part of the archives of the British Foreign Office housed 
in the Public Record Office in London. In all citations 
used here for the massive General Correspondence collection 
(FO 371)1 the number following the slash indicates the vol­
ume. The key to the final series of numbers which is used 
to identify the document (e.g., C I5O8/313/18) is as fol­
lows: (1) the initial specifies the department of the For­
eign Office (Central or Western) which dealt with the paper; 
(2) the first set of digits is the registry number assigned 
to the specific paper; (3) the center set of digits indi­
cates the file number assigned on an annual basis to the 
topic with which the paper deals; and (4) the last set of 
digits is a permanent code to specify which country the 
paper refers to (e.g., I8 indicates Germany, and I7 France).
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APPENDIX II
ANNEX II TO PART VIII OF THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES
Paragraph 17
In case of default by Germany in the performance of any 
obligations under this part of the present Treaty, the 
Commission will forthwith give notice of such default 
to each of the Interested Powers and may make such rec­
ommendations as to action to be taken in consequence of 
such default as it may think necessary.
Paragraph l8
The measures which the Allied and Associated Powers shall 
have the right to take in the case of voluntary default 
by Germany, and which Germany agrees not to regard as 
acts of war, may include economic and financial prohibi­
tions and reprisals and in general such other measures as 
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APPENDIX IV 
NOTE ON FRENCH NEWSPAPERS
French newspaper8 surveyed in this study include 
the entire political spectrum with the exception of ex­
treme right and left. Each of the French daily newspapers 
consisted of from four to eight pages of much smaller size 
than British newspapers. There was relatively little ad­
vertising, and the papers were virtually devoid of pictures 
and cartoons. Most of them except Temps had become 
somewhat "Americanized" in that they devoted quite a bit 
of space to mass-appeal material such as accounts of mur­
ders and social events, household tips, and the theatre.
All of them were patriotic and carried much political news; 
furthermore, as Frederick L. Schuman noted, French news­
papers were marked by "such a constant mingling of fact and 
comment that all pretension of a separation between news 
and editorial interpretation vanishes.
L*Oeuvre and L'Ère Nouvelle, the organs of the Bloc 
des Gauches, had a sma?1 circulation. The former was.
Frederick Lewis Schuman, War and Diplomacy in the 
French Republic. An Inquiry into Political Motivations and 
the Control of ForeYgn Policy (New York; McGraw-Hill Book 
Company, Inc., 1931)7 p. 374.
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according to Raymond Manevy, a quality paper which, although 
it criticized government policy, was not anti-Parliamentary 
and was the most important opposition organ. The British
Ofelt that it represented moderate French liberalism.
Le Temps and Journal des Débats were considered 
journals of the center. Le Temps, with a circulation of 
only about 65,000 in 1931i was the most Influential paper 
in France and the recognized organ of the Quai d'Orsay.
After World War I, it continued its serious approach and 
the old format and had extensive foreign affairs coverage.
Le Journal des Débats, founded in 1789» was also influen- 
tial and was less chauvinistic than Temps «
Both Matin and Le Petit Parisien were basically 
non-partisan papers with a large circulation. They had 
shorter, more sensational articles and easy-to-read edi­
torials. Matin had the reputation of being strong on
foreign policy coverage and was considered a leading dip­
lomatic paper. Jules Sauerwein, its foreign affairs expert, 
was supposed to be in close contact with Poincare during
4the time of the Ruhr occupation.
Raymond Manevy, La presse de la Ille République 
(Paris : J. Foret Éditeur, 1955)» P» lè6î Raymond Manevy,
Histoire de la presse (1914-1939) (Paris : Éditions Correa
& Cie.,1945), P. 50Y Daily Telegraph. July 13» 1923» p. 10.
^Schuman, War and Diplomacy, p. 375» Manévy, His­
toire. pp. 7, 125» 168; Manevy. Presse, p. 213.
4 ,Manevy, Histoire, pp. 7» 150, I67» Crewe to FO,
No. 564, June 6, 1923» FO 371/8638, C 9870/I/I8.
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L'Écho de Paris was a journal of the right which 
reflected moderate conservative opinion. Addressed to the 
conservative, Catholic bourgeoisie, well-written, and having 
a circulation of approximately 200,000 in 1931i it was ex­
tremely nationalistic.̂  Throughout 1923 it was more anti- 
German than anti-British and constantly attacked Germany for 
its failure to execute the Versailles Treaty,
^Manévy, Histoire, pp. 7* 8 , 155, I67-I68; Schuman, 
War and Diplomacy, p. 375.
